VOLUME V 1965

# STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

*A Quarterly of the Institute of East-European Studies*

*at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland*

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY / DORDRECHT-HOLLAND

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 06:26:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

# STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

A QUARTERLY OF THE INSTITUTE OF EAST-EUROPEAN STUDIES

AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG / SWITZERLAND



*Editor:* Joseph M. Bocheński / *Managing Editor:* Pierre J. Beemans

*Editorial Board:* Thomas J. Blakeley, David D. Comey, Siegfried Müller-Markus

*Consulting Editors:* Arnold Buchholz (Stuttgart), Helmut Dahm (Bonn), Helmut Fleischer (Berlin), Zbigniew Jordan (London), George L. Kline (Bryn Mawr), Nicolas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame), Gustav A. Wetter (Rome), Karl A. Wittfogel (New York)


---

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT is intended to serve as an international medium for the publication – in English, German and French – of research papers, short notes, critical reviews and other writings about contemporary Soviet philosophy.

Communications to the editors and manuscripts should be addressed to *The Editor, Institute of East-European Studies, 1 Rue de l'Hôpital, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland.*

All manuscripts should be typewritten with large margin and double spacing. Authors will receive 25 reprints free of charge and additional copies may be ordered at cost price.

The editor invites submission of original papers in the field of Soviet philosophy and of philosophy of other Communist countries.

Authors and publishers are invited to send books and reprints of articles, which are technical and belong strictly to the field of the 'Studies', for review.


Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to *D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland.* Annual subscription price (4 issues) *f* 40.—. Single copy rate *f* 12.50.



Copyright by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Holland



This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 06:26:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

## TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM

| Russian Letter *Cap. Ital.* | Studies in Soviet Thought | U.S. Library of Congress | Russian Letter *Cap. Ital.* | Studies in Soviet Thought | U.S. Library of Congress |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| А *а* | a | a | Р *р* | r | r |
| Б *б* | b | b | С *с* | s | s |
| В *в* | v | v | Т *т* | t | t |
| Г *г* | g | g | У *у* | u | u |
| Д *д* | d | d | Ф *ф* | f | f |
| Е *е* | e | e | Х *х* | x | x͡h |
| Ё *ё* | ë | ë | Ц *ц* | c | t͡s |
| Ж *ж* | ž | ž͡h | Ч *ч* | č | č͡h |
| З *з* | z | z | Ш *ш* | š | š͡h |
| И *и* | i | i | Щ *щ* | šč | š͡hch |
| Й *й* | j | ĭ | Ъ *ъ* | ″ | ″ |
| К *к* | k | k | Ы *ы* | y | y |
| Л *л* | l | l | Ь *ь* | ′ | ′ |
| М *м* | m | m | Э *э* | é | é |
| Н *н* | n | n | Ю *ю* | ju | i͡u |
| О *о* | o | o | Я *я* | ja | i͡a |
| П *п* | p | p | | | |

*Note:* Articles in German will use 'ch' in place of 'x'. Commonly used proper names retain the form which is ordinary in English or German – e.g. Trotsky, Khrushchov, etc.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AN Akademija nauk (Academy of Sciences: of the SSSR unless otherwise specified)

AON Akademija obščestvennyx nauk pri CK KPSS (Academy of Social Sciences of the CK KPSS)

CK KPSS Central'nyj komitet kommunističeskoj partii sovetskogo sojuza (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

FN Naučnye doklady vysšej školy. Filosofskie nauki (Scientific Reports of the Higher Schools. Philosophy)

IF Institut filosofii (Institute of Philosophy: of the AN SSSR unless otherwise specified)

IIL Izdatel'stvo inostrannoj literatury (Foreign Languages Publishing House)

Izd. Izdatel'stvo (Publishing House)

LGU Leninggradskij gosudarstvennyj universitet (University of Leningrad)

MGU Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet (University of Moscow)

SSSR Sojuz sovetskix socialističeskix respublik (USSR)

SST Studies in Soviet Thought

UFN Uspexi fizičeskix nauk (Progress of Physics)

VF Voprosy filosofii (Questions of Philosophy)

VP Voprosy psixologii (Questions of Psychology)

VPŠ Vysšaja partijnaja škola (Upper Party School)

ŽTEF Žurnal eksperimental'noj i teoretičeskoj fiziki (Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics)

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 06:26:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

# SOVIETICA

Publications and Monographs of the Institute of East-European Studies, University of Fribourg, Switzerland; edited by J. M. Bocheński and published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland.

## PUBLICATIONS

*Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie.* Heft I, 1959, VIII + 72 S., *f* 12.25. Heft II, 1959, IV + 109 S., *f* 15.75. Heft III, 1962, X + 73 S., *f* 18.50. Heft IV, 1963, XII + 161 S., *f* 28.75. Heft V, 1964, VI + 143 S., *f* 26.50.

BALLESTREM, KARL G.: *Russian Philosophical Terminology* (Russian – English – German – French). 1964, VIII + 116 pp., *f* 20.00.

BIRJUKOV, B. V.: *Two Soviet Studies on Frege.* Translated and edited by I. Angelelli. 1964, XXII + 101 pp., *f* 18.00.

BLAKELEY, T. J.: *Soviet Philosophy.* A General Introduction to Contemporary Soviet Thought. 1964, VI + 82 pp., *f* 16.00.

BOCHEŃSKI, J. M.: *Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der sowjetischen Philosophie, Stand 1958.* Zusammenfassung der *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* mit Register. 1959, XII + 84 S., *f* 12.50.

*The Dogmatic Principles of Soviet Philosophy (as of 1958).* Synopsis of the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* with complete index. 1963, XII + 78 pp., *f* 15.00.

FLEISCHER, HELMUT: *Kleines Textbuch der kommunistischen Ideologie.* Auszüge aus dem Lehrbuch *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* mit Register. 1963, XIV + 116 S., *f* 17.50.

*Short Handbook of Communist Ideology.* Synopsis of the *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* with complete index. 1964, XIV + 98 pp., *f* 19.75.

*Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie.* Die Moskauer Tagung zur Frage der dialektischen Widersprüche 21.–26. April 1958. Texte ausgewählt, übersetzt und eingeleitet von N. Lobkowicz. 1960, VI + 90 S., *f* 14.35.

VRTAČIČ, L.: *Einführung in den jugoslawischen Marxismus-Leninismus.* Organisation. Bibliographie. 1963, X + 208 S., *f* 29.50.

## MONOGRAPHS

BLAKELEY, T. J.: *Soviet Scholasticism.* 1961, XIII + 176 pp., *f* 19.75.

BLAKELEY, T. J.: *Soviet Theory of Knowledge.* 1964, VIII + 203 pp., *f* 24.00.

LOBKOWICZ, N.: *Marxismus-Leninismus in der ČSR.* 1962, XVI + 268 S., *f* 35.50.

JORDAN, Z. A.: *Philosophy and Ideology.* The Development of Philosophy and Ideology in Poland since the Second World War. 1963, X + 600 pp., *f* 58.00.

MÜLLER-MARKUS, SIEGFRIED: *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie. Krisis einer Lehre.* Band I: Die Grundlagen. Die spezielle Relativitätstheorie. 1960, XVI + 481 S., *f* 64.00. Band II: Die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie, 1966, X + 510 S., *f* 84.00.

PLANTY-BONJOUR, G.: *Les catégories du matérialisme dialectique.* L'ontologie soviétique contemporaine. 1964, VIII + 203 pp., *f* 27.00.

This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 06:26:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

# CONTENTS


*J. M. Bocheński* / On *Partijnost'* in Philosophy 1

*László Révész* / Recht und Sozialnorm 12

*R. J. Kemball* / Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought 30

*Guido Küng* / Soviet Philosophy and the Semantic Definition of Truth 51

*J. Hölling* / Die Metaphysik Whiteheads im Urteil der Sowjetphilosophie 57

*F. Rapp* / Dialectical Materialism versus N. Hartmann's Ontology 68

Notes and Comments 73

A Critical Note on the Critique of a Critic – Adam Schaff on Alienation in Socialism – Logic Congress in Jerusalem – American-Soviet Philosophical Meeting – De-Stalinization and De-Khrushchevization – Western Philosophy in Hungary – Soviet Suruey of Philosophical Demands – Eastern Germany – More Philosophical Encyclopaedia – Publication Cancelled of Soviet Books

Reviews

Metodologičeskie problemy sovremennoj nauki. Sbornik statej. (F. Rapp) 88
Philosophisches Wörterbuch (P. Kirschenmann) 92
*T. J. Blakeley:* Soviet Theory of Knowledge (K. G. Ballestrem) 93
*H. Dahm:* Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie (K. G. Ballestrem) 94
*K. G. Ballestrem:* Russian Philosophical Terminology (A. Heidenreich) 95
Kommunismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart (R. Thomas) 96
*W. Goerdt:* Die "allseitige universale Wendigkeit" (*gibkost'*) in der Dialektik V. I. Lenin's (W. F. Boeselager) 98
*E. Lampert*: Sons Against Fathers (J. M. Bocheński) 101
*K. Marko:* Sowjethistoriker zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft (J. M. Bocheński) 103
*Karl Marx:* A World Without Jews (J. M. Bocheński) 103
*K. Maichel:* Guide to Russian Reference Books II (J. M. Bocheński) 103
*A. Riklin:* Das Berlinproblem (J. M. Bocheński) 104
*G. H. Hampsch:* The Theory of Communism. An Introduction (J. M. Bocheński) 104
*E. Kux, J. C. Kun:* Die Satelliten Pekings (J. M. Bocheński) 104
Etudes et documents sur la première Internationale en Suisse (J. M. Bocheński) 105

Bibliography

Soviet Writings on Atheism and Religion. Supplement (T. J. Blakeley) 106
Selected Writings on Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought (R, Kemball) 114

Books Received 129


*The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editors or members of the Institute*


Printed in The Netherlands by D. Reidel, Dordrecht



This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 06:26:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

J. M. BOCHEŃSKI

# ON PARTIJNOST' IN PHILOSOPHY I*

There are several ways in which the study of Soviet philosophical doctrines may be useful to every philosopher. To begin with, some of the same problems are studied in the Soviet Union as elsewhere – and some of the results obtained there may be of scientific interest. However, even when those Soviet doctrines are concerned which are thought extravagant and obviously wrong by practically all non-Communist philosophers, their study may not be entirely deprived of interest. In the first place, the very fact that such doctrines, radically opposed to what is usually admitted, have been asserted, forces a philosopher to render his own position more precise, to re-think it; for it is very often the case that the really basic things are presupposed and never explicitly stated. Then, Soviet doctrines, which at first glance seem to be simply absurd, may contain some valid aspects which have been only exaggerated by the Soviet classics and their followers. Finally, an examination even of the most preposterous Soviet theories sometimes shows that their adversaries are not always quite free of the attitudes which their Soviet colleagues claim to accept willingly.

One such doctrine is certainly that of *partijnost'*[1]; it belongs without doubt to what was termed "basic dogma" of Soviet ideology. As such it is a part of a realm which, by the very nature of ideology, tends to avoid analysis. As a matter of fact, although Soviet literature is full of assertions that philosophy is and should be a party-affair, and although there have recently been some discussions about the limits of that *partijnost'* – little has been said about what this *partijnost'* really *is*, i.e. what the word means and how it is used.[2]

This being so, the procedure used here will be the following: we shall, after some methodological remarks, establish a list of meanings which seem to be attributed to the term in Soviet writings. Then, each of these will be analyzed and an attempt will be made to distinguish the legitimate

* First of two parts



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

and illegitimate components of the doctrine which asserts *partijnost'* in each of those uses.

I

*The status of the formula*

The following problems occur first in this field. In Soviet literature, which is notoriously charged with emotional elements, the thesis of *partijnost'* is often presented as a *moral rule*: a philosopher *should* behave in such or such a way. However, this does not seem to be in accordance with the basic attitude of the Soviet philosophers. Rather they try to make a descriptive statement about the philosopher. It seems preferable, therefore to interpret the formulae in question as meaning, "if $x$ is a philosopher, then $x$ behaves in such and such way".

What is the nature of those laws? Are they conventions, *a priori* or empirical statements? In the first case, the formulae would simply mean that Soviet philosophers are disposed to call "philosopher" only a man who behaves in the way described by the formula. But this can hardly be their intention. They are still very much opposed to conventionalism, especially in such basic issues as *partijnost'*. The interpretation of our doctrine as a convention must therefore be discarded.

Can the formula be considered as an *a priori* law? This can be understood in two ways: either as a statement about the essence of a being called "philosopher", or as a statement inferred from the theorems in which the word "philosopher" occurs. But neither of these interpretations would do in our case. There seems to exist no such essence as that of a philosopher, and the use of the word is not determined by any *a priori* system of laws, but must be established on empirical grounds.

What remains, then, after these eliminations, is that the formula in question is an empirical law, based on observation of the behavior of philosophers. Or, in more linguistic terms, it is a statement about the way the term "philosopher" is and was applied to people. In other words still, what is attempted here is not a synthetic definition but rather something like an analytical description of the factual use of the word.

The result is that the present study will have to be on the one hand an analytical one – we shall try to understand the various meanings of the formula – and on the other hand, historical: we shall have to use generalizations based on history of philosophy. Now, like all generali-

zations in historical sciences, these cannot pretend to a universality comparable to that known from most natural sciences. They will all be only approximatively universal statements. We shall therefore, instead of using universal quantifiers, where the matter would in principle postulate one, use rather the expression "all or nearly all" and this again will have to be qualified in several ways, e.g. by restricting the class in question to the most influential philosophers, etc.

Because of this immanent weakness of historical studies, we shall not be able to make unqualified affirmative statements. In most cases whatever is said positively here will have to be tentative. But some negative sentences will be, on the contrary, quite categorical. For, as Aristotle remarked, it is far easier to prove that a universal sentence is wrong, than to establish its truth. In fact, in order to show that a sentence of the type "all philosophers are..." is false, it would be enough to show that several, or even one, did not have the property in question.

*The components of the doctrine*

As asserted in Soviet philosophy, the doctrine of "*partijnost'*" is by no means a simple theory. The least that one can say about it is that it is a product of several sentences which, at least apparently, deal with quite different matters. It might be, it is true, that these different sentences – let us call them "aspects" of *partijnost'* – have a psychological and possibly even a logical link. But the first task of an analyser is surely to disentangle the various aspects involved in the complex called "*partijnost'*"; only then may an attempt be made to understand what holds them together.

Even a superficial reading of the various Soviet texts concerned with *partijnost'* shows that there are at least *four* such aspects. They may be described as follows:

1. *Partijnost' as opposed to problematicism* – the doctrine according to which the philosopher upholds the solution of philosophical problems and does not limit himself to the statement of such problems, as problematicists would have it.

This meaning of the word, as far as is known, has never been explicitly given in Soviet philosophy. Yet it is rather obvious that Soviet philosophers do mean it also, at least implicitly. This results, first, from the fact that according to them every proletarian philosopher has to be a materialist and every bourgeois philosopher an idealist, for to be a dia-

lectical materialist or an idealist means to uphold the solution of at least some philosophical problems. The thesis appears also through the well-known extreme dogmatic attitude of most Soviet philosophers, who constantly imply that a philosopher worthy of the name always does know the solution of at least some philosophical problems.

2. *Partijnost' as opposed to individualism:* that the opinions of the philosopher are shared by a social group to which he belongs.

*Partijnost'* in this second meaning of the word is explicitly asserted e.g. by Štraks in the text quoted in footnote 2. Independently from such explicit statements, it is implied by the doctrine of *partijnost'* in the third meaning of the word, which asserts that a philosopher shares his views with a class.

3. *The doctrine of Partijnost' as sociologism,* according to which (a) the fact that a philosopher teaches a certain doctrine is conditioned by his belonging to a social class possessing certain properties, (b) philosophy is an "expression" of the interests of this class and a "weapon" in its struggle.

This is the best known and most explicitly stated meaning of the term. The doctrine in question is to be found already in the *Communist Manifesto* and again and again in practically all Soviet texts concerned with philosophy in general.

4. *Partijnost' as an emotional attitude.* It teaches that the philosopher is emotionally committed to his views. That this is also a component of the doctrine is obvious from the attitude of Soviet philosophers and was, moreover, often explicitly stated, e.g. by Ždanov in his speech of 1947, and more recently by Selektor.

A glance at the above list will suffice to make clear that *each* of the aspects quoted is of interest to *every* philosopher, each being a possible answer to one of the basic problems about the philosopher's situation and possibilities. It will also be noticed that some of the aspects mentioned are not present in Soviet philosophy alone. Thus, problematicism is rejected by many non-Communist philosophers, while both sociologism and emotionalism are widely spread among European and American thinkers. Admittedly, they are seldom presented in such an extreme way as is done by Soviet philosophers; but the very radical statement of such doctrines is precisely what makes the Soviet doctrine of *partijnost'* so interesting.

## II

*Partijnost' as opposed to problematicism*

One part of the complex doctrine called "*partijnost'*" is certainly the contention that a philosopher (every philosopher) does hold opinions on philosophical problems. This is to say, that whoever remains neutral to philosophical problems is not a philosopher at all – which turns out to be the rejection of problematicism, a theory according to which a philosopher only states problems but never solves them.

Now this doctrine can, first of all, have two extreme meanings, namely in so far as it may apply to *all* or to *some* philosophical problems. Let us write "$Ph\,(x)$" for "$x$ is a philosopher", "$Pr\,(y)$" for "$y$ is a philosophical problem" and "$Sol\,(x, y, z)$" for "$x$ holds for the problem $y$ the solution $z$". We can formulate our two interpretations as follows:

(1) $\quad (x, y)\colon Ph\,(x).\, Pr\,(y).\supset (\exists z)\, Sol\,(x, y, z)$

(2) $\quad (x)\,(\exists z).\, Ph\,(x).\, Pr\,(y).\, Sol\,(x, y, z).$

But none of these interpretations will do: (1) is quite obviously false: not all philosophers possess the solution of all problems; otherwise there would be no research in philosophy at all; (2), on the contrary, seems true, but rather trivial: every philosopher seems to be in possession of some solution of some problems.

What is meant by Soviet philosophers must be something intermediary. It can be formulated by using the idea of a *basic* problem. By writing "$Bs\,(y)$" for "$y$ is a basic philosophical problem" we would obtain

(3) $\quad (x, y)\colon Ph\,(x).\, Bs\,(y).\supset .\,(\exists z).\, Sol\,(x, y, z)$

all philosophers do hold a solution for every *basic* problem. Moreover, Soviet philosophers seem to pretend that there is only *one* such basic problem. The following questions arise here:

(1) What does "*basic*" mean?

(2) Suppose we know the answer to (1): is there in all or practically all philosophers a set of problems basic to them?

(3) Is there only *one* such problem?

(4) Is it true that all, or practically all philosophers do hold some solution of *the same* basic problem or problems?

(5) If so, do they all fall in one of the *two categories,* viz. materialism and idealism?

As to (1) "basic" seems to be best interpreted as follows: $x$ is a basic problem in the system $y$ if and only if there is a theorem $z$, such that: $z$ is a solution of $x$, $z$ is an axiom in $y$, and there are some important portions of $y$ which are obtained from $z$. This is, admittedly, not very satisfactory, because of the vagueness of "important portion" and also because most philosophical systems are so muddled as axiomatic systems. Still it seems that the above description fits the common use of the expression "basic problems" both by Soviet and other philosophers, and that it might be used without too much danger of confusion.

We can now consider (2): are there basic problems in every philosophical system? The answer seems to be that there are such problems. It is a matter of historical experience that most philosophers we know did solve some single problem or a group of inter-connected problems and that the solutions thus obtained played an important role in their systems. E.g. to most philosophers for a long time after Berkeley, the solution of the epistemological problem has become quite basic in the sense explained above.

But, (3), can we say that there is only *one* such problem for each philosophical system? Most certainly *not*. It is true that sometimes, as in Berkeley or Kant, one problem has had a prevalent logical influence on the system in question. But very seldom, as far as the present writer is aware, was it *alone* in determining important portions of the system. E.g. Aristotle: it is certain that his solution of the Platonic problem, namely, that of the relation of the ideal to the real, plays a very important role in his thought. But there are obviously also other problems which played a similar role in the system. To quote just a few, the problem of the structure of the real, of the categories, of method, are not marginal but quite central in Aristotelianism. One must confess that *some* philosophers were apparently fascinated by one central problem: one further instance is Bergson. But it seems that with the majority of philosophers even if one problem played a major role in their systems, there were still other questions which might be also called "basic" in the above meaning of the word.

As to the question (4), whether that central problematic is the same for all or practically all philosophers, it is not necessarily disposed of by

the answer to (3). Thus it might be that all or most philosophers had, not one, but several problems as "basic", and yet those problems were common to all of them. Is that the case? In one way this is so: there is a certain unity in philosophy and most philosophers have studied a number of identical problems. It seems, however, that not all and not even the majority of philosophers have considered the same problem or problems as most important. Take, e.g., the epistemological problem which became so important for most philosophers during the 18th and 19th century. Could one say that it is *now* a basic problem for all, or even for most philosophers? It does not seem to be so. Heidegger says it is not a problem at all. Logical positivists often claim that it is a pseudo-problem. Ingarden did not give it a thought during many years. In Bergson it appears as a quite marginal question. On the other hand, some metaphysical problems which are surely basic in many metaphysicians, appear to be irrelevant in other systems. The contention that there is a set of problems which would be basic in all, or even most philosophers appears, consequently, as quite unwarranted. Each original system seems to have its own central, i.e., basic, problems, different from those on which other thinkers have focussed their attention.

Now this does not mean that, from a determined point of view, one could not classify all or nearly all philosophers in a certain way. A certain problem or set of problems is, as we said, basic for a philosophical system. We may say, consequently, that from the point of view *of that system* all or practically all philosophers fall into a certain number of classes. But one should remember, when operating such a classification, that he is assuming as "basic" problems which are basic *to him,* not those which are basic to other philosophers. And if so, this method of consideration will be of little relevance for the understanding of other philosophers.

Let us exemplify it in one instance, that of Heidegger. The epistemological problem plays a very minor role in his system. Suppose now that somebody does, as Soviet philosophers do, think that this problem is basic. He would have, then, to classify Heidegger as an epistemological realist. This may be a pleasant experience to see him so nicely fitted, but what Heidegger has to say of importance – be it true or false – has very little to do with that question. We gain little by saying that he is an epistemological realist, for epistemological realism is just a marginal

consequence from his major assumptions and does not characterize his system as a whole in any relevant way. So much so that there has been a long controversy about whether he is a realist at all.

Finally, the answer to the last question (5) is easily supplied. Soviet philosophers pretend that all philosophers without exception are either materialists or idealists. Such an assertion suffers from two defects. One has been mentioned above: even if one could classify philosophers in that way, there would be very little use in such classification because, as we tried to show, different problems are most important to different philosophers. Second, and this is the principal reason why this classification cannot be accepted as useful, the terms "materialism" and "idealism" are so vague that it seems quite hopeless to use them here at all. Thus, it is usually said that materialists are philosophers who ascribe priority to matter, nature, being, while "idealists" claim that the same priority should be ascribed to spirit, idea, knowledge. Obviously, we have to do with at least three different problems: (1) of the real and of the ideal (the Platonic problem), (2) of the material and spiritual (the anthropological problem), (3) of the nature of knowledge (the epistemological problem). That these problems are not identical is implicitly admitted by Soviet philosophers themselves when they treat separately the problem of knowledge and that of the nature of man. Even Lenin himself made a quite sharp distinction between ontology and epistemology when he asserted that the distinction between material and ideal is one which applies only in epistemology, but not elsewhere.

This being so, the only question which arises in that context, then, is whether the solutions to those problems are inter-connected. This may be considered either systematically or historically.

If we look at the problem from the viewpoint of a historian of philosophy, then it clearly appears that there is little connection between the three questions.

A. There is often no connection between (1) and (3). There were e.g. philosophers who ascribed priority to the ideal, and yet were thoroughgoing epistemological realists. One great instance is Plato, whom nobody would accuse of epistemological idealism (knowledge conceived as a purely creative act), and who still is (as to the ontological problem) a classical idealist. On the contrary, Berkeley is an ontological realist (he

flatly denies the existence of the ideal), while being a nearly extreme epistemological idealist.

B. There is no connection between (2) and (3). Mach was a devout anthropological materialist, and yet he sustained an idealistic view of knowledge. On the contrary, Leibniz was a thorough anthropological (and even cosmological) "spiritualist" (monads are spiritual), while defending epistemological realism.

On the contrary, there seem to have been, in history, some connection between (1) and (2), in so far as the spirit was traditionally conceived as the power of grasping the ideal. Consequently those who denied the existence of spirit (extreme anthropological materialists) generally also denied the existence of the ideal. And inversely, whoever admits the existence of the ideal, will normally also admit the existence of spiritual knowledge. However, there is certainly no equivalence between the assertion of the *priority* of the real and that of the priority of matter. The classical case here is that of Aquinas, to whom the last foundation of every reality is the real being of God, and who still does not assert the priority of matter.

This last instance mentions God. It is worth while to remark that a "materialist" according to the Soviet doctrine should be an atheist, and an idealist something of a theist. But this is again quite a different problem. Many epistemological idealists have been atheists, and many realists, theists.

We may conclude that the treating of all these questions as one single problem is a gross confusion.

Of course, any person is free to construct a system in which a certain answer is given to all problems indistinctly rolled together under the term "materialism or idealism"; however, it is up to him to show that they are really connected in his system. But no Soviet philosopher, as far as is known to the author, has ever done anything of the sort. The assertion is completely unwarranted.

The results of this analysis may be resumed as follows:

*First:* the contention that most philosophers do hold the solution of some problems basic to them is well established by what we know from history of philosophy. In *that* way, philosophers have practically always been party-men, not completely neutral.

*Second:* the theory asserting that there has been just *one* such basic

problem in each philosophical system appears unwarranted; on the contrary, it seems that most philosophers have had a plurality of basic problems.

*Third:* far less is there one single basic problem *common* to all philosophical systems. Each major system seems to have his own basic problems, different from those of other systems.

*Fourth:* the claim of Soviet philosophers that the unique and common basic problem is that of "*materialism vs. idealism*" is not only false for the reasons given above, but also because (1) the Soviet "fundamental problem of philosophy" is not one problem at all, but a gross confusion of several problems, and (2) even if it were not so, very little support for the theory could be found in the history of philosophy.

All this leads us to the conclusion that, with the exception of a rather trivial truth about the existence of some basic problems and their solutions in most philosophers, the part of the doctrine of *partijnost'* which was considered here is false, or at least unwarranted.

But there is some use in discussing this doctrine. For as absurd as it may appear, it is just an exaggeration of similar things which sometimes happen in non-Communist philosophy. Two classical instances come to mind immediately. Many Kantians used to propound not a dichotomy, but still a trichotomy: everybody has to be either a Kantian, or an empiricist or a metaphysician. One has seen even Plato, in Natorp's work, become a Kantian. And, practically all logical empiricists are still more akin to the Soviet philosophers: they think that everybody who is not of their opinion is a metaphysician – a term perhaps as vague as those used by Soviet philosophers.

So a look at the gross errors contained in Marxist-Leninist philosophy may help in detecting minor errors of the same kind in other quarters. It may even be that no philosopher is quite free from them.

## REFERENCES

1. This term is difficult to translate into English without using a rather barbaric expression like "party-mindedness"; we shall therefore use here the Russian term.
2. The *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* says, in the fourth edition of 1954: "Marxism-Leninism teaches that in a class-society every ideology, and consequently also (every) philosophy expresses the interests of one or another class. The struggle of ideological, philosophical trends (*napravlenij*) is an expression (*projavlenie*) of the class-struggle" (coll. 440b–441a). A similar text appears in the *Filosofskij slovar'* of 1963 (coll. 338b). The *Bolšaja sovetskaja enciklopedija* (2nd ed. vol. 32 of 1955) has an

article under the title "*Partijnost'* of philosophy" where we read: "Every philosophy is an expression of the interests of a given (= determined, *opredelennogo*) class, a *Weltanschauung* of (a) party" (coll. 171b). In 1954, the work of G. E. Glezerman was published: *Bazis i nadstrojka v sovetskom obščestve,* (IF AN, 1954). Here we have, for the first time it seems, an attempt at a distinction between the ideological and scientific (non-ideological) elements in different sectors of social consciousness; but what Glezerman has to say about philosophy (pp. 52–58) does not go beyond the already-quoted texts. In 1957 an extensive treatment of our subject was published by M. Z. Selektor ('Princip partijnosti v ideologii', *VF* 1957, 5, 67–81), (see in particular page 71 about the duties of a party-philospher). In the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* the subject is again taken over (ed. of 1960, pp. 30ff.: "Dialectical and historical materialism – an ideological weapon of the revolutionary proletariat", cf. p. 560). Although no definition of *partijnost'* is given here more than in Selektor or any earlier writing, the argument in favor of the objectivity of proletarian philosophy (as opposed to the non-objectivity of that of the bourgeoisie) is developed (pp. 35 ff.). The subject has also been treated by V. Z. Kelle and M. Ja. Koval'zon (*Formy obščestvennogo soznanija,* 1959, in the *sbornik Formy obščestvennogo soznanija* ed. by G. M. Gak (1960)), by V. P. Tugarinov (*Sootnošenie kategorii istoričeskogo materializma,* Leningrad, Izd. LGU 1958; *O cennostjax žizni i kultury,* L., Izd. LGU, 1960, and by V. A. Jadov: *Ideologija kak forma duxovnoj dejatel'nosti obščestva,* Izd. LGU 1961). Some extracts from these writings have been quoted and discussed by Dr. H. Fleischer (*SST* II (1962) 119–131). More interesting from our point of view, as containing an attempt to define the concept, is a text of G. M. Štraks (*Predmet dialektičeskogo i istoričeskogo materializma,* M. 1960.) Štraks distinguishes two meanings of the word: "(1) *Partijnost'* as meaning the belonging to this or another philosophical camp (*lagerju*)... (2) *Partijnost'* as meaning that a given philosophical position expresses the views of a given class". Not a single one of these texts brings anything which could be called an analysis of the meaning and uses of the term, according to the standards of non-Soviet philosophy. (The author is indebted to Dr. H. Fleischer for drawing his attention to this text.)

LÁSZLÓ RÉVÉSZ

# RECHT UND SOZIALNORM

Die Theorie hat in den kommunistisch regierten Staaten auf die Lösung von praktischen Problemen einen entscheidenden Einfluß. Der Primat der Ideologie und der Theorie gegenüber der Praxis kommt im Staats- und Wirtschaftsleben sehr oft zum Vorschein. Deshalb darf, bei Erörterung der praktischen Entwicklung vom Staat und Recht, die Theorie niemals vernachlässigt werden, auch wenn sie gerade zur Tarnung der in eine entgegengesetzte Richtung laufenden Praxis dient.

Die Theoretiker in der UdSSR erarbeiteten neue Staats- und Rechtsbegriffe, um den vom stalinschen vollständig abweichenden ideologischen und theoretischen Ausgangspunkt der ganzen staatlichen Praxis zu dokumentieren. Die ständig betonte Einheit von Theorie und Praxis fehlt aber in der neuen Periode genau so wie früher. Dies äußert sich auf dem Gebiet der Staats- und Rechtstheorie darin, daß der *Inhalt* der Rechtsnormen und der staatlichen Funktionen – trotz gewissen oberflächlichen Veränderungen in ihrer Form – unverändert blieb. Die von der Theorie verkündete und forcierte Einheit von Inhalt und Form ist heute vielleicht noch weiter von der Verwirklichung entfernt als vorher. Der dialektische *Inhalt* erinnert an die Normen der Diktatur des Proletariates, während die Erscheinungs*form* gewisse Elemente der angestrebten kommunistischen Überbauelemente aufweist. Statt der tatsächlichen Einheit von Praxis und Theorie arbeitet die Rechtswissenschaft mit dem Begriff der *dialektischen Einheit,* die des öftern einen Widerspruch zu tarnen hat.

Der Marxismus-Leninismus betrachtet das Recht als eine Klassenerscheinung, die als Folge des Zerfalles der klassenlosen Urgesellschaft in antagonistische Klassen, wie jene der Entstehung des Privateigentums an Produktionsmittel und des Staates, zum Vorschein trat, um die Macht der Besitzenden über die Besitzlosen, die Ausbeutung der Unterdrückten durch die Unterdrücker zu garantieren. Das Recht stelle infolgedessen einen historischen Begriff dar: es war nicht immer und es wird auch nicht immer existieren. Die verbreitete Ansicht: *ubi societas ibi ius,* wird



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

im Marxismus-Leninismus abgelehnt, denn die Existenz des Rechtes (wie auch jene des Staates) *ist* mit der Klassengesellschaft verbunden. Der Staat sei Klassenstaat, das Recht Klassenrecht und alle Institutionen des Rechtes seien vom Klasseninhalt abhängig.

Auf der andern Seite stellt das Recht (und auch der Staat) laut Marxismus-Leninismus eines der wichtigsten Elemente des "Überbaus" der gegebenen Wirtschaftsbasis dar, dessen Aufgabe ist, der Basis zu "dienen" ("dienende Rolle des Rechtes") bzw. ihre Entwicklung zu fördern. Diese "rückwirkende Kraft" des Überbaus wird in der Periode des Hinüberwachsens zum Kommunismus von erhöhter Bedeutung sein: das Recht muß der stufenweisen Umwandlung der sozialistischen Basis in die kommunistische einerseits folgen, andererseits muß es diese fördern, beschleunigen und dadurch zu seinem eigenen Absterben beitragen. Wie es in der Rechtstheorie heißt, ist die Bedeutung des Rechtes als Überbauelement in der Periode des entfalteten kommunistischen Aufbaus, infolge der immer wichtiger werdenden rückwirkenden Rolle, gestiegen. Praktisch geht das so weit, daß es in der Tat die Überbauelemente – vor allem das Recht – sind, welche auf die Entwicklung der Basis einen entscheidenden Einfluß ausüben und nicht umgekehrt. Der theoretisch betonte Primat der Basis wird durch den Primat des Überbaus ersetzt. Diese der Theorie grob widersprechende Entwicklungstendenz wird offiziell mit der Kompliziertheit des Übergangs zum Vollkommunismus gerechtfertigt.[1]

Der Überbau – und damit das Recht – soll seinen politischen Charakter mehr und mehr verlieren, denn parallel mit der stufenweisen Abschaffung der Klassen soll auch die Politik als Ausdrucksform der Beziehungen zwischen Klassen, Nationen und Staaten verschwinden.[2] Der kommunistische Überbau unterscheidet sich also vom sozialistischen nicht nur quantitativ, sondern auch qualitativ, heißt es in der Theorie.[3]

Die Rechtsliteratur sowohl in der Sowjetunion als auch in den europäischen Volksdemokratien betont eindeutig, daß die Rechtstheorie ihre Aufgaben bisher nicht erfüllte: Die Auswirkungen des "Personenkultes" (nur eine Person darf originelle Lösungen erfinden, alle übrigen beschränken sich auf die Kommentierung der unfehlbaren Dogmen und Axiome und erarbeiten die politischen und sozialen Probleme mit deduktiver Methode) haben zur Folge, daß die Wissenschaftler ihre An-

sichten nicht gern veröffentlichen.[4] Die Sowjetjuristen haben aber in der letzten Zeit trotzdem einen Versuch gemacht, den alten Rechtsbegriff im Kommunistischen Manifest von Marx und Engels (das Recht ist der auf den Rang eines Gesetzes erhobene Wille der herrschenden Klasse, dessen Inhalt von den materiellen Bedürfnissen dieser Klasse bestimmt wird) durch einen neuen zu ersetzen. 1962 und 1963 erschienen zahlreiche Abhandlungen, welche die Lockerung des bisher als Axiom geltenden Zusammenhangs zwischen Staat und Recht befürworteten: Die Garantie der Einhaltung der Rechtsnormen wird – ihrer Auffassung nach – vom staatlichen Zwang stufenweise auf die moralische Überzeugung verschoben, wobei das gesellschaftliche Bewußtsein die Hauptrolle spielt.[5] Während sich die alte Rechtsdefinition auf das bürgerliche Recht des frühkapitalistischen Zeitalters bezog und dem Klassenkampf diente, wird heute von mehreren sowjetischen Rechtstheoretikern behauptet, daß das gegenwärtige Recht in der UdSSR nicht dem Klassenkampf und nicht der Festigung der Klassenherrschaft diene, sondern die Harmonie der zusammenarbeitenden Werktätigen, die Interessenseinheit von Individuum und Gesellschaft ausdrücke. Das Recht sei also in der Sowjetunion nicht mehr die Ausdrucksform der Klassenherrschaft, sondern es verwirkliche die Funktionen eines "Klassenregulators": "Das Recht ist der *staatliche Wille* der politisch herrschenden Klasse, der sich in der Gesamtheit jener Normen ausdrückt, welche durch den Staat als Klassenregulator der sozialen Beziehungen geschützt werden". Von der früheren Definition wurden die Worte: "garantiert durch staatlichen Zwang" durch "garantiert durch staatlichen Schutz" ersetzt[6], und es wird sogar behauptet, daß der staatliche Zwang niemals als Hauptgarantie des sowjetischen sozialistischen Rechtes gedient habe.[7] Auf den staatlichen Zwang könne man jedoch heute noch nicht verzichten; er werde aber in Zukunft – und auch heute schon – nicht gegen ganze Klassen, sondern nur gegen Einzelpersonen, ferner nicht durch irgendwelche Klassen, sondern vom gesamten Sowjetvolk ausgeübt.[8] Merkwürdigerweise wird in der Rechtsliteratur ständig betont, daß im heutigen Sowjetstaat des gesamten Volkes die führende Rolle weiterhin der Arbeiterklasse zufalle.

Im Zusammenhang mit dem Klassencharakter des Sowjetrechtes brachte der XXII. Kongreß der KPdSU (Oktober 1961) eine grundsätzliche Änderung, was als natürliche Folge der Revidierung des alten

Staatsbegriffes (Gewaltorgan der herrschenden Klasse, jetzt: Staat des gesamten Volkes) anzusehen ist. Wenn der Staat zum "Halbstaat" wurde und seinen Klassencharakter verlor, mußte auch das Recht, infolge des engen Zusammenhanges zwischen beiden (ohne Staat gibt es kein Recht) zum Recht des gesamten Volkes werden. Das sozialistische Recht entstand, laut gegenwärtiger Rechtstheorie, als das proletarische Recht der Diktatur des Proletariats, als Waffe des Klassenkampfes und des sozialistischen Aufbaus, das aber den *Keim des Hinüberwachsens ins Recht des gesamten Volkes von Anfang an innehatte.*[9] Es war früher der auf den Rang eines Gesetzes erhobene Wille der Arbeiterklasse, die Waffe dieser Klasse zur Unterdrückung, zum Klassenkampf und zum sozialistischen Aufbau; das Recht des gesamten Volkes drückt hingegen den Willen des gesamten Sowjetvolkes aus. Das Recht des gesamten Volkes sei also kein Recht mehr im klassischen Sinne des Wortes (keine Klassenerscheinung), sondern nur ein "Halbrecht". Es trage zum Übergang der Rechtsnormen in Sozialnormen, in die Normen der kommunistischen Moral bei: immer mehr Gebiete des staatlichen und sozialen Lebens werden parallel vom Recht und von der kommunistischen Moral geregelt.[10] Es diene der Beendigung des kommunistischen Aufbaus und der Festigung und Verbreitung der Normen der kommunistischen Moral, wobei es zur Bekämpfung der Überreste der Vergangenheit (hauptsächlich: Verbrechertum, Nationalismus und Religion) durch *Überzeugung*(!) beizutragen hat.[11] Das Recht des gesamten Volkes bedeutet, nach der Theorie, einen großen Schritt zur Annäherung von Recht und Moral, in diesem Fall kommunistischer Moral. Die sozialistische Rechtsentwicklung erhebe viele moralische Grundsätze auf den Rang von Rechtsnormen, und sie werde dazu beitragen, daß immer mehr Rechtsnormen in der öffentlichen Meinung als moralische Normen betrachtet werden. Solange aber der Staat existiere, könne man über das vollständige Hinüberwachsen des Rechtes in die kommunistische Moral nicht reden, denn die Einhaltung der Rechtsnormen werde doch mehrheitlich durch den Staat, jene der moralischen Normen von der Gesellschaft garantiert (Zwang und Überzeugung).[12]

Nach der Theorie erfolgt die Annäherung von Recht und Moral in zwei Aspekten: (a) Die rechtswidrigen und amoralischen Erscheinungen weisen eine rückläufige Tendenz auf und (b) sie stoßen auf Widerstand der ganzen Gesellschaft.

Höchstwahrscheinlich wurde die neue These über das Recht des gesamten Volkes ohne gründlichere Vorbereitungen angenommen. Der XXI. Kongreß der KPdSU (1959), der sich vor allem mit den Fragen des Staates und Rechtes befaßte, wußte vom neuen Begriff nichts. Die Vertreter der Rechtswissenschaften stellten fest – sich auf die Beschlüsse des XXI. Parteikongresses stützend – "daß der sozialistische Staat der höchste Typ der Diktatur des Proletariats und der Klassengesellschaft sei...".[14] 1961 hat sich herausgestellt, daß es in der Klassengesellschaft einen noch höheren Staatentyp (und auch Rechtstyp) gibt: der Staat (und das Recht) des gesamten Volkes. Auch der nationale Juristenkongreß in der Sowjetunion, im Juli 1960, der die Entwicklung der Sowjetstaatlichkeit in die Richtung der kommunistischen gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung prüfte, wußte nichts vom neuen Begriff.[15] Die Rechtsliteratur erwähnte den Begriff des Staates und Rechtes des gesamten Volkes erst kurz vor der Veröffentlichung des Programmentwurfs der KPdSU (in welchem die neue Theorie aufgestellt wurde), aber auch dann in dem Sinne, daß dieser sich "mit der Zeit" entwickeln werde.[16] Die neue Lehre stieß auch in der Philosophie auf Kritik[17]: während es zwei Klassen – jene der Arbeiter und der Bauern – gäbe, könne man über Staat und Recht des gesamten Volkes nicht sprechen.

Die Theorie des Staates und Rechtes des gesamten Volkes hängt mit der Übertragung von Staatsfunktionen auf Gesellschaftsorgane zusammen, wodurch das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Gesellschaftsorganen *formell* (inhaltlich jedoch kaum) einer Änderung unterzogen wurde. Die Funktionen der zentralen Staatsorgane werden aber lediglich auf jene Gesellschaftsorganisationen übertragen, die genau so zentralisiert und dem Grundsatz des demokratischen Zentralismus (die Stellungnahme und die Anordnungen der höheren Organe sind für die niedrigeren unbedingt verbindlich usw.) untergeordnet sind, wie der Staatsapparat.[18] Auch bei der Ausübung von Staatsfunktionen durch Gesellschaftsorgane, welche eines hierarchischen Aufbaus entbehren (Kameradschaftsgerichte, Kommisionen für Minderjährige, Volksbrigaden für die Zusammenarbeit mit der Polizei, usw.) wird der zentralisierte Charakter der übertragenen Funktionen strengt bewahrt, da die diese Organe leitenden und kontrollierenden staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Organe (Gewerkschaften, Sowjets, Polizei) streng zentralisiert sind. Die Übertragung soll den

Übergang in die kommunistische gesellschaftliche Selbstverwaltung einleiten. Dieser Übergang stellt aber eine langdauernde Entwicklung dar.[19]

Jene Gesellschaftsorgane, denen Staatsfunktionen übertragen wurden, werden, nach der Theorie, ihren gesellschaftlichen Charakter nicht verlieren[20], obwohl die Fachliteratur ausnahmsweise auch einer solchen Befürchtung Ausdruck gab, daß die betreffenden Gesellschaftsorgane, infolge der Übernahme von Staatsfunktionen "verstaatlicht" werden. Damit diese tatsächlich begründete Befürchtung mindestens theoretisch beseitigt wird, erklärt die Fachliteratur, daß die übertragenen Staatsfunktionen meist zu gesellschaftlichen Funktionen werden.[21] Allerdings wird, als eine Sicherheitsklausel betont, daß die übertragenen Funktionen von den Staatsorganen beliebig in die eigene Kompetenz übernommen werden können, wodurch die Bedeutung der Entwicklung wesentlich abgeschwächt wird.

Parallel mit der Übertragung von Staatsfunktionen an die Gesellschaftsorgane sollten die Rechtsnormen und die Sozialnormen einander ständig näherkommen. Die Sozialnormen sind

(1) die von den Gesellschaftsorganen erlassenen oder entwickelten Verhaltensnormen des sozialistischen bzw. kommunistischen Zusammenlebens, welche sich auf das sozialistisch-kommunistische Bewußtsein des Volkes stützen und durch gesellschaftliche Maßnahmen garantiert werden;

(2) die technischen Normen, welche nicht die Beziehungen der Menschen untereinander, bzw. des Menschen zur Gesellschaft, sondern die Verhältnisse zwischen Dingen oder Menschen und Dingen regeln.

Anfänglich sollten die Rechtsnormen, durch ihre Annäherung an die Sozial- und Moralnormen, den staatlichen Zwang durch die Überzeugung ergänzen[22], bis zwischen ihnen jeder Unterscheid verwischt werden sollte. Diese Entwicklung sei nach der Theorie schon angelaufen[23] und werde mit dem Hineinwachsen des Rechtssystems ins System der Sozialnormen ihr Ende nehmen.[24] Es wird betont, daß zu dieser Entwicklung auch die kommunistische Moral beitrage, denn sie wirke dahin, daß immer mehr Rechtsnormen als Normen der kommunistischen Moral anerkannt und eingehalten würden.[24a]

Die Theorie ist aber nicht ganz klar, denn einerseits soll die Rückwirkung des Rechtes auf die Basis erweitert werden (d.h. die rechtliche

Regelung soll Raum gewinnen), andererseits sollte aber der Überbau – darunter auch das Recht als Überbauelement – parallel mit der Festigung und Erweiterung der kommunistischen Basis seinen politischen Charakter stufenweise verlieren und sich in den kommunistischen Überbau, das Recht in Sozialnorm, umwandeln.[25] Dieser Widerspruch kann erneut nur durch die Anwendung der Dialektik gelöst werden: Das Recht wird dadurch, daß es von gesellschaftlichen Organen angewandt und zugleich als Norm der kommunistischen Moral betrachtet wird, nicht geschwächt werden, sondern im Gegenteil, die eindeutige Billigung durch die öffentliche Meinung verleiht ihm noch mehr Kraft und Bedeutung. Die gleiche Entwicklung wie beim Staat des gesamten Volkes: der Staat wird dadurch, daß ein Teil seiner Funktionen Gesellschaftsorganen übertragen wird, nichts an Bedeutung einbüßen, er wird dadurch nur gefestigt. (Stalin: "Das Absterben des Staates erfolgt nicht durch die Schwächung der Staatsgewalt, sondern durch ihre *maximale* Stärkung."[26])

Das Recht müsse also seinen Platz den Sozialnormen, welche keinen politischen Charakter haben, und deren Einhaltung durch die Gewohnheit garantiert wird, *stufenweise* abtreten. Der Unterscheid zwischen beiden ist eher qualitativ als quantitativ: hinter den Rechtsnormen steht der staatliche, hinter den Sozialnormen der gesellschaftliche Zwang. Das Milieu entscheidet darüber, ob eine Rechtsnorm durch staatlichen Zwang oder durch gesellschaftliche Maßnahmen garantiert werden muß. Falls auch in dem Fall gesellschaftliche Maßnahmen getroffen werden, in dem die Einhaltung der Rechtsnormen den konsequenten staatlichen Zwang verlangt, treten schädliche Folgen ein (Lockerung der Disziplin, Verbreitung der Spekulation, des "parasitischen Lebenswandels", der kleinen Diebstähle am sozialistischen Eigentum usw.)[27] Deshalb müssen die Übertragung von Staatsfunktionen, und die Anwendung von gesellschaftlichen Maßnahmen statt staatlichen Zwanges immer unter Berücksichtigung der Zweckmäßigkeit im konkreten Fall vorgenommen werden.

Wie schon erwähnt, liegt der Sozialnorm die kommunistische Moral zugrunde. Die Sozialnormen erhalten eine spezielle Färbung, da die ihren Inhalt bildende kommunistische Moral einen historischen und zugleich einen dialektischen Begriff darstellt. Sie befindet sich in ständiger Entwicklung, in ständiger Wandlung, dem Ort und der Zeit entsprechend: jede geschichtliche Periode bzw. jede Klasse hat ihre eigene

Moral. Aus diesem Grund werden sowohl die einheitliche als auch die ewige Moral grundsätzlich abgelehnt.[28] Andererseits ist die kommunistische Moral ein dialektischer bzw. ein "parteilicher" Begriff: ihr konkreter Inhalt wird durch die Parteipolitik bestimmt. Als Grundthese gilt: "Moralisch ist, was dem Sozialismus bzw. dem Kommunismus nützt und dem Imperialismus schadet."[29]

Der enge Kontakt zwischen Sozialnorm und kommunistischer Moral liefert die erstere der Tagespolitik bzw. der Parteipolitik aus und macht sie zum Instrument der KP. Die Grundsätze der kommunistischen Moral, und dadurch auch diejenigen der Sozialnormen, welche die Rechtsnormen stufenweise zu ersetzen haben, wurden im "Sittenkodex der Erbauer des Kommunismus"[30] zusammengefaßt: "Treue zur Sache des Kommunismus, Liebe zur sozialistischen Heimat, zu den Ländern des Sozialismus; ... Kollektivgeist und kameradschaftliche gegenseitige Hilfe... Unversöhnlichkeit gegenüber Ungerechtigkeit, Schmarotzertum und Strebertum; ... Unversöhnlichkeit gegenüber den Feinden des Kommunismus, des Friedens und der Völkerfreiheit; brüderliche Solidarität mit den Werktätigen aller Länder, mit allen Völkern". Der wahre Inhalt der Normen der kommunistischen Moral ist jedoch sehr verwischt und unbeständig, gerade durch seine "Parteilichkeit" (Parteigebundenheit); denn *jeder Begriff* ist dialektisch aufzufassen. Ob ein Land "sozialistisch" ist, hängt davon ab, ob es die führende Rolle der UdSSR anerkennt; Bürgerkrieg und gerechte Kriege werden nicht als Friedensstörung betrachtet; die kameradschaftliche Hilfe und der Kollektivgeist erlauben Einzelpersonen und Organen den direkten Eingriff ins Privatleben anderer Personen (Kontrolle = Hilfe).[31] Der Begriff "Volk" erfaßt nicht alle Staatsbürger, die ganze Bevölkerung, sondern nur die "fortschrittlichen" Elemente, welche sich für die sozialistisch-kommunistische Entwicklung einsetzen[32] usw.; Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit usw. sind Klassenbegriffe, ebenso der Begriff Krieg.

Es ist Aufgabe der die Sozialnormen schaffenden Gesellschaftsorganisationen, Produzenten- und Wohnkollektive, die Sozialnormen den angeführten Prinzipien der kommunistischen Moral genau anzupassen; denn in diesen kommt die von der Partei entdeckte objektive Gesetzmässigkeit der Entwicklung zum Ausdruck. Da aber die kommunistische Moral eine zeitlich und örtlich verschiedene Haltung verlangt, muß auch die Sozialnorm örtlich und zeitlich verschiedenen Inhalt aufweisen. Die

Prinzipien der kommunistischen Moral können nur mit Hilfe der Dialektik, unter Berücksichtigung der Parteibeschlüsse und der allgemeinen Parteilinie dem gegebenen Moment und Milieu angepaßt werden; deshalb ist auch die Anwendung der Sozialnorm ohne dialektisches Denken und ohne Parteilinie unvorstellbar. Ihr praktischer Wert für die Partei liegt gerade darin, daß ihr Inhalt dem Milieu immer angepaßt werden kann.

Als Beispiel für eine typische Sozialnorm kann eine, von einem Kameradschaftsgericht aufgestellte These erwähnt werden: "Jene Person, die sich in ihrem Privatleben von den Überresten der Vergangenheit nicht befreien kann, darf nicht als Leiter oder Erzieher anderer Werktätiger arbeiten."[33] Durch die Sozialnormen des erwähnten Charakters kann z.B. den religiös oder nationalistisch eingestellten Personen das Recht genommen werden, eine bessere, ihrer Fähigkeit entsprechende Stellung zu erhalten. Es besteht kein Zweifel, daß eine Verwaltungswillkür durch solche Sozialnormen und elastische Rechtsnormen viel leichter aufrechterhalten werden kann, als durch genaue Rechtsnormen, bei welchen doch gewisse Tatbestandselemente vorhanden sein müssen. Noch gefährlicher ist es, daß auch die Grundrechte des Individuums, die Freiheitsrechte, stufenweise zu Sozialnormen werden müssen[34], wodurch ihnen sowohl die auch heute labilen Inhaltselemente, als auch der beschränkte staatliche Schutz verweigert werden können.

Die "Regeln des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens"[35] stellen die wichtigsten Sozialnormen dar; denn sie regulieren eine bestimmte Sphäre der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen selbständig. In der Rechtswissenschaft gibt es Meinungen, wonach diese Regeln als zusätzliche, subsidiäre Rechtsquellen zu betrachten seien. Es sind vor allem die bulgarischen Juristen, M. Geovskij und A. Popov, die in ihrem Werk diese Meinung vertreten. Der Auffassung der tschechoslowakischen Juristen entsprechend erfassen die Regeln des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens die wichtigsten sozialen und ideologischen Normen und Anschauungen der sozialistischen Gesellschaft. Es gibt auch eine dritte Gruppe der Sowjet- bzw. volksdemokratischen Juristen, die behaupten: die Normen des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens seien im weiteren Sinne des Wortes Sozialnormen, im engeren Sinne enthielten sie nur jene Verhaltensnormen, welche als Rechtsnorm nicht erlassen würden. Einer vierten Auffassung entsprechend

bilden diese Regeln ein selbständiges System der Sozialnormen, die in den Volksmassen als Folge des steigenden politischen und juristischen Rechtsbewußtseins entstanden; sie bilden den Kontakt zwischen sozialistischem Recht und kommunistischer Moral. Die Regeln des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens entsprechen also den künftigen Normen des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens. Der Unterschied beschränkt sich darauf, daß die ersten die Handlungen und die Haltung des Menschen in einer Periode regeln, in welcher es auch noch Recht gibt. Im Fall der Verletzung dieser Regeln wird der gesellschaftliche – und nicht der staatliche – Zwang in Aktion treten.

In Zukunft werden immer mehr gesellschaftliche Organe errichtet, welche die Fälle der Verletzung der kommunistischen bzw. sozialistischen Lebensnormen erörtern. Im Altajer Grenzgebiet (Russische Föderation) wurden z.B. "Ältestensowjets" errichtet, die in den Angelegenheiten der Verletzung der Arbeitsdisziplin, der Produktion von schlechter Qualität, bei kleinen Diebstählen, bei schlechtem Benehmen im Privatleben usw. Entscheidungen fällen.[36] Für die Garantie der Einhaltung der Rechtsnormen und Sozialnormen (Normen des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens) werden auch die Kameradschaftsgerichte eingesetzt, welche die Einhaltung der Sozialnormen durch staatlich garantierte gesellschaftliche Maßnahmen erzwingen. Von größter Bedeutung sind jedoch die Kollektive der kommunistischen Arbeit (Brigaden, Werkstätte, Betriebe und Städte der kommunistischen Arbeit); die gesellschaftlichen Maßnahmen werden im letzterwähnten Fall nicht von jenen Gesellschaftsorganen gefällt, denen Staatsfunktionen übertragen wurden, sondern von einem Produzentenkollektiv. Infolgedessen tragen die Entscheide einen rein gesellschaftlichen Charakter. Das Kollektiv kontrolliert das Privatleben seiner Mitglieder, vor allem die Kindererziehung[37] und erörtert alle Verletzungen der undefinierbaren, ihren Inhalt ständig wechselnden Normen des sozialistischen bzw. kommunistischen Zusammenlebens in Anwesenheit aller Kollektivmitglieder, wobei den für schuldig gefundenen Mitgliedern eine gesellschaftliche "Strafe" verhängt wird.[38]

Nebenbei soll erwähnt werden, daß die Verletzung der Regeln des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens auch gewisse rechtliche Folgen nach sich ziehen kann: Kündigung der Wohnung, Verfahren vor Staatsbürgerversammlung gegen die Schmarotzer, die "Parasiten". Im letzten Fall werden die für schuldig gefundenen Personen auf Grund des Urteils

der Staatsbürgerversammlung, nach seiner Bestätigung durch den Bezirkssowjet, deportiert[39], wobei man betonen muß, daß "Parasitentum" auch einen strafrechtlichen Tatbestand darstellt (wenn es gewisse, dialektisch festzustellende Grenzen überschritten hat).

Die künftige Entwicklung der Rechtsnormen verläuft also in Richtung des Hinüberwachsens in Sozialnormen, in "Regeln der kommunistischen Gesellschaftsordnung" oder in "Normen der kommunistischen Moral.[40] Dabei wird ein Teil der Rechtsnormen vollständig verschwinden, der andere Teil soll, zusammen mit anderen Sozialnormen, mit den Normen der Moral usw. ins einheitliche System der Normen des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens umgewandelt werden, heißt es in der Theorie.

Das Hinüberwachsen des Rechtes soll in verschiedenen Formen vor sich gehen:

1. Heute kommt das stufenweise Hinüberwachsen hauptsächlich in einer inneren Umgestaltung der Rechtsnormen zum Ausdruck: im Recht entsteht eine Anhäufung von Elementen, welche die spätere kommunistische Regulierung charakterisieren werden (breite Teilnahme der Massen an der Rechtsschaffung durch Diskussion über die Gesetzesentwürfe, Erlassung gewisser *Rechtsnormen* durch gesellschaftliche Organe usw.). Die sich anhäufenden quantitativen Änderungen sollen letzten Endes zu qualitativen Änderungen führen: die Rechtsnormen verlieren ihren rechtlichen – politischen – Charakter. Der Sowjetstaat verzichtet stufenweise auf das Monopol der Erlassung von Normativakten (nach propagandistischer Behauptung): gewisse Gebiete des Arbeitsrechtes und des Sozialversicherungsrechtes werden von den Gewerkschaften (auf Grund von staatlichen Vollmachten) reguliert, wobei diese Vollmachten natürlich jeden Moment entzogen werden können.[41] Die von den Gesellschaftsorganisationen erlassenen Verhaltensnormen (Sozialnormen) sind: (a) "Direktiv-Normen", (b) Normen organisatorischen Charakters, die nur die gegebene Gesellschaftsorganisation oder ihre Organe verpflichten und (c) Rechtsnormen.

Eine spezielle Gruppe der Rechtsnormen (c) gilt als politisches Direktiv an die Staatsorgane. Diese werden von Parteiorganen geschaffen, und die Erfüllung der Direktiven durch die Staatsorgane ist kraft der verfassungsmäßig (Art. 126) verankerten führenden Rolle der Partei im Staat obligatorisch. Mit der führenden Rolle der KP hängt auch zu-

sammen, daß der Kreis jener Rechtsverhältnisse, in welchen die Gesellschaftsorganisationen als Rechtssubjekte auftreten, ständig erweitert wird.[42]

Das Hinüberwachsen des Rechtes wird auch durch eine innere Entwicklung begleitet, bei welcher der Inhalt der Rechtsnormen durch die Annäherung zu den Sozialnormen "vervollkommnet" wird: ihre Anwendung wird im Sinne der kommunistischen Moral vorgenommen. Der normensetzende Charakter der juristischen Regelung wird beim stufenweisen Hinüberwachsen der Rechtsnormen in Regeln des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens beibehalten, die Rechtsnormen bzw. ihr Inhalt werden aber elastischer, beweglicher, auf Kosten der konstanten Tatbestandselemente. Dieses elastische, sich dem jeweiligen Milieu anpassende Recht wird die Bedingungen für die vielseitige Entwicklung der Sowjetmenschen immer mehr direkt schaffen. In dieser Entwicklung sollen die Gerichte eine wichtige Rolle spielen.[43]

2. Das ideale sozialistische Recht muß also elastisch werden, wobei die Lücken der rechtlichen Regelung durch eine dialektische Anwendung ersetzt werden müssen. Die Justizorgane müssen gegen die fertigen Schemen, die Schablonen, bei der Rechtsanwendung kämpfen: eine Interpretierung, welche an einem Ort und in einem gewissen Zeitpunkt richtig ist, kann zu einem anderen Zeitpunkt bzw. an einem anderen Ort unrichtig sein und umgekehrt.[44] Der Richter muß sich nach seinem "sozialistischen Rechtsbewußtsein"[45] richten, und dadurch verschwindet die Atmosphäre der Sicherheit im Gerichtssaal.

3. Immer mehr Gebiete des sozialen Lebens werden durch Sozialnormen geregelt, und zwar entweder so, daß Staats- und Gesellschaftsorgane die Regelung untereinander aufteilen (Hauptprobleme werden durch Rechtsnormen geregelt) oder so, daß auf gewissen Gebieten des Staatslebens der staatliche Zwang durch die an Bedeutung zunehmenden Sozialnormen ausgeschaltet wird[46]; die sozialistischen und kommunistischen Überbauelemente (Recht und Sozialnorm) werden stufenweise ineinanderfließen.[47]

In der erwähnten Normensetzung und Gerichtsbarkeit durch Gesellschaftsorgane, wenn diese auch nur auf Grund von staatlichen Vollmachten ausgeübt werden können, zeigt sich deutlich jene Rolle der künftigen Gesellschaftsorganisationen, welche ihnen im Vollkommunismus zukommen soll.

Das Hinüberwachsen stellt einerseits einen langen Entwicklungsweg dar, andererseits ist es eine komplizierte, dialektische Entwicklung, die mit der Erweiterung der Rolle des Rechtes(!) verbunden sein soll. Nicht nur Rechtsnormen werden zu Sozialnormen, zu Normen des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens, sondern umgekehrt, auch letztere können auf den Rang einer sozialistischen Rechtsnorm erhöht werden: administrative oder sogar strafrechtliche Verantwortung wegen Verweigerung der gemeinnützigen Arbeit, wegen antisozialen, parasitischen Lebenswandels, strafrechtliche Verantwortung wegen nachlässiger Bedienung von Landmaschinen oder ihrer nachlässigen Instandhaltung usw. Die Fachliteratur betont, daß es notwendig ist, den Bereich der rechtlichen Regelung manchmal zu erweitern, um die Aufgaben des kommunistischen Aufbaus zu erfüllen.[48]

Jener Teil der Sozialnormen, der die Regeln des sozialistisch-kommunistischen Zusammenlebens umfaßt, ist meist auf die Beschlüsse der Partei oder anderer Gesellschaftsorganisationen zurückzuführen.[49] Man muß zwischen primären und sekundären (abgeleiteten) Sozialnormen unterscheiden, wobei als primäre Normen immer und unter allen Umständen jene der Partei zu betrachten sind. Gemäß dem Standpunkt der Rechtswissenschaft, der auch auf die Praxis sicher einen großen Einfluß ausübt bzw. ausüben wird, ist der Staat eigentlich verpflichtet, jede Sozialnorm, in welcher der Kollektivwille des "Volkes" zum Ausdruck kommt, als Rechtsnorm zu behandeln.[50] Die Partei handelt im Namen des Volkes und bringt den Volkswillen zum Ausdruck; deshalb sind ihre Beschlüsse für alle Staatsorgane verpflichtend.[51] Die Staatsorgane dürfen nicht warten, bis eine, in einem Parteibeschluß erlassene Maßnahme von den Staatsorganen übernommen wird und als obligatorische staatliche Norm (Rechtsnorm) in Form eines Gesetzes oder einer Verordnung erscheint. Sie müssen den Parteibeschluß bzw. die in ihm enthaltenen Normen als Rechtsnorm betrachten (Parteirecht = inneres Staatsrecht) und diese vollziehen, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob es sich um den Beschluß des Zentralkomitees oder eines lokalen Parteiorganes handelt.[52]

Auch den "technischen Normen" muß Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet werden. Bis vor kurzem behauptete die juristische Literatur, daß diese Normen, da sie die Beziehungen zwischen Menschen und Objekten der Natur,

der Technik usw. regeln, mit den Sozialnormen nichts Gemeinsames haben. In letzter Zeit jedoch wird die Auffassung revidiert: auch die technischen Normen haben einen sozialen Inhalt und werden deshalb als Sozialnormen anerkannt.[53] Der Unterschied zwischen technischen Normen und den Regeln des sozialistisch-kommunistischen Zusammenlebens besteht darin, daß im Vollkommunismus die letzterwähnten direkt von einzelnen Organisationen der Gesellschaft (Partei, Sowjets, vor allem Produzentenkollektive) erlassen werden. Jene Organe, die die Rechtsnormen erliessen, werden vollständig verschwinden. Die technischen Normen müssen aber auch in Zukunft von Fachleuten ausgearbeitet und erlassen werden. Bei den Regeln des sozialistisch-kommunistischen Zusammenlebens wird also die spezielle Gruppe der Menschen, welche die diesen Regeln früher entsprechenden Rechtsnormen schafften, ihren Platz den Kollektiven übergeben; die spezielle Gruppe wird aber für die Erarbeitung der "technischen Normen" auch im Vollkommunismus nicht beseitigt.[54]

Die neue Entwicklung der sowjetischen Rechtstheorie kann mit den Lehren der "Klassiker" sehr schwer in Einklang gebracht werden. Engels erklärte in seinem *Antidühring* die Lehre des freien Volksstaates als eine Phrase, die keine wissenschaftliche Basis hat, denn der Staat kann weder frei sein noch über den Klassen stehen, zum gesamten Volk gehören.[55] Die Sowjetjuristen sind bemüht, die neue Lehre unter Berufung auf Lenins Werk "Staat und Revolution" zu rechtfertigen.

Die Lehre wird aber innerhalb des "sozialistischen Lagers" sowohl von links als auch von rechts kritisiert und abgelehnt. Es sind besonders die chinesischen Kommunisten, die die neue sowjetische Staats- und Rechtslehre am schärfsten kritisieren und angreifen: "Es sind lediglich die bürgerlichen Elemente, welche versuchen, den Klassencharakter des Staates (und natürlich auch des Rechtes – *LR*) zu leugnen und den Staat (und auch das Recht – *LR*) als ein über den Klassen stehendes Geschöpf darzustellen".[56] Nach chinesischer Auffassung müssen Staat und Recht ihren Klassencharakter bis zum Moment ihres Absterbens aufrechterhalten. Der Übergang vom Kapitalismus zum Kommunismus kann eine große Verschiedenheit von politischen Formen aufweisen, sein Wesen ist aber unvermeidbar das gleiche: die Diktatur des Proletariats.

Die jugoslawische Theorie lehnt hingegen die Idee der Stärkung des

Staates und des Rechtes vor ihrem Absterben grundsätzlich ab und beschränkt die Rolle des Staates, des Rechtes und der Partei.[57]

## ANMERKUNGEN

1. Buchalov, Ju. Kulikov, I. N., Partolin, M. N.: 'O razvitii nastrojki sovetskogo obščestva v period razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma' (Über die Entwicklung des Überbaus der sowjetischen Gesellschaft in der Periode des entfalteten Aufbaus des Kommunismus). *FN* 1961, 2, 171–173.
2. Nikolaev, V. V.: 'O putjach razvitija sovetskoj socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti v kommunističeskoe obščestvennoe samoupravlenie' (Über die Entwicklungswege der sowjetischen sozialistischen Staatlichkeit in die kommunistische Selbstverwaltung). In: *Ot socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti k kommunističeskomu obščestvennomu samoupravleniju* (Von der sozialistischen Staatlichkeit zur kommunistischen gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung). M. 1961, 12–13, 44.
3. Ebenda, S. 12.
4. "Die Staats- und Rechtslehre löst neue Aufgaben des Aufbaus der entwickelten sozialistischen Staatlichkeit und des sozialistischen Rechtes". *Pravnik*, Prag, 1962, Nr. 5, 333–343.
5. Vgl. z.B. Lukaševa, E. A.: 'O vospitanii pravosoznanija i pravovoj kul'tury v period razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma' (Über die Förderung des Rechtsbewußtseins und der Rechtskultur in der Periode des entfalteten kommunistischen Aufbaus). *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (SGiP)*. M. 1962, 7, 35–46.
   Ferner: Galešnik, L. S.: 'Obščenarodnoe pravo i vospitanie kommunističeskoj soznatel'nosti' (Das Recht des gesamten Volkes und die Erziehung zum kommunistischen Bewußtsein). *SGiP* 1962, 9, 26–35, usw.
6. Diese Definition von Joffe und Šargorodskij wird jedoch vom polnischen Rechtstheoretiker Kowalski abgelehnt: Kowalski, Jerzy: 'Przyczynek do rozważan nad projeciem prawa' (Ein Beitrag zur Prüfung des Rechtsbegriffes). *Pantswo i prawo*, Warschau, 1964, 1, 563–571.
7. Vgl. Aleksandrov, N. G.: 'Razvitie socialističeskogo prava v normy kommunističeskogo obščežitija' (Die Entwicklung des sozialistischen Rechtes in Normen des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens). *SGiP* 1961, 9, 27–36, besonders S. 30.
8. Krut'ko, N.: 'Rukovodjaščaja rol' rabočego klassa v period razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma' (Die führende Rolle der Arbeiterklasse in der Periode des entfalteten kommunistischen Aufbaus). *Kommunist Belorussii*, Minsk, 1962, 6, 18–24.
9. Alekseev, S. S.: 'O suščnosti obščenarodnogo prava' (Über das Wesen des Rechtes des gesamten Volkes). *SGiP* 1963, 4, 45–59.
10. Aleksandrov, N. G.: 'Obščenarodnoe pravo – novyj etap v razvitii socialističeskogo prava' (Das Recht des gesamten Volkes ist ein neuer Abschnitt der Entwicklung des sozialistischen Rechtes). *SGiP* 1962, 9, 16–25.
11. Galešnik, a.a.O.
12. Halász, Pál: 'A szocialista jog és erkölcs viszonyának néhány kérdése' (Einige Fragen des Verhältnisses zwischen sozialistischen Recht und Moral). *Társadalmi szemle*, Budapest, 1961, 3, 41–51.
13. Aleksandrov: Die Entwicklung des sozialistischen Rechtes.
14. Davletkel'cev, A.: 'Razvitie XXI s'ezdem KPSS učenija o socialističeskom

gosudarstve' (Die Entwicklung der Lehre über den sozialistischen Staat durch den XXI. Kongreß der KPdSU). *Kommunist*, 1959, 14, 35.

15. Karapetjan, L. M. und Razin, V. I.: 'Ob issledovanii razvitija socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti' (Über die Erforschung der Entwicklung der sozialistischen Staatlichkeit). *VF* 1961, 6, 154–161.
    Ferner: das umfangreiche Buch über diesen Kongress: '*Ot socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti k kommunističeskomu samoupravleniju*' (Von der socialistischen Staatlichkeit zur kommunistischen Selbstverwaltung). M. 1961.
16. Petrov, G. I., Petrov, V. S.: 'Socialističeskaja gosudarstvennost' i obščestvennost'' (Die sozialistische Staatlichkeit und Gesellschaft). *Izvestija vysših učebnych zavedenij*. Pravovedenie, Leningrad, 1961, 2, 12–21.
17. Vajčuk, V. A.: 'Razvitie socialističeskoj gosudarstvennosti v kommunističeskoe obščestvennoe samoupravlenie' (Die Entwicklung der sozialistischen Staatlichkeit in die kommunistische gesellschaftliche Selbstverwaltung). *FN* 1962, 5, 160–164.
18. Partei, Gewerkschaft, DOSAAF (Freiwillige Vereinigung zur Zusammenarbeit mit den Streitkräften, der Luftwaffe und der Kriegsmarine), KOMSOMOL, Gesellschaft für Verbreitung von politischen und Sozialwissenschaften usw.
19. Belych, A. K.: 'O dialektike otmiranija gosudarstva' (Über die Dialektik des Absterbens des Staates). *SGiP*, 1963, 1, 18.
20. Denisov, A. I.: 'O sootnošenii gosudarstva i obščestva v perechodnyj ot kapitalizmu period' (Über das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft in der Periode des Übergangs vom Kapitalismus zum Kommunismus). *SGiP*, 1960, 4, 20 ff.
21. Vgl. Man'kovskij, B. S.: 'O povyšenii roli obščestvennych organizacii v stroitel'stve kommunizma' (Über die Erweiterung der Rolle der Gesellschaftsorganisationen im Aufbau des Kommunismus). In: *Von der sozialistischen Staatlichkeit*, 125–129.
    Ferner: Man'kovskij: 'Povyšenie roli obščestvennych organizacij v rešenie gosudarstvennych voprosov' (Erweiterung der Rolle der Gesellschaftsorganisationen in der Lösung von staatlichen Problemen). *VF* 1961, 4, 36–46.
    Petrov, V. S.: 'Nekotorye voprosy teorii socialističeskogo gosudarstva' (Einige Fragen der Theorie des sozialistischen Staates). *Iszvestija vysših učebnych zavedenij*. Pravovedenie, Leningrad, 1961, 4, 3–15.
    Samoščenko, N. S.: 'Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i obščestvennye organizacii' (Der Sowjetstaat und die gesellschaftlichen Organisationen). *SGiP*, 1960, 4, 140–144.
    Nedbajlo, P. E., Beršeda, R. V.: 'Primenenie pravovych norm kollektivami i samodejatel'nymi organizacijami sovetskich graždan' (Anwendung der Rechtsnormen durch die Kollektive und die selbsttätigen Organisationen der Sowjetbürger). *SGiP*, 1961, 5, 30–38.
22. Galešnik, a.a.O.
23. Pigolkin, A. S.: 'Normy prava i pravila kommunističeskogo obščežitija' (Die Rechtsnormen und die Regeln des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens). *Sovetskaja justicija*, M. 1961, 20, 3–5.
24. Trofimov, N. A.: 'O perspektivach razvitija morali i prava v ich vzaimnom otnošenii (Über die Perspektiven der Entwicklung der Moral und des Rechtes in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis). *VF* 1962, 5, 23–29.

24a. Halász, a.a.O.

25. Vgl. Nikolaev, V. V., a.a.O.
26. Stalin, J.: 'Die Ergebnisse der ersten Fünfjahresplanes. Bericht auf dem vereinigten Plenum des ZK und der ZKK der KPdSU (B) am 7. Januar 1933'. In: *Fragen des Leninismus*, M. 477.

*Teorija gosudarstva i prava* (Staats- und Rechtstheorie). M., 1948, 500.
'Über die Kontrollziffern für die Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft der UdSSR in den Jahren 1959 bis 1965'. Die Rede von Chruščev auf dem XXI. Parteitag der KPdSU am 27.1.1959.
*Neues Deutschland,* Berlin/Ost, 29–30. Jan., 1959 (Sonderbeilage).

27. Galešnik, a.a.O.
28. Révész, László: *Friedliche Koexistenz?* Olten, 1964, S. 47.
29. Schumann, Horst, Sekretär des Freien Deutschen Jugendverbandes: 'Nravstvenno to, čto služit kommunizmu' (Moralisch ist, was dem Kommunismus dient). *Molodoj Kommunist,* M., 1962, 8, 119–123.
30. Programm der KPdSU: Teil 2, Kapitel V. Punkt 1. – Statut der KPdSU: Art. 58 Punkt 6. (Angenommen Beide am 31. 10. 1961 am XXII. Parteikongreß).
31. Révész, a.a.O.
32. Ašin, G.: 'Kakovo soderžanie ponjatija "narod" v istoričeskom materializme' (Was ist der Inhalt des Begriffes "Volk" im historischen Materialismus). *Političeskoe samoobrazoyanie,* M., 1964, 7, 62–65.
Patrzalek, Aleksander: *Institucje prawa wyborczego Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej* (Die Institutionen des Wahlrechtes der Polnischen Volksrepublik). Warschau, 1963. – Vgl. die Rezension von Zigmunt Izdebski: *Pantswo i prawo,* 1964, 5–6, 902–904. Der Verfasser des Buches behauptete (S.6), daß Volk und Bevölkerung nicht den gleichen Begriff darstellen, was allerdings vom Rezensenten des Buches abgelehnt wird.
33. Buchtijarov, A.: 'Utverždaem princip: "Kto ne rabotaet tot ne est"' (Wir bestätigen das Prinzip: "Wer nicht arbeitet soll auch nicht essen"). *Agitator,* M. 1961, 6, 50–60.
34. Halasz, a.a.O.
35. Vgl. V. V. Nikolaev, a.a.O.
36. Vgl. Maizenberg, A. M.: 'O razvitii norm socialističeskogo obščežitija v edinye pravila kommunističeskogo obščežitija' (Über die Entwicklung der Normen des sozialistischen Zusammenlebens in einheitliche Regeln des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens). *SGiP,* 1961, 12, 26–35.
37. Vgl. 'Voprosy vospitatel'noj raboty v kollektivach kommunističeskogo truda' (Die Fragen der erzieherischen Arbeit in den Kollektiven der kommunistischen Arbeit). Vypusk I. Krasnojarsk, 1961, 38.
Echin, P.: 'Obobščenie opyta sorevnovanija za kommunističeskij trud' (Verallgemeinerung der Erfahrung des Wettbewerbes für kommunistische Arbeit). *Trud i zarabotnaja plata.* M. 1962, 4, 8–13.
38. *Bakinskij rabočij,* Baku, 3 März, 1964, 1. Echin, a.a.O.
39. Vgl. *Komsomolskaja pravda,* M. 7 Sept., 1960. – *Šargorodskij,* M. D., Sluckij, I. I., Beljaev, N. A.: '*Sovetskoe ugolovnoe pravo. Čast' osobennaja*' (Sowjetisches Strafrecht. Besonderer Teil). Leningrad, 1959, 359–61.
*Sovetskaja Kirigizija,* Frunze, 19 Feb., 1959; *Turkmenskaja iskra,* Aščhabad, 26 Okt., 1960; *Sovetskaja Kirgizija,* 9 Juni, 1960; *Kommunist,* Erevan (ZK-Blatt der KP von Sowjetarmenien), 9 Dez., 1959, usw.
40. Alekseev, S. S.: 'O pererastanii sovetskogo prava v system norm kommunističeskogo obščežitija' (Über das Hinüberwachsen des Sowjetrechtes in ein System der Normen des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens). *SGiP,* 1962, 5, 18–26.
Kerimov, V. A.: 'Rukovodjaščaja rol' KPSS v pravotvorčeskoj dejatel'nosti sovetskogo gosudarstva' (Die führende Rolle der KPdSU in der rechtsschaffenden Tätigkeit des Sowjetstaates). *SGiP,* 1961, 10, 77–85.

41. 'Pererastanie norm prava v pravila kommunističeskogo obščežitija' (Die Umwandlung der Rechtsnormen in Regeln des kommunistischen Zusammenlebens). *Sovetskaja justicija,* M. 1964, 21, 1–3.
42. Jampolskaja, C. A.: 'Wplyw prawa na dzialalnosc organizacji spolecznych w ZSSR' (Der Einfluß des Rechtes auf die Tätigkeit der Gesellschaftsorganisationen in der UdSSR). *Pantswo i prawo,* 1964, 5-6, 760–770.
43. Ebenda.
44. Lebedev, M. P.: 'Ob effektivnosti vozdejstvija socialističeskogo prava na obščestvennye otnošenija' (Über den effektiven Einfluß des sozialistischen Rechtes auf die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse). *SGiP,* 1963, 1, 22–31.
45. Révész, a.a.O.
46. Nedbajlo-Berševa, a.a.O.
47. Nikolaev, a.a.O. 14.
48. Alekseev, a.a.O.
49. Dravčenko, V. B.: 'O charaktere norm sozdavaemych dobrovol'nymi obščestvami' (Über den Charakter der von den freiwilligen Gesellschaftsorganisationen erlassenen Normen). *SGiP,* 1960, 8, 22–31.
50. Stepanov, I. M.: 'Demokratičeskie osnovy pravotvorčestva v SSSR' (Die demokratischen Grundlagen der Rechtsschaffung in der Sowjetunion). *SGiP,* 1960, 4, 89–95.
    Ferner: Jampolskaja, a.a.O.
    Semenov, V. M.: 'Principy sovetskogo socialističeskogo obščenarodnogo prava' (Die Prinzipien des sowjetischen sozialistischen Rechtes des gesamten Volkes). *Izvestija vysšich učebnych zavedenij.* Pravovedenie, Leningrad, 1964, 1, 16–26.
51. Révész, a.a.O.
52. Wie Anmerkung 50.
53. Alekseev, a.a.O. 14–26.
54. Antonova, L. I.: 'Nekotorye voprosy teorii pravotvorčestva' (Einige Fragen der Theorie der Rechtsschaffung). *Izvestija vysšich učebnych zavedenij.* Pravovedenie, Leningrad, 1963, 3, 14–22.
55. Marx-Engels: *Werke* (Sočinenija). M., II. Aufl. Bd. XIX, 27–29.
56. Die chinesische Kritik vgl. im Redaktionsartikel von *Jen-min Jih-pao* und *Hung-ch'i,* Peking, 13 Juli, 1964.
57. Vgl. Perovic, Mirko: '*Socijalizam i odmiranje države – Teorija i praksa*' (Der Sozialismus und das Absterben des Staates – Theorie und Praxis). Belgrad, 1959, 86 ff. Vgl. das Parteiprogramm des Bundes der Kommunisten Jugoslawiens: Gasteyer, Curt: *Die feindlichen Brüder,* Bern, 1960, s. 284–310, besonders die Seiten 300–301.
    Die sowjetische Kritik bezüglich der jugoslavischen Lehre über das Absterben des Staates und Rechtes vgl.: Denisov, A. I.: '*O nekotorych revizionistskich koncepcijach gosudarstva i prava*' (Über einige revisionistische Konzeptionen des Staates und des Rechtes). M. 1960, besonders 118–139.

R. J. KEMBALL

# NINETEENTH- AND EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIAN THOUGHT A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

## I. INTRODUCTORY

"Quand ils ont longtemps et glorieusement vécu, les peuples, quoi qu'ils fassent, ne sauraient rompre avec leur passé; ils subissent son influence au moment même où ils travaillent à le détruire; ... Il n'y a point de révolution, si hardie et si puissante qu'elle soit, qui abolisse les longues traditions nationales. Il importe donc grandement, non seulement pour la satisfaction des esprits, mais pour la bonne conduite des nations dans leurs affaires, que ces traditions soient bien connues et bien comprises."

Thus wrote Guizot, historian and statesman, thinker and man of action, over one hundred years ago.[1] He had in mind, of course, first and foremost, the French Revolution. To-day, what the world has long since learned and accepted concerning the French Revolution has been – or is in the process of being – learned with respect to the Russian Revolution also; and Guizot's words are quoted by Hans Kohn, in the Preface to his anthology of Russian 19th- and early 20th-century thought, in support of Kohn's own contention that, in its historical setting, "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ... cannot be understood without a knowledge of the political and social thought of its predecessors".[2]

Such a statement probably strikes the trained historian as a truism bordering on the platitudinous. Yet, applied to pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, this thesis was, in earlier days, by no means so readily accepted, either in the USSR itself (did even the change of name have something to do with it?!) or among Western specialists. Time, experience, and the logic of events have all combined to alter this, and to prove the underlying truth of Guizot's assertion. As a result, to-day – irrespective of the related, but separate, problem of what reflects "change" and what "continuity" as between pre- and post-1917 Russia – the futility and even the impossibility of grasping or interpreting develop-



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

ments in the latter without reference to the former is now widely recognised.

In no field does this apply more than in that of Russian thought, ideas, and ideology. In his penetrating and original study of *The Origin of Russian Communism*, Berdjaev begins by stressing its twofold nature: "On the one hand it is international and a world phenomenon; on the other hand it is national and Russian." It is the latter – national – aspect which runs like a unifying thread through his book, and it is this aspect which, by implication, he considers to be insufficiently appreciated in the West. "It is particularly important for Western minds to understand the national roots of Russian Communism and the fact that it was Russian history which determined its limits and shaped its character. A knowledge of Marxism will not help in this."[3]

Basically the same idea – albeit from a rather different standpoint – was expressed by a critic recently when he wrote that the present-day student of Russia, "having come to agree with Byron that the best prophet of the future is the past, ... is no longer convinced, for example, that an understanding of Marx is the key to an understanding of Russian Marxism".[4]

It is this realisation, in the same critic's view, which helps to explain the "increasing attention [paid] to the political thought that preceded the events of 1917" and "the existence of a number of valuable scholarly studies dealing with the ideas and political thinkers of pre-revolutionary Russia".[5]

"Perhaps no area of Russian history outside of the Soviet period," writes another critic, "has been written on more extensively in Western languages than nineteenth-century intellectual history."[6]

This statement certainly seems to apply to English-language studies, where the literature that has appeared since the end of World War II is very considerable. In a Preface to his bibliography of works in English on Russian history (in its widest sense), David Shapiro wrote (1962): "Probably on no other non-English speaking country is there such a mass of recent scholarly writing in English, at least on relatively modern history" (i.e. as on Russia).[7] Within this wider field, he found that the themes which had attracted the most recent scholarly work in English were studies of the revolutionary movements and of social and political thought.[8]

Encouraging as this development undoubtedly is in one respect, it also entails certain drawbacks. In the first place, quantity has not always been matched by quality: "... too little has been said that goes much beyond what had already been said in Russian by critics of the last decades of the old regime. New materials have come to light, often better critical editions have been published, but understanding of the deeper motivation of the movement has not advanced apace."[9]

In the second place, as Horecky [1] points out in the Introduction to another valuable bibliography (of publications in Russian) of which he is general editor: "The growing proliferation and differentiation of published materials creates acute problems in the field of Russian and Soviet area studies. ... Even in relatively circumscribed fields of specialisation, the serious student cannot cover the entire spectrum of his subject and is inevitably haunted by the misgiving that some material germane to his activity may be bypassed."[10]

Both these difficulties invite the same remedy – namely, the drawing up of a *selective*, rather than a (would-be) exhaustive, list of relevant and worthwhile studies in the field. This has been the underlying aim of the present writer in compiling this study and the bibliography which accompanies it (*vide infra*, pp. 114ff).[11]

*Limits of the Present Study*

*Basic limits.* Basically and primarily speaking, the present study covers (selected) works in English and in Russian (Soviet and 'Western') dealing with various aspects of Russian 19th- and early 20th-century thought and history of ideas, published between 1945 and 1964 inclusive.[12]

*Exceptions.* In the event, neither the linguistic nor the chronological limitations have been slavishly adhered to where there seemed sound reasons for disregarding or extending them.

*Linguistically*, the study also includes a number of works in French and German (and occasionally other European languages) where these are considered as making a contribution not covered – or not covered in quite the same way – by works in English or Russian. In addition, French or German (more rarely, Spanish or Italian) translations or versions of important English or Russian originals are also mentioned on occasion.

*Chronologically,* isolated works prior to 1945 are included where these are considered essential to a basic understanding of the theme in question,

and have no equivalent in post-1945 studies. (Obvious examples are the fundamental Catholic and Marxist studies of the Slavophils by Gratieux ([1], 1939) and by Rubinštejn (1927) respectively.)[13]

## II. GENERAL WORKS COVERING MORE OR LESS THE ENTIRE PERIOD

A leading place among general studies of the period under review still belongs to Thomas Masaryk's monumental study, *The Spirit of Russia.* Originally published in German in 1913, it was republished in Prague between 1930 and 1933, with the addition of only a minimum of historical and bibliographical matter (at Masaryk's own request). It remains as timeless as any study of this type can well hope to do, and its importance and continued relevance to the history of Russian intellectual thought is borne out by its republication in English (after the 1933 edition) in 1955, with a further reprint in 1961. With all the studies – many of them of great value – that have appeared since, Shapiro still rates it "the best survey,"[14] and it certainly remains a fundamental and essential study in the field.[15] Originally it was conceived as a study of Dostoevskij, but Masaryk soon came to realise "that it would be impossible to do justice to Dostoevskij without discussing his predecessors and successors, and that this would involve the consideration of the chief problems of the history of Russian literature, of the religious and philosophical thought of that country, indeed, of Russian literature in general".[16] In fact, it is even more than this, and the whole of Part II of Masaryk's work – covering over 700 pages out of a total of not quite 1100 – may be regarded as a broad survey of Russian thought and Russian thinkers from Čaadaev onwards.

Another older work of primarily literary origin is the collective study of Russian 19th-century literature edited by D. N. Ovsjaniko-Kulikovskij, the importance of which is likewise reflected in its republication (by photo-reprint) in the U.S.A. in 1948. In examining such thinkers as, say, Belinskij, Černyševskij, and Dobroljubov – all of whom succeeded (they had little choice) in expressing their socio-political ideas through the medium of literary criticism – it is obviously impossible to disregard the history of literature and, *a fortiori*, of literary criticism as such. The work in question contains studies – of rather uneven value, it is true, but many

of them most useful – of these and other 19th-century thinkers, including also Čaadaev, Herzen, Pisarev, and Mixajlovskij.

Of other studies from the cultural sphere, that by Miljukov (English translation [Miliukov] published in the U.S.A. 1942, and again in 1948) is primarily concerned with the arts, but includes important background material on the literature and also the religious thought of the period. The work by V. A. Rjazanovskij [Riasanovsky] includes considerable sections on social thought and philosophy.

One other study with a cultural and philosophical background deserves mention at this stage – Wladimir Weidlé's *La Russie absente et présente*, an English translation of which was published in London and New York in 1952, with a second edition in 1961. In 1956, Weidlé (Vejdle) published a fuller study on the same lines in Russian, under the title *Zadača Rossii*.

Among primarily historical works, some contain sufficient material in the field of ideas to merit inclusion in this study. Thus, N. V. Riasanovsky's recent *History of Russia* [1] contains brief but useful introductory chapters on the social and economic and on the cultural background of the period. The work by Florinskij [1] has been criticised for paying too little attention to the social factors of the historical process[17], but is still considered by many to be the best general history of Russia in English. Kornilov's older history of 19th-century Russia appeared in an English translation in 1943. It is rated highly by N. V. Riasanovsky[18], though S. A. Zen'kovskij considers it now outdated.[19] Either way, there seems little doubt that the most valuable historical work from the point of view of the present study is the *magnum opus* by S. G. Puškarëv (1956), which appeared in an English translation in 1963. A meticulously painstaking and scholarly work, it devotes ample attention to social and ideological problems, at the same time providing a refreshingly new approach to certain questions and destroying, as S. A. Zen'kovskij himself says, "many long-established *clichés* of Russian and Western historiography".[20]

Two interesting symposia containing relevant contributions are those edited by Hugh McLean *et al.* (1957) and by Ernest J. Simmons (1955) respectively. The former contains contributions from 27 post-graduate students of the late Prof. M. Karpovich. Of these, all but three deal with the 19th century or later, and more than half handle themes

covering the intellectual and literary history of the period. These include studies on Pogodin, Ševyrëv, and the Slavophils; Schiller's influence on Belinskij and Herzen; nihilism, utopia, and realism in the thought of Pisarev; Mixajlovskij's attitude towards the U.S.A.; and a study of Russian Liberalism in the 1890's. The second symposium (Simmons) – as its title implies – is devoted to an examination of the problem of continuity and change as between Tsarist and Soviet Russia. Though all concerned with this central theme, the contributions – by thirty different scholars – are subdivided under six main headings, viz.: 'Realism and Utopia in Russian Economic Thought'; 'Authoritarianism and Democracy'; 'Collectivism and Individualism'; 'Rationality and Non-rationality'; 'Literature, State, and Society'; 'Russia and the Community of Nations'. The book includes a valuable general study by A. Gerschenkron on 'The Problem of Economic Development in Russian Intellectual History of the Nineteenth Century'. The other contributions cover a wide range of themes, including: 'Khomiakov (Xomjakov) on *Sobornost'* (N. V. Riasanovsky); 'Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty' (Isaiah Berlin); 'Herzen and the Peasant Commune' (M. E. Malia); 'Populism and Early Russian Marxism on ways of Economic Development of Russia' (S. M. Schwarz); 'Dostoevsky and Danilevsky: Nationalist Messianism' (Hans Kohn); 'Reason and Faith in the Philosophy of Solov'ëv' (G. Florovsky); 'Chernov and Agrarian Socialism before 1918' (O. H. Radkey); 'Leninist Authoritarianism Before the Revolution' (T. T. Hammond); and 'Great Russian Messianism in Postwar Soviet Ideology' (F. C. Barghoorn).[21]

A recent work of considerable importance is Utechin's concise survey of *Russian Political Thought* [2]. Designed primarily for students of politics rather than of Russian history, it claims to be the first English-language text-book in the field. The first two chapters provide an historical introduction (Mediaeval Russia and Muscovite Russia respectively), the third deals with Petrine Russia, and the remainder of the book (from Ch. 4, p. 71, onwards) covers the 19th and 20th centuries, from Čaadaev up to Post-1917 Reformist Trends and Post-Stalin Revolutionism. The author's main concern is "to show the diversity (both in form and substance) of political thinking in Russia rather than to concentrate on a few trends". This means, as he himself admits, that much of the material is perforce treated rather cursorily. "Theories that have recently

been extensively treated in English-language literature receive comparatively little attention, and *vice versa.*" The principal value of this work thus lies in the information it provides on those Russian political thinkers who have previously been accorded little or no attention (at least in the English-language literature); by the opposite token, the reader should not expect to find any important contribution on the better-known thinkers, nor anything very original in the treatment of the subject matter. "Although I have read most of the writings I deal with, I have as a rule followed the interpretations of these writings given by the accepted authorities." Another weakness is what one critic has called the somewhat "encyclopaedic quality" of the work, i.e. the treatment of the various currents of political thought in isolation from one another. The unconventional balance of the work harbours some danger for the reader not previously acquainted with more orthodox studies in the field. For others, however, the book provides useful additional material, and there is justice in the author's claim that "such a reader will gain in the breadth of his knowledge of Russian thought".[22]

Another study of earlier vintage which has stood the test of time – so well that an English translation of the original Russian edition appeared in 1953 and a second Russian edition in 1955 – is V. V. Zen'kovskij's study of *Russian Thinkers and Europe* [1]. Though highly selective as regards the thinkers treated, it marks an important contribution to any study of the problem of "Russia and the West". Far more complete in its own field is Zen'kovskij's larger work [2], which has rightly been hailed as at once the most reliable and the most readable history of Russian philosophy to appear in any language. The fruit of nearly forty years' research and reflection, this study admirably covers the history of Russian philosophical thought from the 18th century onwards (all but the first hundred pages or so in fact deal with the 19th and 20th centuries). The work is available in an admirable English translation (1953) which – aided by Zen'kovskij's own unassuming and uncomplicated style, devoid of technical jargon – makes it eminently readable, *pace* Shapiro's description of it as constituting "very difficult reading".[23] By comparison, N. O. Lossky's study is far less satisfactory.

Other works of a more philosophical trend include the study of Russian 19th-century thought by Koyré (French only, 1950) – author of an earlier study on philosophy and the problem of Nationality in early

19th-century Russia[24] – and Florovskij's *Puti russkago bogoslovija*, which covers a much broader field than its title suggests, and is rated by N. V. Riasanovsky [5] as "one of the most important and thorough studies in the field of Russian intellectual history".[25]

No discussion of Russian philosophical thought or its interpretation would be complete which did not mention Berdjaev, whose study of *The Origin of Russian Communism* [1] is of immense and fundamental importance. Berdjaev's early contact with Marxism, his acquaintance with so many key personalities, his knowledge and understanding of the motives underlying their ideas and beliefs, his profoundly human sympathy for those who differ or differed from him – all these factors lend tremendous weight to his own views and interpretation of trends and developments. Profoundly influenced later by Slavophil thought (though by no means always in agreement with it, e.g. as regards the Petrine reforms), Berdjaev stresses the essentially Russian character of the various 19th-century thinkers and their doctrine, relating each one of them, in one way or another, to all that followed. His *Russkaja ideja* [2] is no less valuable, covering a much wider field in a rather different way, and surveying Russian thought from the standpoint of his philosophy of history, religion, and social development. From the point of view of history of ideas, the second chapter contains a concise account of the Slavophil-Westerniser conflict, as well as of such problems as *narodničestvo* and Russian nationalism and Messianism. Berdjaev's unique position in relation to pre- and post-1917 Russia, together with his outstanding position as a thinker, make *all* his studies in some way relevant.[26] It is obviously impossible to include them all within the confines of this study, but at least mention should also be made of his autobiography [3], which brings out particularly clearly Berdjaev's conception of the continuity and the essentially Russian interrelationship between the various currents of 19th- and 20th-century thought. "Despite the Western element which is active in me, I belong to the Russian intelligentsia whose characteristic attitude is a perennial search for truth. I inherit the tradition of the Slavophils and the Westerners, of Chaadayev and Khomyakov, of Herzen and Belinsky, and even of Bakunin and Chernishevsky, despite the differences in our respective attitudes to life. I am above all an heir of the tradition of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, as well as of Vladimir Solovyev and Nicolas Fyodorov."[27]

As regards Soviet studies, important works covering the entire period under review are not numerous. The vast majority of contributions are concerned with limited, specific periods, schools, or individual thinkers, with a marked emphasis on the more radical and revolutionary thinkers of the second half of the 19th century and onwards.[28] From the point of view of the present study, the most important works would be seem to be that by V. M. Štejn, tracing the development of social and economic thought in Russia during the 19th and 20th centuries (1948), and especially the collective work edited by G. S. Vaseckij *et al* [1], *Očerki po istorii filosofskoj i obščestvenno-političeskoj mysli narodov SSSR* (I/II, 1955/1956), two reviews of which appeared in *Voprosy filosofii* 1956, 6 (pp. 170–174 and pp. 175–179 respectively). A collection of essays on the history of Russian philosophy in the 18th and 19th centuries was published by the Moscow University Press in 1952 (*Iz istorii russkoj filosofii XVIII–XIX vekov. Sbornik statej*).

Of the various critical studies on Western interpretation of the history of Russian philosophy and socio-political or socio-economic thought (on "*bourgeois* falsification" lines), the most important are the work by S. A. Pokrovskij (FBSP 4235) and the collective studies edited by M. V. Nečkina *et al.* (FBSP 3824) and by I. Ja. Ščipanov (FBSP 3828) respectively.[29]

Finally, there is an important work on the history of literary criticism in Russia by B. P. Gorodeckij *et al.*

## III. GENERAL WORKS DEALING WITH THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Of the general works covering (mainly or solely, in whole or in part) the first half of the nineteenth century, the most important from the point of view of the present study are those by Hare [1] and by Lampert [1].[30] Of these, the former covers the wider field, including a brief introductory study of Čaadaev, V. S. Pečërin, and Ogarëv, followed by a chapter on Belinskij, three on the Slavophils, one on Herzen, and, of later thinkers, one each on Černyševskij and Konstantin Leont'ev. The work is of particular interest for the manner in which the various thinkers are related to their subsequent evaluation in the USSR. "I have neither attempted to exhume and rekindle controversies long since decided and

forgotten, nor to retrace in detail the multifarious tendencies or ideas which were then competing for mastery over the minds of Russian intellectuals. I have, instead, confined my selection to a small number of distinctly representative Russian personalities, and related them to the significant manner in which they have since been revalued or devalued in the Soviet Union."[31] The study thus provides a further contribution to the problem of "continuity and change". Lampert's study is confined to an introductory chapter on the Russian intelligentsia and three monographic essays dealing respectively with Belinskij, Bakunin, and Herzen. Where Hare's work provides a straightforward introduction to the field, Lampert's book is an advanced reader which assumes a fairly close knowledge of the personalities concerned. One reviewer criticises the general approach: "The intelligentsia is treated too much in terms of ideological imperatives and not enough of social and political conditions, which were certainly the root of the problem. More specifically, Dr. Lampert places too much blame for the evils of old Russia on Orthodoxy and the state's persisting "theocratic illusion", both of which come in for a rather old-fashioned attack which is neither very illuminating in itself nor particularly germane to the central problem of the book."[32] Despite this criticism, however, the study remains an important contribution in the field.

An interesting – if somewhat laboured and biased – study is von Schelting's *Rußland und Europa,* which justifies inclusion here for its longish treatment of Čaadaev, with whom the author is chiefly concerned. In this context, however, he also deals with Gogol', the Slavophils (especially Xomjakov, also Ivan Kireevskij and Tjutčev), and later with Herzen and Danilevskij. The fundamental distinction between the doctrine of the "true" (early) Slavophils and that of Panslavism becomes blurred, and the author seems to be unduly obsessed with the exclusively nationalistic trend in Russian 19th-century thought. Hence N. V. Riasanovsky's criticism [5] that "the author does not pay sufficient attention to the European context of Russian intellectual development, and tends to regard nationalism and exclusiveness, whether those of the Slavophiles or those of various other Russian thinkers, as a peculiarly Russian perversion".[33]

The three studies by N. V. Riasanovsky himself ([2], [3], and [4]) – though primarily historical in character – all reflect the author's particular

interest in Russian intellectual history, and to this extent form essential background material. The same considerations apply to the essay by M. T. Florinsky [2], and, among Soviet studies, *mutatis mutandis,* to the relevant volumes of the history of the USSR by S. B. Okun' ([1] and [2]). The two articles by Fedosov cover the earliest revolutionary circles in the 1820's and 1830's, while the collective work edited by Vaseckij [2] deals with progressive philosophical thought in Russia during the ensuing three decades (1830–1860). It includes studies of Stankevič, Granovskij, Belinskij, Herzen, Ogarëv, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, and others which are described by George L. Kline as "tendentious but informative".[34]

The article by V. A. Malinin [1] is yet another in the series devoted to "*bourgeois* interpretation" of Russian philosophic thought, this time within the first half of the century.

Finally, in the field of literature and literary criticism, the collection of materials relating to the history of Russian journalism, edited by B. P. Koz'min, deserves mention.

## IV. THE SLAVOPHILS

### *a. Western Sources*

Two fundamental studies of the Slavophils[35] have appeared during the post-war period – that by N. V. Riasanovsky [5] (1952) and the first volume of the vast study planned by P. K. Christoff [1] (1961). To these two essential basic studies should be added the work by A. Gratieux [1] (1939), which – although outside the period covered by the present survey – is sufficiently important to merit inclusion in the present Bibliography.[36]

The work by Riasanovsky – as its title implies – is mainly concerned (Ch. III–V) with the "East-West" problem as seen through Slavophil eyes, and constitutes an admirable introduction to the whole subject. "The perplexing question of Russia's relation to Western civilisation has often conditioned and sometimes even dominated the development of Russian social and political thought. The significance of this relation was emphasised by those thinkers who regarded it not as a connection between the whole and its part but as a contrast between two independent and usually hostile entities. The Slavophile ideology provided the most comprehensive and striking treatment of this perennial problem of Russia and

the West. In doing so, it gave a fuller expression to many earlier views on the subject and also greatly affected most subsequent expositions of it."[37]

In addition, the book includes a lucid and concise account of pre-Slavophil 19th-century thought (Ch. I, Introduction), brief biographical sketches of the six "true leading Slavophils",[38] and concludes with a particularly valuable chapter on 'Estimates and Influence of Slavophilism' which is best summarised in a few brief excerpts: "In tracing the influence of the Slavophiles in the history of ideas it is necessary to beware of all rough and ready schemes which derive various Russian thinkers and schools of thought from the component elements or the contradictions of Slavophilism. ... None of the leading Russian thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth century can be intrinsically connected with Slavophilism or intelligently interpreted as a part of its development. But, in many less overwhelming ways, the Slavophiles did influence these thinkers and the numerous and diverse intellectual, social, and political movements in Russia. ... Slavophilism occupies an important place in the history of Russian culture. ... Its ideology consisted of many different and even contradictory doctrines, and its influence ranged from the Black Hundreds to the Social Revolutionaries, and from the theologians to the Pan-Slavs. ... above all it explored some of the fundamental problems of human life and thought which form the very basis of the history of culture."[39] The work, which contains an extremely valuable, copiously annotated, bibliography, is written in a clear and easy style, and is rightly rated by Shapiro as "the best survey" in the field.[40]

Christoff's study [1] of Xomjakov is on a far more exhaustive scale, and is based on a somewhat different approach. In the first place, it is only the first volume in a series of studies designed to provide "a simple but reasonably inclusive summary of Moscow Slavophilism", to comprise, in addition to Xomjakov, "studies of Ivan V. Kireevskij, Jurij F. Samarin, and Konstantin S. Aksakov. ... In the last volume of the series an effort will be made to determine the content of Moscow Slavophilism as it has transpired through the works of its foremost representatives".[41] Faced with the two major problems of summarising and organising "views on a vast variety of subject matter contained in a combined output of more than twenty volumes", the author decided on "a simple topical arrangement preceded by a chronology of selected bio-

graphical facts ..." The work is, however, essentially "a study in ideas, not biography". The essentially Russian character of Moscow Slavophilism is stressed: "Like most intellectual currents, Moscow Slavophilism presents a tangled web of origins and influences, but whether Slavophilism was good or bad, it came to life on Russian soil ... and was indelibly marked with the views and attitudes of a certain group of Russians." The limitations deliberately imposed on the study include: the choice of a predominantly narrative, rather than interpretative, treatment; "the exclusion of the relationship between Russian ideological developments, Slavophilism in particular, and the classical Russian literature of the nineteenth century"; and the complete omission of the subject of Panslavism, which, "in spite of its kinship to Slavophilism", was on the whole "animated by another spirit, ... had a different content and a different stress", and "belongs to another era in nineteenth-century Russian history". Chronologically, the study is confined to the three decades 1830–1860. Finally, "... the level is that of ideology conceived as a middle ground between philosophy and/or religion, and programme, tactics, organisation, and action. ... we believe that Slavophil thought as a whole lies primarily in the field of ideology". The work constitutes advanced reading to the extent that it "assumes acquaintance on the part of the reader with the basic facts of Russian historical development" and "presupposes familiarity with Western intellectual-ideological developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries".

The conflicting demands set by the choice of narrative treatment on the one hand and an ideological, rather than biographical, level on the other are "solved" by the division of the book into two parts. The first (Ch. I–IV) is predominantly narrative, covering the period decade by decade, while the second (Ch. V–IX) deals with Xomjakov's thought under the following headings: V. Philosophy; VI. Christianity and the Church; VII. Education – the Antidote to Rationalism, Formalism, Legalism, and Individualism; VIII. The State and Government – Theory and Practice; IX. Social-Economic Issues – The *Obščina*.

The fact that this is the first major study of Xomjakov (with copious citations from his *Works*) to appear in English is of less relevance to the present study than the fact that the series as a whole represents the first attempt made in any language to provide a systematic classification and presentation of the ideas of most of the leading Slavophils.[42] The value

of this first volume is further enhanced by copious footnotes and an exhaustive bibliography which covers an extremely wide field. If subsequent volumes maintain the standard of the present one, the series should eventually provide an invaluable survey of the ideology of Moscow Slavophilism as a whole.[43]

The remaining studies listed are of less importance, but, taken together, do reveal the wide interest evinced by Western scholars in recent years in the Slavophils and their doctrine. Chief interest has been centred on Xomjakov, a selected edition of whose works, edited by N. S. Arsen'ev, was published in New York in 1955. The English edition of *The Church is One* contains a brief but interesting introduction by N. Zernov [2], who had previously accorded Xomjakov fuller treatment in his study [1] of *Three Russian Prophets* (1944).

Of the other "true" Slavophils, Ivan Kireevskij and his attitude to "culture" is examined in an article by Janko Lavrin [1], while the social, political, and historical ideas of Konstantin Aksakov form the main theme of an interesting study by Edward Chmielewski, which contains numerous quotations from the generally little-known writings of this colourful figure.

The study by Lieb [2] traces the origins and early development of the Slavophil movement, with particular emphasis on the influence of German thought and the early role of Küchelbecker (Kjuxel'beker), V. F. Odoevskij, etc.[44]

Of the General Works already discussed in Chs. II and III, those by Masaryk and by Hare [1] both accord considerable space to the Slavophils. Zen'kovskij [2] devotes two long chapters to their philosophical ideas, while his smaller study [1] contains a valuable chapter on the "East-West" aspect of the problem. The conflict between Slavophils and Westernisers is admirably – albeit briefly – dealt with by Berdjaev in two of his works ([1], Ch. I; [2], Ch. II), but others by him are also of relevance to Slavophilism in the sense, pointed out by N. V. Riasanovsky [5], that, with V. V. Zen'kovskij, Berdjaev "did more than anybody else to reinterpret Slavophilism and affirm its value in terms of the twentieth-century historical and intellectual development".[45]

*b. Soviet Sources*

Of all the currents of Russian nineteenth-century thought, there is none

in which the dearth of Soviet studies stands in such marked contrast to the keen interest taken by Western scholars as in the case of Slavophilism and the Slavophils.

The *Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy* (Vol. V., Indices 1947–1960) [abbreviated FBSP] published by the Institute of East-European Studies of the University of Fribourg contains not one single reference either to 'Slavophilism' as such, nor to any of the six outstanding figures of the original Slavophil movement. Among their "Westerniser" contemporaries, we find no less than 35 references to Belinskij and 33 to Herzen.

The *Malaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* (3rd ed., 1958–1961) contains a 52-line entry under the heading '*Slavjanofily*' (8, 577/8). Representatives mentioned by name, in addition to the six cited above, include A. I. Košelëv and the historian I. D. Beljaev. The account is relatively factual and objective, e.g.: "In the socio-ideological struggle of the 1830–1850's, the Slavophils clashed with the *Westernisers*. The views of the Slavophils and the Westernisers were opposed by the revolutionary ideology which expressed the interests of the peasantry. ... The Slavophils advanced the "theory" of a special, distinctive (*samobytnyj*) path of development for Russia, separate from [that of] Western Europe. The Slavophils perceived the distinctive character of Russia's path in the alleged absence of the class struggle in her history, in the existence of the communal order (especially in the Russian peasant commune), and also in the Orthodox religion, which they conceived of as the only authentic [form of] Christianity. ...

"In their political views, the Slavophils were convinced monarchists. At the same time, they insisted on the need for the monarch to take account of public opinion, and they advocated the summoning of the *zemskij sobor (duma)*. ..." The only literature cited is Plexanov's account, 'Zapadniki i slavjanofily', from his *Istorija russkoj obščestvennoj mysli v XIX veke (Materialy)* (Plexanov, G. V., *Soč.* t. 23, M.–L., 1926), and S. S. Dmitriev's contribution to *Istorik-Marksist* (1941, No. 1, *q.v.*, *infra*, p. 46, (also Bibl. IV b)).

The entries accorded to individual Slavophils are as follows:

I. S. Aksakov: 12 lines. K. S. Aksakov: 15 lines. Ju. F. Samarin: 12 lines. P. V. Kireevskij: 6 lines.

I. V. Kireevskij (the philosopher and leading theoretician among the Slavophils and second in importance, if at all, only to Xomjakov) gets exactly 5 lines. There is, moreover, no mention in the literature of the

excellent and immensely valuable edition of his *Works* (*Pol. sob. soč.*, 2 vols., M., 1911), but merely of 4 pages from a general Soviet work on the history of Russian philosophical and socio-political thought: *Očerki po istorii filosofskoj i obščestvenno-političeskoj mysli v Rossii,* t. 1, M., 1955, pp. 380–383.[46]

A. S. Xomjakov, the most important figure among the Slavophils, is given 24 lines. The entry stresses Xomjakov's convinced opposition to serfdom and the "positive significance" of his ideas regarding the "necessity of studying national Russian culture". However, as with Ivan Kireevskij, there is no mention in the literature of the fine standard edition of his *Works* (*Pol. sob. soč.*, 8 vols, M., 1911–14), but only to a selection of his *Poems,* in a Soviet anthology containing others by Venevitinov and by Ševyrëv (M., 1937)!

Comparing these entries once more on a bare quantitative basis with corresponding contributions on the Westernisers, we find an entry of 37 lines under the general heading of "*Zapadniki*" (3, 1002/3). At first sight, the entry under *Slavjanofily* – covering 52 lines – would appear to compare very favourably in this respect. Closer examination, however, reveals that thinkers like Belinskij and Herzen, "representing the more radical tendency in Westernism", are considered somewhat apart from the *zapadniki* proper (in this case K. D. Kavelin, B. N. Čičerin, I. S. Turgenev, V. P. Botkin, P. V. Annenkov, also Granovskij and Čaadaev), who are described as "representatives of a bourgeois-liberal current of Russian social thought during the 1840–1850's". Turning to individual entries, we find no less than 173 lines on Belinskij, plus a portrait, plus 9 lines of literature sources (about 1¼ pages in all) and 154 lines on Herzen, plus a portrait, plus 15 lines of literature sources (over 1 page in all).

While it would be facile – and even grotesque – to deduce too much from a bare confrontation of space accorded, the differences in treatment are so enormous that they cannot be altogether ignored. Apart from the purely quantitative aspect (Belinskij 173 lines, Xomjakov 24 lines; Herzen 154 lines, Ivan Kireevskij, 5 lines), the absence of all reference to the *Works* of the two leading Slavophil thinkers – besides constituting a serious scholarly omission – can only be interpreted as part of a deliberate policy of discrimination, designed to belittle their importance and to discourage any serious study of their contribution to Russian nineteenth-century thought. That pre-1917 editions are in no way *a priori*

excluded from the MSE is clearly shown by the references given to the old editions of the *Works* of the two Aksakov brothers and of Samarin.

No less significant is the apparent absence of any Soviet edition – even a selected (or selective) one – of the philosophical writings of any one of the six leading Slavophils, the standard editions of which, as we have seen, are in every instance pre-1917.

In the latest (1963) edition of the *Filosofskij slovar'*, the entries compare as follows: *Zapadniki* 49 lines; *Slavjanofily* 52 lines. Belinskij 153; Herzen 117; Xomjakov 33; Ivan Kireevskij 40. The contrast is thus less marked, though still absurdly disproportionate. Kireevskij at least comes into his own, as befits a brilliant thinker rated by Zen'kovskij ([2E] p. 13) as "the most powerful philosophic mind of the first half of the nineteenth century". Compared with the MSE, the account of Slavophil doctrine is markedly more hostile and subjective (cf. the interspersed comments, my italics, *R.K.*): "In an objective sense, it was a reactionary-utopian programme by which the Russian gentry might switch to the path of *bourgeois* evolution while retaining their maximum privileges. ... The Slavophils considered the peculiar features of Russian history to be Orthodoxy, the communal way of life (*which they idealised*), the submissiveness of the Russian people, [and] the absence in its history of class division (*rassloenija*), [all of] *which represented a distortion of Russian history.*"

One of the earliest Soviet studies of Slavophilism (N. Rubinštejn, 1927) dealt, as might be expected, with the class aspect of the problem, – an approach that had already been foreshadowed some thirty years previously by V. Smirnov, an out-and-out opponent of the Slavophils, in his study of the Aksakov brothers (*Aksakovy, ix žizn' i literaturnaja dejatel'nost'*, P., 1895), and by Plexanov, who, understandably, also stressed the class element. In a brief and superficial reference in his history of Russia, M. N. Pokrovskij had attempted to explain the nature and fortunes of Slavophilism in terms of the fluctuation of agricultural prices. Rubinštejn's study went far deeper and, in 1952, was still considered by Riasanovsky ([5], p. 193) as constituting "what has been so far the most comprehensive Marxist interpretation of the Slavophile movement".[47]

In 1939, *Istorik-Marksist* published an article by N. Deržavin on Herzen and the Slavophils.

In 1941, the same journal published a paper by S. S. Dmitriev on

'Slavophils and Slavophilism', together with a 'reply' by I. Ganičev and details of the ensuing discussion.[48] An article by V. I. Pičeta on the history of slavic studies in the USSR also contained a section on the Slavophil orientation in Russian slavic studies.

In 1948, *Istoričeskie zapiski* (No. 26) contained an article by Š. M. Levin [1] on 'The Historical Peculiarities of Russian Utopian Socialism'. In this, the author referred to the influence of the Slavophils on Herzen with regard to the Russian peasant commune. In a further article in No. 29 (1949), dealing with 'Herzen and the Crimean War', the same author [2] touched on the attitude of the Slavophils towards Nicholas I. In *Voprosy istorii* 6 (1948), there appeared a paper by N. K. Sladkevič on the feud (*polemik*) which developed between Černyševskij and the Slavophils regarding the latter's 'publicist' writings.

One is immediately struck by the fact that, in most of these studies, the Slavophils are analysed in terms of their relations with more radical thinkers, notably with Herzen and Černyševskij. It is a fact that many historians, even prior to 1917, were influenced in their assessment of Slavophilism by the earlier estimates of these two thinkers. This association worked both ways – many studies of Herzen and Černyševskij deal with their relations with the Slavophils, while the latter in turn tend to be interpreted in terms of the former. This seems to apply with particular force to Soviet historians – which is, indeed, as one would expect.

At the same time, as Riasanovsky [5] has pointed out, while Herzen and Černyševskij were fundamentally opposed to most points of the Slavophils' doctrine (emphasis on religion; anti-Western nationalism; justification of autocracy, etc.), they both held them in high *personal* esteem, and especially valued their preoccupation with the *people* (*narod*).[49] Now Herzen and Černyševskij were themselves the main precursors of the *narodnik* (or Populist) ideology, and it is surely in this sense that one must read Berdjaev's assertion that "the Slavophils were the first *narodniki* among us, only *narodniki* on a religious basis".[50] Herzen's "crypto-Slavophilism" has often been referred to, and Černyševskij, who counted the Slavophils among "the most cultured, most noble, and most gifted persons in Russian society"[51], once stated that they might be forgiven everything for their view of the peasant commune alone.[52]

Soviet studies of this type tend to overemphasise the differences at the expense of the points of sympathy and even agreement – e.g. the

paper by Sladkevič on Černyševskij and the Slavophils (*q.v. supra*).

Signs of renewed interest in the Slavophils occurred for a moment in 1955, with the publication, in *Voprosy istorii* (No. 9), of an unsigned editorial, 'O nekotoryx voprosax istorii russkoj obščestvennoj mysli konca XVIII i pervoj poloviny XIX veka'. In this, the author entered a plea, *inter alia,* for research to be undertaken into problems of Slavophilism as well as those of Westernism. To judge by results, this suggestion fell on deaf ears, and little if anything of note would seem to have been published on Slavophilism from the Soviet side since that date.

## REFERENCES


1. Guizot, F.: *Essai sur l'histoire de France* (preface).
2. Kohn, H.: *The Mind of Modern Russia,* p. VII (cf. Bibliography II). All works mentioned in the text which appear in 'Selected Writings on Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought' on pp. 114ff. of this issue will be referred to in the references by the number (Roman numeral) of the Section in which they appear.
3. Berdjaev, N. [1E] (Bibl. II), p. 7.
4. Stephen F. Cohen, in *The Russian Review* 23 (1964) 4, 390–391.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 390 and p. 391 respectively.
6. Martin E. Malia, in *The Russian Review* 17 (1958) 2, 146.
7. Shapiro, David: *A Select Bibliography of Works in English on Russian History,* 1801-1917 (abbreviated: WERH; Bibl. I), p. V.
8. *Ibid.,* Ch. 14, p. 68, A. note. The distinction drawn between "revolutionary movements" and "social thought" is, as Shapiro himself admits, an awkward one – leading, say, to the arbitrary classification of Bakunin as a "revolutionary" and Herzen as a "social thinker" (p. XI). Shapiro groups "social thought" with "philosophy" (Ch. 17), while Chapter 14 (Revolutionary Movements) covers more specifically political thought.
9. Malia, Martin E., *op. cit.,* p. 146 (where he cites Lampert, E. [1] (*q.v.* Bibl. III) as "a highly refreshing exception").
10. Horecky, Paul L. (ed.) [1]: *Basic Russian Publications* (abbreviated: BRP; Bibl. I), p. V.
11. In addition to its basically and deliberately selective nature, it should be emphasised that this is essentially a *preliminary* study, with all the shortcomings that this implies.
12. While the present study is primarily concerned with *socio-political* thought, care has been taken not to confine it or define it within too narrow limits. For any true understanding of the period 1801–1917 in Russian intellectual history as a whole, it is essential to include certain studies primarily concerned with other fields, such as religious thought, philosophy, economic development, and the wider cultural sphere, more particularly the domains of literature and literary criticism.
    The term "works...published" is understood to include works republished, reprinted, or published in translated versions during the relevant period.
13. For details, *vide infra,* Chapter IV (a) and (b) respectively – and corresponding sections in the Bibliography. (Gratieux's study is in French, and so constitutes a linguistic as well as a chronological exception.)

14. WERH, Ch. 17, p. 79, A. note.
15. Zen'kovskij ([2E], I/p. 14; [2R], p. 26) criticises Masaryk for not always being objective in his exposition, but finds his work "very useful" nevertheless ("*vsë. že očen' polezna*").
16. *The Spirit of Russia,* Vol. I, p. VII (Translators' Foreword).
17. By V. A. Riasanovsky, writing in *The Russian Review* 14 (1955) 1, 60.
18. Cf. BRP 359 note.
19. Cf. *The Russian Review* 23 (1964) 2, 191.
20. Cf. *The Russian Review* 23 (1964) 2, 191. The Russian version, surprisingly, is not listed in BRP (The English version appeared too late for inclusion in WERH).
21. Gerschenkron's paper – covering the 19th century generally – is included as a separate work in Bibl. II, *infra.* The remaining studies in this and other collective works (including McLean *et al.*) are mostly listed separately within the sections covering the narrower fields to which they more specifically apply.
22. The passages cited are from the *Introduction,* pp. xv–xvi.
23. Cf. WERH 870 note.
24. Koyré, Alexandre: *La philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIXe siècle.* Paris, Honoré Champion, 1929 (Bibliothèque de l'Institut de Léningrad, tome 10).
25. Cf. *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles,* p. 223.
26. In the 1950's, a catalogue from the Harvill Press, London, announced the preparation of a work entitled: *Russian Social and Political Thought from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century,* edited with an introduction by Nicolas Berdyaev. Inquiries made of the publishers elicited the laconic reply that "this work was not published by Harvill; and unfortunately we have no information to offer you" (Communication from the publishers, February 23, 1965).
27. Nicolas Berdyaev: *Dream and Reality. An Essay in Autobiography.* Preface, pp. XIII–XIV.
28. These studies will be examined in due course in the second part of this article.
29. Cf. also the following articles: FBSP 711 (N. G. Tarakanov), 3511 (V. N. Kuznecov: a review of the work by McLean *et al.*), 3591 (Ju. S. Melent'ev: review of the work by S. A. Pokrovskij, *q.v., supra,* FBSP 4235), 6100 (V. Malinin, N. Tarakanov, and I. Ščipanov). Also FBSP 1868 (V. A. Malinin), (Bibl. III).
30. Both authors have more recently written companion studies dealing with the later part of the century. These are Hare, R.: *Portraits of Russian Personalities Between Reform and Revolution,* London, Oxford University Press, 1959, and Lampert, E.: *Sons Against Fathers. Studies in Russian Radicalism and Revolution,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. The latter is reviewed on page 101–103 of this issue. Both works will be examined in more detail at a later stage.
31. Hare, R.: *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought,* p. V.
32. Malia, Martin E.: in *The Russian Review* 17 (1958) 2, 147.
33. Cf. *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles,* p. 230.
34. Cf. BRP 1270 note.
35. All leading students of the Slavophils in recent times have rightly insisted on the highly individual nature of each member (V. V. Zen'kovskij, A. Gratieux, N. V. Riasanovsky, P. K. Christoff, and others). At the same time, as Riasanovsky points out ([5], p. 28), they *did* form a group "who were drawn together by common beliefs, attitudes, and aspirations in such fundamental issues as religion, philosophy, and the problem of Russia and the West", and it is in this sense that, for convenience' sake, they are grouped together for the purposes of this bibliographical survey.

Basically, this chapter refers only to the six thinkers whom Riasanovsky calls the "true leading Slavophils", viz. Xomjakov, Ivan and Pëtr Kireevskij, Konstantin and Ivan Aksakov, and Ju. Samarin. It expressly *excludes* Panslavism, which, as Christoff rightly stresses ([1] p. 11), "belongs to another era in nineteenth-century Russian history", and will be examined later in this study.

36. Other important Catholic studies included are those by P. Baron (1940) and by B. Schultze ([2] 1938). In dealing with Soviet sources, the even earlier study by Rubinštejn (1927) is included for the same reason (Bibl. IVb).
37. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 1.
38. See Reference 35.
39. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], pp. 211–213.
40. WERH, Ch. 17, p. 80, B. note.
41. This and the following citations are taken from the author's 'Foreword' (pp. 7–12), on which the ensuing account is based.
42. The nearest approach so far was the work by A. Gratieux [1], but this, as its title implies, is mainly concerned with Xomjakov and his relationship with the movement.
43. Inquiries recently made of the publishers revealed that no further volume in this series can be expected before 1966 at the earliest (Communication from the publishers, February 17, 1965).
44. Another study by Lieb ([1], cf. Bibl. II) also deals, *inter alia*, with Xomjakov and Ivan Kireevskij.
45. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 234.
46. *Sic.* Presumably refers to Vaseckij, G. S. *et al.* [1]; cf. *General Works* II.
47. For a succinct paraphrase of Rubinštejn's thesis, cf. Riasanovsky [5], pp. 193–6. Rubinštejn interprets several points of Slavophil doctrine as reflecting or projecting the personal wishes or fears of the Slavophils themselves. Thus, the alleged devotion of the people to the monarchy was "nothing but a projection into history of their own 'monarchy' as landlords"; their emphasis on the 'non-political' nature of the Russian people was an attempt to convince themselves that this people would never revolt against their tsar or their landlords; while their ambivalent attitude towards things Western reflected the equally ambivalent attitude of their own class towards capitalism and industrialisation: in Riasanovsky's paraphrase, "the Slavophiles had desired social development, but not class struggle, Western machines, but not Western ideas, factory goods, but not the proletariat; in short, they had wanted capitalism, but not its consequences". As Riasanovsky points out ([5] p. 196, note 20), Rubinštejn's analysis has been challenged by several Soviet historians, including L. Piper, in his study of Herzen.
48. Hare ([1], p. 71) finds "a solid academic confirmation" of the revision in Soviet attitude towards the Slavophils which took place about this time in N. L. Rubinštejn's *Russian Historiography* (1941). "Here, the Slavophils come in for the usual, now rather perfunctory, reproach about their 'unscientific' brand of nationalism. But they are allowed to atone for this by virtue of having drawn attention to the hidden treasures of Russian folklore and the sturdy force of Russian national character." (Cf. the MSE entry on Xomjakov, cited on p. 45, *supra.*)
49. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], pp. 188–189.
50. Nikolaj Berdjaev [2R], p. 43. Lavrin ([3], p. 307) expresses much the same idea but the other way round: "In some respects *narodnichestvo* might even strike one as secularised Slavophilism" (though he does add: "with due reservations, of course").
51. Cited in Berdjaev [2R], p. 41.
52. Cf. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 188.

GUIDO KÜNG

# SOVIET PHILOSOPHY AND THE SEMANTIC DEFINITION OF TRUTH

Recent discussion of Tarski's semantic definition of truth[1] further exemplifies how Soviet philosophers assimilate Western theories from the borderline of science and philosophy. It shows that the range of declassified doctrines in the field of logic is increasing once more: first it included only mathematical logic in a narrow sense, then it included formal logic in general[2], and now even logical semantics has become recognized as ideologically neutral.

In 1959 R. Carnap's well-known book on semantics *Meaning and Necessity*[3] was published in Russian translation. But in the same year an investigation of the semantic conception of truth by V. V. Mšvenieradze, published by the IF[4], still ignored Tarski's main publication of 1933.[5] It was based exclusively on Tarski's brief philosophical remarks from 1944[6] and on a critical essay by M. Black.[7] The tone of Mšvenieradze was a very militant one: "In science sharp ideological fighting is going on. The scientist cannot stay aside in the role of a "neutral" observer or else he will risk becoming an accomplice of political reaction."[8] Confusing definition of truth and method of verification, the author objected strongly that Tarski said only that a proposition was true if what it stated was the case, but that he did not tell how to find out when something was the case. He refused to recognize Tarski's contribution as a definition of truth and saw in it merely an auxiliary device for reducing the truth of logically complex propositions to the truth of elementary ones.[9] Although he mentioned briefly that the logician's "results concerning the strictness of construction and the completeness of deductive systems" were useful[10], he agreed basically with M. Black on the fundamental character of ordinary language and he defended it against the accusations of equivocity and inconsistency: "Tarski is wrong when he thinks that the task of defining a univocal use of scientific terms is unrealizable in ordinary language."[11] But Mšvenieradze's main concern was to refute Tarski's claim to the philosophical neutrality of



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

the semantical conception of truth and to denounce the "subjective-idealistic" character of Tarski's philosophy.[12]

In 1960 and 1961 I. S. Narskij, a Soviet specialist in the history of positivism, considered Tarski's definition in the course of a broader investigation of the neopositivist doctrine of verification.[13] In the person of W. Stegmüller[14] he had found a guide more congenial to logical semantics than M. Black. He quoted Tarski's main work, and for evaluation from a Marxist point of view he relied upon the previous discussion in Poland.[15] His appraisal was more positive and he used without hesitation the phrase "the semantical definition of truth". Like M. Kokoszyńska he thought that the formula "'p' is true $\equiv p$" could be interpreted in such a way, that it took "entirely the meaning of a notation of the materialist concept of truth".[16] However his main objective was still to refute the philosophical tenets of positivism, and his knowledge of the technical aspect of Tarski's work was rather superficial. He suggested, e.g., that "'p' is true $\equiv \vdash p$" would be a more accurate formula![17]

Remembering the Soviet saying that scientific practice is the touchstone of truth, it is significant to note how in 1961 Narskij stressed that "the semantical conception of truth ... in its narrow logical meaning played a progressive role in science", that "logical semantics helps to work out rational systems of the notation of scientific communications and of the translation from one language to another".[18]

The decisive step in assimilating Tarski's semantical definition of truth was taken in 1962 by P. V. Tavanec.[19] In a paper remarkable for its conciseness, Tavanec separated the exposition of the semantical theory clearly from the treatment of the philosophical problems connected with its interpretation. He formulated his point of view: "The acceptance of the semantical definition of truth does not at all predetermine the philosophical position of the one who accepts it. The main differences of philosophical order appear clearly only when an interpretation is given (a) concerning the nature of the reality which must correspond to true sentences (*predloženija*), (b) concerning the nature of a true sentence, (c) concerning the character of the relation between a true sentence and reality."[20] His statement of the "materialist interpretation" is very valuable because it contains a concise exposition of Soviet semantical terminology: "The materialist interpretation of reality presupposes a clear distinction between the material (objective reality) as primary and

the ideal[21] (reflected in consciousness) as secondary. The objects of knowledge can be material as well as ideal[21] things, processes, their properties and relations. A (declarative) sentence (*predloženie*) is a unity of a sign (*znak*) and a meaning (*značenie*).[22] The meaning of a declarative sentence is the material integument (*oboločka*) of a proposition (*suždenie*). Between a sentence as a sign and the proposition as the meaning of the sentence exists not a relation of designation (*oboznačenie*) (where the sentence would be the sign and the proposition the designated (*oboznačaemoe*)), but a relation of expression (*vyraženie*) (the sentence expresses the proposition). A relation of designation exists only beween objects (facts) and a sentence as a sign (a sentence is the sign of a fact). Also, between the meaning of a sentence (the proposition) and the object exists not a relation of designation, but a relation of reflection (*otraženie*) (the meaning of a sentence reflects the object)."[23] In the "materialist interpretation" it is the relation of reflection which is basic for the question of truth: "If the meaning of a sentence reflects the object adequately, then we say of such a sentence that it is true."[24] Obviously this so-called "materialist interpretation" is merely realistic, i.e., non-idealistic. Probably many Western logicians would be ready to subscribe to it.

However, Tavanec did not think so; taking R. Carnap (and in one instance M. Schlick) as an example and going over the three points of philosophical interpretation, he tried to show that Western logicians were idealists. Let us examine his reasoning: (a) As Tavanec pointed out, Carnap considers the question whether or not the universe of discourse as a whole exists to be meaningless. Carnap wants to be neither a realist nor an idealist. But for Tavanec a non-realist is already an idealist.[25] (b) Tavanec saw a further confirmation of Carnap's idealism (where not the "world of things" but language is primary) in Carnap's statement that he had no objection to identifying facts with true propositions.[26] (c) Finally, Tavanec concluded that, if reality for Carnap was identical with propositions of language, then the relation of reflection was mistakenly replaced by a relation of expression.

On the whole, it seems to me that Tavanec's criticism of Carnap is justified.[27] But it would be wrong to credit all Western logicians with the same views. Tavanec did not take into account the variety of philosophical opinions among Western supporters of logical semantics. Most striking in this paper devoted to the semantical definition of truth is

the absence of any discussion of Tarski's philosophical remarks.[28] Is it because Tarski's philosophical position is less clearly spelled out than Carnap's, or is it perhaps because Tavanec wanted to avoid any mentioning of the fact that Tarski also claims that the semantical definition of truth is neutral?

But Tavanec's shortcoming was made up for in another paper published about simultaneously by A. A. Vetrov.[29] This paper also defended the neutrality of the semantical definition of truth and succeeded in criticizing both Tarski and the enemies of the neutrality of semantics. Vetrov achieved this by distinguishing two concepts (*ponjatija*) of truth, a semantical and a philosophical one: picturing Tarski as wrongly identifying the philosophical with the semantical concept of truth, he mentioned that those were equally wrong who admitted only the philosophical concept and denied the existence of a semantical one.[30]

With respect to the two concepts of truth it is interesting to see how Vetrov based the distinction on the well-known division into pragmatics, semantics and syntax.[31] He emphasized that semantics and syntax constitute successive steps of abstraction. In order to show that semantics is a legitimate outgrowth of the practice of science and not merely a product of empty "idealistic" speculations, he referred to the authority of the famous Soviet logician P. S. Novikov.[32] But if semantical systems are abstractions, then they are meaningful only in so far as they relate back to reality. Vetrov stressed, therefore, that the true formulas in a semantical system must translate into true propositions of an empirically given language; like A. Schaff, he disagreed with Tarski's contention that ordinary language, or rather a language formalized in the spirit of ordinary language, was inconsistent.[33]

Vetrov's charge that Tarski reduces the philosophical to the semantical concept of truth is supported by pointing out two affirmations made by Tarski: (a) the affirmation that with his definition he has made a contribution to philosophy, that he has formulated Aristotle's definition of truth, (b) the affirmation that the semantic conception of truth is entirely neutral with respect to the issue realism vs. idealism.[34] As a matter of fact, an explanation distinguishing different levels of abstraction could easily avoid the charge without dropping either one of the two affirmations, but Tarski does not believe in the existence of "the philosophical problem of truth" beyond the level of logical semantics.[35] Unfortunately,

Vetrov himself does not refer any more to the distinction made in the beginning of his paper and concludes negatively with the condemnation of the philosophy of logical positivism.

The articles of Tavanec and Vetrov certainly constitute a breakthrough. The semantical theory of truth, that part of semantics which borders on a central part of classical philosophy has become a declassified doctrine. This does not mean that all opponents of logical semantics have been disarmed, as has been shown lately by a reactionary attack against Tavanec and Vetrov by B. I. Vostokov.[36] But yet it is significant that Tavanec's paper has been reviewed approvingly by *VF*[37] and that A. S. Bogomolov, in his recent book on contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, explicitly adopts Tavanec's position.[38]

## REFERENCES


1. *Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych.* Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydział 3, No. 34, 1933, German translation: 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen'. *Studia Philosophica* I (1936) (reprint dated 1935) pp. 261–405. English translation: 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages'. In: A. Tarski: *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.* Papers from 1923 to 1938. Oxford 1956. pp. 152–278.
2. Cf. J. M. Bocheński: 'The Three Components of Communist Ideology'. *SST* II (1962) 7–11, especially p. 10.
3. R. Karnap: *Značenie i neobxodimost'.* M. 1959. Preface by S. A. Janovskaja. Translation of the second edition, Chicago 1956.
4. 'O filosofskoj suščnosti "semantičeskoj koncepcii istiny"'. In: *Logičeskie issledovanija.* M. 1959. pp. 48–68. Mšvenieradze was a student of S. A. Janovskaja and the paper appeared three years after a seminar for mathematical logic had been established at the IF. It was reprinted with only small changes in: V. V. Mšvenieradze: *Filosofija neopozitivizma i semantiki.* M. Izd. VPS i AON. 1961, pp. 47–67.
5. Cf. Reference 1.
6. 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (1944) 341–376. Reprinted in: *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (ed. H. Feigl and W. Sellars). New York. 1949. pp. 52–84.
7. 'The Semantic Definition of Truth'. *Analysis* 8 (1948) 49–63. Reprinted in: *Philosophy and Analysis* (ed. M. Macdonald). Oxford 1954.
8. Mšvenieradze, 1959 (cf. Reference 3) p. 68.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
13. 'Kritika učenija neopozitivizma o kriterii istiny'. Stat'ja vtoraja. *VF* 1960, 9, 81–92; and 'Logičeskaja semantika i neopozitivizm ob istine'. In: I. S. Narskij: *Sovremennyj pozitivizm.* M. 1961. pp. 363–386.

14. *Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik.* Wien 1957.
15. A. Šaff (Schaff): *Nekotorye problemy marksistsko-leninskoj teorii istiny.* M. IL. 1953.
16. Narskij, 1960, p. 87. Cf. M. Kokoszyńska: 'A Refutation of the Relativism of Truth'. *Studia Philosophica* 4 (1951) 140.
17. Narskij, 1961, p. 372.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
19. 'O semantičeskom opredelenii istiny'. In: *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoj formal'noj logiki.* M. IF. Izd. AN. 1962. pp. 140–151.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 150–151.
21. Note that 'ideal' (*ideal'noe*) in Soviet philosophy covers both the ideal and the mental.
22. In contemporary Russian terminology the more frequent term for the unity of both a sentence symbol and its meaning is '*vyskazyvanie*'. The term '*predloženie*' has become the standard translation of the English term 'sentence' which covers only the sentence symbol. Cf. the remarks of V. A. Uspenskij, editor of the translation of Church's *Introduction to mathematical logic* (*Vvedenie v matematičeskuju logiku*, tom I, M. IL, 1960), pp. 10–11. The same usage has also been observed in the translation of Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* (cf. note 2).
23. Tavanec, p. 151.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 146. Cf. R. Carnap: *Meaning and Necessity*, 2nd ed., pp. 205f.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 149. Carnap, p. 28.
27. But Tavanec (pp. 148–149) seemed mistaken when – concerning Carnap's statement that the term 'proposition', like the term 'property', is not used "for a subjective, mental occurrence, but rather for something objective that may or may not be exemplified in nature" (Carnap, p. 27) – he discarded the interpretation that Carnap had in mind ideal entities. For Tavanec himself a proposition (*suždenie*) is something mental, but he also speaks expressly of the ideal content (*ideal'noe soderžanie*) of a proposition (p. 148).
28. Tarski's 1944 paper is not mentioned at all!
29. 'O semantičeskom ponjatii istiny'. *VF* 1962, 9, 63–74.
30. 30. *Ibid.*, p. 66. Vetrov adroitly exemplified the latter group by M. Cohen and E. Nagel (cf. *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method.* New York 1934. p. 27), but probably it was as much the reactionaries among Soviet philosophers which he had in mind.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67. Cf. Schaff (cf. Reference 14). Vetrov is careful in his formulations. E.g., he does not identify the empirically given languages with the ordinary language, but says that ordinary language is the basis of all empirically given languages (p. 65).
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70. Cf. Tarski, 1944 (cf. Reference 5) p. 52, p. 69, p. 71.
35. Tarski, 1944 (cf. Reference 5) p. 71.
36. 'K voprosu o semantičeskom ponjatii istiny'. *Vestnik MGU* serija VIII. 1964, 4, 60–68.
37. *VF* 1963, 4, 154. The author of the review was A. A. Vetrov.
38. *Anglo-amerikanskaja buržuaznaja filosofija epoxii mperializma.* M., Izd. "Mysl' ". 1964. pp. 348–361. However there is still a minor quotation from Mšvenieradze, 1959 (cf. Reference 3).

J. HÖLLING

# DIE METAPHYSIK WHITEHEADS IM URTEIL DER SOWJET-PHILOSOPHIE

Eine vergleichende Analyse des dialektischen Materialismus und der Metaphysik der *Emergent Evolution* gehört seit langem zu den Desideraten der philosophischen Literatur. Ein solcher Vergleich müßte davon ausgehen, daß die beiden Systeme als Konkurrenten im philosophischen Verständnis der Evolution aufzufassen sind. Bekanntlich versagen die aristotelische Metaphysik und die kantische Naturphilosophie gleichermaßen, wenn auch aus völlig verschiedenen Gründen, gegenüber dieser biologischen Tatsache. Ein Ansatz zum metaphysischen Verständnis der Evolution ist allenfalls noch in der Naturphilosophie des Deutschen Idealismus (Schelling) zu finden. Doch hat gerade dieses Denken wegen seiner Unvereinbarkeit mit der wissenschaftlichen Erfahrung die Naturphilosophie seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis in die Gegenwart hinein in Mißkredit gebracht. Seitdem hält sich das Nachdenken über die Evolution an den Geltungsbereich einzelwissenschaftlicher Kategorien und Erklärungsprinzipien (Mutation und Selektion).

Nun ist aber die positivistische Behauptung, es könne kein Verständnis der biologischen Tatsachen in höheren Kategorien als denen des Darwinismus geben, als ein bloßes Vorurteil abzuweisen. In dieser Hinsicht ist der dialektische Materialismus von seiner Grundposition her im Vorteil gegenüber der aristotelischen und der kantischen Tradition. Sieht man von der historisch nicht wirksam gewordenen Naturphilosophie Schellings und Hegels ab, so verbleiben innerhalb der zeitgenössischen westlichen Philosophie allein Bergsons Metaphysik der *Evolution Créatrice* und die hauptsächlich von angelsächsischen Denkern ausgebildete Lehre der *Emergent Evolution* als diejenigen Theorien, die ein immanentes Verständnis der Evolution anstreben und in dieser Hinsicht dem Diamat entgegengestellt werden können.

Hier ist eine weitere Einschränkung zu machen. Bergson ging von der Überzeugung aus, daß das begriffliche Denken notwendigerweise die Wirklichkeit "verräumliche" und infolgedessen unfähig sei, das Wesen



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

der Veränderung zu erfassen. Als der klassische Beweis für diesen Sachverhalt galten ihm die zenonischen Aporien der Bewegung. Er wurde so zur Annahme einer irrationalen Erkenntnisweise, der Intuition, geführt, die einen direkten, d.h. nicht durch statische Begriffe vermittelten Einblick in das Werden erlauben soll. Bergsons gesamte Philosophie basiert auf diesem Gedanken. Sie leistet also gerade nicht das, was wir verlangen: ein *rationales* Verständnis der Entstehung des Neuen im Universum. Darauf insistiert aber die Sowjet-Philosophie mit Recht. Aus diesem Grunde wäre eine Konfrontation der *Evolution Créatrice* mit dem dialektischen Materialismus ein aussichtsloses Unternehmen.

Die Auseinandersetzung wird also zwischen dem Diamat und der Emergenz-Philosophie stattfinden müssen. Berücksichtigt man dazu noch, daß *Whitehead* als der bedeutendste Vertreter dieses Denkens, vielleicht sogar als der einflußreichste zeitgenössische Metaphysiker überhaupt, zu gelten hat, so wird die Aktualität des hier behandelten Themas hinreichend deutlich. Freilich stand bei dem großen Unterschied des denkerischen Niveaus beider Seiten zu erwarten, daß die Auseinandersetzung mit einer sowjetischen Polemik beginnen würde. Dieses Material findet man in dem 1963 erschienenen Sammelband *Der zeitgenössische objektive Idealismus*[1], auf den sich die folgenden Ausführungen stützen.

Wir beginnen mit der Zusammenstellung der zentralen Probleme, die beiden Systemen gemeinsam sind, und stellen jeweils die Whiteheadsche Lösung der dialektisch-materialistischen gegenüber. Damit soll das Verständnis der sowjetischen Kritik an Whitehead vorbereitet werden, die im zweiten Hauptteil dieses Artikels wiedergegeben wird.

## I. VERGLEICHBARE PROBLEME IN WHITEHEADS METAPHYSIK UND IM DIALEKTISCHEN MATERIALISMUS

### A. *Die Methoden*

Whitehead hat sein spekulatives Hauptwerk *Process and Reality* mit einem Abriß der philosophischen Methode eingeleitet. "Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted ... Thus the philosophical system should be ... in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here '*applicable*' means

that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and '*adequate*' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation. '*Coherence*' ... means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless."[2]

Man wird Whiteheads Auffassung dahin zusammenfassen dürfen, daß Metaphysik nur als hypothetisch-deduktives System möglich ist. Das Grundgerüst der Whiteheadschen Metaphysik besteht aus 8 Kategorien der Existenz, 27 Kategorien der Erklärung und 9 Kategorien der Bedingung. Die wichtigsten Kategorien der ersten Gruppe sind:

(a) *Actual Entities (res verae)*;

(b) *Prehensions (Concrete Facts of Relatedness)*;

(c) *Eternal Objects (Forms of Definiteness.)*

Die Kategorien der zweiten Gruppe erklären, in welcher Verknüpfung die Kategorien der Existenz den *Prozeßcharakter* der wirklichen Welt konstituieren.

Die Kategorien der dritten Gruppe sind Kompatibilitätsbedingungen, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit die Entstehung einer Einheit aus der Mannigfaltigkeit ihrer primären Daten begreiflich wird.

Dieses Schema wird im folgenden noch zu erläutern sein. Unter dem rein methodologischen Gesichtspunkt ist der Vergleich mit dem dialektischen Materialismus aber schon an dieser Stelle möglich. Zunächst ist deutlich, daß Whitehead für seinen metaphysischen Entwurf nur den Wert einer Arbeitshypothese beansprucht. Seine Unversöhnlichkeit gegenüber jeglichem dogmatischen Anspruch kommt in einer sehr scharfen Formulierung zum Ausdruck: "In philosophical discussion the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly."[3]

Es ist fast überflüssig, darauf hinzuweisen, daß die Sowjetphilosophie trotz aller gegenteiligen Versicherungen von Grund auf dogmatisch ist. Wenn man diesen Unterschied im Auge behält, kann man immerhin Parallelen zwischen dem dialektischen Materialismus und der Whiteheadschen Metaphysik ziehen. Formal entsprechen Whiteheads Kategorien der Existenz den Engels-Leninschen Kategorien der Dialektik (z.B. Materie und Bewegung, Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, das Allgemeine und das Partikuläre). Ferner entsprechen die Kategorien der Erklärung den Gesetzen der Dialektik (z.B. das Prinzip der Realwidersprüche, die Entstehung neuer Qualitäten aus quantitativen Verände-

rungen, die Negation der Negation). Für Whiteheads kategoriale Bedingungen gibt es bezeichnenderweise kein dialektisch-materialistisches Analogon.

Im übrigen verfährt der dialektische Materialismus wie jede systematische Philosophie; das Ziel ist die Subsumption unserer gesamten Erfahrung unter ein Schema höchster Allgemeinbegriffe und Prinzipien.

B. *Die Systeme*

*1. Sein und Werden.* Whitehead entfernt sich von Platon, dem er im übrigen so weit als möglich folgt, am weitesten dadurch, daß er die ursprüngliche Realität im *Werden*, und nicht in einem zeitlosen Sein, annimmt. Das ursprünglich Seiende ist die Pluralität der *actual entities*. Darunter versteht Whitehead die atomaren Prozesse der Konkretwerdung neuer Einheiten durch Synthese einer jeweiligen Mannigfaltigkeit von Daten. Das ist gleichbedeutend mit einer "epochalen" Theorie der Zeit. Jedes Werden setzt Dauer voraus. Wird also die *actual entity*, das Werden einer Einheit, mit Wirklichkeit überhaupt gleichgesetzt, so folgt, daß nur die *actual entity* in ihrer ganzen zeitlichen Ausdehnung existiert, d.h. daß die Entstehungsphasen innerhalb ihrer selbst nur virtuell unterschieden sind.

Es gibt zwei Klassen von Daten, die in die Synthese einer *actual entity* eingehen. Erstens die *eternal objects*, die den platonischen Ideen entsprechen mit dem einzigen Unterschied, daß sie den ontologischen Status der Möglichkeit, und nicht der Aktualität, besitzen. Zweitens die "objektive Welt", aus der eine actual entity entsteht. Darunter versteht Whitehead die der betreffenden *actual entity* unmittelbar vorangehende Gesamtheit von *actual entities*, die als vollendete Tatsachen die Entstehung des Neuen *einschränken*. In bezug auf den konkreten Werdeprozeß erfüllen also die eternal objects und die jeweilige *objective world* die gleiche Funktion: sie spezifizieren (und das ist in Whiteheads System gleichbedeutend mit "individualisieren") das Werden, den Grund aller Realität. Das Werden sieht Whitehead nicht wie Heraklit als ein bloßes Fließen aller Dinge, sondern als schöpferische Kraft, die sich in jedem Einzelgeschehen auf einmalige Weise konkretisiert. Das bloße Werden, abgesehen von seinen individuellen Bestimmungen, heißt daher bei Whitehead "*Creativity*". Bis hierher ist die Dichotomie von *actual entities* und *eternal objects* ein rein platonischer Ansatz. Für jeden Platoniker

stellt sich die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen idealem und realem Sein. Die folgende Erörterung der Modalkategorien Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit soll zeigen, durch welche Maßnahmen Whitehead der aristotelischen Chorismos-Kritik entgeht.

*2. Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit.* Folgendes ontologische Prinzip ist die aristotelische Komponente in Whitehead: "Every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason *either* in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, *or* in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence ... This ontological principle means that actual entities are the only *reasons*."[4] Dieses Prinzip hat eine wesentliche Konsequenz für das Reich der *eternal objects*. Da sie als formale Bestimmungen in konkrete Ereignisse eintreten und insofern die Wirklichkeit *bedingen*, müssen sie dem Prinzip zufolge ihrerseits in einer aktualen Wesenheit begründet sein. Gäbe es nun, wie Aristoteles glaubte, in der wirklichen Welt nur die *Wiederholung* der formalen Bestimmungen, so wäre Whiteheads Prinzip automatisch erfüllt. Dem stehen aber die Tatsachen der Evolution entgegen. M.a.W., es gibt in jeder Epoche der kosmischen Geschichte eine Gesamtheit von *eternal objects*, die *noch nicht* aktualisiert sind. Für diese *eternal objects* muß also ein außerweltlicher Realgrund vorgesehen werden. Diesen Realgrund setzt Whitehead als die "primordiale Natur" Gottes. "The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the 'primordial nature' of God. By reason of this complete valuation, the objectification of God in each derivative actual entity results in a graduation of the relevance of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivative occasion."[5]

*3. Effiziente und finale Verursachung.* Für die positive Einbeziehung eines Datums in den Werdeprozeß einer *actual entity* verwendet Whitehead den suggestiven Ausdruck "*feeling*". Man könnte dadurch zu dem Mißverständnis verleitet werden, Whiteheads Metaphysik sei psychologistisch gemeint, indem sie eine psychologische Kategorie zu Unrecht auf metaphysische Sachverhalte anwende. Gewöhnlich denken wir die Gefühle als notwendig mit Bewußtsein verbundene Erfahrungen der Lebewesen von hinreichend hoher Organisation. Selbstverständlich ist *feeling* in diesem Sinne kein metaphysischer Begriff. Aber Bewußtsein ist nach Whitehead ein sekundäres Phänomen. Gefühle im psychologi-

schen Sinne des Wortes fallen unter den Whiteheadschen Oberbegriff *feeling*, dessen Bedeutung soeben erklärt wurde. Whitehead unterscheidet *physical feelings* und *conceptual feelings*. Die ersteren sind das, was herkömmlicherweise unter effizienter Verursachung verstanden wird. Das bedeutet konkret folgendes: Jedes *eternal object* einer *actual entity* $A_1$ wird in der primären Phase der unmittelbar folgenden actual entity $A_2$ in der gleichen subjektiven Weise verwirklicht ("gefühlt"), wie es in $A_1$ verwirklicht war. $A_2$ paßt sich in seiner primären Phase dem Vorgänger $A_1$ an oder anders gewendet: $A_1$ bedingt den Nachfolger $A_2$. Darin ist das Analogon zu dem scholastischen Prinzip *Causa aequat effectum* zu sehen.

Die effiziente Verursachung erklärt nicht die *Einheit* jeder *actual entity*. Diese Einheit liegt in dem jeweiligen subjektiven Ziel, das in der Synthese der ursprünglichen Mannigfaltigkeit von Daten (*physical prehensions*) zu einer neuen formalen Einheit besteht. Die Synthese kann in ihren späteren Phasen neue *eternal objects* einschließen. Diese Art der Einbeziehung von *eternal objects* in das konkrete Geschehen ist die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks "*conceptual feeling*". Offenbar sind diese späteren Phasen der Konkretwerdung verantwortlich für das Auftauchen von Neuem, während die primären Phasen nur die Reproduktion des Vergangenen nach dem Schema der Effizienzursache (Konformität) leisten. Die Erreichung subjektiver Einheit ist also nach Whitehead das Telos einer *actual entity* und damit zugleich der Grund dafür, daß Neues entstehen kann.

*4. Materie.* In der aristotelischen Metaphysik hat der Materiebegriff zwei Funktionen zu erfüllen, die eng miteinander zusammenhängen. Materie ist erstens das Bleibende in der Veränderung (Substrat), zweitens der Stoff, aus dem ein bestimmtes Einzelwesen entstanden oder gemacht ist (Materie als Individuationsprinzip). Für beide Bedeutungen von "Materie" sind Analoga in Whitehead zu finden, aber die Begriffe sind hier nicht mehr kongruent.

"'Creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter', and of the modern 'neutral stuff'. But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form', or of external relations; ... Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own."[6]

Nimmt man also "Materie" in der Bedeutung des Bleibenden in der

Veränderung, so entspricht ihr in Whiteheads System die unbestimmte schöpferische Kraft am Grunde der Realität. Nimmt man dagegen "Materie" in der anderen Bedeutung des Wortes (als Stoff, aus dem die Einzelwesen entstanden sind), so verdoppelt sich dieser Begriff in der Whiteheadschen Metaphysik: erstens ist Materie die in den *physical feelings* erfaßte objektive Welt, aus er eine actual entity entsteht. Das entspricht der aristotelischen *materia proxima.*[7] Zweitens ist Materie das Reich der *eternal objects* im Zustand der reinen Potentialität. Dies ist das Analogon zur aristotelischen *materia prima.*

In der aristotelischen Metaphysik tritt die Form der Materie als ontologisches Konstitutionsprinzip gegenüber. Das Whiteheadsche Analogon zur Form eines Einzelwesens ist die Selbstbestimmung (*decisiveness*) einer *actual entity.* Damit ist der Gegensatz zwischen Aristoteles und Whitehead bezeichnet: an die Stelle der Bestimmtheit tritt die Selbstbestimmung.

Zum Vergleich gebe ich nun die den vorangehenden vier Punkten entsprechenden Begriffserklärungen der *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija* wieder.

1. "*Sein:* eine philosophische Kategorie, welche die vom Bewußtsein unabhängige Existenz der objektiven Welt, der Materie, der Natur bezeichnet, und in der Gesellschaft die bewußtseinsunabhängige Existenz des materiellen Lebensprozesses der Menschen."[8]

"Nur die Materie existiert, und ihr Sein erweist sich durch das Gesetz der Erhaltung und Umwandlung der Energie, sowie durch die gesamte Entwicklung der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie."[9]

"Nichtsein bedeutet nicht das Leere oder das absolute Verschwinden, sondern ist nur der Übergang, die Umwandlung der Materie aus einer Seinsform in eine andere."[10]

2. "*Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit:* Kategorien der materialistischen Dialektik, die zwei grundlegende Entwicklungsstufen jedes Gegenstandes und jeder Erscheinung in Natur, Gesellschaft und Denken widerspiegeln. *Möglichkeit* ist die objektiv existierende Entwicklungstendenz eines Gegenstandes; sie entsteht auf Grund dieser oder jener Gesetzmäßigkeit der Entwicklung des Gegenstandes und drückt diese Gesetzmäßigkeit aus; *Wirklichkeit* ist die objektiv existierende Einheit der Gesetzmäßigkeit des Entwicklungszusammenhangs der Dinge und aller ihrer Erscheinungen."[11]

"*Gesetz:* die notwendige, der Natur der Erscheinungen der realen Welt innerlich eigentümliche Tendenz zur Veränderung, Bewegung, Entwicklung, welche die allgemeinen Etappen und Formen des Prozesses der Entstehung und Selbstgestaltung der konkreten, sich entwickelnden Systeme von Erscheinungen in Natur, Gesellschaft und geistiger Kultur der Menschheit bestimmt."[12]

3. Es ist hinreichend bekannt, daß der dialektische Materialismus im Bereich der Natur ausschließlich die effiziente Verursachung anerkennt. Die finale Verursachung hat ihren Platz im menschlichen Handeln, aber nur auf Grund der Kenntnis der notwendigen Entwicklungsgesetze von Natur und Gesellschaft. Die Finalität ist also ein untergeordnetes Prinzip. Freiheit ist allenfalls möglich als Vollzug des als notwendig Eingesehenen. Diese Notwendigkeit ist aber eine heteronome. Für eine persönliche Autonomie gibt es im dialektischen Materialismus keinen Platz.

4. Die Erklärung des Materiebegriffs ist schon in (1) enthalten.

## II. DIALEKTISCH-MATERIALISTISCHE EINWÄNDE GEGEN WHITEHEAD

Der in Teil I angebahnte Vergleich der Systeme Whiteheads und des dialektischen Materialismus mußte mit Rücksicht auf den hier zur Verfügung stehenden Raum etwas oberflächlich bleiben. Soviel dürfte aber deutlich geworden sein, daß der tiefste Gegensatz zwischen beiden Systemen in der Auffassung der Modalkategorien Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit liegt. Ich zeigte, auf Grund welcher Überlegungen Whitehead sich zur Einführung seines Gottesbegriffes gezwungen sah. Nun ist evident, daß im dialektischen Materialismus die "Gesetzmäßigkeiten" (*zakonomernosti*) gerade diejenige Funktion übernehmen, die Whiteheads Metaphysik zufolge Gott zufallen muß. Das läßt sich aus Whitehead eindeutig belegen: "Here 'God' is that actuality in the world, in virtue of which there is physical 'law'."[13] Dies scheint der Punkt zu sein, von dem aus man die sowjetische Kritik an Whitehead verstehen sollte.

A. S. Bogomolov, der Verfasser der Whitehead-Darstellung in *Sovremennyj ob'ektivnyj idealizm*, verfehlt Whiteheads Ansatz von Grund auf und nimmt den Gottesbegriff zur Zielscheibe der üblichen antireligiösen Propaganda. "In diesem Mystizismus einer 'beständig vergehenden' Welt, die ihre Unsterblichkeit in Gott findet, drückt sich der Pessimismus des

zeitgenössischen liberalen Bourgeois aus, der vom Untergang der kapitalistischen Welt eingeschüchtert ist und alle seine Hoffnung in eine gütige, mitleidige Gottheit verlegt."[14] Diese Kritik ist, abgesehen von ihren unsachlichen psychologischen Bestandteilen, deshalb so verfehlt, weil sie die von Whitehead getroffene Unterscheidung des philosophischen und des religiösen Gottesbegriffes geflissentlich übersieht. Bekanntlich hat Whitehead Philosophie und Religion unter den gemeinsamen Begriff der "Versöhnung" gebracht. Tatsachen können den Menschen in zweierlei Hinsicht betreffen: die bloße Tatsächlichkeit der einzelnen Erfahrung verlangt nach Subsumption unter ein Gesetz. Wissenschaft und Philosophie widmen sich dieser Aufgabe auf verschiedenen Stufen der Allgemeinheit. Zweitens betreffen uns Tatsachen durch die emotionale Resonanz, die sie in uns hervorrufen. Es sind die Unstimmigkeiten der Tatsachen mit ästhetischen und sittlich-normativen Prinzipien, weshalb wir außer der intellektuellen noch eine weitere Versöhnung mit den Tatsachen verlangen. Um eine solche Versöhnung bemühen sich Kunst und Religion.

Offenbar hat Whiteheads Gottesbegriff mit den Aussagen einer kirchlichen Religion ebenso wenig gemeinsam wie Aristoteles' "Unbewegter Erster Beweger". Die soeben angeführte Kritik Bogomolovs ist also völlig gegenstandslos.

Bogomolov erreicht nur an wenigen Stellen die spekulative Höhe der Philosophie, die er kritisiert. Beachtenswert ist folgender Einwand gegen Whiteheads Lehre von der objektiven Unsterblichkeit des Vergangenen in Gott: "Im Unterschied zu Hegel, der im Begriff der 'Aufhebung' gewisse Züge des logischen Prozesses verabsolutierte, verabsolutiert Whitehead im Gefolge von Bergson eine Eigenschaft des menschlichen Bewußtseins, nämlich das Gedächtnis."[15]

Auf die Gefahr psychologistischer Mißverständnisse habe ich oben im Zusammenhang mit der Lehre von den *physical* resp. *conceptual feelings* bereits hingewiesen. Hier trifft Bogomolov in der Tat auf die größte Schwierigkeit aller spekulativen Philosophie: die Unangemessenheit unserer Sprache gegenüber dem, was in der Metaphysik gedacht werden soll. Diese Schwierigkeit hat Whitehead natürlich selbst gesehen. Man findet in der Einleitung zu *Process and Reality* dieses Problem in aller wünschenswerten Klarheit ausgesprochen. Es ist eine bedauerliche Tatsache, daß die Sowjetphilosophie bisher noch nicht die schematische

Einteilung aller Philosophie in Materialismus und Idealismus überwunden hat. So heißt es bei Bogomolov,: "Daher besteht die Absicht der Substitution der Begriffe 'Materie', 'Raum' und 'Zeit' durch den Begriff der '*actual entity*' darin, den materialistischen Gesichtspunkt durch einen idealistischen zu ersetzen."[16]

An diesem Argument ist soviel richtig, daß Whitehead von einem platonischen Ansatz ausgeht, und daß "Materie" in seinem System als ein abgeleiteter Begriff auftritt, während der dialektische Materialismus von der Materie als Grundbegriff ausgeht, so daß ihm die (schwierigere) Aufgabe zufällt, die geistigen Dimensionen wie Bewußtsein, Denken, finale Verursachung, Apriorität der Logik und der Mathematik u.a. zu erklären.

Zum Schluß möchte ich noch einmal auf das Problem der Evolution zurückkommen, von dem die Gegenüberstellung Whiteheads und der Sowjetphilosophie ausging. Bzgl. der Entstehung neuer Qualitäten in der kosmischen Geschichte schreibt Bogomolov: "Der dialektische Materialismus erklärt sie als Übergang quantitativer Veränderungen in qualitative ... Aber die 'schöpferische Evolution', die die Entwicklung in einseitiger Weise als rein qualitative Veränderung begreift und die quantitativen Veränderungen als Ursache der qualitativen ignoriert, kann nicht ohne die Einführung des 'Schöpferischen', einer idealen Kraft, in ihr Verständnis des Entwicklungsprozesses auskommen."[17]

An keinem Problem wird es deutlicher als an diesem, daß der dialektische Materialismus trotz aller anderslautenden Behauptungen an einem äußerlichen Verständnis der Wirklichkeit haftet. Materialität, Raum, Zeit und effiziente Verursachung sind das Äußere der Dinge. Der dialektische Materialismus nimmt sie als die einzigen Erklärungsprinzipien. Damit steht dieses Denken abseits von jeder Metaphysik, die ja immer, ob sie nun mit dem aristotelischen Physis-Begriff oder mit den Kategorien des Deutschen Idealismus oder mit Whiteheads Begriff der *creativity* arbeitet, ihren Standpunkt im *Innern* der zu erklärenden Realität einnehmen muß.

## ANMERKUNGEN

1. *Sovremennyj ob"ektivnyj idealizm. Kritičeskie očerki* (Der zeitgenössische objektive Idealismus. Kritische Abrisse). M. 1963.
2. Whitehead, A. N.: *Process and Reality*. New York. 1941. p. 5.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. X.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 36.
5. *Op. cit.*, p. 46.
6. *Op. cit.*, p. 46.
7. *The Concept of Matter* (ed. by Ernan McMullin). Notre Dame, Ind. 1963. pp. 497–524.
8. *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (Philosophische Enzyklopädie). M. 1960. 1. Teil, S. 207.
9. *Op. cit.*, 1. Teil, S. 209.
10. *Op. cit.*, 1. Teil, S. 209.
11. *Op. cit.*, 1. Teil, S. 269.
12. *Op. cit.*, 2. Teil, S. 149.
13. Whitehead, A. N., *op. cit.*, p. 434.
14. Bogomolov, A. S.: 'Neorealizm i spekulativnaja filosofija'. *Sovremennyj ob"-ektivnyj idealizm. Kritičeskie očerki.* M. 1963. S. 288.
15. *Op. cit.*, S. 286.
16. *Op. cit.*, S. 275.
17. *Op. cit.*, S. 279.

F. RAPP

# DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM VERSUS N. HARTMANN'S ONTOLOGY

In the *sbornik, Problema vozmožnostiti i dejstvitel'nosti* (Izd. AN, M.–L. 1964). T. N. Gornštejn deals on pp. 242–278 with two aspects of N. Hartmann's philosophy: (I) the concept of ideal being and (II) the analysis of possibility and reality.

N. Hartmann (1882–1950) erected a realistic ontology beginning with every-day experience and that of science, and always tried to keep in close touch with them. The center of his system, which is elaborated clearly and in detail, is formed by the philosophical categories and the various mutually irreducible levels of reality. Thus Hartmann's thinking and dialectical materialism have basic elements in common and their confrontation should be of great interest. It is therefore to be regretted that this confrontation has been limited to the two points mentioned above.*

## I

Concerning the controversy about the existence of ideal beings (such as values, universal concepts and the laws of logic and mathematics) Mrs. Gornštejn exposes Hartmann's opinion: according to him these immaterial universal beings are not subject to change of time and space and are independent of their relation to concrete, individual, material objects. On the other hand the structure and the general laws of the real world are parts of this autonomous sphere of ideal being. Though the ideal beings can only be grasped by an intellectual intuition, they exist independently of their being known, and therefore they are as objective as material beings.

Mrs. Gornštejn declares this position to be radically false. By not

* According to *Novye knigi SSSR* 1, 1965, p. 16, the book of the same authoress titled *Filosofia N. Gartmana* which had been announced in *Sovetskie knigi* 1964, (Templan Izd. AN) p. 46, no. 154, will not appear. In the short exposition attached to the original announcement, Hartmann's philosophy is rejected as opposed to dialectical materialism because of its objective-idealistic character and its acceptance of irrational elements.



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

taking into account the dialectic between the particular and the universal Hartmann splits the "only objective existing material world" into an ideal sphere of the unchangeable timeless essence of things and an always changing sphere of real entities. Hartmann's one-sided stressing of the dependence of real being from the ideal leads to the *priority* of ideal being and thus to objective idealism. But in fact universal concepts and mathematical relations do not exist independently of the objects of the real world. These concepts and relations are rather products of the elaboration of reality by human thinking.

In order to see whether the quoted arguments are consistent it will be useful to distinguish two levels of philosophical reasoning: (A) Speculative metaphysics, where the interest is primarily directed to the synthesis of a system which represents the total world, and (B) Philosophical analysis of the experience we have of reality. Now dialectical materialism contains both of these levels, as it represents the reinterpretation of Hegel's speculative system (which corresponds to the former) from a materialistic point of view closely connected with natural sciences (corresponding to the latter level).

This would not be unusual, for it is possible and in philosophy even indispensable to make, at the level of speculative metaphysics, heuristic assumptions the consequences of which are examined on the level of experience. But in dialectical materialism the dicta of the classics (Marx, Engels, Lenin) at the speculative level are obligatory and therefore with respect to experience any of these dicta is simply a prejudice. For, concerning experience rather than arguments of authority, only what is confirmed by sober investigation and research can be regarded as reliable.

What does this mean with regard to our problem of ideal being? At the metaphysical level the materiality of the world has been once and for all strictly established by the classics of dialectical materialism. Therefore all further investigations can only confirm this apodictic statement. That is why even the balanced interconnection between the real and the independent ideal sphere, which Hartmann proposes, has to be rejected. Therefore the independence of the known object from the knowing subject has to be claimed with respect to material entities, but this very independence is denied as referring to ideal beings.

Furthermore, it may be doubted whether the arguments of dialectics

and theory of abstraction are compatible. – If, at the level of speculation, the dialectic of the single and the universal is accepted with all its consequences, this will lead to Hegel's movement of concept where everything is what it is only together with its process of becoming and change as conceived by spirit. Thus, reality at the level of Hegel's *Vernunft* will coincide with thinking. Therefore the radical variability will abandon the difference between matter and ideas. – On the other hand, if one starts from reality at the level of experience and tries to build up a nominalistic theory of abstraction, one will be led only to fixed, well-defined concepts and therefore this approach is irreconcilable with the consistent dialectical position quoted above.

In addition to this, even a nominalistic theory of abstraction would have to take into account the fact that there exist a formal logic and a pure mathematics, which obviously have no direct contact with reality, so that at least a constructivist approach must be accepted.

## II

The analysis of Hartmann's ideas about possibility and reality forms the real subject of Mrs. Gornštejn's paper and occupies by far the greatest part of it (pp. 253–278), while the discussion of ideal being (I) was only intended as a preparation. As the authoress explains in detail, Hartmann elaborated in his book *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* (Berlin, 1938) the ontological concept of real possibility which holds in the realm of *real* beings (i.e. in space and time). Dissatisfied with the ambiguity of Aristotle's concept of disjunctive possibility (according to which the possibility of $A$ implies the possibility of non-$A$) Hartmann is looking for an unmistakable criterion for the *real* possibility of an event. This criterion he finds in the presence of the totality of conditions affecting the event: if the sum total of its real conditions is present, an event is possible. Before the event itself takes place only partial possibilities can have existed, corresponding to the incompleteness of conditions. So Hartmann arrives at the megaric concept of possibility, where possibility and reality coincide.

Mrs. Gornštejn declares this position to be unacceptable. Her main arguments against Hartmann can be divided in the following way:

(A) The static and therefore metaphysical approach, which only

regards univocal determinateness and thus abstracts from the *change* of reality, has to be replaced by a dialectical analysis.

(B) When the development of a phenomena in time is taken into account in its different stages, the concept of possibility becomes decisive and does not vanish, as would follow from Hartmann.

(C) The inner laws of an object determine possibilities, which exist in the very nature of things and represent tendencies or directions of development.

(D) During the development because of the dialectical struggle of opposing tendencies, there are always new possibilities arising.

(E) During this latter process there exists an indeterminacy concerning the question of *which* of the possibilities will be realized.

(F) The choice of which of the possibilities at hand is realized is based on an objectively existing chance. This chance is due to the interlacing of different causal-chains, for any exterior influence is a chance-event with respect to the causal-chain in question.

(G) As Hartmann does not observe the above-mentioned points, his position is close to mechanical determinism, which necessarily leads to fatalism.

(H) Though dialectical materialism does not acknowledge any autonomous ideal being distinct from real being (see Section I), a distinction has to be made between (1) ideal or abstract possibility and (2) real possibility. To (1) belong the structures of pure mathematics, hypotheses and other possibilities which are elaborated "in reserve" *(v zapas)* and cannot be as yet realized. The process of science transforms (1) into (2).

Concerning Mrs. Gornštejn's criticism one has to say that her dialectical analysis in (B)–(F) indeed reveals the central point of Hartmann's reasoning: he only regards co-existing conditions, without considering the process as a whole nor the connection of its stages. This concept is in fact close to the mechanistic determinism of classical physics. Hartmann tried to take into account the long-range determination of processes and their "directness" towards an aim in biology and human activity by higher forms of determination which influence the processes on the lower levels by *Überbauung*. So the "inner laws" of dialectical materialism (see C) correspond to Hartmann's *Überbauung*. In both theories the very nature of this long-range directed determination, and especially its

relation to causal determination, remain rather vague. An argument in favor of Hartmann's theory is its greater specification. But the position of dialectical materialism has the important advantage that it furnishes an ontological basis for the concept of disjunctive possibility, which has been proved in science and in every-day use. In addition to this, the dialectical-materialistic concept of "different forms of the movement of matter" opens the way to further specification, too.

Furthermore, it can be stated that in Hartmann's terminology the "struggle of tendencies" (see (D)) would correspond to the connection between partial possibilities, and the definition of chance (see (F)) could be accepted as conventional denotation (chance = exterior to a certain context). This means that with exception of the important point of long-range determination Mrs. Gornštejn has not shown something wrong in Hartmann, but rather something which can be expressed in another way.

Notwithstanding the criticism which has been made it must be said that Mrs. Gornštejn gives an extremely lucid presentation of Hartmann's thinking. She exhibits a profound knowledge of this great German philosopher's books, (none of which has been translated into Russian) and her criticism always remains on a high philosophical level. Certainly a further discussion between dialectical materialism and Hartmann's ontology will be fruitful for both sides.

# NOTES AND COMMENTS

## A CRITICAL NOTE ON THE CRITIQUE OF A CRITIC

"The writings of Mr. Bocheński have nothing in common with real science: his attempt to pass off 'Sovietology' as the science of Communism, and himself as a serious and objective researcher in this field is based on worthless means."

This is the summary judgment of I. T. Jakuševskij, presented in an article 'On the 'Sovietology' of Mr. Bocheński' in the *Voprosy filosofii**, based, as the author acknowledges, on I. M. Bocheński's 'Sowjetologie' in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (supplement to *Das Parlament*), 11 (1962), on March 14, 1962. This one article, which outlines problems and tasks of Soviet studies, must bear the entire burden of Bocheński's "writings", for other publications are neither cited nor referred to otherwise in this "review".

It cannot be known whether this review was intended to serve any particular purpose, or what that purpose was, but one can list some of the effects it may have had, and leave it open which of these, if any, were intended.

One class of readers may consider itself putting on notice not to become too familiar with this "philosophizing adversary" because he is only a professional anti-Communist. Another class may be persuaded that Bocheński is a "falsifier" and thus undeserving of any credit. Yet another group, by judiciously discarding the reviewer's bows to *partijnost'*, may obtain a fairly clear and comprehensive resumé of Bocheński's article.

The first three of the review's four parts indeed contain a substantial outline of the article which, with few exceptions, is accurate. Interspersed are several criticisms which are argued on the sandbox level. Amid extensive citations from Bocheński's demands for a high quality of work in Sovietology and among its contributors, the reviewer also quotes a purported requirement of an "anti-Communist minimum". This demand is not to be found in or out of this article by Bocheński, but it neatly "documents" the reviewer's charge that Bocheński, whatever his pretensions of scientific objectivity, merely serves the cause of primitive

* Jakuševskij, I. T.: 'Cennye priznanija odnogo iz našix 'kritikov' (O 'sovetologii' gospodina Boxenskogo)'. *VF* 1964, 10, 143–147.

anti-Communism. Perhaps the notion of the "anti-Communist minimum" is derived from Bocheński's reasonable observation that the possibilities of objective investigation and judgment are not forfeited when a personal position toward Communism is taken.

It is charged in the review that Bocheński and the others who share "all the Jesuitic secrets of contemporary Western propaganda"*, besides being basely motivated, are bound to come up with the wrong results from their study of Communism because they ignore the basic fact that "Capitalism is in a general crisis" while "the new societies are rising all over the world". There is not much that can be done with such a statement, except to allow it to illustrate that in Soviet thought events are normative and that the resulting truths depend upon who is winning. Although Bocheński is once characterized as a "sober- and constructive-minded man"** he is not believed, for throughout the review, his opposition to those who embarass Sovietology by the "nonsense" they produce is not accepted. Bocheński's extensively-quoted criticisms of poor work are repeatedly turned against him to demonstrate him to be no better than those he disavows. No reasons are given why this identification should be accepted.

This pedestrian determination to post Bocheński's "admissions" of quality problems in what he terms "pseudo-Sovietology" over "the gates of the house in which he himself lives"*** permeates also the fourth and final section of the review, which is an *ad hominem* attack against him.

The main charge is "falsification". The evidence is (1) the fact that Bocheński wrongly described Marx to have been influenced by Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner; (2) that he concentrates on Marx's and Lenin's formulations of theory and ignores the social-economic conditions of the middle of the 19th century and (3) that he falsely makes a distinction between the teaching of Lenin and contemporary Soviet thought. The verdict: guilty as charged. On charge (1), "it is already well-known to everyone that Marx and Engels already in 1845–1846 . . . issued a devastating critique of the idealistic concept of the young-Hegelians, as well as of the abstract anthropologism of Feuerbach".† On charge (2), "even the most mediocre dilettantes in the field

* *Op. cit.*, p. 143.
** *Op. cit.*, p. 144.
*** *Op. cit.*, p. 145.
† *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

of the history of Marxism could have explained to Mr. Bocheński that without a determination of the basic features of an investigated epoch, an objective analysis of the development of the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat is not possible".* Charge (3) is proven because Bocheński was inconsistent when he declared that the differences between the Leninist and new Soviet period do not amount to a complete break. So much in support of the judgment.

It would appear that had Bocheński accepted Marx's word defining his relationship to the "Holy Family" and other former colleagues and the current Soviet definition thereof, instead of investigating further on his own, he could have saved himself a lot of trouble from the *Voprosy filosofii*. He would not risk the rather unbecoming epithet of "falsifier", if he were to guide his search for understanding by the certain truths produced by the revolutionary situation of any given period of history. Bocheński, it appears from the hypersensitive reaction, sinned most when he implied something less than an absolute identity of contemporary Soviet thought with the teachings of Lenin.

Assuming that Bocheński's conversion to Marxism would make things right, it would be interesting to learn of the mechanics whereby he can liberate himself from the *partijnost'* which he necessarily and inevitably owes the world in which he lives.

There are more charges but, like the foregoing, they do not lend themselves to serious discussion. Perhaps we can look forward to a time when Soviet philosophers will pose "open" questions, in discussable terms, now that they have begun to submit accurate statements along with their critiques of the positions of their "adversaries".

The fact that this review provides the trained Soviet reader an essentially accurate understanding of the content of the article, must be stressed as a positive development. The possibilities of real confrontations could be further enhanced if the Soviet critiques were to extend the approach demonstrated here from isolated books and articles to the appreciation of the whole work of any given scholar, and if the time lag between publication and review could be reduced (Bocheński's article appeared in early 1962; this review in late 1964).

*Joseph Schiebel*

* *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

## ADAM SCHAFF ON ALIENATION IN SOCIALISM

The noted Polish philosopher Adam Schaff published a study entitled 'Az egyén és teremtményei' (The Individual and his Products) in the Hungarian cultural and philosophical journal *Valóság* (Reality), 1964, 10. An editorial note defines the paper as an excerpt from Schaff's new book, *Marxism and the Human Individual,* now in preparation. If the above study reflects the general tenor of Schaff's new book, it will mark a new milestone in the evolution of the thinking of a man who has already been called an 'official revisionist' (George L. Kline) an 'orthodox revisionist' (Josef Kozłowski) and who has led one western reviewer to hope that his previous major work, *Introduction to Semantics* (English version published in New York, 1962) "may be a first sign of philosophical revolution in the Marxist camp, which will lead it to the twentieth century and will result in the end of a party philosophy" (Mario Bunge in *The Journal of Philosophy*, LIX, 25). To judge from the published excerpt, Schaff's latest work goes further than anything he wrote previously in being broad-minded in the interpretation of the 'Classics' and in relying on empirical evidence. Therefore, it merits a more extensive summary than a single paper would normally justify.

Schaff's key-concept is the Marxian concept of 'alienation'. Although Marx himself did not always like to use this term (in the *German Ideology* he spoke of it with irony and placed it in brackets), Schaff holds that this was due to the false sense lent to it by pre-Marxist philosophers (e.g. Hegel, Rousseau) and, as few people other than a handful of specialists know anything about how this concept was used before Marx (!), Marxists may use it today without fear of being misunderstood. Consequently Schaff uses the term 'alienation' in a somewhat wider sense than Marx did. The concept is central to humanistic philosophy since alienation is an antihumanistic evil to be eliminated, or at least restricted as much as possible. 'Alienation' means the 'objectification' of spiritual and material goods, whereby these, though produced by man, gain autonomy and begin to rule him. Alienation is typical of capitalism, where it is a root-evil, entailed by the material basis (the mode and relations of production) of society. Since the base determines the superstructure, and alienation is manifested in the superstructure (as a distorted form of the social consciousness), Marx believed that alienation will

vanish with the elimination of the capitalist economic system.

Schaff contests the validity of this basic Marxian doctrine. He appeals to empirical evidence (an act which he previously condemned as 'anti-Marxist') and asserts that, in the light of experience in contemporary socialism, it is clear that alienation does not vanish with the introduction of the socialist mode of production, but remains an important factor.

He poses the problem as follows. The basic ground of alienation is private property, i.e. the capitalist economic system. But does this mean that by virtue of the elimination of capitalism through the abolition of private property, alienation is automatically ended? In their later works Marx and Engels do not provide definite answers to this problem. The question is, then, whether the conclusion that alienation must cease in socialism is a legitimate inference from Marxist premisses? Schaff believes that it is not. For, from the premiss that in bourgeois society economic alienation is the basis of all other forms of alienation, it does not follow that the alienation of private property in a socialist system eliminates all other forms of alienation as well. Even if in capitalism economic conditions (private property) are the ground of all alienation, it is not inconceivable that under different conditions other grounds should result in other forms of alienation. This must be decided empirically, in the light of actual experience. Schaff wishes to examine first, how alienation is manifested in socialism, and second, what conclusions can be drawn as to the building of Communism on the basis of the experience of socialist alienation. The first question is quickly answered: alienation is present in all thus far known forms of socialism. Without presenting further evidence for this claim (which appears to be taken as self-evident) Schaff concludes that there is no automatism eliminating alienation with the abolition of private property. The real problem for him is to answer the second question. He tells us that we no longer can make use of speculative and utopian arguments (from which the young Marx and Engels were not entirely free), instead, we should base ourselves on the actual experience of socialism. Let us start our empirical studies (Schaff suggests) with the problem of the *state*. In capitalism the state is a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes and as such it must die away when the capitalist economic system is abolished. But socialism also needs the state and the socialist state is an externally directed power as well as an internally effective factor of influence. The cult of personality testified to the fact

that the state can be fearfully alienated in socialism: proceeding from the noblest motives, the socialist state became an autonomous power ruling over its creators and annihilating them. How this could come about requires sociological analysis, but no Marxist has penetrated beyond superficial analyses yet. Schaff asks us to suppose that in socialism the state dies away as ruling power. Nevertheless, we are told, the problem of alienation remains acute in an area where Marx never thought it would, namely in the *administration* of socialist society. Administrative problems have grown tremendously since Marx's time, and now require a correspondingly extensive administrative apparatus. Bureaucracy remains a necessity, and this could not be foreseen by Marx a hundred years ago. The best we can attain to today is to make bureaucracy expert and rational. The fight against bureaucracy must be the fight against deficient administration and not against administration and bureaucracy in general. No matter how society is organized, it requires organization and a specialized, centrally directed apparatus. This contradicts the utopia of stateless society and free creative activity, but it need not necessarily lead to bad results. Still, bad results are possible, since it is problematic in what respects the functions of a highly evolved administrative apparatus differ from the functions of an apparatus of coercion. This, Schaff suggests, remains a problem to be considered. Nevertheless, the crux of the problem lies therein, that the existence of social classes is due not only to economic conditions, but also to other factors. It has become evident that the existence of classes cannot be excluded from our conception of socialist society merely by virtue of the elimination of economic differences. Quite the contrary, their existence must be assumed in the light of our present experiences. While talk of *economic* classes is nonsense (for economic classes *ex definitione* cannot exist in socialism), differences in prestige and social position entail economic stratification and in this sense classes can be said to exist. The problem is not the definition and the sociological category, but the alienation involved in actual class differences.

Schaff believes that it is difficult to say anything concrete about how the needs of all people will be satisfied in the world-communism envisaged by Marx, but at any rate, such Communism lies in the distant future. In the meanwhile, however, one must live under normal conditions. The question is, by what principle? Marxism (contends Schaff) never advocated

abstract egality: socialism's 'to all according to work performed' as well as Communism's 'to all according to need' recognize differentiation between man and man. But can one give more to some than to others without involving further difficulties? Difficulties are inherent not only in the possibility that 'giving more' can take distorted forms, but also in the fact that the grounds of alienation in socialism are thereby strengthened. (In this connection Schaff recalls Orwell's *Animal Farm* where the big chief changes the slogan "all animals are equal" to "all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others".)

Another major problem of socialism is the alienation of labour. The economic bases of alienation are eliminated in socialism, but the elimination is not complete: the products of labour conserve the character of commodity, with the result that economic markets are also conserved. Hence "alienation" in the Marxian sense is preserved, even if the elimination of private property has changed its mode of operation. It is possible that in advanced Communist society the production of commercial merchandise will cease, but Schaff holds this contention to be disputable in the light of present experience. On the other hand, he believes that it is uncontestable that the alienation of labour expounded by Marx remains, and will remain also in the foreseeable future. The mature Marx did not hold on to the fantasy that labour will be replaced by free creative activity. This notion is just as much an utopia in the world of industrial society as the notion that everyone knows everything and can change his activity according to the flight of fancy. Such notions should be attributed to the youthful fantasy and *naïveté* of the young Marx. Work must be performed in socialism as well, and as long as there is work there is specialization and specialization deforms human personality: the character of modern labour entails alienation. Consequently alienation cannot be disposed of in socialism, the best one can do is to mitigate it through the reduction of working hours.

*Ervin Laszlo*

## LOGIC CONGRESS IN JERUSALEM

An International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, from August 26 to September 2, 1964, under the joint auspices of the Inter-

national Union for History and Philosophy of Science and the Academy of Sciences and Humanities. The last congress of this kind took place at Stanford, California, four years before. Students from about 25 different countries of America, Australia, and Europe came to Jerusalem. The participation of the Russian representatives was officially withdrawn by the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union immediately before the beginning of the congress. However, there were delegates from Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. According to the general disposition of the congress itself the papers given by those eastern students chiefly treated purely scientific problems. Only a few of them had a somewhat closer relation to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, but it is not worthwhile giving any detailed account of the considerations put forward in this regard. On the other hand, the audience quite obviously never felt like discussing any of the ideological subjects broached, at least not publicly.

*P. Kirschenmann*

## AMERICAN-SOVIET PHILOSOPHY MEETING

On December 27, 1964, at 7.00 pm there was a meeting of the Society for Philosophical Study of Dialectical Materialism at the Hotel Statler-Hilton in Boston, Mass. The presiding officer was John Sommerville, the Russian guests were Kopnin and Mšvenieradze, and the discussant was Prof. Brand Blanschard of Yale.

As one member of the audience put it, "That was my first Communist cell meeting". Sommerville was unconvincing as "impartial arbiter". Kopnin and Mšvenieradze had nothing to say. And when Prof. Blanschard pointed out (with great skill) the futility of such meetings as long as the Communists insisted on maintaining a "Party-line" in philosophy, he was met with nonsensical remarks.

During the meeting a Mitin-Omeljanovskij sheet, attacking personally Prof. G. L. Kline and the undersigned in the well-known style of those writers was passed out.

It makes one wonder why the American Philosophical Association allows its name to be implicated in such blatantly non-philosophical propaganda.

*T. Blakeley*

## DE-STALINIZATION AND DE-KHRUSHCHEVIZATION

Joravsky has drawn our attention to the fact that the linking of philosophical trends to political ones is not always legitimate. It seems that one should also not overstress the parallelism between philosophical and political events. Thus, it is felt that some correction has to be made in the wide-spread use of dividing the history of recent Soviet philosophy into its Stalinian and post-Stalinian periods. According to this view, the death of Stalin marks the beginning of a new era in Soviet philosophy.

This, it seems, is simply not true. Ždanov's famous speech on June 24, 1947 is an event which had far greater consequences for Soviet philosophy than did the death of Stalin. It marks, in fact, the beginning of the "thaw" in that area of thought. As everybody is familiar with the events immediately after that speech, it will be enough to recall the following facts: the founding of the *Voprosy filosofii*, Kedrov's *Zametki*, Kamenskij's frontal attack on Russian chauvinism, the Markov discussion, and, to a large extent, the Einstein discussion. All that happened before the death of Stalin. Moreover, there are at least indications that after the fall of Malenkov, who (with G. F. Aleksandrov as Minister of Culture) continued the line taken by Stalin in 1947, i.e. a more liberal line, the new rulers tried to "put on the screws" during something like a year, before it appeared impractical.

A correct periodization is, consequently, *not* that which assumes 1953 as the limit between two periods, but rather one which takes 1947 as such. But the year 1947 is situated long before the death of Stalin. Therefore, one must say, if we wish to keep to the already traditional terminology, that the de-Stalinization was operated in philosophy to a great extent by Stalin himself.

Those who know the situation had no illusions about the goodly character of Stalin. They thought he was a criminal and said so. But it is not necessary to burden him with crimes he did not commit; it seems that we have at our disposal a sufficient number of real ones. On the other hand, one has the unpleasant feeling that the attribution of all merits to Khrushchev during his reign was due to a large extent to that unfortunate habit of accepting the adulatory statements made by Soviet writers. In actual fact, there is no justification for this habit among free scholars.

It seems now, that we are entering a new period of similar mistakes. As

Mr. Khrushchev has been replaced by other men, we may very soon have much talk about a de-Khrushchevization. It may be indeed that some change will materialize. But, and this must be stressed, up to now there is very little evidence for *any* change in philosophy at all. At least, if one understands philosophy as in the phrase "Hegel's philosophy" and not as in "philosophy of poultry-husbandry."

*J. M. B.*

## WESTERN PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY

Hungarian philosophers are presently concentrating more of their attention on western philosophy than on Marxism-Leninism. Surprising as this sounds, the statistics of the contents of the last two issues (1964.6. and 1965.1.) of the *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle* (Hungarian Review of Philosophy) confirm it.

Of a total of eight articles (four to each issue) no less than four (two in each issue) deal exclusively with western philosophy. These are: Zádor Tordai, 'On the Relation of Sartre's Existentialism, the Ego, and "Others"'; J. N. Findlay (the British philosopher who lectured recently for the Hungarian Academy of Science), 'Contemporary British philosophy'; Agnes Heller (the illustrious disciple of Lukács, now rehabilitated), 'Kierkegaardian Aesthetics and Music'; and Stefan Morawski, 'The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in 18th Century English Aesthetics'.

Of the remaining four articles one is a scholarly treatise on Aristotle, and no more than three make use of Marxist-Leninist theories in discussing, respectively, higher nervous activity, theory of probability and quantum mechanics, and decadence in art. We may add that György Márkus and Zádor Tordai have just published their *Tendencies in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy* (in Hungarian) in which they devote over 500 pages to a qualified discussion of Existentialism, Thomism, and Neo-Positivism.

A common feature of these works is that their authors express regret over the inadequate Marxist interpretation of western philosophy. But, they usually add, western philosophy is a labyrinth in which one easily loses one's way. The question coming to mind is, are not, for western philosophy, 'finding one's way' and 'adequate Marxist interpretation' mutually exclusive?

*E. L.*

## SOVIET SURVEY OF PHILOSOPHICAL DEMANDS

A "consumer's survey" is being undertaken by the editors of *VF* (*VF* 1965, 1, 191) on the demands and needs in the field of philosophical literature. The inquiry is in the context of a larger general survey conducted by the editorial board for socio-political literature of the State Committee of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the IF AN. *VF* is addressing its enquiry to all its readers, especially to teachers, students and workers "on the ideological front"; the questions posed are the following:

(1) Which of the published works in Marxist-Leninist philosophy are necessary to you for teaching, studies, and work on a higher educational level, etc.?

(2) In your opinion, which questions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy have been insufficiently elucidated in literature, which theoretical and practical problems of the construction of socialism and Communism in our country have been weakly elaborated, and which fields of philosophical science do you consider hold the most prospects for the future (*perspektivnymi*)?

(3) On which problems of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, from your point of view, is it necessary to publish basic works, monographs, and scientific research works?

(4) What popular scientific literature in Marxist-Leninist philosophy is needed for the different categories of readers (definite books and brochures, series and libraries (*bibliotečki*) of works?

(5) On which problems are you at present working which you could present in the near future to a publishing house as a book or brochure for the year 1966–67 (give an approximate date)?

The results of this enquiry will be of great interest to all those in the field of Soviet philosophy, and it is to be hoped that the editors of *VF* will oblige its readers by publishing the conclusions.

*P. Beemans*

## EASTERN GERMANY

In 1964 the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (German Journal of Philosophy) of East-Berlin published a great number of articles discussing the object, method and importance of philosophy, especially as in relation to and distinction from the (natural) sciences. This interesting discussion was started by Max Steenbeck with his 'Essay eines Naturwissenschaftlers über Philosophie und Einzelwissenschaften' (Essay of a Natural Scientist about Philosophy and the Particular Sciences) in *D.Z. f. Ph.* 1963, 12, 1472–1488. One of the most important contributions was made by Alfred Kosing in his 'Gegenstand, Struktur und Darstellung der marxistischen Philosophie' (Object, Structure and Presentation of Marxist Philosophy) in *D.Z. f. Ph.* 1964, 7, 781–807. In this article Kosing wishes to propose a completely new definition of philosophy, because its current one as the science of the most general laws of nature, society and thought is only maintained in the handbooks (Soviet and German) due to conservative laziness, although quite insufficient and wrong. Kosing argues that the definition mentioned and similar others make philosophy identical to dialectics, that they do not include materialism, the answer to the basic question of philosophy, that they "scientistically" forget the problems of man and the human need for *Weltanschauung*, and that they lack differentiation and methodological elaboration (pp. 785–786).

Kosing considers the redefinition of philosophy as a prerequisite for the new handbook of philosophy, the appearance of which he announces. It is to be written on the order of the Central Committee of the SED by a collective of authors including M. Buhr, W. Eichhorn I, G. Heyden, G. Klaus, A. Kosing, G. Kröber, G. Redlow, R. Schulz, W. Stoljarow. The high aspirations of originality, the intention to think through all of philosophy and to present it in a new way, and the planned outline which looks unusual and intelligent (pp. 805–807) lead us to look forward in pleasant anticipation and curiosity to the promised book.

*W. F. Boeselager*

## MORE PHILOSOPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

*Chi va piano, va sano!* Volume III of the *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija* has recently appeared, after some delay; however, it appears to have been

worth waiting for, both in scope and depth of content. A considerable part of the book is biographical in character, with extensive presentation of philosophers of antiquity and of the 18th and 19th centuries, of contemporary Soviet philosophers (almost 50 are mentioned) and non-Communist philosophers, all of whom receive a fairly objective treatment. Over one-third of the volume is concentrated on about a dozen topics or complexes of topics: logic and logical subjects (c. 50 pp.), Marx and Marxism-Leninism (18 pp.), matter and materialism (25 pp.), mathematics (14 pp.), method and methodology (13 pp.), Science (20 pp.), person and cult of personality (13 pp.), Communism (32 pp.), Lenin (9 pp.), etc. There are a total of 584 pp. in the volume, covering subjects from *Kommunizm* to *Nauka*.

*P. B.*

## PUBLICATION CANCELLED OF SOVIET BOOKS

A rather large number of philosophical and other books, the publication of which had been announced by *Novye knigi* since 1961, will not be issued according to that journal (1965, No. 1). Among these cancelled books are the following:

ANDREEV, G. L.: *Ateizm N. G. Černyševskogo* (The Atheism of N. G. Černyševskij). Izd. AN SSSR (Nauč.-popul. serija).

BAJER, B. i GINZBURG, Z.: *Osnovnye položenija naučnogo kommunizma i Programmy KPSS* (The Basic Positions of Scientific Communism and of the Programme of the KPSS). Gosizdat UzSSR.

DVORCOV, A.: *Gegel'* (Hegel). Izd. AN SSSR (Nauč.-popul. serija).

ÉZRIN, G. I.: *Obščestvennyj progress* (Social Progress). Politizdat.

GARKAVENKO, F.: *Logičeskie formy myšlenija* (Logical Forms of Thought). Učeb. posobie dlja vuzov. 'Vysš. škola'.

GORNŠTEJN, T. N.: *Filosofija N. Gartmana* (The Philosophy of N. Hartmann). Leningradskaja kaf. fil.

GRAČEV, G. D.: *Iskusstvo i texnika* (Art and Technics). Učeb. posobie dlja vuzov. 'Vysš. škola'.

GROŠEV, I. I.: *Teorija, programma i politika Kommunističeskoj partii po nacional'nomu voprosu* (The Theory, Programme and Policy of the CP on the Nationalities Question). 'Mysl".

IL'IČEV, L. F.: *Filosofia i naučnyj progress* (Philosophy and Scientific

Progress). Metodologičeskie problemy estestvoznanija i obščestvoznanija. Izd. AN SSSR.

*Iskusstvo i kommunizm* (Art and Communism). 'Iskusstvo'.

KLYKOVA, O. M.: *Kritika buržuaznoj filosofii i sociologii epoxi imperializma* (Critique of Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology in the Age of Imperialism). Ukazatel' sovetskoj literatury za 1917–1961 gg. Fundamental'naja biblioteka obščestvennyx nauk AN SSSR.

KON, I. S.: *Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj sociologii* (Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology). Politizdat.

KONSTANTINOV, P. N.: *Leninskie idei narodovlastija* (The Leninist Ideas of Democracy). Kazgosizdat.

KOVALEV, A. M.: *Naučnyj kommunizm – sostavnaja čast' marksizma-leninizma* (Scientific Communism – a Constituent Part of Marxism-Leninism). Izd. MGU.

KUZ'MIN, V. P.: *Kategorija mery v marksistskoj dialektike* (The Category of Measure in Marxist Dialectics). 'Mysl' '.

LAVRENT'EV, D. F.: *Kritika sovremennyx buržuaznyx reformistskix teorij zarabotnoj platy* (Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Reformist Theory of Wages). Učeb. posobie dlja ekonomičeskix vuzov. 'Vysš. škola'.

LJUBINSKAJA, L. N.: *Kategorija vremeni v marksistskoj filosofii* (The Category of Time in Marxist Philosophy). Učeb. posobie dlja vuzov. 'Vysš. škola'.

NAUMENKO, L. N.: *Dialektičeskaja logika kak metod naučnogo poznanija* (Dialectical Logic as Method of Scientific Knowledge). 'Vysš. škola'.

*Material'noe proizvodstvo–osnova suščestvovanija i razvitija obščestva* (Material Production – Basis of the Existence and Development of Society). Politizdat.

*Reakcionnaja rol' musul'manskogo duxovenstva v Uzbekistane.* 1917–1940 gg. (The Reactionary Role of the Moslem Clergy in Uzbekistan from 1917–1940). Sbornik. Gosizdat UzSSR.

SLAVINA, M.: *Političeskaja organizacija obščestva* (The Political Organization of Society). Politizdat.

SMIRNOV, I. I.: *Leninskij metod praktičeskix zadanij* (The Leninist Method of the Practical Task). Iz. 2-e, pererabot. i dop. Politizdat.

ŠAFF, A.: *Filosofija čeloveka* (The Philosophy of Man). Per s pol'sk. Politizdat.

ŠAPOVALOV, N. I.: *Osnovnye kategorii materialističeskoj dialektiki* (The Basic Categories of Materialist Dialectics). 'Mysl' '.

XARČEV, A. G.: *Obščestvennoe soznanie* (Social Consciousness). Učeb. posobie dlja vuzov. 'Vysš. škola'.

ZAXAROV, F. I.: *Vseobščaja svjaz' i razvitie material'nogo mira* (Universal Relationship and the Development of the Material World). Izd. VPŠ i AON.

ZOZULJA, A. M.: *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (Foundations of Marxist Philosophy). Učeb. dlja vyss. učeb. zavedenij. 'Vysš. škola'.

*J. Hänggi*

# REVIEWS

*Metodologičeskie problemy sovremennoj nauki.* Sbornik statej. Pod redakciej V. S. Molodcova i A. Ja. Il'ina. Izd. MGU, 1964. 245 pp.

In the preface, written in good dialectical-materialistic terms, V. S. Molodcov claims dialectics to be the only real methodology of sciences. By the union of dialectical-materialism and concrete sciences both areas will profit. Molodcov opposes the inconsistency of subjective and objective idealism (leading only to human consciousness and an absolute idea, respectively) by the objectivity and strict determinacy of the laws of nature, proved by practice and experience. As the plenum of the CC of CPSU pointed out in June, 1963, the principle of peaceful coexistence has not to be extended to the relation of materialism and idealism. On the basic philosophical question (the relation of thought and being) both positions are strictly irreconcilable. This book, written by eleven young scientific workers of the Department of Dialectical Materialism of the Philosophical Faculty of MGU, is to be followed by another collective- book dedicated to the same subject. Thus, we can state that the trend to regard dialectics as general methodology is increasing.

In the contribution of B. S. Grjaznov and A. Ja. Il'in all the arguments of the preface are to be found again. Further, the authors try to make clear that philosophy (i.e. dialectical materialism) has rights of its own in three respects: (1) The basic ideas and principles of every concrete science are philosophical ones (e.g. the question of the cause of development and evolution, or the question concerning the truth of our knowledge). (2) The results of science also raise problems which cannot be solved by the individual sciences alone (e.g. the question of the real nature of matter; the problems of continuity and infinitude; the nature of mathematical statements and proofs; and more generally, the content of and the relations between scientific concepts and the question of the limits and subjects of the individual sciences). (3) Philosophy supplies the scientist with the method for knowing reality (by adhering to Lenin's doctrine of the inexhaustibility of matter and the theory of reflection). *C**: While the questions raised in the first two points make good sense, the measures really proposed by the third one seem to be too general and self-evident.

Starting with an historical survey B. S. Grjaznov gives a clear exposition of the quarrel between realism (Platonism) and nominalism in modern logic. While in the middle ages these tendencies distinctly represented the idealistic and materialistic position, today logical nominalism has to be blamed for its anti-scientific negation of theoretical knowledge. On the other hand, logical realism does not sufficiently differentiate between the existence of abstract (universal) and concrete (singular) entities. *C:* It seems to the writer that this very lack of

* Reviewer's comments.



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

differentiation holds for dialectical materialism, which by its classics is prevented from taking into account a being not intrinsically connected with matter.

Basing himself on good arguments, A. R. Pozner declares that in quantum-theory as well as in the theory of relativity one has to stress the objective and absolute laws of nature and not the relative and conditioned ways we conceive them. To deal with the new situation in micro-physics new methods have to be elaborated which must be based on the dialectical unity of contradictions. Pozner discusses in detail the principle of complementarity as a not completely satisfactory attempt to do this. *C:* However, one may doubt whether dialectics can be a suitable means to clarify the situation of microphysics.

In exhaustively describing the peculiarities of statistical laws (concerning a great number of similar objects, subject to the same conditions and being independent from each other in their behaviour) V. G. Vinogradov and A. Ja. Il'in insist that the necessity and determinacy which the collective as a whole reveals can only be based on the causal determination of the single objects. But with respect to the whole, the single events have chance-character; thus necessity appears in the form of chance. *C:* Concerning many fields (e.g. social sciences or classical statistical mechanics) we know indeed the cause of the single events; but as the authors mention themselves, the question of why probability enters into quantum theory remains open.

In opposition to the preceding paper V. J. Kupcov insists that statistical laws cannot be reduced to dynamical ones (which concern the single subjects). This question has to be investigated in the context of the irreductibility of the forms of movement of matter (e.g. physical, biological and sociological forms). *C:* It seems evident to us that the existence of different levels in nature does not prevent a relation between these levels; thus one cannot exclude that the single objects of a collective are subject to their own laws.

In her analysis of the role of models and the question of imagination (*nagljadnost'*) in modern physics I. B. Mixajlova explains that this problem can be judged correctly only when the activity of human mind is taken into account. For (as she claims) we project into the percepted world the concepts of science which form a dialectical unity of thinking and imagination. If one does not accept this position and opposes a world of physical models to the real world, one would be led to the idealistic concept of thinking without matter. *C:* Notwithstanding the question of its internal consistency the interesting thesis of the activity of human mind (cf. *intellectus agens* and *apriorische Anschauungs-formen*) will raise the question how the subject of this spiritual activity can be reduced to matter.

In their contribution A. M. Koršunov and V. V. Mantatov give a definition of the concept of information (as the isomorphic relation in the process of regulation between two systems). Furthermore, they try to limit information from other concepts, especially from reflection (*otraženie*) and image (*obraz*). In both cases they stress the connection with human activity. Guenther's concept of information as a third being aside from matter and consciousness is

rejected. *C:* In this newly developed complex field the following questions might give rise to further specifications: Does information concern a one-way process, too, or only one of interaction? In what sense can we speak about information without respect to man, his consciousness, his aims, and his activity? Can the image in the mind (as representative of reality) itself react on reality; or, what else reacts?

In presenting the correlative categories of part and whole with respect to the living organism G. P. Šubina insists that the new qualities of the whole, which the parts do not possess, are the product of material relations among the parts; therefore the wholeness (*celostnost'*) is of material constitution. The authoress blames mechanistic concepts for not taking into account qualitative differences, and neo-vitalistic theories are refuted as being idealistic and overestimating the whole. *C:* The question arises: what is really a material relation and the material nature of the whole?

By a detailed historical analysis of the origin of Pavlov's concept of conditioned reflex, M. M. Sidorov tries to give an example of the dialectical process of knowledge. He pretends that social practice is the base on which the contradiction between reality and the old concept (and not between the two concepts, as in Hegel) is solved by the formation of a new concept which penetrates deeper into the essence of things. *C:* Leaving aside the question of dialectics, we find here an interesting hint of a fundamental tension in dialectical materialism: on the one hand there is the radical fluidity of concepts and reality itself (stemming from Hegel), and on the other, being is conceived as static and subject to necessary laws (as in natural sciences). The first position quoted seems to be the root of the strange idea, often to be found in dialectical materialism, that not only concepts but also categories and even laws can come to be and change (rather than merely the way we conceive them).

Based on the western literature on the matter E. N. Nikitin discusses the logical analysis of scientific explanation. He proposes to distinguish three classes of logical models of explanation with respect to the character of (1) the *explicandum* (individual event or law), (2) the *explicans* (containing or not containing only verified propositions), and (3) the logical relation between (1) and (2) (deductive, analogous or inductive explanation). In the event that a general law has not yet been found, Nikitin claims the establishment of such a law by induction to be also an instance of explanation. *C:* Whether the mentioned case of induction has to be regarded as explanation or not seems to depend on the ambiguous interpretation of everyday language. This clearly written paper contains many creative suggestions; every specialist in this field would profit by reading it.

In the last paper Ju. N. Soloduxin explains the advantages of formal languages. Then he turns to the laws of physics and asserts that their necessity is founded in the very nature of things, and not only in the logical sphere (as is held by neo-positivists). This is to be proved by purposeful human activity (praxis); furthermore, without accepting objective necessity one would be led to solipsism.

Reichenbach's effort to formalize natural laws by means of homological statements is explained and rejected as not being based on clear presuppositions. *C:* While the anti-solipsist argument sounds reasonable as a proof for necessity, there is e.g. no difference to be found in the falling of a tile from a tower when released by men (corresponding to praxis) or when loosened by the wind (without praxis). The critique of Reichenbach is convincing.

*Summary:* In every paper of the collective book (which gives a fairly representative cross-section of contemporary dialectical materialism) most of the attention is occupied by a detailed and competent description of the respective problem. Thus the Russian reader receives a good deal of information. Beyond this, within the sometimes rather vague frame which is furnished by the general and over-all statements of the classics (Marx, and for dialectical materialism, especially Engels and Lenin), all the authors exhibit a philosophical reasoning that often leads to interesting results. With respect to the materialistic dialectical method, nowhere in the book is the reader given any counsel or reference which would allow him to acquire a knowledge of it in an easier and more exhaustive fashion than the usual methods presently in use, which never seem to be the subject of any reflection. On the methodological level the only advantage of dialectics seems to consist in giving a description of apparently opposite results, *after* the state of affairs has been stated. The increasing contact between dialectical materialism and the sciences (with their method of independent and consistent reasoning) combined with the consciousness of philosophical questions (inaugurated by the classics) may be a good stimulus to further investigation.

*F. Rapp*

*Philosophisches Wörterbuch.* Herausgegeben von Georg Klaus und Manfred Buhr. VEB Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig. 1964. XV + 634 S.

Ein Wörterbuch mit ausgeprägt eigenem Charakter erschien kürzlich in Ostberlin. Es ist eine Gemeinschaftsarbeit des Instituts für Philosophie der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin und des Lehrstuhls für Philosophie am Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Ostdeutschlands, unterstützt von einigen anderen, auch sowjetischen Institutionen. In ihm werden ungefähr tausend Stichworte behandelt, was bei einem Umfange des Buches von 634 Seiten recht wenig ist: Ein Zeichen seiner enzyklopädischen Anlage. In erster Linie werden Kategorien des Dialektischen und Historischen Materialismus und die mit ihrer Hilfe formulierten Gesetze abgehandelt. Einzelne Philosophen wurden nicht aufgenommen. Doch es ist keineswegs rein systematisch. Denn in vielen Artikeln wird, nach einer Definition des jeweiligen Begriffs, dessen historischer Werdegang in ziemlicher Ausführlichkeit dargestellt. Im ganzen gesehen ist es ein Wörterbuch philosophischer Kategorien, Begriffe, Richtungen und Disziplinen sowie der allgemeinen philosophischen Terminologie. Auffallend ist die große Zahl von Beiträgen zur zeitgenössischen Logik und der große Raum, den die Kybernetik unter den Explikationen der philosophisch relevanten Tatsachen der Naturwissenschaften einnimmt. Die jetzt noch leicht festzustellenden Einseitigkeiten in der Behandlung der verschiedenen philosophischen Disziplinen und anderer Gebiete von philosophischer Bedeutung sollen in den weiteren Auflagen behoben werden. Die Herausgeber betrachten ihr Wörterbuch als ständige Aufgabe. Bemerkenswert ist schließlich, daß das neue Wörterbuch abgesehen von der mit anderen, etwa sowjetischen Wörterbüchern gemeinsamen marxistisch-leninistischen Grundlage durchaus als unabhängige und manchmal sogar eigenwillige Arbeit angesehen werden muß.

*P. Kirschenmann*

Thomas J. Blakeley: *Soviet Theory of Knowledge*. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. 1964. VIII + 203 pp.

This is the first work undertaken in the West to give an overall view of the Soviet theory of knowledge. At least, it is the first such work entirely based on original sources and explaining this field of Soviet philosophy even in its recent developments (up to 1963). Whoever is aware of how vast this field is and what an important place it holds within Communist doctrine since the 'Classics', will appreciate this competent and scholarly study.

In a first chapter (pp. 1–12) the author gives some general ideas and topics of the field, including remarks on current events and leading philosophers. The second chapter (pp. 13–28) studies the sources of Soviet theory of knowledge as found in the 'Classics' and particularly in the works of Engels and Lenin. In this chapter also, the precise place of theory of knowledge within dialectical materialism is defined. The third chapter (pp. 29–47) explains the main tenets of Soviet theory of knowledge, namely the theory of reflection, the concept of truth, the role of practice in knowledge and the dialectic of the 'Logical' and the 'Historical'. While this chapter treats the basic problems or – as one may call it – Soviet metaphysics of knowledge, the fourth chapter (pp. 48–66) proceeds with a detailed analysis of Soviet psychology of knowledge, i.e. of the hierarchy of cognitive functions and their mutual relations. It begins with what Lenin called 'living contemplation', goes on to sensation, perception, representation, imagination, concept, judgement and reasoning. In the fifth chapter (pp. 67–78) the author exposes Soviet theories about basic cognitive modes, under which heading he groups the problems of generalization, of analysis and synthesis, of abstract and concrete, of deduction and induction, of hypothesis, theory, law and analogy. The sixth chapter (pp. 79–89) deals especially with Soviet methodology and classification of sciences, an important random field of Diamat's theory of knowledge. Chapters VII and VIII (pp. 90–139) offer a new and interesting approach, as they show how Soviet philosophers judge 'bourgeois' theories of knowledge and the different solutions to the problem of knowledge in the history of philosophy. The concluding chapter IX (pp. 140–145) gives a short evaluation by distinguishing positive elements, negative elements and nonsense in Diamat's theory of knowledge and describing the possibilities of further developments.

This book is both a short synthetic exposition of its subject and a good introduction, because by treating most problems very concisely it leaves many things open to further questioning. It can therefore be thoroughly recommended to everybody who is interested in Communist thought and Soviet philosophy.

*K. G. Ballestrem*



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

Helmut Dahm: *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie.* Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik. Köln. 1963. 152 S.

Ein wichtiges Buch zur sowjetischen Philosophie. Der Autor untersucht in seinem Buch, wie die Dialektik als das Grundprinzip der sowjetischen Philosophie in den verschiedenen Teilen und Problemen dieser Philosophie durch die neueren Entwicklungen gefährdet und wie zugleich in einer Art Glaubenshaltung an ihm festgehalten wird. Das wird in einzelnen Gebieten der sowjetischen Philosophie, wie Anthropologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Ontologie nachgewiesen. Besonders schwerwiegend sind die Fragen, welche die Naturwissenschaft an die Philosophie und das Dogma stellt.

Das Buch beeindruckt vor allem durch den ungeheuren Reichtum an erschlossenem Material und durch die Menge der (z.T. höchst spekulativen und schwierigen) behandelten Fragen.

*K. G. B.*

K. G. Ballestrem: *Russian Philosophical Terminology*. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht. 1964. VIII + 116 pp.

The beginning student of Soviet philosophy will be especially appreciative of the work done by Mr. Ballestrem in compiling his dictionary of *Russian Philosophical Terminology*. This glossary, destined by the author to be an aid in the tedious job of learning the basic Russian philosophical vocabulary, is divided into two parts. Part I is an alphabetical listing of approximately 1000 Russian terms and expressions (primarily in substantive form), chosen on the basis of frequency of appearance in Russian philosophical texts, with their equivalents in English, German and French. The terms having a specific meaning in Soviet philosophy (e.g. *Zakony dialektiki*) are marked with an asterisk to especially facilitate the student's initial study of Russian philosophical vocabulary. Part II of the book contains three separate indices of terms employed in English, German and French. In order to provide an easy cross-reference each term is followed by one or several numbers which coincide with the Russian terms in Part I.

The uniqueness of the book rests in the fact that it is a simple and ready reference and learning aid. It is not meant to be used as a regular Russian-foreign language dictionary, and it follows that it is limited to strictly philosophical terms (few terms from the natural sciences are included) and then to the most basic terminology. The dictionary, however, will provide the student with tremendous advantages in his initial studies of Soviet philosophy.

*A. Heidenreich*



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

*Kommunismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart.* Ausgewähltes Bücherverzeichnis bearbeitet in Verbindung mit Werner John, Kurt Marko, Karl-Eugen Wädekin u.a. von Karl-Heinz Ruffmann. Schriften der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn.

Eine unerlässliche Voraussetzung jeder sachgerechten Forschung ist das Vorhandensein bibliographischer Orientierungsmöglichkeiten. Muß sich der Forscher diese Hilfsmittel im Einzelfall jeweils selbst zusammenstellen, so wird viel Zeit für eine Sache aufgewendet, die der eigentlichen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit verloren geht. Diese Feststellung ist, so trivial sie klingen mag, im Bereich der Kommunismusforschung leider lange Zeit eine bloße Forderung geblieben. Zwar standen bereits seit einigen Jahren bibliographische Hilfsmittel für einzelne Teilbereiche zur Verfügung – unter denen besonders die *Bibliographischen Mitteilungen* des Osteuropainstituts an der Freien Universität Berlin, die vom Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen herausgegebene Bibliographie *Literatur zur deutschen Frage* und die vom Osteuropainstitut in Fribourg publizierte *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* zu nennen sind – doch hatte man bisher die Mühe gescheut, eine bibliographische Gesamtdarstellung zum Problembereich des Kommunismus zu erarbeiten. Karl-Heinz Ruffmann, Ordinarius für osteuropäische Geschichte an der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, hat diese umfangreiche Aufgabe nun in einer von der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung herausgegebenen Publikation in Angriff genommen.

Bei der kaum noch überschaubaren Zahl von Veröffentlichungen zu Fragen der kommunistischen Welt kann auch das vorliegende Bücherverzeichnis nur eine Auswahl bieten. Zunächst wurde insofern eine zeitliche Zäsur gesetzt, als nur Publikationen berücksichtigt worden sind, die auch nach 1945 in Neuauflagen erschienen sind. Da ein breiter Kreis von Interessenten angesprochen werden soll, hat man auf eine Aufnahme von Büchern, die nur in slawischen Sprachen publiziert wurden, verzichtet.

Begrüßenswert ist allerdings, daß die Verfasser neben dem deutschen Schrifttum aus der SBZ und der Bundesrepublik auch die wesentlichen englischen und französischen Werke in das Bücherverzeichnis aufgenommen haben. Die Arbeit mit der neuen Bibliographie wird durch die sorgfältige Gliederung sehr erleichtert. Die annähernd 2000 verzeichneten Schriften sind sowohl nach Sachgebieten als auch nach regionalen Gesichtspunkten gegliedert. Außerdem sind in Vorbemerkungen zu den einzelnen Abschnitten jeweils besonders wichtige Schriften gekennzeichnet. Obwohl der philosophische Teil der Bibliographie unter Einbeziehung der Klassiker und der kritischen westlichen Literatur nur etwa 500 Titel umfaßt, dürfte das vorliegende Bücherverzeichnis auch für alle Sowjetologen von Bedeutung sein, die sich auf Sowjetphilosophie spezialisiert haben, weil hier eine schnelle und zuverlässige Information über die Gesamtproblematik des Sowjetsystems und seiner geistigen Voraussetzung ermöglicht wird.



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

Bei der Beurteilung von Bibliographien wird man stets davon ausgehen müssen, daß Vollständigkeit nur ein anzustrebendes Ideal ist, dem man sich bestenfalls annähern kann. Auch wird man über die Auswahlkriterien stets streiten können. Dieser Umstand ist den Bearbeitern der Kommunismusbibliographie deutlich bewußt, wie vom Herausgeber in seinem Vorwort ausdrücklich betont wird. Kritische Bemerkungen sollten sich daher nicht nach Beckmesserart auf einzelne Details richten, sondern eher einige grundsätzliche Aspekte hervorheben. Der Rezensent würde es begrüßen, wenn sich die Bearbeiter in der Zweiten Auflage – die nach Mitteilung der verantwortlichen Stellen schon bald erscheinen soll – dazu entschließen könnten, in das Zeitschriftenverzeichnis auch die wichtigsten östlichen Zeitschriften aufzunehmen, zumal Aufsätze in der Bibliographie nicht berücksichtigt sind. Im Kapitel über Ideologie sollten die Verfasser ihren Grundsatz durchbrechen, nur Schriften, die nach 1945 erschienen sind aufzunehmen. Die Kenntnis der philosophiegeschichtlichen Entwicklung innerhalb des Marxismus-Leninismus dürfte von so erheblicher Bedeutung sein, daß man z.B. auf Autoren wie Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring und Bucharin nicht verzichten sollte, weil diese in ihren Werken wesentliche Aspekte zur Kritik des Marxismus-Leninismus geliefert haben, die in den gegenwärtigen Erörterungen leider zu wenig berücksichtigt werden.

Kleine Ergänzungen und Korrekturen wird die zweite Auflage noch bringen müssen, doch darf man insgesamt sagen, daß die Kommunismusbibliographie eine bisher schmerzlich empfundene Lücke voll und ganz schließen kann. Der Forscher freilich wird auch in Zukunft darauf warten, daß mit dem gleichen Elan der Versuch unternommen wird, eine ähnliche Bibliographie für die sowjetischen Publikationen zu erarbeiten.

*Rüdiger Thomas*

Wilhelm Goerdt: *Die "allseitige universale Wendigkeit" (gibkost') in der Dialektik V. I. Lenins.* In der Reihe: Schriften der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung der Universität Münster, hrsg. v. Eduard Hegel, Manfred Hellmann, Ernst Diekenmann und Robert Stupperich. Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. 1962. X + 97 S. Brosch. DM 14.—

Der münsterische Sowjetologe Dr. Goerdt hat schon 1960 in seinem Werk *"Fragen der Philosophie". Ein Materialbeitrag zur Erforschung der Sowjetphilosophie im Spiegel der Zeitschrift "Voprosy filosofii" 1947–1956* einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Darstellung der Sowjetphilosophie geleistet. So befaßt sich auch die vorliegende Arbeit hauptsächlich mit Fragen der marxistisch-leninistischen Dialektik im Allgemeinen und speziell in der Gegenwart – mehr als mit Lenin selbst.

Zum zentralen Thema macht der Autor die *gibkost'*, die ein 'Grundbegriff der Dialektiktheorie Lenins' sei und die bisher weder die westliche noch die östliche Literatur befriedigend behandelt habe (S. 1–10). Was ist diese *gibkost'* (Wendigkeit, Biegsamkeit) denn nun? Erstmal: Sie ist eine Eigenschaft von dialektischen *Begriffen* und dialektischem Erkennen, hat also ihren Platz in der *subjektiven* Dialektik. Sieht man die ganze Dialektik von dieser ihrer subjektiven Seite, von der *gibkost'* aus (wie es unser Autor tut), so ist damit schon gleich die subjektive erkenntnistheoretische, psychologische und methodologische Seite der Dialektik einseitig herausgegriffen.

Aber die Beschränkung des Autors auf einen sehr speziellen Aspekt der Dialektik geht weiter. Lenins *gibkost'* ist die Einführung dialektischer Bewegung, Entwicklung, Vielfältigkeit und Widersprüchlichkeit in die Begriffe selbst. Damit ist sie wirklich ein Kernstück der Dialektik als Methode. In dem kurzen Zitat aus der Kritik der Hegelschen 'Wissenschaft der Logik' (1914) in den *Filosofskie Tetradi**, auf das der Autor seine Analyse stützt (S. 17), kommt zum Ausdruck, daß die *gibkost'* der Begriffe *alle* Aspekte der subjektiven Dialektik umfaßt; ausdrücklich von Lenin genannt sind Bewegung, Entwicklung, Identität der Gegensätze und Einheit der verschiedenen Seiten in den Begriffen. Dies scheint dem Rezensenten auch die durchgehende Lehre Lenins zu sein. Demgegenüber beschränkt der Autor seine Untersuchung – wohl hauptsächlich aus nicht explizitierten methodischen Gründen – auf einen einzigen Aspekt der *gibkost'*. Dieser Aspekt ist die Wendigkeit des denkenden Menschen zwischen seiner persönlichen, konkreten, mehr analytischen Erkenntnis und der ihm als objektiv vorgegebenen totalitär gültigen systematischen Wahrheit des Diamat. "*Gibkost'* ist *gebundene* Wendigkeit. Sie ist ausgespannt zwischen

* Der Autor zitiert russisch aus der Ausgabe von 1947, str. 84 und deutsch aus der von V. Adoratski besorgten Ausgabe *Aus dem philosophischen Nachlaß,* Wien-Berlin, 1932, S. 27. Weiterhin findet sich die zitierte Stelle in der 5. Auflage der *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij,* tom 29. *Filosofskie tetradi,* M., 1963, str. 98–99 und in der Übersetzung *Aus dem philosophischen Nachlaß,* Exzerpte und Randglossen, Dietz Verl., Berlin, 1949, S. 27.

den Polen einer den Anspruch der Wahrheit stellenden Theorie und dem, was sich im weitesten Sinne unter 'Wirklichkeit' verstehen läßt, als Neuigkeiten vom Tage, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kunst, Literatur, Wissenschaft und Philosophie, Geschichte, Religion usw. – Die im Kairos agierende Wendigkeit als *gibkost'* basiert auf dem Aushalten und Durchstehen der Spannung, die zwischen den Polen 'Theorie' und 'Wirklichkeit' jeweils gegeben sein kann." (S. 1). Es geht also offenbar um den Konflikt zwischen Parteilichkeit und Wissenschaftlichkeit bezw. eigener Meinung.

Nach Interpretation und Einordnung der *gibkost'* in diesem Sinne (S. 17–35) geht der Autor auf Lenins Unterscheidung von objektiver und subjektiver *gibkost'* ein. Im Rahmen der psychologischen und metatheoretischen Fragestellung des Autors bedeutet diese Unterscheidung für ihn: Beide Arten der *gibkost'* sind Teile der subjektiven Dialektik, aber die eine paßt die Tatsachen und das subjektive Urteil dem System an und ist dadurch orthodox und wahr (*objektive gibkost'*), die andere verfälscht die Wahrheit zugunsten des sich überbewertenden Subjekts und wird darum als eklektisch oder sophistisch verurteilt (*subjektive gibkost'*). Der Autor zeigt, wie willkürlich diese Unterscheidung ist und daß ohne Dogmatismus nur noch der allerdings erkenntnistheoretisch wichtige Aspekt der '*Erkenntnisgewandtheit*' übrig bleibt.

Im dritten und umfangreichsten Kapitel macht der Autor den sehr schwierigen und interessanten Versuch, die "Realität der materialistischen Theorie der Dialektik als 'Erkenntnisgewandtheit'" zu untersuchen (S. 48–95). '*Realität*' heißt hier erstens die Anwendung auf die Geschichte der Philosophie und zweitens vor allem die tatsächliche psychologische Situation der Philosophen, Dichter und Schriftsteller in den sozialistischen Ländern. Die Methoden und Urteilsschemen der sowjetischen Historiographie werden in einem Überblick über die Darstellung und Bewertung der gesamten Philosophiegeschichte skizziert (S. 49–64). Die dann folgenden Untersuchungen über die Denkweisen und die Ausdrucksformen problembewußter Autoren unter kommunistischer Herrschaft (S. 76–95) scheinen dem Rezensenten das Hauptinteresse des Autors darzustellen und mit ihren zahlreichen interessanten Perspektiven auch den wichtigsten Teil des Buches. Gleichzeitig sind sie wohl auch die Rechtfertigung für die festgestellte sonst doch etwas erstaunlich wirkende Einengung des Interesses auf den subjektivsten Aspekt der Dialektik und der *gibkost'*. Es entspricht ja durchaus der Philosophie Lenins, ihre spekulative Theorie einmal ganz an der Praxis und an der historischen Situation zu messen.

Ein spezielles Anliegen des Autors, das etwas am Rande immer wieder erscheint, ist folgendes: Durch die Philosophie N. O. Losskij's könne der 'diskutable Kern' der materialistischen Theorie der Dialektik und die russische Tradition in eine zukünftige freie Philosophie Rußlands hineingetragen werden. Einer Ausführung dieses überraschenden Gedankens und des gesamten Komplexes Tradition und Fortschritt im russischen Denken, wie sie der Autor ankündigt, kann man mit Erwartung entgegensehen.

Inzwischen sollte die vorliegende Untersuchung trotz ihrer manchmal etwas

schwerverständlichen bilderreichen Sprache von jedem gelesen und berücksichtigt werden, der die marxistisch-leninistische Dialektik oder die geistige Lage und Entwicklung der sozialistischen Länder im allgemeinen untersucht.

*W. F. Boeselager*

E. Lampert: *Sons against Fathers. Studies in Russian Radicalism and Revolution.* Oxford, Clarendon Press – Oxford University Press. 1965. X + 405 pp.

The book contains two introductory chapters: 'Revolution from Above' (pp. 1–36) and 'Revolution from Below' (pp. 37–93), followed by three monographic studies devoted to Černyševskij (pp. 94–225), Dobroljubov (pp. 226–271), and Pisarev (pp. 272–338). Among them, Černyševskij (1828–1889) emerges as one of the major sources of Lenin; indeed, he would seem to have influenced him perhaps as much as Marx did; Dobroljubov (1836–1861) is important for the same reason, while Pisarev (1840–1868) is another leading representative of the group of "Sons" (in contrast to the "Fathers" of the generation of Herzen and Belinskij).* This group of thinkers thus constitutes the immediate Russian background to Lenin. This alone would be sufficient reason to make the subject relevant for any study of Lenin, Leninism, and contemporary Soviet thought. But the way in which the author treats his subject still further enhances its relevance to such studies. A large part of the book – especially of the central and most substantial chapter on Černyševskij – is devoted to philosophy. The book thus supplies – together with a presentation of the political, social, and literary background – a fairly detailed presentation and analysis of some of the most important philosophical doctrines propounded by the revolutionary intelligentsia of this time. The presentation and analysis are such as one would like to find more often in similar works. In fact, in the opinion of the present reviewer, Lampert's study is a model of how the history of ideas should be written.

To quote just two instances of the method used: the author is at great pains to provide as complete a framework as possible in which the thought in question did arise and was developed. Not only does he carefully describe the political and social events preceding and accompanying the philosophical facts; he also offers a penetrating, sympathetic, and most illuminating analysis of the character of the persons concerned. This is one aspect of the work which deserves to be stressed. The other is described by the author himself when he states the following methodological rule: "A history of ideas must do more than tell us what past thinkers thought, or even whether they were right or wrong in thinking as they did. It must explain how they came to hold their views. It is important, therefore, to look for the governing factor in Chernyshevsky's philosophical doctrines, for his *idée maitresse*, . ." (p. 154). Throughout the work, he has in fact done his best to follow this rule.

There is yet another aspect of the book which merits attention. While describing events and doctrines, while analysing the behaviour and character

* The "Fathers" were dealt with by the same author in an earlier work: *Studies in Rebellion. Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen.* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, xi + 295 pp. (Cf. *inter alia,* Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie (Fribourg) No. 4214. Reviewed by Basin, E. Ja. in *VF* 59, 10, 179–181 (No. 3069 (1)). Good 'Western' review by Martin E. Malia in *The Russian Review,* Vol. 17, No. 2, 1958, pp. 146–148).



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

of his heroes, the author introduces more or less explicitly personal remarks on a great number of basic philosophical issues, mostly stating problems but here and there also suggesting solutions. It is, consequently, a book which should not be read in haste, but should form the subject of slow and attentive meditation.

The present reviewer profited greatly from this reading. Among the many points which occurred to him, the following might perhaps be mentioned. Reading the first and, more especially, the second chapters, which are historical, one gains an insight, rarely obtained elsewhere with comparable clarity, into the origin of some aspects of contemporary Soviet doctrines. To take but one instance: J. Harper once pondered at length over the differences between Lenin and Marx as regards their attitudes to religion. Yet all he was able to find and all that has been brought out by many others shrinks into insignificance in comparison with Lampert's vivid picture of what the Russian Church really was at that time and how it behaved. Moreover, the remarkable thing about Lampert's presentation is that it is made with such superb objectivity, *sine ira et studio,* and with full acknowledgement of the positive sides of that Church, e.g. of the little-known value of the studies in the Theological Academies (p. 71). It is thanks to his objectivity that one grasps better the position of those who fought against the cruel injustice meted out to peasants – just how cruel it was, this book reiterates in brilliant fashion. This explains why Lenin is so different from Marx, and why it is so difficult for a Western student of contemporary Communism to understand the doctrines in question; which is yet one more reason why the book is so relevant for Sovietology.

Another point which struck the reviewer is the curious fact that, in his basic ideas, Černyševskij was an almost complete Aristotelian. He called himself a materialist, and is so classified by most of those who have written about him, especially in the Soviet Union. But, as Lampert himself stresses, this is not materialism in the common meaning of the word. It is realism; it is a unitary view of man – an ill-stated but powerful brand of humanism. Of course, there is in Černyševskij one element which is completely missing in Aristotle: the understanding of history, which he drew, it seems, mostly from Hegel. He tried hard to combine his basically Aristotelian views with historical considerations – but with little success exactly like many of the Russians who followed him, including Lenin himself. But the picture drawn here of Černyševskij states a problem which to the present reviewer constitutes perhaps *the* problem of our times: how to integrate our modern (i.e. post-Augustinian and post-Hegelian) view of becoming into the general framework of Aristotelianism, or Černyševskism, or Marxism (because it is always the same fundamental trend) – that framework which, it seems, is the only one acceptable. This does not mean that the followers of Černyševskij in Soviet Russia went very far in that direction; they did not go further, it seems, than the old thinker himself. Among our philosophers, it was perhaps Whitehead who undertook the most coherent effort to solve the problem – and even he with too much Platonism involved.

These personal reflections are made here only in order to illustrate how

stimulating this book is for one interested in philosophical problems. To turn to other features of the work, one is pleasantly struck by the wide use the author makes of the ample Soviet literature on the subject. This literature does in fact contain valuable contributions to the field. Yet the assertion may be ventured that it does not contain a single book which could be compared with this one.

A learned, stimulating and important book, which one would like to see read by every Sovietologist interested in philosophy.

*J. M. Bocheński*

Kurt Marko: *Sowjethistoriker zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft: Aspekte der sowjetrussischen Wissenschaftspolitik seit Stalins Tod 1953–1963* (Abhandlungen der Bundesinstituts zur Erforschung des Marxismus-Leninismus, Bd. VII). Köln, Verl. Wissenschaft und Politik. 1964. 108 S.

A small but very important book. In spite of its subject matter, it deals with a set of problems which have a great relevance to philosophy. The work, written with an exemplary erudition and excellent understanding of the Soviet frame of thought, may be recommended to all serious students of Soviet Philosophy. It might also be useful to those who believe that ideology has lost, by a sort of miracle, all importance after Stalin's death.

*J. M. B.*

Karl Marx: *A World without Jews*. Edited and with an Introduction by Dagobert D. Runes, 4th Ed. New York, Philosophical Library. 1959. XII + 83 pp.

This seems to be the first English translation of the two writings of Marx on Bruno Bauer's "Jewish Question". As such, it is a useful addition to the translations of Marx. The author also has many pertinent things to say in his introduction. However, the present reviewer feels that Marx has been misconstrued by him as a pure anti-Semite, which he was not. Moreover, the book may possibly render ill service to Jews in the Communist countries, whose fate is not an enjoyable one.

*J. M. B.*

Karol Maichel: *Guide to Russian Reference Books. Vol. II. History Auxiliary Historical Sciences, Ethnography,* and *Geography*. Ed. by J. S. G. Simmons (Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series XVIII). The Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 1964. 297 pp.

"At the present juncture a powerful combination of factors makes a work of

this kind not merely desirable but essential" (p. 23). and every worker in Sovietology will be grateful to the author, the editor and the Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution for this volume. It is not merely a bibliography of bibliographies and other reference works (1560 titles), but supplies also a short description of each item. Students of social sciences and of philosophy are awaiting with great interest the third volume.

*J. M. B.*

Alois Riklin: *Das Berlinproblem. Historisch-politische und völkerrechtliche Darstellung des Viermächtestatus* (Abh. d. Bundesinstituts zur Erforschung des Marxismus-Leninismus, Bd. VI). Köln, Verl. Wissenschaft u. Politik. 1964. 446 S. and a (twofold) map.

A standard work with ample Bibliography, many official documents (original texts!) etc. In spite of the name of the Institute, this volume has little to do with Marxism-Leninism; but it may be useful for general purposes.

*J. M. B.*

George H. Hampsch: *The Theory of Communism. An Introduction.* New York, Philosophical Library. 1965. XII + 245 pp.

An elementary exposition of the basic doctrine, based on second-hand sources and translations. The book is divided as follows: Meaning of Communism (Dictatorship, Socialism, Communism); Marxist Theory of Truth (Historical Materialism); Marxist Philosophy of Nature and Being (Diamat), Marxist Theory of Man; Marxian Ethics; State and Law; Education; Aesthetics; Classless Society and Political Order; Social Power and Classless Society. One basic assumption is "that Leninism and ideology invoked in the Soviet Union.. is basically Marxian." This, while being in one sense true, is pushed so far that the whole frame of mind in which the doctrine is presented is certainly not Soviet (i.e. is alien to contemporary Soviet thought). To quote just one instance among many, no Soviet philosopher would place the Theory of Truth in Histomat, as the author does.

*J. M. B.*

E. Kux/J. C. Kun: *Die Sateliten Pekings. Nordvietnam – Nordkorea.* W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart. 283 S.

A useful book on two little studied countries by the well-known Sovietologist, correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and Lecturer in the Commercial School of St. Gallen, and Dr. Kun, a Hungarian Sino-sovietologist. There

seems to be little philosophy either in North Vietnam or in North Korea. The nearest thing is perhaps "The Struggle against 'Revisionism'" in the former (pp. 153–168), but Dr. Kux quite rightly places such names as "Marxism-Leninism", "Revisionism", etc. in quotation marks.

*J. M. B.*

J. Freymond (ed.): *Etudes et documents sur la première Internationale en Suisse.* Genève, Librairie Droz. 1964. XVI + 317 pp.

This book is an important addition to the documents of the First International previously published by Professor Freymond in French. It contains an Introduction by the Editor, studies on the local organizations in the Jura (by J. H. Droz, pp. 1–44), Vaud (A. Lasserre, pp. 45–82), Basel (W. Haeberli, pp. 83–134) and the protocols of the Geneva Section (15. I. 1869–23. XII. 1870, by B. Andréas and M. Molnar, pp. 135–266). A chronology of the International in Switzerland from 1863 to 1871 and an excellent register follow.

*J. M. B.*

# SOVIET WRITINGS ON ATHEISM AND RELIGION: SUPPLEMENT

This list is supplementary to that published in *SST* IV (1964) 319–338 and is numbered in sequence with it.


367. ALEKSEEV, A. V.: 'Duša i mozg' (Soul and Brain). *Sov. voin* 1960, 17, 26–29.
368. ALEŠKO, E. N.: *Fakty razoblačajut religiju* (Facts Refute Religion). Moskva. 1963. 66 str.
369. ANDREEV, G. L.: 'O nekotoryx osobennostjax ateizma russkix revoljucionerov-demokratov' (On some Particularities of the Atheism of the Russian Revolutionary Democrats). In (67) str. 193–218.
370. ANDREEV, G. L., SUXOV, A. D., FILIMONOV, E. G.: 'Boevoe oružie ateističeskoj propagandy' (Aggressive Arm for Atheist Propaganda). *VF* 1964, 7, 158–164.
371. ANISIMOV, A. F.: 'Problema emocional'nogo v pervobytnoj religii' (The Emotional in Primitive Religion). In (67) str. 145–165.
372. ARSEN'EV, A. S., PLJUŠČ, L. N., LEVADA, Ju. A., GAPOČKA, M. P.: 'Bor'ba nauki i religii' (The Fight Between Science and Religion). In (233).
373. AVKSENT'EV, A. V.: *Proisxoždenie i suščnost' musul'manstva* (Origins and Essence of Mohammedanism). Čerkessk. 1960. 55 str.
374. AVKSENT'EV, A. V.: *Perestupaja Koran* (Transcending the Koran). Stavropol'. 1960. 79 str.
375. AVKSENT'EV, A. V.: *Moral' i religija* (Morality and Religion). Stavropol'. 1961. 88 str.
376. BARTOŠEVIČ, E., BORISOGLEBSKIJ, E.: *Imenem boga Iegovy* (God's Name is Jehovah). Moskva, Gt., 1960. 160 str.
377. BATALOV, E. Ja.: 'Buddizm "Dzen" i buržuaznaja ideologija' (Zenn Buddhism and Bourgeois Ideology). In (67) str. 234–249.
378. BELEN'KIJ, M. S., ŠAXNOVIČ, M. I.: 'Iudaizm'. In (233).
379. BENKLIEV, S. N.: *Nauka oprovergaet religiju* (Science Refutes Religion). Voronež. 1960. 76 str.
380. BESPJATYX, V. A.: 'Kommunističeskij byt i ego rol' v preodolenii religioznyx perežitkov' (The Communist Way of Life and its Role in the Elimination of Religious Remnants). In *Naučnye Trudy* (Kazanskij aviacionnyj in-t). Vyp. 79. 1963.
381. BORTKEVIČ, N. A.: 'V. I. Lenin o klassovoj suščnosti religii i zadačax partii v bor'be protiv religioznyx predrassudkov' (Lenin on the Class-Essence of Religion and the Tasks of the Party in the Fight Against Religious Prejudices). In *Sbornik statej Vsesojuzn. zaočn. politexn. in-t.* Vyp. 25. Moskva. 1960. str. 156–169.
382. BRISOV, E. M.: 'Bor'ba za mir i religija' (The Fight for Peace and Religion). In (220) str. 105–121.




*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

383. BUDILOVA, E. A.: *Marksizm-leninizm o religii i putjax eë preodolenija* (Marxism-Leninism on Religion and Paths to its Elimination). Moskva. 1955. 68 str. (bibliography).
384. BURXARD, A. I.: 'Filosofija i religija'. In *Vzaimodejstvie form obščestvennogo soznanija* (Reciprocity of the Forms of Social Consciousness). Izd. MGU. 1964. str. 281–309.
385. CAMERJAN, I. P.: 'O problematike naučnyx issledovanij po filosofskim voprosam ateizma' (On the Problem-Complex of Scientific Investigations on Philosophic Problems of Atheism). In (67) str. 5–31.
386. CAMERJAN, I. P.: 'Vozniknovenie i razvitie ateizma' (Origins and Development of Atheism). In (233).
387. ČANYŠEV, AN.: 'Protestantizm'. In (233).
388. ČAŠNIKOV, V. I.: XXII s'ezd KPSS i voprosy naučno-ateističeskogo vospitanija trudjaščixsja' (The Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU and Problems of the Scientific-Atheist Education of the Workers). In (220) str. 6–21.
389. ČERTKOV, A. B.: 'O prisposoblenii pravoslavnok cerkvi k sovremennym uslovijam' (On the Adaptation of the Orthodox Church to Modern Conditions). In (67) str. 219–233.
390. DAVIDJUK, G. P.: *Nesovmestimost' religioznoj ideologii i kommunizma* (The Incompatibility of Religious Ideology and Communism). Minsk. 1963. 85 str.
391. DEMIN, M. V.: '"Xristianskij kommunizm" kak otraženie krizisa sovremennoj religioznoj ideologii' (Christian Communism as the Reflection of the Crisis of Contemporary Religious Ideology). In (220) str. 178–215.
392. DOLGIX, F. I., VEŠČIKOV, A. T.: 'Otnošenie KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva k religii i cerkvi' (Relationship of the CPSU and the Soviet Government to Religion and Church). In (233).
393. DOLJA, V. E.: 'Antigumanizm ideologii sovremennogo pravoslavija' (The Anti-Humanism of the Ideology of Contemporary Orthodoxy). *FN* 1964, 4, 120–125.
394. DRUJANOV, L.: *Vozmožny li čudesa* (Are Miracles Possible?). Moskva, "Mosk.rabočij". 1960. 80 str.
395. ERMAKOV, I. M.: *Naučno-ateističeskaja rabota so studentami* (Scientific-Atheist Work with Students). Moskva, "Vyssaja škola". 1960. 32 str.
396. EZERSKIJ, V. I.: *Pravda o religii* (The Truth about Religion). Saransk. 1960. 124 str.
397. EZERSKIJ, V. I.: *Nauka i religija o Vselennoj* (Science and Religion on the Universe). Xar'kov. 1960. 64 str.
398. FADEEV, Ju. V.: 'Otnošenie Kommunističeskoj partii i Sovetskogo gosudarstva k religii i cerkvi' (Relations of the Communist Party and Soviet Government with Religion and Church). In *Sbornik naučnyx rabot kaf.m.-l. Novočerkasskogo inženerno-meliorativnogo in-t.* 1960. str. 61–96.
399. FADEEV, K.: 'Nauka otvergaet religiju' (Science Refutes Religion). *Agitator* 1960, 4, 23–35.

400. FEDIN, Ju.: *O sovremennyx popytkax obnovlenija religii* (On Contemporary Efforts to Modernize Religion). Moskva. Gt. 1962. 78 str.
401. FILATOV, A. N.: 'Rol' tradicij i privyček v soxranenii religioznyx perežitkov v SSSR' (The Role of Traditions and Customs in the Preservation of Religious Remnants in the U.S.S.R.) In (220) str. 122–142.
402. FILIMONOV, E. G.: 'Propoved' irracionalizma i mistiki' (Proponent of Irrationalism and Mysticism). *VF* 1960, 12, 123–134.
403. FOGELER, Ja. G.: 'Reakcionnaja ideologija i politika klerikalizma v FRG' (Reactionary Ideology and Policies of Clericalism in West Germany). In (220) str. 238–259.
404. FOMENKO, A. O.: *O religioznoj morali i sovremennom prisposoblenčestve eë propovednikov* (On Religious Morality and the Contemporary Adaptationism of its Proponents). Dnepropetrovsk. 1964. 154 str.
405. *Francuzskie prosvetiteli XVIII v. o religii* (The French Enlighteners of the Eighteenth Century on Religion). Moskva, Gt .1960. 788 str.
406. FROLOV, M. F.: 'Marksizm-leninizm o religii' (Marxism-Leninism on Religion). In *Učenye zapiski* (Gor'kov. PgIn-t. inost. jazykov). Vyp. 12. 1959. str. 187–203.
407. GABINSKIJ, G. A.: 'Xristianskaja apologetika i racionalizm' (Christian Apologetics and Rationalism). In (67) str. 125–144.
408. GADIEV, D. N.: 'K postanovke voprosa bor'by protiv religii i religioznyx perežitkov v ranee otstalyx stranax' (On Posing the Question of the Fight Against Religion and Religious Remnants in Formerly Backward Countries). In *Učenye zapiski* (Taškentskij GPgIn-t) Vyp. 3. 1964.
409. GAGARIN, A. P.: *O xristianskoj religii i nravstvennosti* (On Christian Religion and Morality). Smolensk. 1960. 67 str.
410. GARKAVENKO, F. I.: *Sektanty, ix vera i dela* (Sectarians, their Belief and Deeds). Kiev. 1960. 120 str.
411. GORBAČEV, N. A.: 'Nekotorye voprosy ateizma v knige V. I. Lenina "Materializm i empiriokriticizm"' (Some Questions on Atheism in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*). In *Učenye zapiski* (Saratovskij GPgIn-t). Vyp. XXXIX Saratov. 1963.
412. GUBANOV, N. I.: 'Nekotorye voprosy kritiki xristianskogo lžegumanizm' (On Critique of Christian Pseudo-Humanism). In (67) str. 106–124.
413. GUBANOV, N. I., ANDREEV, G. L., FILIMONOV, E. G.: 'Religioznye perežitki v SSSR i puti ix preodolenija' (Religious Remnants in the U.S.S.R. and Paths to their Elimination). In (233).
414. JAKOMOV, A. T.: 'Buddizm'. In (233).
415. JAKOVLEV, E.: 'Danoli čeloveku čuvstvo prekrasnogo bogom?' (Is the Sense of the Beautiful Given to Man by God?). *Nauka i religija* 1960, 10, 81–84.
416. JAMPOL'SKIJ, K. I.: *Proisxoždenie i klassovaja suščnost' iudejskix prazdnikov i obrjadov* (The Origins and Class-Essence of Jewish Feasts and Rites). Kiev. 1961. 48 str.

417. JUROVSKIJ, S. V.: 'Sovremennaja buržuaznaja filosofija na službe religii' (Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy in the Service of Religion). In *Tezisy dokladov VIII Konferencii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava po itogam naučnoj raboty*. Leningrad. 1960. str. 3–5.
418. KAN, I.: *Moral' kommunističeskaja i moral' buržuaznaja* (Communist Morality and Bourgeois Morality). Moskva, Gt. 1960. 72 str.
419. KARAPETJAN, A. K.: *Reakcionnaja suščnost' religii i puti eë preodolenija* (The Reactionary Essence of Religion and Paths to its Elimination). Erevan. 1960. 42 str. (bibliography).
420. KARLJUK, A.: 'Religija – konservativnaja forma ideologii' (Religion, the Conservative Form of Ideology). *Ko. Belorussii* 1960, 6, 58–63.
421. KAS'JANOV, V. M.: 'Učenie I. P. Pavlova – ostroe oružie v bor'be s religiej' (Pavlov's Teaching as a Sharp Weapon in the Fight with Religion). In *Učenye zapiski* (MGPgIn-t). Vyp. 192 1964.
422. KLIMOVIČ, L. I.: 'Islam'. In (233).
423. KOL'MAN, E.: *Est' li bog?* (Does God Exist?). Moskva, "Molodaja gvardija",
424. KOLONICKIJ, P. F.: 'Religioznaja moral' i kommunizm' (Religious Morality and Communism). In (233).
425. KOMM, A.: *Mrakobesy bez maski* (Unmasked Obscurantists). Majkop. 1960. 79 str.
426. Same as (149) Moskva, Gt. 1961. 111 str.
427. KOVALEV, S. I.: 'Proisxoždenie xristianstva' (The Origins of Christianity). In (233).
428. KOŽARINOVA, R. K.: 'Nesovmestimost' religioznoj morali s kodeksom kommunističeskoj morali' (Incompatibility of Religious Morality with Communist Morality). In *Učenye zapiski* (Astraxanskij GPgIn-t) T. 10. Astraxan'. 1964.
429. KRYVELEV, I. A.: *O dokazatel'stvax bytija božija* (On the Proofs of the Existence of God). Moskva. 1960. 48 str.
430. KUBLANOV, M. M.: *Iisus Xristos – bog, čelovek, mif?* (Jesus Christ. God, Man, Myth?). Moskva. 1964. 166 str.
431. LADORENKO, V. E.: 'Prisposoblenie sovremennogo pravoslavija k novym obščestvenno-istoričeskim uslovijam' (Adaptation of Contemporary Orthodoxy to new Social-Historical Conditions). In (220) str. 158–177.
432. LAŠINA, M. V.: 'Značenie naučno-ateističeskogo vopitanija dlja formirovanija naučnogo mirovozzrenija' (The Importance of Scientific-Atheist Education for the Formation of a Scientific *Weltanschauung*). In *Učenye zapiski* (MGPgIn-t). Vyp. 192. 1964.
433. LEBEDINEC, G. M.: *Preodolenie religii i eë perežitkov v processe kommunističeskogo stroitel'stva* (Elimination of Religion and its Vestiges in the Process of Communist Construction). KGU. 1960. (d).
434. LENSU, M. Ja.: 'Religioznye perežitki i puti ix preodolenija v uslovijax kommunističeskogo stroitel'stva' (Religious Remnants and Paths to their

Elimination Under the Conditions of Communist Construction). In *Voprosy istorii KPSS i filosofii.* Sverdlovsk. 1960. str. 105–119.
435. LEVADA, Ju. A.: 'Osnovnye napravlenija buržuaznoj sociologii religii' (Basic Trends in Bourgeois Sociology of Religion). In (67) str. 63–105.
436. LUNEV, G. K.: 'Gnoseologičeskie i social'no-klassovye korni religii i idealizma' (Epistemological and Social-Class Roots of Religion and Idealism). *Naučnye trudy* (Kursk. med. in-t). Vyp. 14. 1959. str. 5–12.
437. MAJACKIJ, F. S.: *Pravda o Tore i Talmude* (The Truth About the Torah and Talmud). Kišinev. 1960. 71 str.
438. MAJAT, E. V., UZKOV, I. N.: *"Brat'ja"* i *"sestry" vo Xriste* (Brothers and Sisters in Christ). Moskva, "Sov. Rossija", 1960. 72 str.
439. MAKAROV, M.: 'Značenie knigi V. I. Lenina *Materializm i empirio-kriticizm* dlja bor'by protiv teologii' (The Importance of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* for the Fight Against Theology). In *Učenye zapiski* (Tartusk. GU). Vyp. 89. 1960. str. 60–76.
440. 'Marksistsko-leninskaja étika i naučnyj ateizm' (Marxist-Leninist Ethics and Scientific Atheism). *VF* 1960, 12, 181–182. (bibliography).
441. MITROXIN, L. N.: 'Xristianskoe sektantstvo v SSSR' (Christian Sects in the U.S.S.R.). In (233).
442. MIXNEVIČ, D. E.: *Očerki iz istorii katoličeskoj reakcii* (Essays on the History of Catholic Reaction). Moskva. 1955. 408 str.
443. MOLČANOV, Ju. B., NOVIK, I. B.: 'Protiv teologičeskoj interpretacii estestvoznanija' (Against a Theological Interpretation of Science) *VF* 1960, 11, 84.
444. MOMDŽAN, X. N.: *Kommunizm i xristianstvo* (Communism and Christianity). Moskva, "Znanie". 1959. 40 str.
445. MOROZOV, K. E.: 'Ispol'zovanie istorii matematiki v ateističeskom vospitanii' (Use of the History of Mathematics in Atheistic Education). In *Učenye zapiski* (MGPgIn-t). Vyp. 192. 1964.
446. MOTROGILOVA, N.: 'Bogoslov v roli kritika dialektičeskogo materializma' (A Theologian as Critic of Dialectical Materialism). *Ko* 1960, 2, 115–118.
447. *My byli baptistami* (We were Baptists). Moskva, Gt. 1960. 110 str.
448. *My otkazalis' ot religii* (We broke with Religion). Alma-Ata. 1960. 125 str.
449. *My porvali s religiej* (We Broke with Religion). Moskva, Voenizdat, 1961. 280 str.
450. *My porvali s religiej* (We Broke with Religion). Moskva. 1963. 506 str.
451. *Naučno-teoretičeskaja konferencija po voprosu "Perežitki religii islama i puti ix preodolenija"* (Scientific-Theoretical Conference on "Remnants of Islam and Paths to the Elimination of Them"). Maxačkala. 1960. 47 str.
452. *Nauka i religija* (Science and Religion). Moskva, "Kniga". 1964. 55 str. (bibliography).
453. *O nekotoryx religioznax kul'tax i ix suščnosti* (On some Religious Cults and their Essences). Ss. Ulan-Ude. 1961. 71 str.

454. *O propagande ateizma v lekcijax po astronomii* (Propaganda for Atheism in Courses on Astronomy). Moskva. 1960. 44 str.
455. OGRYZKO, I. I.: *Počemu my protiv religioznyx pardnikov* (Why we are Against Religious Feasts). Leningrad. 1961. 79 str.
456. PANTIN, I.: 'Gnoseologičeskie korni religii' (The Epistemological Roots of Religion). *Agitator* 1960, 1, 28–31.
457. PAŠKOV, N. A.: 'Nesovmestimost' moral'nogo kodeksa stroitelja kommunizma i religii' (Incompatibility of the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism with Religion). In (220) str. 22–53.
458. PEKELIS, V.: 'Čelovek, kibernetika i bog' (Man, Cybernetics and God). *Nauka i religija* 1960, 2, 25–30.
459. PETRENKO, R. F.: 'Otnošenie xristianstva k trudu' (Christianity's Relation to Work). In (220) str. 74–104.
460. PISMANIK, M. G.: 'Obščečelovečeskoe v morali i religija' (The Universally Human in Morality and Religion). In (220) str. 54–73.
461. PJASKOVSKIJ, B.: 'Matematika protiv religioznyx predrassudkov' (Mathematics Against Religious Prejudices). *Nauka i religija* 1960, 5, 15–19.
462. *Počemu my porvali s religiej* (Why we Broke with Religion). Barnaul. 1960. 111 str.
463. POLJAKOVA, L. P.: 'Nesostojatel'nost' popytok otoždestvlenija ideologii rannego xristianstva s kommunizmom' (Unviability of Efforts to Identify the Ideology of Early Christianity with Communism). In (220) str. 143–157.
464. *Pravda o religii* (The Truth on Religion). Frunze. 1960. 112 str.
465. *Protiv religioznyx perežitkov* (Against Religious Remnants). Stavropol'. 1959. 86 str.
466. *Protiv religioznyx perežitkov*. Ulan-Ude. 1960. 80 str.
467. PUXLIKOV, V. K.: 'Nekotorye čerty social'noj i političeskoj doktriny katolicizma v SŠA' (Some Traits of the Social and Political Doctrines of Catholicism in the U.S.A.). In (220) str. 216–237.
468. 'Religija'. In *Formy obščestvennogo soznanija* (The Forms of Social Consciousness). Izd. MGU. 1960. str. 207–270.
469. RIŽSKIJ, M. I.: *Čto takoe Biblija* (What is the Bible?). Čita. 1960. 182 str.
470. RJAZANCEV, N. I.: *Est' li u čeloveka sud'ba?* (Does Man have a Destiny?). Moskva, Voenizdat, 1961. 83 str.
471. ROGOV, I. M.: *Osnovy naučnogo ateizma* (Principles of Scientific Atheism). Leningrad. 1960. 69 str.
472. ROZENTAL', N. N.: *Xristianstvo, ego proisxoždenie i suščnost'* (Christianity. Origins and Essence). Moskva, Voenizdat, 1960. 95 str.
473. ROZENTAL', N. N., FILIMONOV, E. G.: 'Pravoslavie' (Orthodoxy). In (233).
474. ROŽNOV, V. E., ROŽNOVA, M. A.: *Gipnoz i "čudesnye iscelenija"* (Hypnosis and 'Miraculous Cures'). Moskva, "Znanie," 1960. 88 str.
475. SAL'NIKOV, Ju. F.: 'O gumanizme istinnom i mnimom' (True and So-Called Humanism). In *Učenye zapiski* (Vsesojuzn. juridičesk. zaočn. in-t). Vyp. 11. 1960.

476. *Sbornik statej i materialov po propagande naučno-ateističeskoj znanij* (Articles and Materials for the Propagation of Scientific Atheism). Molotov. 1954. 277 str.
477. SENIN, Ju.: '"Moral'noe perevooruženie" ili perevooruženie bez morali' ('Moral Rearmament' or Rearmament Without Morality). *Nauka i religija* 1960, 7, 75–81.
478. SIDOROV, D. I.: *Vojna i religija* (War and Religion). Moskva, Voenizdat, 1961. 170 str.
479. SMIRNOV, N. A.: 'Islam i ego klassovaja suščnost' (Islam and its Class-Essence). In *Prepodavanie istorii v škole* 1960, 5, 48–56.
480. STEPANJANC, M. T.: 'Ob odnoj reakcionnoj koncepcii religioznogo socializma' (On one Reactionary Conception of Religious Socialism) *VF* 1964, 9, 78–87.
481. STEPANOVA, A.: 'V. I. Lenin v bor'be s religiej' (Lenin in Conflict with Religion). *Na rubeže* 1960, 1, 101–107.
482. STEPIN, I.: *V bor'be protiv religioznoj ideologii* (In Conflict with Religious Ideology). Kaluga. 1961. 96 str.
483. STRUMLIN, S. G.: *Bog i svoboda* (God and Liberty). Moskva, Gt. 1961. 96 str.
484. SUXOV, A. D.: 'K voprosu o pervonačal'noj forme religii' (On the Original Form of Religion). In (67) str. 166–192.
485. ŠAXNOVIČ, M.: *Reakcionnaja suščnosť iudaizma* (The Reactionary Essence of Judaism). Izd. AN SSSR. 1960. 239 str.
486. ŠAXNOVIČ, M.: 'Sovremennaja iudejskaja "filosofija" v kapitalističeskix stranax' (Contemporary Jewish 'Philosophy' in Capitalist Countries). *FN* 1959, 4, 132–141.
487. ŠEJNMAN, M. M., VELIKOVIČ, L. N.: 'Katolicizm'. In (233).
488. ŠERN-BORISOVA, I. S.: 'Religija i aparteid'. In (67) str. 250–258.
489. ŠILINCEV, N.: 'Odna iz važnyx form bor'by s religioznymi perežitkami' (One of the Important Forms of the Fight with Religious Remnants). *Ko. Moldavii* 1960, 7, 69–76.
490. ŠIŠKOV, V.: *Pogovorim o religii* (Talking About Religion). Moskva. 1960. 112 str.
491. *Temy lekcij po propagande estestvenno-naučnyx, naučno-ateističeskix znanij, mediciny, fizičeskoj kul'tury i sporta na 1960 g.* (Lesson-Plans for the Spread of Scientific, Scientific-Atheist Knowledge, of Medicine, Physical Culture and Sports for 1960). Leningrad. 1960. 43 str.
492. *Teni prošlogo* (Shades of the Past). Ss. Ju.-Saxalinsk. 1960. 80 str.
493. TOKAREV, S. A.: 'Vozniknovenie religii' (Origins of Religion). In (233).
494. TULUZAKOV, A. A.: 'V. I. Lenin o propagande naučnogo ateizma' (Lenin on Propaganda for Scientific Atheism). In *K 90-letiju so dnja roždenija V. I. Lenina.* Penza. 1960. str. 238–281.
495. UGRINOVIČ, D. M.: 'Religija i iskusstvo' (Religion and Art). In *Vzaimodejstvie form obščestvennogo soznanija* (Reciprocity of the Forms of Social Consciousness). Izd. MGU. 1964. str. 245–280.

496. 'V čem smysl žizni?' (What is the Sense of Life?). *Nauka i religija* 1960, 7, 7–20.
497. *V pomošč' ateistu* (For the Atheist). Ss. Saratov. 1960. 123 str.
498. *V pomošč' lektoru-ateistu* (For the Atheist Reader). Ss. Petrozavodsk. 1959. 102 str.
499. VELIKOVIČ, L. N.: 'Katoličeskaja cerkov' i krax kolonializma' (The Catholic Church and the Collapse of Colonialism). In (67) str. 32–62.
500. VENCKOVSKIJ, L. E., OSIPOV, B. S.: 'Fizika oprovergaet religioznye dogmy' (Physics Refutes Religious Dogmata). In *Obščeobrazovatel'naja škola vzroslyx* 1960, 3, 36–41.
501. VOJTKO, V. I.: *Naučnoe i religioznoe mirovozzrenie* (Scientific and Religious *Weltanschauung*). Kiev. 1960. 52 str.
502. ZAJCEV, G. N.: *Religioznyj vopros v programme i taktike KPSS* (The Religious Question in the Program and Tactics of the CPSU). Moskva. 1960. 36 str.
503. *Znanija i vera v boga* (Knowledge and Belief in God). Moskva, "Znanie", 1960. 254 str.
504. ZYBKOVEC, V. F.: *Ot boga li nravstvennost'* (Is Morality from God?) Moskva, Gt., 1961. 147 str.

*Thomas J. Blakeley*

# SELECTED WRITINGS ON NINETEENTH- AND EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIAN THOUGHT

*Limits.* Basically, this bibliography contains selected works on various aspects of Russian nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thought published (re-published, reprinted, or published in translations) in English and/or Russian (exceptionally in French, German, Italian, Spanish) between 1945 and 1964. For details of exceptions (see this issue pp. 32–33).

The sections of the bibliography (Roman numerals) correspond to the relevant chapters in the main text of this study (see pp. 30 ff.).

In the case of more than one study by the same author, each study bears a serial number in square brackets after the author's name. Where the same (or largely the same) work appears in different languages, this serial number is followed by an indicatory letter, *viz.* R (Russian), E (English), F (French), G (German), It (Italian), Sp (Spanish). Example: Berdjaev, Nicolaj [2E]: *The Russian Idea*, etc.

*Transliteration* is basically according to the 'Harvard' system currently used in *Studies in Soviet Thought*. Exceptions are made for proper names (a) where they are spelt otherwise in non-Russian titles; (b) where they are conventionally spelt otherwise in Western countries (e.g. Herzen, not Gercen); (c) where they appear otherwise as authors of non-Russian works (e.g. N. V. Riasanovsky, *not* Rjazanovskij). *Note:* Khomiakov (Khomyakov) is referred to (except in certain non-Russian titles) as Xomjakov, this being the spelling adopted in the most important recent study of him (cf. Christoff [1], p. 130, *infra*).

*Abbreviations.* Most of the works referred to will be found in Section I.

| | |
|---|---|
| ASEER | *American Slavic and East European Review (Slavic Review)* |
| BRP | Basic Russian Publications (cf. Horecky (ed.) [1], Section I, *infra*) |
| FBSP | *Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy* (cf. Bocheński/ Blakeley (eds.), Section I, *infra*) |
| FS | *Filosofskij slovar'* |
| KIRF | Knigi po istorii russkoj filosofii (cf. Baskakov, Section I, *infra*) |
| Lit. N. | *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* |
| MSE | *Malaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* |
| SEER | *Slavonic and East European Review* (London) |
| VPŠ | Vyssšaja partijnaja škola pri CK KPSS |
| WERH | *A Select Bibliography of Works in English on Russian History 1801–1917* (cf. Shapiro (ed.), Section I, *infra*) |
| WLP | Western-Language Publications (cf. Horeckij (ed.) [2], Section I, *infra*. |



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

## I. REFERENCE WORKS (BIBLIOGRAPHIES, HANDBOOKS, ETC).

*a. Bibliographies, etc.*

BASKAKOV, V. G.: *'Knigi po istorii russkoj filosofii'. VF* 1949, 1, 327–338.

BOCHEŃSKI, J. M. and BLAKELEY, T. J. (eds.): *Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy,* Dordrecht-Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Company (in the series: *Sovietica,* Publications of the Institute of East-European Studies, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Vols. I–IV and V (Index), 1959–1964. VIII + 76, III + 109, X + 73, XII + 158, 143 pp.

HORECKY, Paul L. (ed.)

[1] *Basic Russian Publications. An Annotated Bibliography on Russia and the Soviet Union.* Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. 1962. XXVI + 313 pp. Index.

[2] *Russia and the Soviet Union. A Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications.* Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. 1965. XXIV + 473 pp. Index. (*Note.* Not yet received. It is hoped to utilise this companion volume when compiling the second part of the present study.)

SHAPIRO, David (ed.): *A Select Bibliography of Works in English on Russian History, 1801–1917.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 1962. XIV + 106 pp. Index.

*b. Encyclopaedias, General Reference Aids, etc.*

*Filosofskij slovar'*, pod red. M. M. Rozentalja i P. F. Judina. Moskva, Politizdat. 1963. 544 str.

*Literaturnoe Nasledstvo,* Moscow, Izd. AN SSSR (various volumes). No. 1 1931.

*Malaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija,* 3'e izd., Moscow, 1958–1961. 10 vols. plus Index.

UTECHIN, S. V.

[1] *Everyman's Concise Encyclopaedia of Russia,* London, J. M. Dent & Sons. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co. 1961. XXVI + 623 pp.

Frequent cross-references. Very full bibliography.

## II. GENERAL WORKS COVERING MORE OR LESS THE ENTIRE PERIOD

AL'TMAN V. V. (ed.): *Iz istorii social'no-političeskix idej. Sbornik statej. (K semidesjatipjatiletiju akademika Vjačeslava Petroviča Volgina.)* Moscow, Izd. AN SSSR, 1955. 752 str. [FBSP 1119]

ARSENIEV (ARSEN'EV), N.

[1F] *La Sainte Moscou. Tableau de la vie religieuse et intellectuelle russe au XIXe siècle.* Paris. 1948.

A popular work on the religious and social background of the period. Originally published in English (London, 1940) [1E].

BERDJAEV (BERDYAEV), Nikolaj A.

[1R] *Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma.* Paris, YMCA-Press. 1955. 159 str. Index. [BRP 1182]

[1E] *The Origin of Russian Communism.* London, Geoffrey Bles. 1955. 191 pp. Translated by R. M. French. Also: Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960.

[1F] *Les sources et le sens du communisme russe.* Trans. A. Nerville. Paris. 1952. Originally published in English (1937). New edition: 1948; reprinted London, 1955. The book stresses "the national roots of Russian Communism and the fact that it was Russian history which determined its limits and shaped its character" (p. 7). Concise, penetrating survey of 19th-century Slavophilism, Westernism, Socialism, Nihilism, *Narodničestvo*, Anarchism, etc. [BRP 1182 note; WERH 864 note]

[2R] *Russkaja ideja* (Osnovnye problemy russkoj mysli XIX veka i načala XX veka). Paris. YMCA-Press. 1946. 259 str. [BRP 1197 note]

[2E] *The Russian Idea* (translated by R. M. French). London, Geoffrey Bles. 1947. 255 pp.; New York, Macmillan. 1948. 255 pp.; paperback edition announced for 1962 by University of Michigan Press (BRP 1197 note).

"Broad survey of Russian thought, centred on ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion." (BRP 1197 note). [BRP 1197 note; WERH 864]

[3R] *Samopoznanie. Opyt filosofskoj avtobiografii.* Paris, YMCA-Press. 1949. 378 str.

[3E] *Dream and Reality. An Essay in Autobiography* (translated from the Russian by Katherine Lampert). London, Geoffrey Bles. 1950. XV + 332 pp. Index

[3G] *Selbsterkenntnis. Versuch einer philosophischen Autobiographie* (translated from the Russian by R. von Walter). Darmstadt. 1953.

Essential to an understanding not only of Berdjaev's thought but of Russian currents during the period treated. Chapters on Existentialism and Romanticism, Conversion to Socialism, Marxism and Idealism, The Movement towards Christianity, Russia and the West. Cf. also Section IVa of this Bibliography.

BOWMAN, H. E.

[1] 'Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia'. In: *The Slavic and East European Journal* 15 (1957) 5–21.

BUBNOFF, Nikolai von

[1] *Russische Religionsphilosophen. Dokumente.* Heidelberg, Verlag Lambert Schneider. 1956. 494 SS.

An anthology with brief introduction (Begleitwort); includes passages from I. V. Kireevskij (*q.v.* Section IVa, *infra*), K. Leont'ev, V. V. Rozanov, V. I. Nesmelov, E. N. Trubeckoj, and L. I. Šestov.

FILIPPOV, L. A.: 'Voprosy istorii russkoj obščestvennoj mysli XVIII–XIX vekov'. In: *VF* 1957, 5, 230–232). [FBSP 1656]

FLORINSKY, Michael T.

[1] *Russia. A History and an Interpretation.* New York, Macmillan. 1953. 2 vols. 628 + 1511 pp. Bibliography.

Primarily historical, in which field Shapiro considers it "the best survey". Vol. 2 covers the period 1801–1917 in 850 pp. Likewise Hans Kohn: "The best general history of Russia ... in English." (*The Mind of Modern Russia*, p. 287). See, however, critical review by V. A. Riasanovsky in *The Russian Review* 14 (1955) No. 1, 60–65, e.g.: "... accords too little attention, while not neglecting them entirely, to the social factors of the historical process." (p. 60). [WERH 33 and note on p. 4].

FLOROVSKIJ, G.: *Puti russkago bogoslovija.* Paris, YMCA-Press, 1937, 574 str. Bibl.

"Much broader than the title might suggest." "One of the most important ... studies in the field of Russian intellectual history." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 223) Valuable discussion of the literature (Bibl. pp. 521–574). [BRP 1219].

GERSCHENKRON, A.: 'The Problem of Economic Development in Russian Intellectual History of the Nineteenth Century.' In: Simmons, E. J., *Continuity and Change* ..., etc., pp. 11–39). [WERH 874]

GORODECKIJ, B. P. *et al.*: *Istorija russkoj kritiki.* M.-L., Izd. AN SSSR. 1958, t. I, 590 str. t. II, 735 str.

HECHT, David: *Russian Radicals Look to America, 1825–1894.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 1947. XII + 242 pp. Bibl. [WERH 872] Discusses American influence on Russian Radical thought. British influence is dealt with in a much earlier study by P. Milyukov: 'The Influence of English Political Thought in Russia'. In: *SEER*, 5 (1926) 258-270 [WERH 210]

*Iz istorii russkoj filosofii XVIII–XIX vekov.* Sbornik statej. M., Izd. moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. 1952. 317 str. [FBSP 1118]

KOHN, Hans (ed.): *The Mind of Modern Russia. Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age.* New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press. 1955. 298 pp. (Also in Harper Torchbooks (TB 1065), New York, London, Harper and Row, 1962, 298 pp.) Selective bibl., Index.

An anthology, containing excerpts from Čaadajev, Pogodin, Tjutčev, Xomjakov, I. S. Aksakov, Belinskij, Černyševskij, Herzen, Danilevskij, Vl. Solov'ëv, Lenin, Berdjaev, and Fedotov. [WERH 868]

KORNILOV, Alexander: *Modern Russian History from the Age of Catherine the Great to the End of the Nineteenth Century.* New York. 1943.

Translated from the Russian *(Kurs istorii Rossii XIX veka)* by A. S. Kaun. The 2nd Russian edition was published in 3 vols., Moscow, Izd. M. i S. Sabašnikovyx, 1918. English edition originally in 2 vols. (New York, London, 1916–1917). Primarily historical. "One of the few good and extremely useful histories of Russia in the nineteenth century." (BRP 359 note) "The translation ... is not entirely satisfactory." (WERH 42 note). (For Sergej Zenkovskij's view that this work is now "outdated", cf. his review of the English work [1E] by Pushkarev, *infra.*) [BRP 359. WERH 42]

KOYRÉ, A. A.: *La Pensée philosophique russe au dix-neuvième siècle.* Paris. 1950.

LIEB, Fritz

[1] 'Das westeuropäische Geistesleben im Urteil russischer Religionsphilosophie'. In: *Sophia und Historie. Aufsätze zur östlichen und westlichen Geistes- und Theologiegeschichte.* Herausgegeben von Martin *Rohkrämer. Zurich,* EVZ-Verlag. 1962. SS. 55–82.

Originally published in 1929 (Verlag J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen). An attempt to trace "at least the main lines of development of the problems treated by sketching the ideas of some of the more important ... Russian thinkers". (p. 55, note 1). Deals mainly with Čaadaev, Xomjakov, Ivan Kireevskij, Vladimir Solov'ëv, and Berdjaev. A sympathetic study by a Protestant theologian with a marked interest in Russian religious thinkers in general and Berdjaev in particular. Cf. also [2] in Section IVa of this Bibliography.

LOSSKY, Nikolai O.

[1E] *History of Russian Philosophy.* New York. 1951. 416 pp.

[1F] *Histoire de la philosophie russe.* Paris. 1954.

Marked emphasis on philosophy of religion.

MASARYK, Thomas Garrigue

[1E] *The Spirit of Russia. Studies in History, Literature, and Philosophy.* Third Impression, London, George Allen & Unwin; New York, Macmillan. 1961. 2 vols, XXII + 480, XIX + 664 pp. Bibl., Index. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul: from the German original

[1G] *Rußland und Europa; Studien über die geistigen Strömungen in Rußland.* Jena. 1913. 2 vols.

First published 1919. Second edition 1955, with additional chapters and bibliographies by Jan Slavik (added at Masaryk's request). Still one of the best basic works on Russian social and political thought, philosophy, etc.; deals almost entirely with 19th century. Shapiro says: "Much has been written recently, but [Masaryk] remains the best survey" (WERH note on p. 79). But see Reference 15 on page 49, *supra.* [WERH 862]

MCLEAN, Hugh *et al.* (ed.): *Russian Thought and Politics* (Harvard Slavic Studies, vol. 4). Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 1957; The Hague. 1957. XI + 513 pp.

A collection of essays by 27 graduate students of the late Professor M. Karpovich, in honour of his retirement. Reviewed, *inter alia,* by Ralph T. Fischer, jr., in *The Russian Review* 17 (1958) No. 2, 142–143. For a Soviet critique (on "falsification" lines) cf. V. N. Kuznecov: 'Fal'sifikacija istorii russkoj revoljucionnoj mysli', *VF* 1960, 1, 176–180 [FBSP 3511]. [WERH 32; FBSP 4240].

MILIUKOV (MILJUKOV), P.: *Outlines of Russian Culture.* Translated by Valentine Ughet and Eleanor Davis, and edited by Michael Karpovich. Philadelphia, University of Philadelphia, 1942, 3 vols. Also subsequent 1-vol. reprints, e.g. Philadelphia, 1948.

Greatly abridged translation of Vol. 2 of the original work: *Očerki po*

*istorii russkoj kul'tury* (Paris, Izd. Sovremennyja Zapiski. 1931. Č I and II, XVI + 453 & 553 str.). [WERH 45 & note].

NEČKINA, M. V. *et al.* (ed.): *Protiv buržuaznoj fal'sifikacii istorii sovetskogo obščestva.* Moskva, Izd. VPŠ i AON. 1960. 383 str. [FBSP 3824]

OVSJANIKO-KULIKOVSKIJ, Dimitrij N. (ed.): *Istorija russkoj literatury XIX veka.* Photo-reprint for the American Council of Learned Societies. Ann Arbor, J. W. Edwards. 1948, 5 vols. (orig. ed. Moskva, Izd. Mir. 1908–1911. tt. 1–5). Covers much wider field than title suggests. Emphasis on aspects of Russian social thought and history. Includes studies by various contributors on Čaadaev, Belinskij, Herzen, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Lavrov, Mixajlovskij, and several early Russian Marxists. Vol. 5 contains a bibliography. [BRP 1028 & 1191]

POKROVSKIJ (POKROVSKY), M. N.

[1R] *Očerk istorii russkoj kul'tury.* Fourth ed. M., Gosizdat. 1929, tt. 1–2. An early study by a Soviet historian of political and religious ideas in Russia up to the end of the 19th-century. Strong emphasis on economic factor, even in relation to Slavophilism *(q.v. infra).*

[1Sp] *Historia de la cultura rusa.* Translated by Andrés Nin. Madrid, Editorial España. 1932. 345 pp. [ BRP 1177 note]

[2E] *Brief History of Russia.* Translated from the Russian ([2R], *infra*). London. 1933. 2 vols. [WERH 36]

[2R] *Russkaja istorija v samom sžatom očerke.*

POKROVSKIJ, S. A.: *Fal'sifikacija russkoj političeskoj mysli v sovremennoj reakcionnoj buržuaznoj literature* M., Izd AN SSSR. 1957. 184 str. [FBSP 4253]

PUŠKAREV (PUSHKAREV), S. G.

[1R] *Rossija v XIX veke (1801–1914).* New York, Izd. imeni Čexova. 1956. 509 str.

Wide historical material, divided into four sections: (1) Government and society, (2) Socio-economic conditions, (3) Foreign policy, (4) Cultural and intellectual life.

Reviewed by Sergej Zen'kovskij in *Novyj Žurnal* 1958, No. 52, 299–301. "In its completeness and objectivity, unique of its kind among works devoted to the last century of imperial Russia ... An exceptionally conscientious and interesting work ...". Zen'kovskij considers the best chapters to be those dealing with the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, especially the account of the birth of the revolutionary movement in the early 1860's, but believes Herzen's influence to be underrated.

[1E] *The Emergence of Modern Russia.* Translated by Robert H. McNeal and Tova Yedlin. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1963, 544 pp. Bibl.

The English version of the preceding work, again reviewed by Zen'kovskij (Serge A. Zenkovsky) in *The Russian Review,* 23 (1964) No. 2. 119–192. "Widely discussing Russia's ideological, social, and internal political problems ..." – "very rich and helpful bibliography" which is unfortunately often

not arranged alphabetically – "destroys many long-established *clichés* of Russian and Western historiography in appreciation of the Russian government and society" – "will become the standard work for the investigation of one of the most interesting eras of Russian history", replacing, *inter alia*, the work by A. Kornilov *(q.v., supra)*, which "has become outdated".

REAVEY, G.: 'The Russian Thought Pattern'. In: *SEER* 27 (1949) 450–468. [WERH 873]

RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas V.

[1] *A History of Russia.* New York, Oxford University Press. 1963. XVIII + 711 pp. Maps, Bibl., Index.

One of the best recent histories, containing separate chapters on economic, social, and cultural aspects; economic and social development is treated in Ch. XXVII (1800–1860) (pp. 378–384) and Ch. XXXII (1861–1917) (pp. 468–482).

RJAZANOVSKIJ (RIASANOVSKY), Valentin A.: *Obzor russkoj kul'tury. Istoričeskij očerk.* New York, Izd. avtora. č I, 1947, 639 str. č II/1, 1947, 557 str. č II/2, 1948, 213 str.

Deals, *inter alia*, with social thought, philosophy, and religion in Russia up to and including the Soviet period. Some sections contributed by the author's wife, others by his son, Nikolaj Valentinovič (*q.v.* under RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas V., *supra et infra*) [BRP 1178 and note]. English title: *Historical Survey of Russian Culture.*

SCHULTZE, B.

[1] *Russische Denker, ihre Stellung zu Christus, Kirche, Papsttum.* Wien, Verlag Herder. 1950. 456 SS.

Contains interesting studies of Čaadaev, Belinskij, Ivan Kireevskij, Xomjakov, Danilevskij, K. Leont'ev, Dostoevskij, Rozanov, Vl. Solov'ëv, Bulgakov, Berdjaev, and others, from a Catholic standpoint.

SIMMONS, Ernest J. (ed.): *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 1955. XII + 563 pp.

A very important symposium containing studies by thirty scholars on the central theme of what reflects change and what continuity in Russia after 1917. Cf. review by George C. Guins in *The Russian Review*, 15 (1956), No. 4, 278–280. By and large, Guins finds that the non-Russian contributors tend to emphasise the similarities, while the Russian *émigrés* emphasise the differences. Among the latter, he cites the view of M. M. Karpovich (p. 279): "the continuity is not between pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russian thought in general, but between one specific trend of pre-revolutionary thought and the ideas of Soviet leaders who had been brought up in that tradition". [WERH 863]

ŠČIPANOV, I. Ja. (ed.): *Protiv sovremennyx fal'sifikatorov istorii russkoj filosofii*, M., Socekgiz. 1960. 455 str. [FBSP 3828]

ŠTEJN, V.M.: *Očerki razvitija russkoj obščestvenno-ékonomičeskoj mysli XIX–XX vekov.* L. 1948.

UTECHIN, S. V.

[2] *Russian Political Thought. A Concise History*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1963, including a paperback edition; London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1964. XVI + 320 pp. Bibliography. Index.

The bulk of this work (from p. 71 onwards) is devoted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It claims to be the first English-language text-book to cover the entire subject (Preface, p. VII). The author tries to illustrate the diversity of Russian political thought rather than to concentrate on the main trends already covered in other studies. The conventional balance is thus deliberately reversed: "Theories that have recently been extensively treated in English-language literature receive comparatively little attention, and *vice versa*." (Introduction, p. XV). Reviewed, *inter alia*, in *The Russian Review* 23 (1964) No. 4, 390–392, by Stephen F. Cohen, who makes the criticism that "the volume has a sort of encyclopaedic quality in the sense that individual thinkers are discussed briefly but the inter-relationships between various schools of thought are almost totally ignored." (p. 391). The bibliography is useful.

VASECKIJ, G. S. *et al.*

[1] *Očerki po istorii filosofskoj i obščestvenno-političeskoj mysli narodov SSSR*. M., IF AN SSSR. t. I, 1955, 590 str. t. II, 1956, 895 str. [FBSP 902]

Reviewed in *VF* 1956, 6, 170–174 (by F. I.) and 175–179 (by L. N. Kogan). [FBSP 187 (2) and 335 (2)]

VEJDLE (WEIDLÉ), Vladimir V.

[1R] *Zadača Rossii*. New York, Izd. imeni Čexova. 1956. 230 str.

"Philosophical reflections on problems of Russian intellectual and cultural history." (BRP 1179 note). [BRP 1179]

[2E] *Russia Absent and Present*. New York, The John Day Company. 1952. Also: London. 1952. VI + 153 pp. Second edition, New York, Vintage Books, 1961. [WERH 53]

Not a direct English version of *Zadača Rossii*, though it contains certain sections of the latter. The English version is translated by A. G. Smith from the French original:

[2F] *La Russie absente et présente*. Paris, Gallimard. 1949.

VYŠESLAVCEV, B. P.

[1] *Večnoe v russkoj filosofii*. New York, Izd. imeni Čexova. 1952. 304 str.

Study by a brilliant representative of the idealistic school; analyses fundamental problems of philosophy (freedom, power, spirit and material, etc.) and their reflection in Russian literature and history.

ZEN'KOVSKIJ (ZENKOVSKY), Vasilij V.

[1R] *Russkie mysliteli i Evropa. Kritiki evropejskoj kul'tury u russkix myslitelej*. Second edition. Paris, YMCA-Press. 1955. 292 str.

Important study on attitude of various Russian nineteenth-century thinkers to Western culture. Chapters on: Early Nineteenth Century; Gogol';

Slavophils; Herzen; I. S. Aksakov and Danilevskij; K. N. Leont'ev and the 'Eurasians'; Straxov, Lev Tolstoj, Mixajlovskij; V. V. Rozanov and V. F. Érn; Dostoevskij, Vl. Solov'ëv, Berdjaev. First published in 1926.

[1E] *Russian Thinkers and Europe.* Translated from the Russian by Galia Bodde. Washington – Ann Arbor, J. W. Edwards for the American Council of Learned Societies. 1953. 199 pp.

The English translation of the first edition of the Russian original. [BRP 1180 and note; WERH 871]

[2R] *Istorija russkoj filosofii.* Paris, YMCA-Press. t. I, 1948, 469 str. t. II, 1950, 477 str. (Bibliography: t. I, pp. 25–29, also bibliographical footnotes. Name and Subject Index: t. II, pp. 467–477.)

The best history of Russian philosophical thought from the eighteenth century up to and including the first half of the twentieth century. [BRP 1209 and note]

[2E] *A History of Russian Philosophy.* Authorised translation from the Russian by George L. Kline. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1953; New York, Columbia University Press. 1953. Vol. I. XIV + 465 pp. Vol. II, VIII + pp. 469–947. [BRP 1209 note; WERH 870]

The official English translation of the Russian original. There is also a French edition:

[2F] *Histoire de la philosophie russe.* Translated from the Russian by C. Andronikov. Paris, Gallimard. Vol. I, 1953, 522 pp. Vol. II, 1955, 512 pp.

ŽABA, S. P.: *Russkie mysliteli o Rossii i čelovečestve. Antologija russkoj obščestvennoj mysli.* Paris, YMCA-Press 1954. 283 str.

A useful anthology as an introduction to Russian nineteenth-century social thought. Contains concise sketches with excerpts from Čaadaev, I. V. Kireevskij, Xomjakov, I. S. Aksakov. Ju. Samarin, Stankevič, Belinskij, Granovskij, Herzen, Bakunin, Černyševskij, Pisarev, Nečaev, Tkačëv, Lavrov, Mixajlovskij, Plexanov, Tixomirov, Danilevskij, K. Leont'ev, Dostoevskij, Vl. Solov'ëv, etc.

## III. GENERAL WORKS DEALING WITH THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BERLIN, Isaiah

[1] 'A Marvellous Decade, 1838–1848'. In *Encounter* (London), June 1955, pp. 27–39; Nov. 1955, pp. 21–29; Dec. 1955, pp. 22–43; May 1956, pp. 20–34.

FEDOSOV, I. A.

[1] 'Revoljucionnye kružki v Rossii konca 20-x – načala 30-x godov XIX veka'. In *Istoričeskie zapiski* 59 (1957) 211–254.

[2] 'Iz istorii obščestvennogo dviženija v Rossii v konce 30-x godov XIX stoletija'. In *Voprosy istorii* 12 (1956) 80–91.

Two studies of the earliest revolutionary movements from a Soviet standpoint.

FLORINSKY, Michael T.

[2] 'Russian Social and Political Thought 1825–1855'. *The Russian Review* 6 (1947) No. 2, 77–85.

HARE, Richard

[1] *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought.* Studies of Non-Marxian Formation in Nineteenth-Century Russia and of its Partial Revival in the Soviet Union. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press. 1951. VIII + 307 pp. Index. [WERH 866] Second ed. New York, Vintage Books. 1964. 362 pp.

Studies of early 19th-century thinkers. Chapters on: Early Westernisers; Belinskij; the Slavophils (3 chapters); Černyševskij; Herzen: Konstantin Leont'ev. The personalities treated are "related ... to the significant manner in which they have been revalued or devalued since in the Soviet Union" (p. V).

KOZ'MIN, B. P. (ed.)

[1] *Sbornik materialov k izučeniju istorii russkoj žurnalistiki.* Vypusk I (XVIII v. i pervaja polovina XIX v.). M. 1952.

Useful study for the history of Russian journalism, compiled and edited by a leading Soviet historian.

LAMPERT, E.

[1] *Studies in Rebellion. Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen.* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1957. New York, Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. XI + 295 pp.

Containing an introduction on the intelligentsia and one essay each on Belinskij, Herzen, and Bakunin, aimed at fixing "with all possible precision the quality of their moral and intellectual personalities". – "... an advanced reader, which presupposes fairly close knowledge of the personalities concerned". (Martin E. Malia, in *The Russian Review* 17 (1958) No. 2, 146–148. For a Soviet review, cf. E. Ja. Basin: 'Novye tendencii v osveščenii istorii russkoj filosofskoj mysli za rubežom'. In *VF* 1959, 10, 179–181. [FBSP 3069 (1)] [WERH 889; FBSP 4214]

MALININ, V. A.

[1] 'Russkaja filosofija pervoj poloviny XIX veka i eë buržuaznaja interpretacija'. In *Filosofskie nauki* 1958, 3, 150–162. [FBSP 1868] (Cf. also Reference 29 on p. 49, *supra.*)

OKUN', Semën B.

[1] *Očerki istorii SSSR. Konec XVIII – pervaja četvert' XIX veka.* L., Učpedgiz. 1956. 414 str.

Basically historical, but useful background material. "One of the better recent Soviet text-books". (BRP 366 note). [BRP 366]

[2] *Očerki istorii SSSR. Vtoraja četvert' XIX veka.* L., Učpedgiz. 1957. 429 str.

"The best and most up-to-date treatment of the reign of Nicholas I." (BRP 367 note). [BRP 367]

REEVE, H. S.: 'Utopian Socialism in Russian Literature: 1840's–1860's. In *ASEER*, 18 (October 1959), 374–393.

RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas V.

[2] *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855.* Berkeley, University of California Press. 1959. X + 296 pp. Annotated bibliography.

"The most scholarly work." (WERH 78 note). Important for a true understanding of the theory of "official nationality", confused by some historians with Slavophil doctrine (cf. Riasanovsky [5], p. 192). Reviewed, *inter alia*, by Alan W. Ferguson in *The Russian Review* (1960) No. 2, 209–210, who concludes that this work, together with Riasanovsky [5] and that by Petrovich (on Panslavism), "does much to fill the vacuum long existing for English readers interested in Russian intellectual history during the second quarter of the nineteenth century". (Cf. also Riasanovsky [3], *infra.*) Useful bibliography of the period. [WERH 78]

[3] '"Nationality" in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I'. *The Russian Review* 19 (1960) No. 1, 38.

[4] 'Some Comments on the Role of the Intelligentsia in the Reign of Nicholas I of Russia, 1825–1855'. *The Slavic and East European Review* 3 (1957) 163–176.

SCHELTING, Alexander von: *Rußland und Europa im russischen Geschichtsdenken.* Bern, A. Francke Verlag. 1948. 404 SS.

Title misleading. Mainly concerned with Čaadaev, though there are sections referring to the Slavophils (esp. Xomjakov), also Herzen and even Danilevskij. Contains interesting ideas, but the interpretation remains often superficial and always biased. – "... the author does not pay sufficient attention to the European context of Russian intellectual development, and tends to regard nationalism and exclusiveness, whether those of the Slavophiles or those of various other Russian thinkers, as a peculiarly Russian perversion". (Riasanovsky [5], p. 230)

VASECKIJ, G. S. (ed.)

[2] *Russkaja progressivnaja filosofskaja mysl' XIX veka: 30–60 gody.* Sbornik statej. M., Izd. VPŠ i AON, 1959, 478 str.

"Tendentious but informative studies of the philosophic views of Stankevič, Granovskij, Belinskij, Herzen, Ogarëv, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, and others ..." (BRP 1207 note). [BRP 1207. FBSP 3870]

## IV. THE SLAVOPHILS

### *a. Western Sources*

ARSEN'EV (ARSENIEV), N. S. (ed.)

[2] Cf. XOMJAKOV [1], *infra.*

BARON, Pierre: 'Un théologien laïc orthodoxe russe au XIXe siècle: Alexis Stépanovich Khomiakov (1804–1860). Son ecclésiologie exposé et critiqué'.

In *Orientalia Christiana Analecta,* No. 127. Rome. 1940.

"The best Catholic answer to Khomiakov." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 222).

BERDJAEV (BERDYAEV), N.: Cf. items [1], [2], and [3], under Section II of this Bibliography. Riasanovsky points out that Berdjaev's other philosophical studies are also of interest in this connection, "because of Berdjaev's relation to Khomiakov and Slavophile thought in general" ([5], p. 222). Moreover, "Berdjaev and Zen'kovskij did more than anybody else to reinterpret Slavophilism and affirm its value in terms of the twentieth-century historical and intellectual development" ([5], p. 234).

BOLSHAKOFF, Serge: *The Doctrine of the Unity of the Church in the Works of Khomyakov and Moehler.* London. 1946. XIV + 334 pp. Bibliography. [WERH 883]

CHMIELEWSKI, Edward: *Tribune of the Slavophiles. Konstantin Aksakov.* Gainesville, Florida, University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, No. 12, 1961, 96 pp.

CHRISTOFF, Peter K.

[1] *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism. A Study in Ideas.* Vol. I, A. S. Xomjakov. Slavistic Printings and Reprintings XXIII. 's-Gravenhage, Mouton & Co. 1961. 301 pp. Appendix. Bibliography. Index.

The first of several volumes on Moscow Slavophilism. Others planned include studies of Ivan Kireevskij, Jurij Samarin, and Konstantin Aksakov, and a final volume in which "an effort will be made to determine the content of Moscow Slavophilism as it transpired through the works of its foremost representatives". (Foreword, p. 7).* The Slavophils are treated primarily on an ideological level. The study is confined to the three decades 1830–1860, and deliberately omits the subject of Panslavism. Important study of Xomjakov, including many excerpts from his own writings, and a useful bibliography (with occasional annotations) covering a much wider field. [WERH 877].

GRATIEUX, A.

[1] *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile.* Vol. I, 'Les hommes'. Vol. II, 'Les doctrines'. Paris, Editions du Cerf. 1939. XXXIV + 203 and VIII + 275 pp.

"One of the best books written on the Slavophiles", by a Catholic admirer of Xomjakov (Riasanovsky [5], p. 224). A basic work in the field.

[2] *Le mouvement slavophile à la veille de la Révolution: Dmitri A. Khomiakov. Suivi du traité d'Alexis Stépanovich Khomiakov: 'L'église est une'.* Translated by Roger Tandonnet. Paris. 1953.

HARE, Richard

[1] *Vide supra,* Section II.

The Slavophils are dealt with in detail in: Chapter III (pp. 69–102), 'The

* No further volume is as yet being printed, and none is likely to appear before 1966 at the earliest. (Communication from the publishers.)

Original Slavophils'; Chapter IV (pp. 103–129), 'A. S. Khomyakov'; Chapter V (pp. 130–170), 'Five Political Slavophils' (Tjutčev, I. S. and and K. S. Aksakov, Košelëv, Ju. Samarin).

KHOMIAKOV (KHOMYAKOV), A. S.: see *Xomjakov, infra.*

KIREEVSKIJ, I. V.

[1G] *Über den Charakter der Bildung Europas und ihr Verhältnis zur Bildung Rußlands* (1852). Translated and edited by Nicolai von Bubnoff. Stuttgart, Verlag Ernst Klett. 1948.

[2G] *Über die Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit einer neuen Grundlegung der Philosophie.* In: Bubnoff [1] (*q.v. supra* Section II), SS. 23–74.

See also the anthology by Žaba.

LAVRIN, Janko

[1] 'Kireevsky and the Problem of Culture'. *The Russian Review* 20 (1961) No. 2, 110–120. [WERH 885]

[2] 'Vladimir Soloviev and Slavophilism'. *The Russian Review* 20 (1961) No. 1, 11–18. [WERH 929]

[3] 'Populists and Slavophiles'. *The Russian Review* 21 (1962) No. 4, 307–317.

LIEB, Fritz

[2] 'Ursprung und Entfaltung des slawophilen Messianismus in Rußland' *Sophia und Historie...*, SS. 1962, 83–113. Originally published in: *Theologische Zeitschrift* (Basle) 2 (1946) 101–124.

MASARYK, Thomas Garrigue: *Vide supra,* Section II. The "true" Slavophils are dealt with in Vol. I, Part I, Chapter IX, §§. 52–62.

POGODIN, M. P.: (Excerpt from) *Letter on Russian History, 1837.* English translation in: Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Modern Russia,* pp. 60–68 (see Section II of this Bibliography).

RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas V.

[5] *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles. A Study of Romantic Ideology.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 1952. 244 pp. Appendix (Khomiakov's *History* and Friedrich Schlegel's *Philosophy of History*). Annotated bibliography. Index.

Clear, straightforward exposition of Slavophil doctrine and the entire "East-West" problem. An essential study, rightly described by Shapiro as "the best work" (at least in English) (WERH, p. 80, B. note). [WERH 876]

[6] 'Khomiakov on *Sobornost'*'. In Simmons, E. J. (ed.), *Continuity and Change...* pp. 183–196. [WERH 882]

[7] 'Pogodin and Shevyrev in Russian Intellectual History'. *Harvard Slavic Studies* No. 4 (1957) 149–167.

Although much nearer to the doctrine of Official Nationality than the Slavophils proper, Pogodin and Ševyrëv were respected by the latter, who greatly appreciated their work and cooperated with them in several publications (cf. Riasanovsky [5], pp. 10–11). On Ševyrëv, cf. also P. Struve, *infra.* [WERH 880]

SCHULTZE, B.

[2] 'A. S. Chomjakow und das halb-jahrtausend Jubiläum des Einigungskonzils von Florenz'. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 4 (1938) No. 3/4, 473–496.

"One of the more important Catholic discussions of Khomiakov." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 230).

STRUVE, P.: 'S. P. Ševyrëv i zapadnye vnušenija i istočniki teorii-aforizma o 'gnilom' ili 'gnijuščem' Zapade'. *Zapiski Russkago Naučnago Instituta v Belgrade*. Beograd. 1940.

An analysis of Ševyrëv's attitude towards the West. "...throws much light on some Western sources of the Russian criticism of the West." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 232).

THADEN, E. C.: 'The Beginnings of Romantic Nationalism in Russia'. *ASEER* 13 (1954) 500–521. [WERH 878]

XOMJAKOV, A. S.

[1] *Aleksej Xomjakov. Izbrannye sočinenija*. Edited by N. S. Arsen'ev. New York, Izd. imeni Čexova. 1955. 415 str.

Contains "nearly all his poems, some of his more important religious writings, some studies on the history of philosophy and culture, and a considerable number of his letters" (Publishers' catalogue).

[2E] *The Church is One*. Introduction by N. Zernov. London. 1948; New York. 1953.

[2F] *L'Eglise est une*. Translated by Roger Tandonnet. Paris. 1953 (in: Gratieux [2], *q.v. supra*).

[3] *Letter to a Foreign Friend on the Eve of the Crimean War*. (English translation in Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Modern Russia*, pp. 108–112; see Section II of this Bibliography).

See also the anthology by Žaba.

ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V.: *Vide supra*, Section II of this Bibliography. The Slavophils are treated in [1], Chapter III; [2], Vol. I, Part II, Chapter III (Načalo "slavjanofil'stva". Xomjakov) and Chapter IV (Kireevskij, Samarin, Aksakov) (In [2E] these are Chapters VI and VII). On Zen'kovskij and Slavophil thought, see note under Berdjaev in this section.

ZERNOV, Nicholas

[1] *Three Russian Prophets. Khomiakov, Dostoevsky, Soloviev*. London. 1944. "Popular and interesting." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 234).

[2] 'Introduction' to Xomjakov [2E], pp. 5–13.

ŽABA, S. P.: *Vide supra*, Section II of this Bibliography. This anthology contains, *inter alia*, excerpts from I. V. Kireevskij, Xomjakov, I. S. Aksakov, and Ju. Samarin.

*b. Soviet Sources*

DERŽAVIN, N.: 'Gercen i slavjanofily'. *Istorik-Marksist* 1 (1939) 125–145.

DMITRIEV, S. S.: 'Slavjanofily i slavjanofil'stvo. Iz istorii russkoj obščestvennoj

mysli serediny XIX veka'. *Istorik-Marksist* 1941, 85–97.
See also Ganičev, *infra.*

(Editorial): 'O nekotoryx voprosax istorii russkoj obščestvennoj mysli konca XVIII i pervoj poloviny XIX veka'. *Voprosy istorii* 9 (1955) 3–12.
Contains a plea for the study of Slavophilism as well as Westernism.

GANIČEV, I.: 'Obsuždenie doklada S. S. Dmitrieva 'Slavjanofily i slavjanofil'stvo'. Informacija o diskusii'. *Istorik-Marksist* 1941, 79–100, See also Dmitriev, *supra.*

LEVIN, Š. M.:

[1] 'K voprosu ob istoričeskix osobennostjax russkogo utopičeskogo socializma'. *Istoričeskie zapiski* 26 (1948) 217–257.

[2] 'Gercen i Krymskaja vojna'. *Istoričeskie zapiski* 29 (1949) 164–199.

PIPER, L.: *Mirovozzrenie Gercena.* L. 1935.
Examines Herzen's relations with the Slavophils; there is also a section on Slavophilism as such (pp. 66–78) (Riasanovsky [5], p. 196, note 20).

PIČETA, V. I.: 'K istorii slavjanovedenija v SSSR'. *Istorik-Marksist* 3 (1941) 36–62.
Contains a section on the Slavophil orientation in Russian slavic studies.

POKROVSKY, Mikhail N.: *Brief History of Russia.* Vol. I (*vide supra*, Section II of this Bibliography).
Pokrovsky's "rough and ready" interpretation of Slavophilism is given on pp. 244–246 (Riasanovsky [5], p. 193, incl. note 16).

RUBINŠTEJN, Nikolaj: 'Istoričeskaja teorija slavjanofilov i eë klassovye korni'. Trudy Instituta Krasnoj Professury. *Russkaja istoričeskaja literatura v klassovom osveščenii. Sbornik statej.* Edited by M. N. Pokrovskij. M. 1927, pp. 53–118.
"So far the most comprehensive Marxist interpretation of the Slavophile movement". (Riasanovsky [5], p. 193). For a good summary of its contents, cf. Riasanovsky [5], pp. 193–196.

SLADKEVIČ, N. K.: 'K voprosu o polemike N. G. Černyševskogo so slavjanofil'skoj publicistikoj'. *Voprosy istorii* 6 (1948) 71–79.
"Emphasises the hostility between Chernyshevskii and the Slavophiles." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 188, note 1).

*(To be continued)* *R. Kemball*

# BOOKS RECEIVED

AFANASE'V, V. G.: *Problema celostnosti v filosofii i biologii* (The Problem of Integrity in Philosophy and Biology). AON. M., Mysl'. 1964. 415 str.

ANDREEV, B. V.: *Ivan Petrovič Pavlov i religija* (Ivan Petrovič Pavlov and Religion). AN. M. – L., Nauka. 1964. 96 str.

ANDREEV, I. D.: *O metodax naučnogo poznanija* (On the Method of Scientific Knowledge). AN. M., Nauka. 1964. 184 str.

ASEEV, Ju. A., KON, I. S.: *Osnovnye napravlenija buržuaznoj filosofii i sociologii XX veka* (The Basic Trends of Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology in the Twentieth Century). L., LGU. 1961. 107 str.

AŠIN, G. K.: *Mif ob elite* (The Myth of the Elite). M., Znanie. 1964. 39 str.

AVETIS'JAN, A. A.: *Kritika sovremennoj religioznoj social'noj filosofii* (Critique of Contemporary Religious Social Philosophy). AN Ukrainskoj SSR. Kiev, Izd. AN USSR. 1964. 103 str.

BELENKIJ, M.: *Spinoza* (Spinoza). M., Molodaja Gvardija. 1964. 238 str.

BERKLI, E.: *Simvoličeskaja logika i razumnye mašiny* (Symbolic Logic and Thinking Machines). Per. s angliskogo. M., IIL. 1961. 260 str.

*Besedy o religii i znanii* (Talks on Religion and Knowledge). Učebnik. M., Politizdat. 1964. 367 str.

BEZČEREVNYX, E. V.: *Ot mysli k dejstviju* (From Thought to Activity). M., Politizdat. 1964. 70 str.

BLAUBERG, I. V.: *Problema celostnosti v marksistskoj filosofii* (The Problem of Integrity in Marxist Philosophy). M., Vysšaja Škola. 1963. 96 str.

BOGOMOLOV, A. S.: *Anglo-amerikanskaja buržuaznaja filosofia epoxi imperializma* (Anglo-American Bourgeois Philosophy in the Era of Imperalism). M., Mysl'. 1964. 420 str.

BOGUSLAVSKIJ, V. M.: *U istokov francuzkogo ateizma i materializma* (The Sources of French Atheism and Materialism). M., Mysl'. 1964. 254 str.

BONDARENKO, E., SAVOV, M.: *Meždunarodnoe socialističeskoe razdelenie truda* (The International Socialist Division of Labor). M., Politizdat. 1964. 94 str.

BUDREJKO, N. A.: *Filosofija, fizika, ximija* (Philosophy, Physics, Chemistry). M., Moskovskij rabočij. 1964. 222 str.

*Čelovek i epoxa* (Man and the Age). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 259 str.

EKMAL'JAN, A. M.: *Agnosticizm i problema znanija i very v buržuaznoj filosofii* (Agnosticism and the Problem of Knowledge and Truth in Bourgeois Philosophy). An Armanskoj SSR. Erevan, Izd. An Armanskoj SSR. 1964. 228 str.

ELISEEVA, V. S.: *Trud, iskusstvo, nauka* (Labor, Art, Science). M., Znanie. 1964, 39 str.

*Filosofkaja Enciklopedija* (Philosophical Encyclopedia). Red. F. V. Konstantinov. T. 3., Kommunizm – Nauka. AN. M., Sovetskaja Enciklopedija. 1964. 584 str.

ESPER, K.-G.: *Kto sozdal bogov?* (Who Created God?). Per. s nemeckogo. M., Politizdat. 1964. 76 str.



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (June 1965); © *D, Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

FAL'KONI, K.: *Vatikanskij Sobor i pričiny ego sozyva* (The Vatican Council and the Causes of its Convocation). Per. s ital'janskogo. M., Progress. 1964. 80 str.

FILIP'EV, Ju. A.: *Tvorčestvo i kibernetika* (Creativity and Cybernetics). AN. M., Nauka. 1964. 80 str.

*Nemeckaja filosofija posle 1945 goda* (German Philosophy Since 1945). R. i pred. T. I. Ojzermana. M., Progress. 1964. 135 str.

GAJDUKOV, Ju. G.: *Rol' praktiki v processe poznanija* (The Role of Practice in the Process of Knowledge). M., Mysl'. 1964. 335 str.

*Galileo Galilej. Izbrannye trudy v dvux tomax. Tom pervyj* (Galileo Galilei. Selected Works in Two Volumes. Volume One). AN. M., Nauka. 1964. 639 str.

*Galileo Galiliej. Izbrannye trudy v dvux tomax. Tom vtoroj* (Galileo Galiliej. Selected Works in Two Volumes. Volume Two). AN. M., Nauka. 1964. 571 str.

GANOVSKIJ, SAVVA: *Obščestvenno-ekonomičeskaja formacija i mirnoe sosuščestvovanie* (Socio-Economic Formation and Peaceful Coexistence). Per. s bolgarskogo. M., Progress. 1964. 515 str.

GINDIN, A., KOZLOV, I.: *Dve progressivnye tendencii v nacional'nom voprose* (Two Progressive Tendencies in the Nationalities Question). M., Znanie. 1964. 38 str.

GUREVIČ, V.: *KPSS – organizator razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma* (CPSU – The Organizer of Large-scale Construction of Communism). M., Politizdat. 1964. 62 str.

GURVIČ, S., PETLENKO, V., CAREGORODCEV, G.: *Voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma* (Questions of Dialectical Materialism). Kiev. G Medicinskoe Izd., USSR. 1964. 261 str.

*Iz istorii marksizma i meždunarodnogo rabočego dviženija.* The History of Marxism and the International Workers' Movement). K 100-letiju so dnja osnovanija I internacionala. In-t marksizma-leninizma pri CK KPSS. M., Politizdat. 1964. 664 str.

*Istorija biblioteki akademii nauk SSSR, 1714–1964* (History of the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1714–1964). AN. M.–L., Nauka. 1964. 599 str.

*Istorija Estetiki. Tom II. Estetičeskie učenija XVII–XVIII vekov* (History of Aesthetics. Volume II. 17–18th Centuries). M., Iskusstvo. 1964. 830 str.

JAKOVLEV, M. V.: *Marksizm i sovremennaja buržuaznaja istorija filosofii* (Marxism and Contemporary Bourgeois History of Philosophy). AON. M., Mysl'. 1964. 349 str.

KAGARLICKAJA, O. T.: *Kak rabotat' nad "Kapitalom" K. Marksa* (How to Work on the *Capital* of K. Marx). L., LGU. 1964. 94 str.

KARPOV, G. D.: *Antikommunizm – suščnost' sovremennoj buržuaznoj sociologii* (Anti-Communism – the Essence of Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology). M., Znanie. 1964. 39 str.

KELER, V.: *Čelovek razumnyj* (Man is Rational). M., Molodaja Gvardija. 1964. 224 str.

KIRILLOV, V. I., ZYKOV, P. G., STARČENKO, A. A., ČURAKOV, Ju. D.: *Logika* (Logic). M., Vyšsaja Škola. 1964. 207 str.

KNJAZEV, G. A., KOL'COV, A. V.: *Kratkij očerk istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR* (A Short Outline of the History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR). Iz. 3–e, dop. AN. M.–L., Nauka. 1964. 224 str.

KOCH, G.: *Marksizm i éstetika* (Marxism and Aesthetics). Per. s nemeckogo. M., Progress. 1964, 751 str.

*Moral'nyj kodeks stroitelja kommunizma.* (The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism). M., Politizdat. 1964. 192 str.

KON, I. S.: *Positivizm v sociologii. Istoričeskij očerk* (Positivism in Sociology. A Historical Essay). L., LGU. 1964. 207 str.

KOSIČEV, A. D.: *Bor'ba marksizma-leninizma s ideologiej anarxizma i sovremennost'* (The Struggle of Marxism-Leninism with the Ideology of Anarchism Today). M., MGU. 1964. 414 str.

KOVAL'SKIJ, N. A.: *Vatikan i mirovaja politika* (The Vatican and World Politics). AN. M., Izd. "Meždunarodnye otnošenija". 1964. 268 str.

KOZLOV, G. A.: *Dejstvie zakona stoimosti v usloviax sovremennogo kapitalizma* (The Operation of the Law of Costs in the Conditions of Contemporary Capitalism). VPŠ pri CK KPSS. M., Mysl'. 1964. 400 str.

*Kritika sovremmennyx buržuaznyx reformistskix i revizionistskix teorij po voprosam političeskoj ekonomii* (A Critique of Present-day Bourgeois Reformist and Revisionist Theories on Political Economy). Red. A. P. Mamaluja. Xar'kov, Izd. Xar'kovskogo GU. 1963, 302 str.

KRIVOGUZ, I. M.: *Vtoroj Internacional 1889–1914* (The Second International 1889–1914). M., Mysl'. 1964. 494 str.

KUZ'MIN, V. F.: *Filosofskaja kategorija soznanija i sovremennaja nauka* (Philosophical Categories of Consciousness and Contemporary Science). M., Vyšsaja Škola. 1964. 128 str.

KUZ'MINA, A. A.: *Kategorija pričinnosti i praktika* (The Categories of Causality and Practice). M., Vyšsaja Škola. 1964, 96 str.

LARMIN, O. V.: *Estetičeskij ideal i sovremennost'* (The Aesthetic Ideal and the Present Day). M., MGU. 1964. 155 str.

LJUBČENKO, G. G.: SERGIENKO, I. V.; *Matematičeskie mašiny i programmirovanie* (Mathematical Machines and Programming). Kiev, Izd. KGU. 1963. 219 str.

*Formal'naja logika i metodologija nauki* (Formal Logic and Methodology of Science). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 299 str.

LOPUXOV, B. R.: *Antonio Gramši* (Antonio Gramsci). AN. M., Izd. AN. 1963, 90 str.

MAL'CEV, V. I.: *Očerk po dialektičeskoj logike* (Essay on Dialectical Logic). M., MGU. 1964. 187 str.

MALYŠEV, B. T.: *Čelovečeskaja ličnost' i ee projavlenija* (Human Personality and its Manifestations). M., MGU. 1964. 76 str.

*Dialektičeskij materializm i sovremennoe estestvoznanie* (Dialectical Materialism and Contemporary Science). M., MGU. 1964. 403 str.

MILOVIDOV, A. S.: *Moral'nyj kodeks i nravstvennoe vospitanie voinov* (The Moral Code and the Moral Education of Soldiers). M., Voennoe Izd. Ministerstva Oborony SSSR. 1964. 83 str.

*Mir socializma v cifrax i faktax 1963 g.* (The World of Socialism in Facts and Figures, 1963). M., Politizdat. 1964. 157 str.

MIROŠXINA, N. M.: *Lenin i voprosy naučnoj abstrakcii* (Lenin and Questions of Scientific Abstraction). Taškent, G Izd. Uzbekskoj SSR. 1964. 194 str.

MŠVENIERADZE, V.: *Antikommunizm – oružie obrečennyx* (Anti-Communism – Weapon of the Doomed). M., Mysl'. 1964. 243 str.

NESTERENKO, G. Ja.: *Ideologija, ee osobennosti formy* (Ideology – its Peculiarities of Form). VPŠ pri KPSS. M., Mysl'. 1964. 199 str.

NOVIK, I. B.: *O filosofskix voprosax kibernetičeskogo modelirovanija.* (On Philosophical Questions of Cybernetic Modelling). M., Znanie. 1964. 31 str.

NOVINSKIJ, I. I.: *O dialektike živoj prirody* (Art and the Education of the New Man). M., Znanie. 1964. 31 str.

*Nravstvennost' i religija* (Morality and Religion). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 213 str.

*Moral'nyj oblik stroitelja kommunizma* (The Moral Aspect of the Construction of Communism). AN. M., Nauka. 1964. 347 str.

OBLOMSKAJA, I. Ja.: *Material'naja zainteresovannost' – ékonomičeskaja kategorija socializma* (Material Incentive – an Economic Category of Socialism). M., Mysl'. 1964. 94 str.

PETROSJAN, M. I.: *Gumanizm. Opyt filosofsko-etičeskogo i sociologičeskogo issledovanija problemy* (Humanism. An Essay at a Philosophico-Aesthetic and Sociological Investigation of the Problem). M., Mysl'. 1964. 335 str.

PETROV, I. G.: *Predmet i metody sociologičeskix issledovanij* (The Subject and Method of Sociological Research). M., Znanie. 1964. 40 str.

PLJUŠČ, L.: *Entropija i suščnost' žizni* (Entropy and the Essence of Life). M., Znanie. 1964. 32 str.

POLIKAROV, A. P.: *Otnositel'nost' i kvanty* (Relativity and Quanta). IF. 1964. 48 str.

PORŠNEV, B.: *Mel'e* (Meslier). M., Molodaja Gvardija. 1964. 240 str.

*Problema vozmožnosti i dejstvitel'nosti* (The Problem of Possibility and Reality). AN. M.–L., Nauka. 1964. 279 str.

*Problemy naučnogo metoda. Dialektika – teorija poznanija* (Problems of Scientific Method. Dialectics – Theory of Knowledge). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 499 str.

*Problemy myšlenija v sovremennoj nauke* (Problems of Thought in Contemporary Science). Pod r. P. V. Kopnina i M. B. Vil'nickogo. AN USSR. M., Mysl', 1964. 467 str.

*Problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija* (Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 408 str.

*Metodologičeskie problemy sovremennoj nauki* (Methodological Problems of Contemporary Science). Ss. R. V. S. Molodcova i A. Ja. Il'ina. M., MGU. 1964. 245 str.

*Rasprostranenie idej marksistskoj filosofii v Evrope* (The Spread of the Ideas of Marxist Philosophy in Europe). Konec XIX – načalo XX vekov. L., LGU. 1964. 186 str.

RAZIN, V. I.: *Marksizm-Leninizm o slome ekspluatatorskoj gosudarstvennoj mašiny* (Marxism-Leninism on the Scrapping of the Exploiting State Machine). M., MGU. 1964. 50 str.

REZNIKOV, L. O.: *Gnoseologičeskie voprosy semiotiki* (Gnoseological Questions of Semiotics). L., LGU. 1964. 302 str.

RUŽELITE, O. S.: *Otricanie svobody sovesti v buržuaznyx stranax* (The Denial of Freedom of Conscience in Bourgeois Lands). M., Juridičeskaja literatura. 1964. 126 str.

*Politekonomičeskij slovar'* (Politico-Economic Dictionary). R. E. F. Borisova, V. A. Žamina, M. F. Makarovoj. M., Politizdat. 1964. 303 str.

*Slovar' ateista* (The Atheist's Dictionary). M., Politizdat. 1964. 271 str.

*Kratkij naučno-ateističeskij slovar'* (Short Scientific-Atheistic Dictionary). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 641 str.

*Enciklopedičeskij slovar'* (Encyclopedic Dictionary, 2 Vols.) M., Izd. "Sovetskaja enciklopedija". 1964. 736 str.

*Marksistskaja i buržuaznaja sociologija segodnja* (Marxist and Bourgeois Sociology Today). IF. M., Nauka. 1964. 477 str.

SOKOLOV, V. V.: *Filosofija Spinozy i sovremennost'* (The Philosophy of Spinoza and the Present Day). M., MGU. 1964. 350 str.

*O suščnosti žizni* (On the Essence of Life). AN. M., Nauka. 1964. 350 str.

SVIDERSKIJ, V. I.: *Nekotorye osobennosti razvitija v ob"ektivnom mire* (Some Particularities of Development in the Objective World). L., LGU. 1964. 46 str.

ŠIMIN, N.: *Sem'ja, brak, byt* (Family, Marriage, Daily Life). M., Politizdat. 1964. 46 str.

ŠINKARUK, V. I.: *Logika, dialektika i teorija poznanija Gegelja* (Hegel's Logic, Dialectics, and Theory of Knowledge). Kiev, Izd. KGU. 1964. 295 str.

ŠVARC, T.: *Ot Šopengauera k Xejdeggeru* (From Schopenhauer to Heidegger). Per. s nemeckogo. M., Progress. 1964. 359 str.

ŠVARCMAN, D. A.: *Etika ... bez morali. Kritika sovremennyx buržuaznyx etičeskix teorij* (Ethics ... without Morals. Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Ethical Theory). M., Mysl'. 1964. 263 str.

ŠČEDROVICKIJ, G. P.: *Problemy metodologii sistemnogo issledovanija* (Problems of Methodology of Systematic Research). M., Znanie. 1964. 48 str.

TITARENKO, A. I.: *Pragmatistskij Ižemarskizm – filosofija antikommunizma* (Pragmatist Pseudo-Marxism – Philosophy of Anti-Communism). M., MGU, 1964. 290 str.

TOKAREV, S. A.: *Religija v istorii narodov mira* (Religion in the History of the Peoples of the World). M., Politizdat. 1964. 558 str.

URSUL, A. S.: *Nekotorye filosofskie voprosy osvoenija kosmosa* (Some Philosophical Questions of the Mastering of the Cosmos). M., Znanie. 1964. 32 str.

VELIKOVIČ, L. N.: *Cerkov' i social'nye problemy sovremennosti* (The Church and Present-Day Social Problems). IF. M., Nauka. 1964, 219 str.

VERBIN, A. I.: *Bazis i nadstrojka* (Basis and Superstructure). M., Politizdat. 1964. 38 str.

VESELOVSKIJ, V. N.: *Filosofskoe značenie zakonov soxranenija materii i dviženija* (The Philosophical Meaning of the Laws of Conservation of Matter and Motion). AON. N., Mysl'. 1964. 142 str.

VINOGRADSKAJA, P.: *Ženni Marks* (Jenny Marx). M., Mysl'. 1964. 358 str.

VINTER, E.: *Papstvo i carizm* (Papacy and Tsarism). Per. s nemeckogo. M., Progress. 1964. 531 str.

*Voprosy dialektiki i logiki* (Questions of Dialectics and Logic). L., Izd. LGU. 1964. 112 str.

*Voprosy formirovanija naučno-ateističeskix vzgljadov* (Questions of the Formation of a Scientific-Atheist View). AON pri CK KPSS. M., Mysl'. 1964. 108 str.

*Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma* (Questions of the History of Religion and Atheism). M., Nauka. 1964. 317 str.

*Voprosy istorii estestvoznanija i texniki* (Questions of the History of Science and Technology). Vyp. 16. AN SSSR. M., Nauka. 1964. 115 str.

*Voprosy istoričeskogo materializma i naučnogo kommunizma* (Questions of Historical Materialism and Scientific Communism). M., MGU. 1964. 262 str.

*Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoj fiziki* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Physics). AN Ukrainskoj SSR. Kiev, Naukova Dumka. 1964. 328 str.

VORONOV, A. I., MIXAJLOV, F. T.: *Obščestvo, kollektiv, ličnost'* (Society, the Collective, Personality). M., Znanie. 1964. 44 str.

*Vzaimodejstvie form obščestvennogo soznanija* (The Interaction of Forms of Social Consciousness). M., MGU. 1964. 310 str.

XARČEV, A. G.: *Brak i sem'ja v SSSR* (Marriage and the Family in the USSR). M., Mysl'. 1964. 323 str.

XEMP, E.: *Slovar' amerikanskoj lingvističeskoj terminologii* (Dictionary of American Linguistic Terminology). M., Progress. 1964. 263 str.

XOMENTOVSKAJA, A. I.: *Lorenco Valla – velikij ital'janskij gumanist* (Lorenzo Valla – a Great Italian Humanist). AN. M.-L., Nauka. 1964. 146 str.

XRUŠČEV, N. S.: *Marksizm-Leninizm – naše znamja, naše voevoe oružie* (Marxism-Leninism – Our Banner, Our Fighting Weapon). M., Politizdat. 1963. 47 str.

ZAKLADNAJA, V., CELIKOVA, O.: *O samovospitanii* (On Self-Education). M., Znanie. 1964. 20 str.

ZERKIN, D. P.: *K kommunističeskim proizvodstvennym otnošenijam* (Towards Communist Productive Relations). M., Znanie. 1964. 43 str.

ZMEEV, Ju. N.: *Nauka i religija o vselennoj* (Science and Religion about the Universe). K., Naukova Dumka. 1964. 69 str.

ZORINA, D. Ju.: *Kak Džon Streči "obnovil" Marksa* (How John Strachey "Renovated" Marx). M., Ékonomika. 1964, 108 str.

ŽOŽA, At.: *Logičeskie issledovanija* (Logical Investigations). Per. s rumynskogo. M., Progress. 1964. 502 str.

## REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

*Lectures:* There were 71 students in the Institute during the Winter Term 1964/65.

*Publications:* The following books have been published in the series "Sovietica": *Soviet Philosophy. A General Introduction to Contemporary Soviet Thought,* by Th. J. Blakeley; *Russian Philosophical Terminology,* by Karl G. Ballestrem; *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* V (containing the registers); *Les catégories du matérialisme dialectique. L'ontologie soviétique contemporaine*, by Guy Planty-Bonjour.



This content downloaded from 155.69.24.171 on Fri, 12 Aug 2016 15:35:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

# CONTENTS

*K. G. Ballestrem* / Dialectical Logic 139

*R. J. Kemball* / Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought. A Preliminary Review of the Literature II 173

*S. Müller-Markus* / Soviet Discussion on General Relativity Theory 204

Notes and Comments 223

A Rejoinder – Current Soviet Philosophy in its Own Mirror – Two Soviet Conferences on Gravitation – A Philosophical Condemnation of Lysenko – New Centres of Atheism – Stalin Newly Sentenced

Review

The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, ed. by Harry G. Sheffer (P. J. Beemans) 235

Bibliography

Soviet Dialectical Logic (K. G. Ballestrem) 237

Selected Writings on Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought II (R. Kemball) 240

Chronology 269

*The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editors or members of the institute*

Printed in The Netherlands by D. Reidel, Dordrecht

This content downloaded from 132.239.1.230 on Wed, 14 Sep 2016 20:59:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

K. G. BALLESTREM

# DIALECTICAL LOGIC

Dialectical logic is really no logic. It is a general interpretation of knowledge, an application of the general dialectic to epistemology.

After a long history of discussions, dialectical logic has become since 1950 an established philosophical discipline in the Soviet Union. Many Soviet philosophers have contributed to the establishment of dialectical logic through books and articles; among them people like M. N. Alekseev, B. M. Kedrov and P. V. Kopnin, i.e. some of the best-known Soviet philosophers.

In Western Sovietology there is as yet no study on Soviet dialectical logic, although the discussions which later led to the establishment of dialectical logic were well analyzed by J. M. Bocheński[1], H. Dahm[2], A. Philipov[3], and G. A. Wetter.[4] Besides, important aspects of Soviet dialectical logic are mentioned in T. J. Blakeley's *Soviet Theory of Knowledge* (Dordrecht 1964). This article is meant to give a first, preliminary survey of the field.

The article is divided into the following parts: (I) a *history* of the problem; (II) the general *metaphysical premisses*; (III) the *dialectical interpretation of knowledge*; (IV) the theory of *truth*; (V) some *concluding remarks*.

## I. THE HISTORY OF DIALECTICAL LOGIC

The history, or rather the pre-history of Soviet dialectical logic, can be traced back directly to *Hegel*.

Hegel's philosophy is a dialectical monism. '*Dialectical*' means above all – in Hegel's system – a relationistic and evolutionary view of reality. *Relationistic* – because reality is not constituted by substances and their properties and relations, but every thing is constituted by its 'other', is the result of 'dialectical negations' of itself by all others, is the result of relations. *Evolutionary* – because reality is not conceived as a static structure, in a once-and-for-all given order, but as being in permanent evolution, through 'dialectical negations' and negations of negations. Hegel's



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 3 (September 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

*monism* is expressed in the view that all different types of being are results of the self-developing, self-differentiating and self-actualizing activity of one basic reality: the *Idee*. Everything that is has always been a basic potency of the *Idee*. Also thinking or knowledge is nothing different from the one basic reality, because there is an original unity of being and thought in the *Idee*.

The original unity of being and thought allows the affirmation that the laws of being and the laws of thought are the same and that thinking or knowledge must be explained dialectically, just as is being in general. Thus, Hegel finds the same order among the categories of his logic (= ontology) and in his history of the knowledge of mankind, especially in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, Hegel's dialectical explanation of knowledge can be seen in his view that individual knowledge (knowledge by an individual) is an inferior type of knowledge, that the real subject of knowledge is mankind, which develops in its history to ever greater being and knowledge, through different stages of relative truth towards absolute truth, through subjective and objective spirit towards absolute spirit.

The 'classics' accepted Hegel's dialectical monism. By misunderstanding – among other things – Hegel's *Idee* as a subjective idea, his absolute spirit as the traditional God, they thought to 'reverse' Hegel by calling the *Idee* 'matter' and absolute spirit 'mankind' (on its highest level of development). It is obvious that this was more a reversal of words than of concepts since it was still a dialectical monism in Hegel's sense, at least in Engels' and Lenin's philosophy.

But Engels and Lenin were not only dialectical monists. Engels also describes 'matter' as a very general name for a common property, rather than as the one self-developing basic reality. All of the 'classics' have more concern than Hegel for the individual knower and for the reflection in him of an objective reality although they also think dialectically of the knowledge of mankind in its historical development.

It is above all Lenin who felt the necessity of a dialectic as logic and theory of knowledge, i.e. of an application of dialectics to the theory of knowledge. In his *Filosofskie tetradi* (Philosophical Notebooks) he thinks of a logic as universal history of knowledge: "Logic is the doctrine not of the external forms of thinking but of the laws of development of 'all material, natural and spiritual things', i.e. of the development of each

concrete content of the world and of its knowledge, i.e. the result, the sum total, the conclusion of the *history* of the knowledge of the world."[5] Lenin even developed a plan for this logic as historiography of human knowledge.[6]

Lenin's enthusiasm for Hegel seems to have grown continuously from the time of the *Filosofskie tetradi* until his death. It is obvious that his urgent advice of 1922 to study Hegel and his plan of a dialectic as logic and theory of knowledge have greatly encouraged the rise of a dialectical philosophy in the early years of the Soviet Union. Under Deborin the study of Hegel became one of the major tasks of Soviet philosophers. Also, Deborin showed much enthusiasm for Lenin's plan of a dialectical logic.[7]

The reason why no dialectical logic was developed by Deborin and his pupils must be seen in the fact that until 1929 they had to defend the right of philosophy as such and of the dialectical explanation of nature against the mechanists. Only after 1929, when they had won over the mechanists, they could develop their dialectical philosophy.

The rule of Deborin's school in Soviet philosophy was very short. At the end of 1930 and the beginning of 1931, their views were condemned in the name of Stalin. One of the primary accusations was that they had lead to a hegelianization of Marxism. Under Stalins's rule the meaning of dialectic as a whole under-went considerable change; in particular, Lenin's plan of an application of dialectic to theory of knowledge was never again mentioned. An entirely undialectical view began to prevail in the theory of knowledge.

B. M. Kedrov describes the situation in the following way: true was only what Stalin said; if Stalin did not mention a certain question, it was doubtful that one could even ask the question. As to dialectical logic, Stalin never talked about it. It was therefore concluded that dialectical logic was only another name for dialectical materialism and that there was only one real logic, formal logic. This view was – in Kedrov's opinion – still prevailing during the beginning of the 1950's.[8] Although this and similar statements might be considered as examples of trying to blame Stalin for each and every thing that – in today's opinion – seems deficient during his period, much of it can be verified from the publications during this time. They repeated what Stalin said and definitely never tried to develop a dialectical logic.

The history of dialectical logic as a discipline within Soviet philosophy can be divided into three periods:

The *first*, between 1950 and 1955, is really another pre-history. It is the time when the big developments in formal logic took place. During this time, the relations between formal logic and dialectic were discussed at length. The question was, above all, whether the laws of dialectic could be compatible with the laws of formal logic, whether the domain of formal logic was subordinated to the more general domain of the dialectic, etc. Although there was much talk of dialectical logic in this context and the whole discussion was often formulated by asking whether there was only one or several logics, nobody offered any concrete ideas about a dialectical logic as a specific discipline different from dialectical materialism as a whole.

Until 1955 nobody really knew what dialectical logic as a specific philosophical discipline could be. That was probably the main reason why K. S. Bakradze's and N. I. Kondakov's opinion that there was only one logic – formal logic – was more and more supported by philosophers in the Soviet Union. This at least was the complaint which was formulated in an editorial article of the *Voprosy filosofii* in 1955.[9]

The *second* period, between 1955 and 1958, was the time when the foundations of dialectical logic as a specific discipline were laid. The first attempt to lay these foundations was an article in the sixth number of the *VF* of 1955: 'The Unity of Materialistic Dialectic, Logic and Theory of Knowledge'. In this article one reads that the laws and categories of the dialectic, as the reflections of the general laws of reality in our knowledge, are also methodological principles, and are applicable to the process of our knowledge. "This means that the laws of the dialectic must be understood as laws of knowledge, of thinking, as laws of dialectical logic. Dialectical materialism also investigates such laws that are specific laws of our knowledge (e.g. the laws of inter-relation between absolute and relative truth), insofar as they are not an immediate reflection of material reality itself, but a reflection generalizing the experience of the development of all sciences and of the social practice of mankind."[10]

It appears from this text that dialectical logic is going to be the dialectical explanation of knowledge, the application of the general laws of the dialectic to the theory of knowledge. Now the question arises: what is the difference between the laws of the dialectic as general ontological laws and as laws determining the process of knowledge? In other words: what

is the difference between ontology and theory of knowledge in this new meaning of the word? Because Lenin had used the ambiguous term of *sovpadat'* (coincide) in this context, the problem is called the problem of *sovpadenie*; are dialectic (i.e. general ontology), logic and theory of knowledge identical, or somewhat different? (In this context, logic and theory of knowledge are seen on one side, ontology on the other, since this basic question is about the relation between the domain of ontology and the domain of knowledge in general).

This problem, which is of course extremely important for the foundation of dialectical logic as a philosophical discipline, was the subject of most discussions during this second period. In comparison with it, the problem of the relation of dialectical logic to formal logic lost much of its importance during this period. The problem of *sovpadenie* and its discussion in Soviet philosophy has been well analyzed by T. J. Blakeley and H. Fleischer.[11]

Beginning in 1958, a *third* period in the history of Soviet dialectical logic starts, in which dialectical logic is actually constructed. Since that date, an ever increasing number of books and articles have appeared in which many problems of the dialectical interpretation of knowledge are actually elaborated. Considering books alone, there have been (as far as we have been able to determine): two in 1958, three in 1959, two in 1960, two in 1961, five in 1962, four in 1963, six in 1964.[12]

In these books, the two preliminary problems of dialectical logic, that of its relation to formal logic and the problem of *sovpadenie*, are still discussed. But lately the different views of Soviet philosophers have been classified and one opinion seems to be prevailing. Thus, formal logic is usually said to reflect the static and formal sides of reality, while dialectical logic reflects reality in its movement and concrete content. As to the problem of *sovpadenie*, i.e., above all of the relation between ontology and theory of knowledge, three different opinions seem to be held: (1) there exists only a loose and external relation between ontology and theory of knowledge, the laws of the dialectic are applied very differently in ontology and in the theory of knowledge; (2) ontology and theory of knowledge are – if they both give a dialectical explanation of reality – completely identical; (3) between ontology and theory of knowledge there exists no complete identity, but a dialectical unity; the laws of the dialectic in ontology and in theory of knowledge have the same content but

a different form, as it is often expressed. This third group constitutes, as Kedrov points out, the majority of Soviet dialectical logicians.[13]

Although Kedrov himself gives no names and other authors present different divisions of opinions in the problem of *sovpadenie*, one can give the following examples: to the first group in Kedrov's scheme belong people like *K. S. Bakradze* and *V. P. Rožin*; to the second group one must count *V. I. Čerkesov, G. G. Gabriel'jan* and *E. V. Il'enkov*; the third group is constituted by *M. N. Alekseev, B. M. Kedrov, P. V. Kopnin, V. I. Mal'cev, M. M. Rozental'* and others

This might suffice as a short sketch of the pre-history and history of Soviet dialectical logic. We will now proceed to an examination of this philosophical discipline in itself.

## II. GENERAL METAPHYSICAL PREMISSES

The recent development of dialectical logic signifies a Hegelian attack on a part of Soviet philosophy which had been Aristotelian before. Knowledge was conceived in a dualistic way: knowing subject on one side, known object on the other; although the role of practice was always mentioned in this context, it was the passive reflection of the object in the individual knower – through sensation, perception etc. – that was said to be the essence of knowledge.

This dualism of knowledge was also expressed on a general ontological level. Consciousness was described as different from matter, otherwise one would fall into vulgar materialism, an accusation only slightly less serious than that of idealism. But at the same time and sometimes on the same page one could read that everything was material, or a form of the movement of matter. In this consisted the unity of the material world.

In philosophical texts before 1955 (discussion about G. F. Aleksandrov's *Dialektičeskij materializm*) there was not even an attempt made to clarify the confusions and dilemmas implied in such statements. One example of this attitude can be seen in V. N. Kilbanovskij's answer to the question: "Is it right to affirm that consciousness is material?"[14] The answer is a very clear *no*. However the author states with Engels that everything that exists is matter or one of its movements. Then he goes on to explain the peculiarities of the psychic and of knowledge as compared to other phenomena. The reader remains thoroughly confused. – Another

example is *Dialektičeskij materializm* of 1954, the much criticized book under G. F. Aleksandrov's editorship, in which no attempt is made to clarify this confusion.[15]

The confusion is at least double: (1) to affirm on the one hand that everything is material, and on the other hand that there exists consciousness which is not material; (2) to continuously mix up the ontological and the epistemological question. As to the *first* confusion, Soviet philosophy has made some progress in clarification. Often the problematic is clearly exposed: both the monism of vulgar materialism and dualism have to be avoided, the only possibility that remains is dialectical monism. The *second* confusion dates from Engels' formulation of the 'basic question of philosophy' about the relation between thought and being, between spirit and nature. This question, Engels said, has two corresponding sides, one ontological, the other epistemological. Ever since, these two sides have been treated together in Marxist-Leninist philosophy. A clarification in this confusion is now sought through determining what the relation is between ontology and epistemology, between the laws of thought and the laws of being.

It already becomes clear at this point that in Soviet philosophy the question of knowledge has always been closely related to ontological considerations. This is the reason why we shall also have to briefly analyze the developments of a *general dialectical monism* in order to understand the dialectical interpretation of *knowledge* that is given in Soviet dialectical logic.

The Soviet general theory of the dialectic has been competently treated by H. Fleischer.[16] We shall limit ourselves to a few remarks which are relevant in this context.

A Hegelian type of dialectical monism is recently appearing more and more in Soviet theories about *matter*. As indicated in the publications of H. Fleischer[17] and N. Lobkowicz[18], it has been difficult to make sense out of the different Soviet statements about matter. Matter was in one place described as a *common property* of all beings, in another as a most general *genus*, once as basic *stuff* out of which everything was made, and once again it seemed to be applicable only to bodies or substances. But in recent years, matter has been explained more and more often as the *one basic substance*, the *substantia unica*, whose dialectical self-creation is the cause for everything that exists. Apart from the texts that can be

found in H. Fleischer's book[19], we would like to refer here only to one very recent article (1965) by M. F. Vorob'ev of Leningrad University, in which this view is very forcefully defended.[20]

During the last ten years one could also notice a revival of a genuine *dialectical* explanation of the development or self-creation of matter. When Stalin dominated Soviet philosophy, the dialectical interpretation of movement and development was replaced by a more mechanist view.[21] But since then, especially since 1958, dialectic has been strongly developed. It is really the genuine Hegelian dialectic that is exposed here, a relationistic (the general relatedness of phenomena) and evolutionistic (universality of movement, progressive movement being the general trend) view of the world, based upon the principle of dialectical negation. Actually, it is not these basic principles that are explained primarily in Soviet theory of dialectic, but the three laws of the dialectic, which Engels had explicitly taken from Hegel. Above all, the third of these laws, that of the negation of negation, has been newly introduced into Soviet philosophy after 1955 and has been much elaborated since.

Hegel considered reality as the dialectical self-creation of one basic reality. This self-creation was an actualization of many real potencies, that were originally and always inherent (as potencies) to that one basic reality. Nothing could become which was not always a potency of the one basic reality, in Hegel's terminology an *ansich* of the *Idee*. This was especially true with spirit and knowledge or thought. The possibility of spirit and thought was always inherent to the *Idee* and could therefore once become a reality in the development of the *Idee*. In this consisted Hegel's idea of the original unity or identity of being and thought.

There is a similar theory in Soviet philosophy which dates back to Lenin, but which has been strongly underlined only recently: the theory of *reflection as a property of all matter*. It is said to be astonishing that consciousness, although different from matter, has the possibility of reflecting matter objectively, has the faculty of knowledge. There must be a basic property of all matter which – although only a potency at the beginning – can then be actualized as consciousness or knowledge. This theory is very developed in the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*[22] and has been the object of special studies by V. G. Anan'ev[23], A. G. Spirkin[24], V. S. Tjuxtin[25], and many others.[26]

The Soviet theory of reflection as a property of all matter, which seeks

to explain the possibility of knowledge, corresponds exactly to Hegel's theory of the original unity of being and thought, as an explanation of the possibility of the development of the *Idee* toward (absolute) spirit without any actualization and finalization from outside.

Even if Soviet philosophy considers the procreation of consciousness by matter as the actualization of a basic potency – as is very well explained in an article by I. P. Čueva[27] – one must not forget that this remains all the same a dialectical development, i.e. a development through dialectical negation. Whatever is an original potency of matter is also a potential contradiction or negation of matter, and once it appears in reality, it becomes – in a leap – an actual contradiction or negation of matter. This is especially true with consciousness: although an original potency of matter, it is always a potential negation of matter, and becomes an actual negation of matter once it really appears in the development of matter. It is interesting that this Hegelian idea is not only implicit in Soviet philosophy but has even been explicitly traced back to Hegel and accepted.[28]

It becomes sufficiently clear at this point, that there is a great similarity between matter in recent Soviet Diamat and Hegel's *Idee*. This, of course, makes Diamat's pretention of a 'reversal' of Hegel even more meaningless. But it helps on the other hand to explain the relation between thought and being, or – as it is usually put – between consciousness and matter in a Hegelian scheme of thought, thus avoiding both vulgar materialism and dualism.

Accepting the Hegelian type of dialectical monism, Soviet philosophers can now face the problem and state the dilemma openly: everything is material – consciousness is not material. Because they now have the answer ready.

M. N. Rutkevič formulates the dilemma thus: "If there is nothing on earth but moving matter, is it then right to affirm that consciousness is *not* matter and that the world thus includes matter *as well as* consciousness? But as a matter of fact, there is no discrepancy at all between these two affirmations."[29] He goes on to explain that consciousness is the result of the dialectical self-development of matter and of its faculty: reflection. Prof. Wetter who judges Soviet philosophy in this regard as undecided between vitalism and mechanism, is said to not have understood the essence of the dialectical *skačok*.[30]

A. D. Makarov also states the dilemma openly and calls it a formulation of vulgar materialists, who apparently also exist in the Soviet Union, and who don't understand the dialectical solution to the problem. In reality, consciousness is a necessary dialectical product of the one, self-developing matter. And although consciousness depends upon matter in several ways (it has been produced by matter, only exists where there is matter, and reflects matter in knowledge), it is yet different from matter, has a certain independence. It even acts back on matter, through conscious and intentional practice.[31] In the terminology of Hegelian dialectic one could say, that consciousness is a dialectical negation of matter, while practice is the negation of the negation. Makarov expresses it thus: "...dependence of consciousness upon matter, its (consciousness) relative independence of development and its reverse acting upon matter, upon material being, the actively transforming role of human consciousness in the relation to the material world."[32]

Similar explanations are also given among others by I. D. Andreev[33] and in the new *Filosofskij slovar'*.[34]

The clarification that has been achieved in the question of the materiality or non-materiality of consciousness by Soviet philosophers; thus lies in the clear application of a Hegelian scheme of thought: consciousness is a dialectical product of matter, matter being the one basic reality which develops actualizing its own potencies and thus negating itself dialectically.

Now there remains the second confusion, that this question of the general relation between matter and consciousness, between nature and spirit is necessarily related to the epistemological question, a confusion that has been often criticized by Western Sovietologists. In Soviet terminology: why is there a necessary correspondence between the first and the second side of the 'basic question of philosophy'?

This problem and the Western criticism of it (saying that it implies a confusion between materialism and realism) have been discussed in Soviet philosophy. Usually there is one basic argument: because matter existed before consciousness, and consciousness is a dialectical product of matter, matter exists independently of consciousness and consciousness must reflect this material world that surrounds it and out of which it has risen. If one considers this not as a proof of critique, say in the Kantian sense of the word, but as an argument that follows from already accepted meta-

physical principles, it can indeed show that dialectical materialism implies epistemological realism. It cannot, of course, exclude other metaphysical positions, e.g. spiritualism, to take the same view in epistemology, namely realism.[35]

But the problem of the relation between the two sides of the 'basic question of philosophy', ontology and epistemology, is nowadays more often posed in a different way. If the world is a dialectically evolving unity, then consciousness must follow the same laws as the rest of the world. On the other hand, consciousness, a dialectical product of the material world, is not identical with it. This is the question of the relation between the subjective and the objective dialectic, which joins the above-mentioned problem of *sovpadenie*.

The majority of Soviet philosophers think that material reality (nature, society) is subject to the same laws as the realm of consciousness or knowledge. But the distinction of form and content is applied: the content of knowledge is objective, the form of existence of these contents is subjective. Thus, the laws of the dialectic have the same content in material reality and in knowledge, but exist in a different form. This existence in a different form, however, seems to be understood completely psychologically, i.e. the known object exists in the knower in the form of the psychic. It does not mean that Soviet philosophy accepts the realm of *ens rationis*, of relations of reason, which would not reflect the material world. On the contrary, Soviet philosophy affirms – unanimously, it seems – that the forms of knowledge and reasoning, like universality, negation, rules of reasoning, etc. are also reflecting the objective material world. Explicit statements to this effect can be found, e.g., by G. M. Gak[36], P. V. Kopnin[37], T. I. Ojzerman[38] and M. N. Rutkevič.[39]

Some Soviet philosophers go so far in the identification of the laws of being and the laws of thought, that they identify epistemic truth and logical correctness (like V. I. Čerkesov[40]), or that they openly defend Hegel's identification of thought and being (like E. V. Il'enkov[41]). Although these extreme views are not shared and are even criticized by the majority of Soviet philosophers[42], the recent developments of dialectical monism and the considerations about its relation to the theory of knowledge show the necessity for Soviet philosophy to apply the general dialectic to the theory of knowledge, i.e. to elaborate a 'dialectic as logic and theory of knowledge'.

## III. THE DIALECTICAL INTERPRETATION OF KNOWLEDGE

The study of the metaphysical premisses, as given in the treatment of the 'basic question of philosophy', is necessary for the understanding of Soviet dialectical logic. As V. P. Rožin puts it: "...the basic question of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the question about the relation between thought and being, consciousness and matter, spirit and nature. This question is also basic in dialectical logic ..."[43]

We initially defined dialectical logic as the dialectical interpretation of knowledge. The *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* describes it in the following way: "Dialectical logic reveals the dialectic of knowledge, i.e. the laws of its development, also of the development of the forms of thinking. But this means that it is the all-embracing and deepest doctrine of the development of human knowledge as reflection of the development of the material world."[44] The new *Filosofskij slovar'* offers the following definition: "Dialectical logic is the logical doctrine of dialectical materialism, the science about the laws and forms of the reflection in thinking of the development and change of the objective world, of the knowledge of truth in its conformity to laws (*o zakonomernostjax poznanija istiny*)... In dialectical logic, the doctrine of being and the doctrine of its reflection in consciousness are inseparably related, it is a logic of content (*soderžatel'naja logika*)..."[45]

These two definitions or descriptions, to which many similar ones could be added, justify our original definition of dialectical logic. It appears however, that the dialectical interpretation of knowledge is a complex thing. It is on one hand a study of the *forms* of thinking, on the other hand of the *content* of human knowledge in its dialectical development toward truth. This distinction coincides with that between dialectic as (1) *logic* and (2) *theory of knowledge*, or – as V. P. Rožin puts it – between the theory of *thinking* and the theory of *knowledge*.[46]

Following this distinction, Soviet dialectical logic offers on the one hand an attempt to dialectically interpret the *forms of thinking*, like concept, judgment, reasoning, analysis, synthesis, etc. By thus sharing the object with traditional classical logic, dialectical logic tries to justify its name of 'logic'. But K. S. Bakradze still remains correct in saying that this has nothing to do with logic, namely with the laws and rules of reasoning. What has been done in the meantime proves him right. It is a curi-

ously confused type of methodology which has nothing to do with what was traditionally considered formal logic and even less with modern mathematical logic. The question about the relation between dialectical and formal logic therefore seems to become more and more void of content.

But on the other hand, dialectical logic is the application of dialectic to the *theory of knowledge*. Here belongs the analysis of the laws and categories of the dialectic as laws of and steps in the historical development of human knowledge. The theory of truth also belongs to the dialectic as theory of knowledge and is often even called the primary question of dialectical logic.

These two sides of dialectical logic, namely as logic and as theory of knowledge, form no different disciplines. Both the forms of thinking and the content of knowledge are reflections of reality. Lenin praised Hegel as genial, because logic and theory of knowledge coincide in his philosophy, and this is of course still repeated in today's Soviet philosophy.[47]

The complexity of Soviet dialectical logic is also due to the multiplicity of philosophers, with relatively different opinions about this new field in their system. Apart from the differences of opinion on the problem of *sovpadenie*, which were already mentioned, there are differences in the actual elaboration of this discipline. As a detailed comparative study is impossible in this context, a few examples of different ways to elaborate and expose the subject may suffice.

One extreme must be seen in G. G. Gabriel'jan's *Marksistskaja logika kak dialektika i teorija poznanija* (Erevan 1963). The author identifies ontology and epistemology to a point that the general description of reality and of the different steps of knowledge coincide. Furthermore, the author is quite extreme in his open positive appreciation of Hegel. He agrees with Hegel's division of logic into logic of being, of essence and of concept (p. 20). Accordingly, he divides his logic into: (1) The knowledge of *matter* as such; (2) the knowledge of the *attributes* of matter; (3) the *forms* and *laws* of the knowledge of matter (p. 22). Besides agreeing so heartily with Hegel's logic, he also copies Hegel's *Phänomenologie* to a refreshing extent, namely in the first three chapters of the first book, which partly correspond to Hegel's first chapter about consciousness. One need only read the first few pages of the first chapter (pp. 67ff., after the introduction) and one is already deeply involved with 'sensual certainty' (*čuvstvennaja dostovernost'* = *sinnliche Gewißheit*), a Hegelian term completely alien to

Soviet philosophical terminology. In his explanation of *čuvstvennaja dostovernost'* Gabriel'jan even repeats Hegel's dialectic of the 'now' and 'here' (*teper' i zdes'* = *Jetzt und Hier*) in analyzing the object of sensual certainty (p. 71f.). Gabriel'jan's book is only seldom quoted by other dialectical logicians and has not even been reviewed in the *Voprosy filosofii*.

Another example is V. I. Čerkesov: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija* (M. 1962). Although quite akin to Gabriel'jan's views in the problem of *sovpadenie*, his elaboration of dialectical logic is very different. His book is divided into six chapters: (1) A history of views about dialectical logic and the problem of *sovpadenie* in Soviet philosophy; (2) "Truth and formal correctness of thinking", where he tries to prove a necessary correspondence between truth and formal correctness; (3) A history of the problem of dialectical logic before Marx; (4) Dialectical logic as theory of knowledge, where the 'basic question of philosophy' is also treated; (5) "Materialist dialectic and logic", about dialectic as logic and the relation of it to traditional and modern logic; (6) "The forms of dialectical thinking", a dialectical interpretation of concept, judgment and reasoning. Čerkesov's book was severely criticized by P. V. Kopnin, I. S. Narskij and V. A. Smirnov[48], above all because of its confusion between truth and correctness, his history of Soviet dialectical logic and unfair treatment and denunciations of contemporary Soviet philosophers.

Quite different again – in general style as well as in content – is the book of P. V. Kopnin: *Dialektika kak logika* (Kiev 1961). After a first introductory chapter where the problem of *sovpadenie* is discussed, the second chapter of this book treats the relation between dialectical and formal logic. The third chapter deals with categories and more specifically with the possibility of constructing a system of categories. The fourth chapter is properly dialectic as theory of knowledge, i.e. discusses the nature of knowledge and thinking, the question of truth, etc. The two remaining chapters treat the forms of thinking, concept, judgment, reasoning, but also analysis and synthesis, hypothesis and even about "science – the synthesis of knowledge". The two last chapters are the least interesting because of the intention of doing logic, without actually succeeding. Kopnin's book is highly esteemed in the Soviet Union and was an important step in the dialectical interpretation of knowledge.

Then there are the books by M. M. Rozental' and M. N. Alekseev.

M. M. Rozental' wrote two books: *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki* (M. 1960) and *Lenin i dialektika* (M. 1963). M. N. Alekseev produced three: *Dialektika form myšlenija* (M. 1959), *Dialektičeskaja logika. Kratkij kurs* (M. 1960) and *Dialektičeskaja logika kak nauka* (M. 1961). It is quite unfair and inadequate to put Rozental' and Alekseev together, the first being a known confusionist, the second quite the contrary. T. J. Blakeley even thinks that Alekseev is one of the few hopes of Soviet dialectical logic.[49] We grouped them, because both – besides treating the general question of *sovpadenie* and the relation to formal logic – concentrate their effort on a dialectical explanation of the forms of knowledge, i.e. a dialectic as logic, rather than as theory of knowledge. In both cases, the dialectical interpretation of induction and deduction, of analysis and synthesis, etc. is terribly boring and even Alekseev's original distinction between 'dialectic of knowledge' (*dialektika myšlenija*) and 'dialectical knowledge' (*dialektičeskoe myšlenie*) cannot help this.

B. M. Kedrov's contributions to dialectical logic are by far the most interesting and important. Apart from several articles, Kedrov is the author of one book (*Edinstvo dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija,* M. 1963) and the actively contributing editor of four collective works: (1) *Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija* (M. 1962), (2) *Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija* (M. 1962), (3) *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Istoriko-filosofskie očerki* (M. 1964), (4) *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Problemy naučnogo metoda* (M. 1964).

Many philosophers of different opinions are contributing in these *sborniki*, ranging from P. V. Tavanec and A. A. Zinov'ev on one side, to E. V. Il'enkov and V. A. Lektorskij on the other. Most are, however, representatives of a rather sound medium position, like P. V. Kopnin, and of course Kedrov himself. The subjects treated are many. While the first two volumes are to a large extent concerned with the relation to formal logic, the two volumes of 1964 elaborate dialectical logic as theory of knowledge.

This short survey of books and topics must suffice for the moment, although it is of course very incomplete, as well in the number of publications as in the analysis of their content.[50] Instead of going into a further analysis of details and different opinions, we shall now try to understand what is common among Soviet dialectical logicians and what are the basic views implied in a dialectical interpretation of knowledge.

Both for Hegel and Soviet philosophy, dialectic – as we have already seen – is a relationistic and evolutionistic view of reality, which is further specified by the 'three laws of the dialectic'. To apply dialectic to the theory of knowledge would therefore mean to give a relationistic and evolutionistic interpretation of knowledge. And this – although it seems to openly contradict traditional Soviet theory of knowledge – is actually done in Soviet dialectical logic. The *subject* of knowledge is not primarily the individual knower, but mankind, social consciousness. The *process* of knowledge is not primarily the act of knowledge of the individual knower but the historical process of the knowledge of mankind. Soviet dialectical logic is thus based upon a conception of knowledge as the *knowledge of mankind in its historical development.* As this is an important change in Soviet theory of knowledge which has not yet been taken into account by Western students of Soviet philosophy, we shall document this question in some detail.

The *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* already states the entire problematic: "The process of knowledge bears a socio-historical character... The materialist theory of knowledge before Marx considered man *qua* isolated individual as the subject of knowledge... The dialectic examines the laws of development of knowledge (*poznanija*) by generalizing the entire history of knowledge (*znanija*)."[51] Then follows Lenin's plan of a theory of knowledge as generalization of history of philosophy, of the history of the sciences, of the process of intellectual development in the child, of the pre-history of human thinking (the development of the psychic in animals), of the history of language, etc.

Considering the subject of knowledge not as the isolated individual, but as somehow social, does one think of the individual knower as (necessarily) related to others and to his social environments, or does one primarily think of mankind, social consciousness as such? A few texts will answer this question.

The one who states his position most clearly and openly is *V. A. Lektorskij,* a dialectical logician who also writes in Kedrov's *sborniki.* The following excerpts are from an article in the *VF*[52]: "The genuine gnoseological subject is the social subject, the individual is only subject insofar as he was able to acquire the modes of consciousness (*sposobi soznanija*), like language, logical categories, collected knowledge, etc., which society created during the course of its history... As a matter of fact, the indi-

vidual subject need not 'transcend' the limits of his own consciousness, because he is already originally 'outside' of himself and only makes sense as a part and a form of existence of the social subject... From what was said it follows that society is the gnoseological subject in the strict sense of the term, which exists in the activity of the individuals. Society appears as subject of knowledge through the historically elaborated kinds of activities of knowledge and through the system of collected knowledge. The individual only appears as subject of knowledge insofar as he acquires the 'world of culture', elaborated through society, which (world of culture) is expressed and embodied in the objects of an 'artificial milieu', which surrounds man..."[53]

N. G. Alekseev and E. G. Judin, when describing contemporary Soviet works on the theory of knowledge, state as a "general principle" on which all studies are based: "I.e., above all the analysis of the ideal, of consciousness in its social peculiarity, is the conviction that consciousness cannot be examined as belonging to the psychological individual – it must be considered as belonging to the social individual and as 'acquired' by him under certain social conditions."[54]

Soviet treatments of the relation between individual and social consciousness are frequent. Apart from G. M. Gak, whose views we already related on a different occasion[55], a good example can be seen in an article by L. P. Bueva[56], where one reads: "From its origin and content, individual consciousness (i.e. the consciousness of the individual) is a social product... But it cannot be identified with social consciousness..." The reason is that social consciousness has a wider content and many more different forms of existence than individual consciousness. It is always more than the sum total of knowledge and views of the individuals of a society. The text continues: "The subject of social consciousness is mankind (*čelovečestvo*), at the basis of its development lie the objective laws of history."[57]

Some Soviet philosophers extend the attempt to understand the subject of knowledge as a social one even to psychology. Although S. L. Rubinštejn sees as a distinctive mark of psychology the study of the psychic processes of the individual[58], others – like A. X. Kasymžanov and O. K. Tixomirov – want to understand the psychic processes as results of the history of mankind, of the history of society. They both praise L. S. Vygotskij, a Soviet psychologist who died in 1934, for having elaborated

such a psychology for the first time and criticize Prof. J. Piaget in that line.[59]

Many similar views could be quoted concerning the relation between individual and social consciousness. There are also, of course, those who put the accent on the individual knower and consider social consciousness as one necessary side or aspect of his consciousness and not as the primary subject of knowledge. A. G. Spirkin is certainly an example.[60]

However difficult it is to understand the precise position of Soviet philosophers on this point, one has nevertheless the clear impression that they all – even Lektorskij – want to avoid the same two extremes: on one hand the conception of the epistemological subject as the isolated individual knower, on the other hand the conception of the epistemological subject as a separate transcending super-mind. To understand the medium position which is implied in the Soviet answer to this problem as well as to the problem of the social in general, one must remember the Hegelian doctrine of the *concrete universal.*

For Hegel, the concrete universal is a determination or quality (in reality as well as in knowledge) which forms the unity and internal connection in a multitude of particular and individual determinations. It has both the unity of an abstract genus and the concreteness of a collectivity. In developing this concept, Hegel was apparently thinking of the phenomenon of an *organism*: the internal unity of a living multitude of different parts or members. The whole of the organism determines what is *common* among the members and what *differentiates* them by assigning different functions to each. Hegel distinguishes this universality from the *abstract university* of a common property, based upon simple similitude among things or phenomena.

Both Lenin and contemporary Soviet philosophy have shown considerable enthusiasm for this concept. A good example of this lies in the article 'Universal' in the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija.*[61]

This helps to explain the Soviet concepts of society in general and of social consciousness in particular. This latter must be understood as a concrete universal, an organism, which can only live in its members, the individual knowing subjects, but which nevertheless determines their function for the whole, actually determines the content of their knowledge (their 'idea-content', as the *Osnovy* put it[62]).

This idea of the subject of knowledge as a concrete universal becomes

even clearer, if one considers dialectical logic's attempt to interpret the process of knowledge as the *history of the knowledge of mankind in its dialectical development*. It is evident from the beginning that in such a view the individual knower can only be instrumental and that it needs something like a concrete universal to guarantee the continuity of the process.

Soviet dialectical logic is full of texts where this idea of a historical explanation of knowledge is exposed. Often one finds references to Engels and above all to Lenin who elaborated this historical interpretation of knowledge on many occasions in his *Filosofskie tetradi*. But then Soviet philosophers go on to further develop their ideas. A. G. Spirkin explains it thus: "The consciousness of contemporary man is a product of history. All the peculiarities it possesses are not at all eternal. They originated historically and changed in the process of historical development... Individual consciousness thus appears to be the accumulated experience of history... One says that the secret of knowing things lies in the discovery of the secret of their origin. Historicism is the genuine heart of the method and the entire system of dialectical materialism."[63]

P. V. Kopnin: "...it is necessary... to consider knowledge itself as a socio-historical process..."[64] And M. M. Rozental', in a conclusion to his 'Principles of Dialectical Logic': "Human thought, knowledge is historical, therefore also the science about thinking is a science about its historical development, about the gradual genesis and formation of the laws of knowledge."[65]

Rozental''s conclusion that theory of knowledge therefore is a historical science is shared practically by all dialectical logicians. P. V. Kopnin: "Materialist dialectic is a theory of knowledge, but not in the limited sense like the old epistemology... but in the widest sense... as the final result of the entire history of knowledge of the world and of the practical activity of man."[66] And G. S. Grigor'ev gives the following definition: "The theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism is the scientific generalization of the history of knowledge and of the practical activity of mankind."[67]

What becomes of the individual knower and his process of knowledge in this kind of a theory of knowledge? V. I. Šinkaruk gives the answer by pointing out that Hegel found a new solution "...by considering the individual process of knowledge as a reproduction (*vosproizvedenie*) of

the basic steps of the historical process of knowledge..." [68] Engels himself was enthusiastic about Hegel's parallelism between individual and historical consciousness and compared it with the parallelism between embryology and paleontology; it is only natural that Soviet philosophy shares Engels' enthusiasm.

By stating that theory of knowledge should be the science about the laws of development of the history of human knowledge which studies and generalizes the history of the knowledge of mankind, one has still not explained how such a science is possible, because many difficulties remain. One such difficulty is what should be the (material) object of this study, because obviously it can no more be the individual knower whose process of knowledge can be studied through insight. But Soviet philosophy has an answer ready: it is the *objectivized human knowledge* which is the object of this research. Through language, which necessarily belongs to knowledge or thinking, the individual act of knowledge has always been objectivized. Through written language this objectivized knowledge attains a certain degree of independence. The more human knowledge develops, the more this body or system of objectivized knowledge becomes independent, becomes at the same time more differentiated and more centralized. In relation to the individual knower it becomes an 'ideal object', something that must be acquired through learning or education, because only thus can the individual reach the level of science of his time, and only then begins his personal encounter with the object and his possible contribution to the (objectivized) knowledge of mankind. It is also this objectivized human knowledge which is the necessary material for a historical examination of knowledge. This theory was first and furthest developed by S. L. Rubinštejn [69], but is also elaborated today by others, like A. G. Spirkin [70] and V. A. Lektorskij.[71] How much this changes the traditional Soviet conception of knowledge appears from one of Lektorskij's texts: "Realizing its subjective limitation, the individual subject connects the knowledge which has been elaborated in a social system with objective reality, it even basically identifies them and considers its own subordination under the objective system of knowledge as according to the object (*kak sledovanie ob"ektu*)." [72]

Another difficulty in this new type of a theory of knowledge is that it presupposes the history of knowledge as evolving in conformity to laws. Otherwise, no laws could be discovered and no generalization could be

made. For this difficulty, Soviet philosophy has again an old Hegelian answer: *the unity of the logical and the historical.*

To understand this theory, the first thing to realize is that it comes from Hegel and makes sense only within the Hegelian system. Soviet philosophers are conscious of this fact and praise Hegel as genial for the invention of this principle, although they usually blame him for exaggerating the side of the 'logical'.[73] They accept Hegel's statement in the introduction to the 'History of Philosophy' that the main steps in the history of human knowledge, especially in the history of philosophy, correspond to the logical development of the *Idee.*

At this point an incredible confusion starts. It begins with a misunderstanding of Hegel: the 'logical' is said to be the subjective, the realm of knowledge, the 'historical' is the objective, reality in its development.[74] This is a misunderstanding – which dates back to the 'Classics' – because the 'logical' for Hegel is precisely the objectively given ontological order, while the 'historical' is specifically the development of spirit and knowledge. Now Soviet philosophy wants to 'reverse' Hegel, but because they misunderstood him from the beginning, they again 'reverse' nothing and fall back on their Hegelian feet – only with a 'reversed' terminology: the 'logical' (subjective) corresponds to the 'historical' (objective). The same thing in Hegelian terminology: the 'historical' (subjective) corresponds to the 'logical' (objective). They have, however, a vaguely common terminology: the 'subjective dialectic' corresponds to the 'objective dialectic'.

The 'logical' is subjective dialectic – a given system of concepts or categories – insofar as it reflects (in a generalized or summarized way) the objective reality in its *development.* But this has two different meanings in Soviet dialectical logic: (1) the given system of categories reflects *reality* in its dialectical development; (2) it reflects *its own history*, i.e. how this system of ideas was developed in the history of human knowledge. Now these two types of reflections, the reflection of reality and the reflection of the history of knowledge are not at all the same, because the two objects are not the same. They even move inversely: only at the *end* does knowledge reach what appears to be the *origin* and basis of reality and its dialectical development.[75]

Dialectical logic examines above all the second type of reflection, i.e. the reflection of the *history of a system of knowledge in the system itself.* It explains the origin of categories and the laws which governed their

development and elaboration. It is therefore the task of dialectical logic to study the history of human knowledge, to show that it developed in conformity to the laws and categories of the dialectic, and to draw conclusions as to the nature of knowledge in general and of a given system of ideas in particular.

Dialectical logicians, being philosophers, went above all into the *history of philosophy*, trying to explain that today's philosophical system of Marxism-Leninism is a necessary result of, and reflects in a summarized form, the history of philosophy, i.e. the main steps of this history. The theses and categories of Diamat and Histomat are shown to be results of the dialectical development of human thought, a development through internal contradictions, the appearance of qualitatively new ideas, the negation of opinions and negations of negations.

This concentration on the history of philosophy has lately made an enormous progress in the Soviet Union. While it was typical of the years before 1955 that historical studies were done independently of systematic work [76], it has since become more and more of a rule that all systematic treatments must have a historical introduction. In this introduction, the progressive trends in history must be shown, which lead to the mature, diamatical solution of the given problem. Today one can read practically any article in the *Voprosy filosofii* and *Filosofskie nauki* for an example of this procedure. The best examples to our knowledge must be seen in most of the systematic articles in the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija*, the first three volumes of which have appeared since 1960. Moreover, the number of exclusively historical works is continuously increasing, an astonishing amount of which are devoted to Hegel.

The following publications are examples of attempts to analyse the history of knowledge as a dialectical process and the dialectical categories as steps in the history of knowledge: B. M. Kedrov: 'About the dialectico-logical generalization of the history of natural sciences' [77]; B. M. Kedrov: 'The history of knowledge as a process and its dialectic' [78]; B. M. Kedrov: 'Attempt at a methodological analysis of scientific discoveries' [79]; A. P. Šeptulin: 'The categories of the dialectic as steps of knowledge' [80]; A. P. Šeptulin: 'The correlation of the categories of the dialectic as inference (*vyvod*) from the history of philosophy' [81]; A. P. Šeptulin: 'The categories as steps of the development of knowledge' [82]; V. I. Stoljarov: 'Approach to a dialectical elaboration of the history of scientific knowledge'.[83]

These publications have only appeared recently and are mostly considered by their authors as first attempts rather than as definite answers. One will have to wait some time to judge their utility and success even within Soviet diamat. Anyhow, they all follow the principle that was formulated by P. V. Kopnin in the following way: "... the sequence of categories must reflect in an abbreviated and generalized way the whole history of their formation and development."[84] He makes it very clear, however, that this correspondence between the sequence of the categories and their formation in the history of knowledge does not correspond to the sequence and formation of the corresponding realities. As an example he mentions that the question about the categories of quantity and quality can well be posed as to their logical sequence and their corresponding formation in the history of knowledge, but not in regard to the actual priority of quantitative or qualitative determinations in reality. But he insists that – although the order of categories does not reflect the order of the corresponding determinations in reality – there is no idealism implied in his view, because each category objectively reflects reality.[85]

B. M. Kedrov has made a great effort to show the epistemological function of the laws of the dialectic, i.e. their application to the history of knowledge. Being himself a natural scientist, he usually takes examples from physics, chemistry or biology. He presents a theory, e.g. a neo-Darwinist theory of evolution, or the theory of spectral analysis, and explains the history of the research that led to this theory. This explanation is dialectical: opposite ideas, the sudden genesis of a new hypothesis, a synthesis of the opposite ideas on a higher level, etc. He also insists that a given theory is not only dialectical because it reflects dialectical reality, but because the history of its formation is a dialectical process. This dialectical process of knowledge is even in some regards quite opposite to the order in which reality develops.[86]

This has been a short survey of the dialectical interpretation of knowledge which is offered by contemporary Soviet dialectical logic. Many things were omitted, e.g. all about the dialectical interpretation of the forms and functions of knowledge, like the dialectical interpretation of judgement, reasoning, analysis-synthesis, etc., and like the question of the *gibkost'* of the concept or the relation between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, which is explained as a *skačok*. All this was omitted, because to analyse and quote these pseudo-logical elaborations takes

more patience than this author has. On the other hand, the dialectical interpretation of the history of the knowledge of mankind has been examined to some extent.

## IV. THE THEORY OF TRUTH[87]

"The main question of dialectical logic is the question about truth", as the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* says.[88] Dialectical logic examines knowledge and even the forms of thinking under the aspect of their objective content.

Soviet philosophy usually defines truth as the correspondence between knowledge (idea, concept, etc.) and an objective reality, as the reflection of an independent object in a knowing subject. Truth is said to be objective if the content of an act of knowledge is – as Lenin expressed it – independent of 'man or mankind'.

This sounds very Aristotelian, especially if one thinks of the theory of reflection and abstraction that goes with it in Soviet theory of knowledge. But Soviet philosophers affirm that not only judgments or propositions but all forms of knowledge are capable of truth. Practically all say that not only concepts but also sense knowledge can be true, and some even affirm, that reasonings as such can be true (e.g. V. I. Čerkesov).

To make all forms of knowledge possible bearers of truth is not Aristotelian any more. But it certainly is not dialectical either. On the whole, this realistic theory of truth as a reflection of an independent object in an individual knower seems to contradict somewhat the above-mentioned dialectical interpretation of knowledge.

But in Soviet theory of knowledge, truth is also said to be *relative* and *absolute*, a *process* and *concrete*. With this Hegelian terminology a Hegelian theory reappears which Soviet philosophy inherited through the 'classics' (Engels and Lenin): the dialectical interpretation of knowledge. From this terminology it already appears that truth is here not considered as a perfection of knowledge, but is simply identified with knowledge.

Following Lenin, the theory of *relative* and *absolute* truth answers the question whether we can know everything at once, or whether our knowledge must proceed slowly from ignorance to ever greater knowledge. 'Relative truth' means two things: (1) preliminary, and (2) partial knowledge. 'Absolute truth' means also two things: (1) definite, and (2) all-comprehensive knowledge. Human knowledge moves from relative truth

toward absolute truth. Some truths are definite although not all-comprehensive, i.e. absolute in one sense and relative in the other. Absolute truth as all-comprehensive knowledge is only a basic possibility and an ideal limit of human knowledge.[89]

The development of human knowledge from relative truth toward absolute truth is the meaning of 'truth as a *process*'. In this as well as in the question of relative and absolute truth it is clear that one thinks of the knowledge of mankind in its historical development. Although this has been said many times, it is particularly well explained in a recent article by G. S. Batiščev: 'Truth as process'.[90]

Dialectic as evolutionism is expressed in the theories of relative and absolute truth, and of truth as a process. Dialectic as relationism is expressed in the idea of the *concreteness* of truth. It means that no single act of knowledge, no isolated concept or proposition can be called true. Only a totality of mutually related concepts or propositions can be true and ultimately only a scientific system.[91]

If truth is thus the system of scientific knowledge in its historical development and mankind the subject of true knowledge, the theory of truth joins the dialectical interpretation of knowledge as it was explained above. This must of course also somewhat modify the original concept of truth and of reflection. If the individual knower, the individual act of knowledge, a given theory have only a conditioning and functional role in the history of knowledge, their relation to the object will also be modified. They now reflect their own history and their particular context, rather than the objective world. But the entire history of knowledge, truth as a process, discovers the objective world more and more, to a point where – as G. S. Batiščev says – it not only corresponds to objective reality but coincides with it (*sovpadat'*).[92]

This idea of an actual coinciding of consciousness with objective reality is also sometimes expressed in the concept of practice. Practice, being central for the theory of truth, is also an important question within dialectical logic.

From the many definitions that can be found in Soviet philosophy, it appears that practice is the *specifically human activity of transforming the world.* It is a *conscious* and *purposeful* activity, which implies the knowledge of reality (to be transformed) and the setting of a goal (to be attained).[93] By transforming nature, man transforms himself i.e. the trans-

forming subject is itself transformed in the process of practice.[94] But as in the dialectical interpretation of knowledge in general, the dialectical interpretation of practice takes the subject of practice as a concrete universal and the process of practice as a historical process. Thus, most Soviet definitions of practice mention that it is a *socio-historical process*, i.e. a transformation of nature by mankind or society through which society itself is transformed.[95] There are many different *modes* of practical activity, the basic one being the production of material things, but also all kinds of political, economical and other activities.[96]

As to its relation to knowledge, practice is described as the *foundation*, *truth-criterion* and *purpose* of all knowledge. All Soviet philosophers seem to agree that practice is the *foundation* of knowledge. This is understood first of all in a general historical sense. It was not matter or nature as such which led to the dialectical genesis and further development of consciousness or knowledge, but the working upon and transforming of nature.[97] Similarly, practice is also the foundation of all knowledge by an individual. Practice is also accepted by all Soviet philosophers as the only real *criterion* of *truth*. In this context, the scientific experiment as a form of practical activity is discussed.[98] Practice as the only criterion of truth also raises the question of pragmatism.[99] Practice as *purpose* or *goal* of all knowledge is not mentioned by all Soviet philosophers who treat this question, and by many of them only incidentally. This attitude is derived from Hegel and Lenin, rather than from Marx. Marx wanted knowledge to serve only for practical achievements, to become a (necessary) means instead of a purpose in itself. He replaced philosophy by a *Kritik*, i.e. a theory which only served to demolish old and establish new, concrete situations. Lenin, on the contrary, went directly back to Hegel's doctrine of practice, where theory and practice are both types of knowledge. In this view, which is shared by many Soviet philosophers, practice is 'taken into the theory of knowledge' and serves to verify the theories, instead of the theories going over into practical achievements.[100] But there are also representatives of the Marxian idea among Soviet philosophers.[101]

Both groups, the Marxians and the Hegel-Leninists, tend towards a dialectical interpretation of practice. This was elaborated above all to solve the problem of how to distinguish theory and practice. M. N. Rutkevič who is the most prominent among those who developed the Soviet doctrine of practice was condemned in 1955 for overly separating theory

and practice and for excluding practice from the realm of knowledge by limiting it to direct acting upon material objects.[102] The opposite extreme view was brought forward in a discussion of East-German philosophers by G. Klaus and D. Wittich: practice is every material or ideal activity insofar as it is immediate foundation, immediate goal and immediate truth-criterion of knowledge. This definition also includes theoretical or spiritual activities within practice, depending upon their position in the process of knowledge.[103]

The East-German discussion is interesting in this context, because Soviet philosophers participated in it and it gave M. N. Rutkevič the occasion to explain the dialectical solution to the problem. Rutkevič and others see a direct correspondence between the relation *practice-theory* and the general relation between *matter* and *consciousness*. As on one hand we say that all being is matter, and on the other that consciousness is not matter, thus we say on one hand that all human activity is practice and on the other that spiritual activity is not practice. For this one must distinguish between general statements and statements within the specific field of epistemology. Without dialectic, Rutkevič continues, one could really get lost and could arrive at a simple identification of practice and theory.[104] Ju. G. Gajdukov, whose book 'The Role of Practice in the Process of Knowledge' (M. 1964) is the most recent monographic contribution to the doctrine of practice, offers a similar dialectical explanation.[105]

The dialectical solution to the 'basic question of philosophy' consists – as was shown above – in explaining that consciousness or knowledge is a dialectical product of matter and that – although a dialectical negation of matter – knowledge as a socio-historical dialectical process strives toward a more and more comprehensive and concrete understanding of matter. But it is not matter as such out of which knowledge develops and where knowledge is applied, but practice, the working upon material objects. Practice thus appears as the link that explains why knowledge has appeared in the history of the world and why it appears again and again in every individual act of knowledge. But practice also appears as the link that explains the ever greater unity between consciousness and matter, between knower and known: through practice, knowledge can be applied to reality by creating an artificial milieu and a more and more humanized world, in which the contradiction between consciousness and matter is

solved. Practice appears thus as that which founds and actually realizes the dialectical unity between matter and consciousness, between being and thought. Apart from H. Kreschnak[106] and W. Lerch[107] (in the East-German discussion), this idea was most explicitly developed by G. S. Grigor'ev in his article 'The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism About the Unity of Thought and Being'.[108]

Soviet philosophy considers the doctrine of practice as essential to the dialectical explanation of the 'basic question of philosophy' and of the problem of knowledge. It is therefore implied that this doctrine is also essential for Soviet dialectical logic.[109]

## V. CONCLUSION

Soviet dialectical logic was originally defined as an application of the general dialectic to epistemology.

We followed the history of the establishment of dialectical logic as a philosophical discipline from Hegel and the 'Classics' up to contemporary Soviet philosophy.

Soviet philosophy's clear option for a Hegelian type of dialectical monism was shown. As a general metaphysical premiss, this dialectical monism is the precondition for (and leads to) a dialectical interpretation of knowledge.

The dialectical interpretation of knowledge, as given by P. V. Kopnin, B. M. Kedrov, V. A. Lektorskij and many others, was then exposed in some detail. The most important result can be seen in the fact that Soviet dialectical logicians conceive the subject of knowledge as a concrete universal and the process of knowledge as the historical development of the knowledge of mankind. Dialectic as theory of knowledge thus becomes an analysis of the dialectical development of human knowledge. By this it seeks to explain the nature of knowledge in general and the knowledge of our time in particular. The Soviet concept of truth and especially the doctrine of practice complete the dialectical interpretation of knowledge.

A critical appreciation of the main problems that are touched by Soviet dialectical logic would require a long treatise. A few indications must be enough in this context.

This author is no dialectical monist and does not sympathize with dia-

lectical logic. Nevertheless, he believes that some of the basic ideas of Soviet dialectical logic are very interesting. E.g., it seems valuable to somehow include the *social* and the *historical* in the *theory of knowledge*, i.e., not to consider only the individual subject in his relation to the object, but also the subject in his social determinations and as a step in the history of human knowledge.

The epistemological importance of this consideration can be easily seen: (1) The individual knower always finds himself in a *context*, i.e., in a set of accepted opinions, within a system of already acquired knowledge, also within certain kinds of interests and practical necessities which force knowledge in a certain direction. All this somehow screens the object in its relation to the knowing subject. (2) The individual knower also finds himself always within a *tradition*, as conditioned – *qua* knower – by a previous history of knowledge. This fact also directs the relation between knower and known in a certain direction.

It seems even justified to talk about the knowledge of a civilization and maybe even of the knowledge of mankind in its historical development. The epistemological importance of this depends upon whether this knowledge is objectivized (in books, catalogues, computers, etc.) and whether this objectivized knowledge exists in a differentiated, centralized and useful way. Differentiated, because it must include detailed information; centralized, because it must be in some unity and order; useful, because it must be attainable by the individual knower. If all this is the case – and nowadays much of this is realized – the relation between knower and known will be deeply modified. The knowledge of an individual will be more the result of the experience of generations of knowers than the result of personal experience, will directly reflect more of the actual 'system of scientific knowledge' than of the objective world. The individual will identify the knowledge of his time with objective reality, as V. A. Lektorskij puts it. The personal encounter with objectively existing reality – as far as it is epistemologically important – will be reduced to those who actively contribute to the process of knowledge toward absolute truth. Even practice offers this encounter and realistic experience to an ever lesser degree, because man moves and works in a more and more artificial and humanized world.

Much of all this is justified or at least interesting and merits further analysis. But there are other ideas exposed in Soviet dialectical logic

which are either wrong or banal. By this we mean almost all of the properly *dialectical* character of knowledge.

Even if it is valuable to include the social context in the epistemological consideration of the knowing subject, it seems wrong to make this a determining factor and to understand the subject of knowledge as a concrete universal. This is actually just as wrong as any relationistic ontology.

Even if it is valuable to include the history of human knowledge in the consideration of knowledge as such, these historical and conditioning explanations must be subordinated to, and cannot replace, an understanding of the essence of knowledge. Furthermore, dialectically optimistic evolutionism in epistemology seems unjustified. To explain the history of human knowledge as a progress toward absolute truth, means to overlook many things and to absolutize the development of natural sciences. Even if the ever greater centralization of human knowledge and the new mathematization of certain fields of knowledge seems to justify this optimistic view, we would like to oppose dialectical logic by saying that no progress can be seen in the knowledge about many things that are of basic concern to man, e.g., in philosophy.

To say that the development of human knowledge follows the three laws of the dialectic and the logical sequence of the categories seems either banal or absurd. It is obvious that frequently in the history of knowledge when two ideas have opposed each other, suddenly a new idea has been developed which has perhaps somehow integrated the two opposing ideas. To call this an example for the three laws of the dialectic is to say too little or too much. As to the logical sequence of the categories and their correspondence in the history of knowledge, this has been a rather gratuitous affirmation up to now.

It remains true, however, that Soviet dialectical logic offers many interesting ideas. They certainly merit further analysis after this first preliminary survey.

## REFERENCES

1. J. M. Bocheński: 'Soviet Logic'. *SST* I (1961) 29–38.
2. H. Dahm: 'Renaissance der formalen Logik'. *Ostprobleme* 1957, 8, 254–267.
3. A. Philipov: *Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union*. New York. 1952.
4. G. A. Wetter: 'Die Logik'. In: *Der dialektische Materialismus*. Wien. 1958. pp. 593–623.
5. V. I. Lenin: *Filosofskie tetradi*. Pol. sobr. soč., izd. 5e, tom 29, M. 1963. p. 84.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

7. Cf. R. Ahlberg: *'Dialektische Philosophie' und Gesellschaft in der Sowjetunion*, Berlin, 1960, p. 35.
8. B. M. Kedrov: *Edinstvo dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija.* M. 1963. pp. 11–12.
9. *VF* 1955, 3, 158.
10. *VF* 1955, 6, 239–240.
11. T. J. Blakeley: 'Is Epistemology Possible in Diamat?'. *SST* II (1962) 99–101. – Id.: *Soviet Theory of Knowledge.* Dordrecht. 1964. pp. 19–24. – H. Fleischer: *Die Ontologie im dialektischen Materialismus.* Berlin. 1964 (Man.). XI–XIV.
12. Cf. *Bibliography*, pp. 237–239 of this issue.
13. B. M. Kedrov: *loc. cit.*, pp. 18–21. – Cf. also N. G. Alekseev – E. G. Judin: 'Problemy dialektičeskogo materializma v rabotax sovetskix filosofov' in: *VF* 1964, 12, 151–152. – Cf. M. M. Rozental': 'O razrabotke dialektiki kak logiki i teorii poznanija' in: *VF* 1964, 10, 16. – etc. etc.
14. V. N. Kolbanovskij: 'Pravil'no li utverždat' čto soznanie material'no?' *VF* 1954, 4, 236–238.
15. *Dialektičeskij materializm.* Pod. red. G. F. Aleksandrova. M. 1954. pp. 326–376: *Pervičnost' materii i vtoričnost' soznanija.*
16. H. Fleischer: *Die Ontologie im Dialektischen Materialismus.* Berlin. 1964 (Man.).
17. H. Fleischer: *ibid.* Chapter I – Id.: 'The Materiality of Matter'. *SST* II (1962) 12–20.
18. N. Lobkowicz: 'Materialism and Matter in Marxism-Leninism'. In *The Concept of Matter.* Notre Dame U.P. 1963. pp. 430–464.
19. H. Fleischer: *Die Ontol. im dial. Mat., loc. cit.*, pp. 19–22.
20. M. F. Vorob'ev: 'Kategorii materii i soznanija v marksistskoj dialektičeskoj logike'. In: *Filosofija* (Otv. red. V. P. Rožin). L. 1965. pp. 50–60.
21. Cf. R. Ahlberg: *loc. cit.*, pp. 120–127, where this affirmation is sufficiently documented.
22. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*, M. 1963. pp. 126 ff.
23. V. G. Anan'ev: *Teorija oščuščenij.* L. 1961. pp. 19 ff.
24. A. G. Spirkin: *Proisxoždenie soznanija.* M. 1960. – Id.: 'Materija i soznanie'. In: *VF* 1963, 10, 136–149, above all 141 ff.
25. V. S. Tjuxtin: 'O suščnosti otraženija'. In: *VF* 1962, 5, 59–71. – Id.: 'Kletočka' otraženija i otraženie kak svojstvo vsej materii'. In: *VF* 1964, 2, 25–34.
26. E.g. P. K. Anoxin: 'Operežajščee otraženie dejstvitel'nosti'. In: *VF* 1962, 7, 97–111. – V. G. Afanas'ev: *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* M. 1960. pp. 70 ff. – *Dialektičeskij materializm.* Pod red. A. D. Makarova i dr. M. 1960. pp. 104 ff. – V. I. Kremjanskij: 'Tipy otraženija kak svojstva materii'. In: *VF* 1963, 8, 131–142.
27. I. P. Čueva: 'Vozmožnost' i dejstvitel'nost' v stanovlenii soznanija'. In: *Problema vozmožnosti i dejstvitel'nosti.* Otv. red. B. A. Čagin. M.-L. 1964. pp. 96–116.
28. M. F. Vorob'ev: 'Zakon perexoda količestva v kačestvo v logike Gegelja'. In: *Vestnik LGU*, Serija Ek., Fil, Pr., 1959, 2, 52–60. *Cf. ibid.* 57–58.
29. M. N. Rutkevič: *Dialektičeskij materializm.* M. 1960. p. 145.
30. *Ibid.* pp. 147–149.
31. *Dial. mat.* Pod red. Makarova, *loc. cit.* pp. 89–91, 98–101.
32. *Ibid.* p. 92.
33. I. D. Andreev: *Dialektičeskij materializm.* M. 1960. p. 159, 163.
34. *Osnovnoj vopros filosofii.* In: *Filosofskij Slovar'*, M. 1963. p. 330.
35. Cf. T. I. Ojzerman: 'O materialističeskom rešenii vtoroj storony osnovnogo

voprosa filosofii'. In: *Vestnik MGU,* Serija Ek., Fil, Pr., 1959, 3, 147–155. – Id.: 'Osnovnoj filosofskij vopros i kritika sovremennogo idealizma'. In: *VF* 1960, 8, 137–148, especially 140–142.

36. G. M. Gak: *Učenie ob obščestvennom soznanii v svete teorii poznanija.* M. 1960. pp. 15, 18.
37. P. V. Kopnin: 'Marksistskaja filosofija kak metod naučnogo poznanija'. *VF* 1960, 5, 138.
38. T. I. Ojzerman: 'O materialističeskom rešenii vtoroj storony osnovnogo voprosa filosofii'. *Loc. cit.*, p. 154.
39. M. N. Rutkevič: *loc. cit.*, p. 190.
40. V. I. Čerkesov: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija.* M. 1962. Cf. *ibid.* pp. 80–135: Istinnost' i formal'naja pravil'nost' myšlenija.
41. E. V. Il'enkov: 'Vopros o toždestve myšlenija i bytja v domarksistskoj filosofii'. In: *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Istoriko-filosofskie očerki* (Red. Kedrov). M. 1964, specially pp. 21, 51–53.
42. Cf. the devastating criticism of Čerkesov's book by P. V. Kopnin, I. S. Narskij and V. A. Smirnov in *VF* 1964, 4, 165–170.
43. V. P. Rožin: 'O dialektičeskoj logike kak nauke'. In: *Voprosy dialektiki i logiki* (Otc. red. V. P. Rožin). L. 1964. p. 5.
44. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii,* M. 1963. p. 258.
45. *Filosofskij slovar',* M. 1963. p. 127.
46. V. P. Rožin: *loc. cit.*, p. 13.
47. Cf. e.g. B. M. Kedrov: *loc. cit.*, pp. 23–24.
48. Cf. ref. 42.
49. T. J. Blakeley: *loc. cit.* pp. 6, 145.
50. For a more complete list of publications, cf. *Bibliography* on pp. 237–239. For a more detailed analysis of the content, cf. T. J. Blakeley's *reviews* of some of the booksby Kopnin, Čerkesov, Alekseev, Rozental' and Kedrov, in *SST* III (1963) 73, 74, 76, 162, 167.
51. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii,* M. 1963. pp. 253–254.
52. V. A. Lektorskij: 'Problema sub"ekta – ob"ekta v teorii poznanija'. *VF* 1964, 5, 24–34.
53. *Ibid.* pp. 31, 33.
54. N. G. Alekseev – E. G. Judin: *loc. cit.*, p. 155.
55. G. M. Gak: *loc. cit.* – Cf. K. G. Ballestrem: 'The Soviet Concept of Truth'. In: *SST* 1964, 10 ff.
56. L. P. Bueva: 'Individual'noe soznanie i uslovija ego formirovanija'. *VF* 1963, 5, 67–79.
57. *Ibid.* p. 67.
58. S. L. Rubinštejn: *Bytie i soznanie.* M. 1957. pp. 47–48.
59. A. X. Kasymžanov: *Problema sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija.* Alma-Ata 1962, p. 127. – O. K. Tixomirov: 'Obščestvenno-istoričeskij podxod k razvitiju psixičeskoj dejatel'nosti čeloveka'. *VF* 1961, 12, 144–147.
60. A. G. Spirkin: *Proisxoždenie soznanija.* M. 1960. pp. 12–13.
61. 'Vseobščee'. In *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* I. M. 1960. pp. 301–303. Author: E. Il'enkov!
62. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* M. 1963. p. 561.
63. A. G. Spirkin: *loc. cit.* pp. 14, 15, 16.
64. P. V. Kopnin: *loc. cit.* p. 139.

65. M. M. Rozental': *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki.* M. 1960. p. 474.
66. P. V. Kopnin: *Dialektika kak logika.* Kiev. 1961. p. 40.
67. G. S. Grigor'ev: 'Teorija poznanija dialektičeskogo materializma o edinstve myšlenija i bytija'. In: *Voprosy teorii poznanija.* Perm'. 1961. p. 23. – Another example for such a definition is V. P. Rožin: *loc. cit.* pp. 4–5.
68. V. I. Šinkaruk: *Logika, dialektika i teorija poznanija Gegelja.* Kiev. 1964. p. 289.
69. S. L. Rubinštejn: *loc. cit.* pp. 41–54. – Cf. also K. G. Ballestrem: *loc. cit.*, pp. 12 ff.
70. A. G. Spirkin: *loc. cit.* p. 14. – Id.: 'Materija i soznanie'. *VF* 1963, 10, 144.
71. V. A. Lektorskij: *loc. cit.*
72. *Ibid.* p. 32.
73. Cf. S. F. Efimov: 'Sovpadenie dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija v filosofii Gegelja'. In: *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Istoriko-filosofskie očerki* (Red. Kedrov). M., 1964, p. 82. – Cf. also B. M. Kedrov: 'Istorija poznanija kak process i ego dialektika'. In: *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Problemy naučnogo metoda* (Red. Kedrov) M., 1964, pp. 21–22.
74. Cf. e.g. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* M. 1963, pp. 279–280.
75. Cf. e.g. E. Il'enkov: 'Logičeskoe i istoričeskoe'. In: *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* III, M., 1964, pp. 242–245.
76. It is significant that in the discussion of 1955 about Aleksandrov's *Dialektičeskij materializm,* it was one of the main criticisms that the book was completely a-historical, except for quoting the 'Classics'.
77. B. M. Kedrov: 'O dialektiko-logičeskom obobščenii istorii estestvoznanija'. *VF* 1960, 1, 61–74.
78. B. M. Kedrov: 'Opyt metodologičeskogo analiza naučnix otkritij'. *VF* 1960, 5, 63–78.
79. B. M. Kedrov: 'Istorija poznanija kak process i ego dialektika'. In: *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Problemy naučnogo metoda.* M. 1964. pp. 7–39.
80. A. P. Šeptulin: 'Kategorii dialektiki kak stupeni poznanija'. *VF* 1964, 6, 27–36.
81. A. P. Šeptulin: 'Vzaimosvjaz' kategorij dialektiki kak vyvod iz istorii filosofii'. *FN* 1965, 2, 12–21.
82. A. P. Šeptulin: 'Kategorii kak stupeni razvitija poznanija'. In: *Dial. – teorija poznanija. Ist.-fil. očerki.* M. 1964. pp. 280–294.
83. V. I. Stoljarov: 'Podxod k dialektičeskoj obrabotke istorii naučnogo poznanija'. In: *Dial. – teorija poznanija. Probl. nauč. metoda.* M. 1964. pp. 163–198.
84. P. V. Kopnin: *loc. cit.* p. 134.
85. *Ibid.* pp. 138–140.
86. Cf. ref. 79. – Cf. also for the application of the laws of the dialectic to the history of knowledge: B. M. Kedrov: 'Protivorečivost' processa poznanija i kritika idealizma'. In: *Dial. – teorija poznanija. Probl. nauč. met.* M. 1964. pp. 40–62.
87. We shall expose the theory of truth only briefly and document little. We have explained and documented this theory on another occasion in more detail. Cf. therefore: *SST* IV (1964) 1–19.
88. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* M. 1963. p. 257.
89. Recently an article appeared where the view of 'absolute truth' as *all-comprehensible* knowledge was attacked. The author proposed to only use the term as *definite* knowledge. F. G. Knyšov: 'K voprosu ob opredelenii ponjatij absoljutnoj i otnositel'noj istin'. In: *Vestnik LGU,* Serija Ek., Fil. 1964. 4, pp. 49–59.
90. G. S. Batiščev: 'Istina kak process'. In: *Dial. – teorija poznanija. Ist.-fil. očerki.* M. 1964. pp. 252–266.

91. Cf. G. S. Batiščev: *loc. cit.* p. 265. – P. V. Kopnin: *loc. cit.* p. 116, 391.
92. G. S. Batiščev: *loc. cit.* p. 261. – Cf. the way V. A. Lektorskij explains the modification of the theory of reflection: the individual identifies the 'system of objective knowledge' with objective reality – Ref. 72.
93. Cf. e.g. V. P. Rožin: *Marksistsko-leninskaja dialektika kak filosofskaja nauka.*, L., 1957, pp. 112–113. – V. A. Lektorskij: *loc. cit.* pp. 27–28. – Ju. G. Gajdukov: *Rol' praktiki v processe poznanija,* M. 1964. pp. 65–66.
94. V. A. Lektorskij: *loc. cit.* – Ju. G. Gajdukov: *loc. cit.* p. 68.
95. A. P. Kazakov, V. Ja. El'meev: 'Ob absoljutnosti i otnositel'nosti praktiki kak kriterija istiny'. In: *Dialektičeskij materializm.* L. 1958. p. 180. – Ju. G. Gajdukov: *loc. cit.* pp. 68–69.
96. Ju. G. Gajdukov: *loc. cit.* pp. 70 ff.
97. Cf. e.g. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii,* M. 1963. pp. 123, 289. – A. G. Spirkin: *Proisxoždenie soznanija,* M., 1960, pp. 17–26. – N. N. Trubnikov: 'Poznania kak forma predmetnoj dejatel'nosti'. In: *Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Istoriko-filosofskie očerki,* M. 1964. p. 266–267.
98. Cf. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii,* M. 1963. p. 293. – D. P. Gorskij: 'Istina i ee kriterij'. In: *VF* 1962, 2, 128 ff.
99. Cf. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii,* M. 1963. pp. 291–292.
100. Ju. G. Gajdukov: *loc. cit.* p. 30, wrongly attributes to Marx the "doctrine about the role of practice in knowledge". This is Lenin's theory, as is pointed out in N. N. Trubnikov: *loc. cit.* p. 266. – Here must be mentioned all those who don't consider knowledge as being entirely directed toward practice as toward its absolute purpose or goal (e.g. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii, FS,* Gajdukov: *loc. cit.*, etc. etc.).
101. Cf. A. G. Spirkin: *loc. cit.*, pp. 9–10. – G. S. Grigor'ev: *loc. cit.*
102. Cf. the editorial article in *VF* 1955, 1, 144–149.
103. G. Klaus, D. Wittich: 'Zu einigen Fragen des Verhältnisses von Praxis und Erkenntnis'. In: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (henceforward: *DZfPh*) 1961, 11, 1377–1396.
104. M. N. Rutkevič: 'Für eine dialektische Auffassung der Praxis'. In: *DZfPh* 1962, 11, 1430–1445; here 1437–1438.
105. Ju. G. Gajdukov: *loc. cit.* pp. 66–68.
106. H. Kreschnak: 'Zur Dialektik von Praxis und Erkenntnis'. In: *DZfPh* 1962, 8, 1047–1067.
107. W. Lerche: 'Erkenntnis und materialle Veränderung – zwei Seiten der Praxis'. In: *DZfPh* 1962, 9, 1167–1175.
108. G. S. Grigor'ev: *loc. cit.* – Cf. also V. A. Lektorskij: *loc. cit.*
109. Elaborate considerations of practice have not been frequent in the direct context of Soviet dialectical logic. Cf. however the article by N. N. Trubnikov: *loc. cit.*

R. J. KEMBALL

# NINETEENTH- AND EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIAN THOUGHT A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE II*

As this preliminary study proceeds, one cannot fail to be struck by a marked shift in the balance between Western and Soviet sources. Nor is the difference only a relative one; it is also one of absolute quantity. The first part of this article – embracing (I) reference works (bibliographies, etc.), (II) general studies covering the whole period, (III) general studies covering the first half of the 19th century, and (IV) works dealing with the Slavophils – listed rather more than one hundred titles, Western sources and Soviet sources figuring in the proportion of roughly eight to three respectively.[53] This second part – which continues roughly to the middle of the 19th century, and includes the proverbial "fathers" but not the "sons" – is based on over 250 references, in the reverse proportion of about 8 Soviet titles to every 5 Western ones. As far as can be judged at present, the third and final part – covering the history of Russian thought up to the October Revolution – will be, both relatively and absolutely, very similar to the second.

## V. EARLY THINKERS. ČAADAEV. THE 'LOVERS OF WISDOM'. THE DECEMBRISTS. STANKEVIČ AND HIS CIRCLE

A vast Soviet literature exists on certain Russian thinkers – of those covered by the period here under review, especially on Belinskij, also Herzen and Ogarëv (but Bakunin hardly at all); in the later period, more particularly on Černyševskij and Plexanov. A great deal of this literature – a majority of studies, even – is on similar, at times almost identical lines – a characteristic noted, *inter alia*, by Gleb Struve in his review of the Belinskij 1948 centenary literature.[54] This drab uniformity is to a large extent reflected in the titles, many of which recur with monotonous regularity, mostly on the (slightly interchangeable) pattern:

* For part I, cf. *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 30–50 and 114–128.



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 3 (September 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

$$\textit{The} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{socio-political} \\ \textit{sociological} \\ \textit{ethical} \\ \textit{aesthetic} \end{array} \right\} \textit{(and/or) philosophical views of X.Y.Z.}$$

Other favourites include: *A.B.C.'s materialism (and/or) atheism* and – particularly in the period covered in this part of the present study – *E.F.G.'s struggle against idealism.*

Regarded as original contributions to the interpretation of Russian thinkers and Russian thought, many of these studies, taken individually, are of slender worth; indeed, their main interest lies less in the history of Russian thought as such than in the "history of Soviet history of Russian thought". At the same time, they do often contain interesting data and/or useful references to the relevant editions of the *Works* of the thinkers concerned. It is in this latter sphere that Soviet literary scholarship has undoubtedly made its finest contribution, and for the excellent editions – selected and complete – of the writings of those authors and thinkers whom it regards as important (the list is, by Western standards, highly selective), the world has certainly been placed greatly in its debt. Apart from the numerous editions of *Works* proper, special mention should be made here of that magnificent series, *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* (Literary Heritage), many of the volumes of which contain valuable material concerning a number of Russian thinkers and writers. Of those covered by this part of the present study, this applies with particular force to Čaadaev, Belinskij, Herzen, and Ogarëv. It is to the first of these that we next turn.

### *a. Čaadaev*

With Vladimir Solov'ëv, Čaadaev is probably the Russian thinker of the 19th century who has been most variously interpreted, both by his contemporaries and, more particularly, by those that came after him. This is best explained by the universalism in the approach of both the one and the other to the problem of culture and religion; it is also worth noting that in both cases there was at one stage a close and favourable preoccupation – unusual among Russian 19th-century thinkers generally – with the Roman Catholic Church.

Too often regarded, in oversimplified and misleading fashion, as "the

first Westerniser", Čaadaev in his political thought was certainly far more Conservative than the leading figures usually classed under this rather vague head. Moreover – in sharp contrast to most "Westernising" thought – Čaadaev, in Lavrin's [4] words, "repudiated wholesale the secularised aspects of Western civilisation and proclaimed the religious element as the only true guiding force in history and in life".[55] In equally sharp contrast to Slavophil ideas, he sought his ideal of religious universalism, not in Russian Orthodoxy, but in the Catholic West. Moreover (and this, of course, had nothing to do with the religious problem as such), he differed fundamentally from the Slavophils with regard to the role of Peter the Great in Russian history.[56] The ultimate effect was that Čaadaev – who was nothing if not sincere, outspoken to the point of being provocative, and courageous – succeeded in antagonising the representatives of both groups. "Even those liberal-minded Westerners who were willing to agree with his [general] views were repelled by Chaadayev's partiality for religion, especially for Roman Catholicism. Those, however, who sided with the Slavophile trend could forgive neither his denigration of Russia nor [again] his sympathies with the Catholic Church at the expense of Orthodoxy. In fact, it did not take long before they themselves submitted both Catholicism and the West to the same merciless criticism which Chaadayev had piled upon Russia."[57]

Whatever particular label, if any, one may choose to append to Čaadaev's thought, his importance in the history of Russian ideas is clear. Virtually all authorities agree on this point: that it was he, with his typically provocative approach, who more than any other single man, focussed attention on the problem of "Russia and the West", which was to become one of the touchstones of Russian socio-political and even philosophical thought throughout the 19th century and, indeed, beyond, even to our own day.[58]

Čaadaev thus played, as it were, the part of a catalyst, forcing his contemporaries to take up their position on the underlying East-West problem and so, with time, widening – perhaps even indirectly precipitating – the rift between the two main schools of thought. It is presumably this role which explains the description of "first Russian philosopher of history" bestowed on him by Lavrin.[59]

The attribution of any particular "label" to Čaadaev may well strike many persons as something of an idle pastime. From the bibliographical

point of view, however, it is helpful to know something of the interpretative trends that have emerged with respect to a given thinker over the years. In Čaadaev's case, these trends were conveniently summarised only last year in an interesting article by R. T. McNally [2] entitled: 'The Significance of Chaadayev's *Weltanschauung*' (*q.v.* Bibliography).

Very briefly, the classifications of Čaadaev traced by McNally – all of which, incidentally, he regards as "legends" – are as follows:

1. The Herzen legend, which "placed Chaadayev definitely in the revolutionary camp of Russian intellectuals". This view was the one subsequently taken up by Plexanov, who supplied it with the necessary social-economic foundation, thanks to which it has remained, with variations, the Soviet view of Čaadaev as an "advocate of bourgeois freedom" up to the present day. In McNally's view, P. S. Škurinov (cf. Bibliography, [1], [2], and [3]) has attempted to renovate the Herzen-Plexanov thesis, presenting Čaadaev as a "progressive, aristocratic revolutionary".[60]

2. The opposing "legend", first created by Pypin and subsequently developed by P. Miljukov, which regards Čaadaev's thought as reactionary rather than progressive.

3. The idealistic legend (which partly overlaps with the Catholic presentation. R.K.), originally postulated by Geršenzon and much more recently (1954) taken up by Falk (*q.v.* Bibliography). This view, broadly speaking, regards Čaadaev as "a mystic inclined towards the Roman Church".

4. The legend of Čaadaev as a sort of "post-Christian ideologue", first posed by Florovskij and later (1956) followed up by Scheibert (*q.v.* Bibliography).

5. The view – "found in most general works on Russian history" – which considers Čaadaev as "a sort of 'Westerner' in opposition to the Slavophiles". McNally regards this, with some justice, as "by far the most useless classification" of all, in view of the "inherent contradiction" it contains.

As stated, McNally regards all the above classifications as legends, "because they are based either upon inadequate or faulty evidence or else upon the use of misplaced, vague labels". In the process of demolishing them, he himself advances a number of interesting – albeit controversial – points (Čaadaev's thought is, and is likely to remain, always a controversial issue). Thus, of Čaadaev's political Conservatism, McNally al-

leges that Čaadaev "objected very strongly to the Decembrist uprising; in his opinion this ill-fated revolt set Russia back half a century. He abhorred the July Revolution of 1830 in France; he was against the Hungarian uprising of 1848". Confining ourselves to the Decembrist revolt for the moment, it seems fair – given Čaadaev's demonstrably close association with the *Dekabristy* – to question whether it was the uprising *as such* to which he objected, and which "set Russia back half a century", or whether it was not to the very fact that it *was* ill-fated, i.e. that it failed.[61] However this may be, McNally is quick to insist that Čaadaev was certainly no blind reactionary: "Through an analysis of the latest archival materials in Russia, it is clear that the influence of the Christian liberal Lamennais was much stronger than that of the reactionaries de Maistre and de Bonald." "Like Lamennais", McNally continues, "Chaadayev felt that separation of church and state was necessary, in order for the church to be able to function as an independent moral force in society. He did not want to have a pope as arbitrator of European political affairs."

In view of Čaadaev's relative disinterest in strictly political questions (in this he displays, not for the first time, a certain parallelism with Xomjakov), McNally rightly deprecates the use of any such facile labels as "revolutionary" or "reactionary" in respect of his thought. At the risk, as he himself admits, of adding to the Čaadaev legends, McNally, "on the basis of the published and unpublished evidence available", finally advances his own definition, which is that "Chaadayev was simply a Christian social and cultural utopian critic in the tradition of Erasmus and Thomas More. As he himself wrote many times, his *idée fixe*... was the necessity of achieving what he called 'the kingdom of God' on earth. By this he meant the gradual establishment of a post-Kantian synthesis of philosophy and religion which would lead to the moral agreement of all men and their actual unification in a new world-wide Christian social system of 'church'."[62]

McNally's paper, besides being one of the most recent, is also, from the standpoint of the history of ideas, one of the most useful among Western contributions to the study of Čaadaev and his thought. In fact, Čaadaev is comparatively poorly represented in the English literature, which explains the inclusion in the present Bibliography of a number of basic studies in French and German. The former include, exceptionally, the

valuable pre-1945 studies by Quénet ([1] and [2]) and that by Mazour [1]. German-language studies include the work by Father Falk already mentioned (1954), that by A. von Schelting (cited earlier in Chapter IVa, in connection with the Slavophils, but *mainly* concerned with Čaadaev), and part of the general study by Scheibert, referred to in McNally's article [2] ("Florovskij-Scheibert legend").

One of the surest guides to Soviet interest in a given thinker or writer is the size, extent, and frequency of publication of Soviet editions of that writer's works. Judged by this yardstick, Čaadaev comes off little better than his Slavophil contemporaries.[63] The 'standard' (because virtually only) edition of his works is still that edited by Geršenzon and published in Moscow in 1913 (*Sočinenija i pis'ma v dvux tomax*). On the other hand, a vital and scholarly contribution to our understanding of Čaadaev came with the publication in 1935, in *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* Nos. 22–24, of the complete set of eight *Lettres philosophiques* in a Russian translation, together with a long and detailed article by D. Šaxovskoj (*q.v.* Bibliography Va).

A brief reference in a recent (1965) Soviet paper dealing with the general theme of "bourgeois falsification" indicates that a selected Soviet edition of Čaadaev's philosophical works is now in preparation. The author of the paper in question expresses the view that this edition, which will contain previously unpublished material, "will undoubtedly contribute towards unmasking the ... falsification of the Russian thinker's views" by adherents of the bourgeois-idealistic school, who portray Čaadaev as "a great mystic".[64]

It will indeed be interesting to see what new material this Soviet edition contains, and to what extent it may perhaps justify a revision of ideas currently held in the West concerning Čaadaev's thought, including the latest interpretation (will it also prove a "legend" in its turn?!) put out by McNally.

*b. The 'Lovers of Wisdom' and their Friends*

If Čaadaev is the most important of the early 19th-century Russian thinkers, no survey of Russian intellectual history would be complete without at least some mention of those lesser figures associated with such groups as the 'Lovers of Wisdom' (*Ljubomudry*), the so-called 'Young Men of the Archives', and the Decembrists. Indeed, the problem set by

a selective study such as the present one is rather that of where to draw the line. This is largely owing to the difficulty – mentioned briefly at the outset of this study[65] – of distinguishing between the spheres of literature pure and simple (in the generally accepted Western sense), literature in the broader sense (as has always been customary in Russia), literary criticism, socio-political thought, and finally philosophy proper.[66] This overlapping of fields explains the inclusion in the present Bibliography of a few sources relating to such primarily 'literary' figures as Küchelbecker (Kjuxel'beker), the gifted poet Venevitinov, Prince V. F. Odoevskij (brother of the Decembrist poet and creator of a new literary *genre*, the 'philosophical novel'), P. A. Vjazemskij (another poet of the Puškin *plëïade*), and even of one (pre-1945) title dealing with the political views of Puškin himself.

For Küchelbecker, there is a fairly extensive Soviet edition of his selected *Works*, published in 1959 (in addition to the 2-volume version edited by Ju. Tynjanov and published in 1939). No. 59 in the series *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* also contains hitherto unpublished articles by Küchelbecker – in one of which, incidentally, Gleb Struve [2E] discovered a minor but very significant suppression of six words in which Küchelbecker expressed the conviction that "the altar and the throne (were) sacred to the Russian people".[67]

Among Western critics, Lieb, in his general article on Slavophilism [2], accords a brief but significant mention to Küchelbecker, whom he regards as having at one time been "well on the way towards becoming the first real Slavophil".[68]

Of the writings of V. F. Odoevskij, Nos. 22–24 of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* contains his diary for the years 1859–1869, but this, of course, is of no relevance to our present concern with Odoevskij as an "early thinker". Of his novels and tales (which, given the philosophical background mentioned above, are essential to an understanding of Odoevskij's thought), there exist both Soviet and Western selected editions. As regards secondary sources, there is no recent monograph to set beside the classic study by P. N. Sakulin, which – more than fifty years after its original publication – still remains the standard study in the field.[69]

Among the general studies included in the present Bibliography, the fullest accounts are those given by V. V. Zen'kovskij. In his work on *Russian Thinkers and Europe,* Zen'kovskij [1] discusses in some detail

Odoevskij's ideas on the basic problem of Russia and the West, with particular reference to his series of articles collected under the title of *Russian Nights*.[70] In this connection, N. V. Riasanovsky [5] sees Odoevskij's importance in the fact that he was "the first Russian to give a critical philosophic appraisal of Western culture and to formulate on this basis the doctrine of Russian Messiahship".[71] Zen'kovskij, who considers everything written and published by Odoevskij during the 1830's to be the most interesting and most characteristic material of the period, cites with approval the statement by Sakulin that, "of all the Lovers of Wisdom, Prince Odoevskij was alone capable, during the 1830's, of serving as a living link between (the) two generations". "In fact", Zen'kovskij continues, "the entire Stankevič circle, as well as those outside it, ... all the outstanding figures at that time stood close to (Odoevskij's) position, which was still free from all violent extremes..." [72] Of this moderate position of Odoevskij's, N. V. Riasanovsky tells us: "Odoevskii's benevolent idealism, his emphasis on religion, art, and science, his desire to find a place for all in the regenerated world, his willingness to recognise the value both of prepetrine Russia and of Peter the Great's reforms, as well as various other traits of his thought, were a faithful expression of romanticism in its earlier, less exclusive, and more humane form." [73]

On Venevitinov as a thinker, a brief account is given by Zen'kovskij – this time in his *History of Russian Philosophy* [2] – where he also refers readers to the (pre-1945) account given in another general work by A. Koyré [3].[74] A Soviet edition of Venevitinov's selected *Works* appeared in 1956, but the standard edition remains the splendid *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* edited by B. V. Smirenskij, with introductory article by D. D. Blagoj, published in 1934.

During his short life (he died in his twenty-third year), Venevitinov undoubtedly occupied a position of considerable importance among the *Ljubomudry*. Not only was he secretary of the society, but he was, in Zen'kovskij's words, "passionately devoted to philosophy and... infected others with his enthusiasm". Košelëv, in his journal (*Zapiski*), has testified to the fact that, at their meetings, it was Venevitinov who spoke at greatest length, "often raising us to ecstasy with his words".[75] As for his philosophical ideas, Zen'kovskij, basing his account largely on Venevitinov's *Letter on Philosophy*, gives the following interpretation: "He conceived the function of philosophy in the spirit of transcendental-

ism; philosophy's task, in his view, is 'theory of knowledge'. At the same time, Venevitinov stressed the necessity of creating an independent *Russian* philosophy. He took a negative attitude toward blind imitation of the West, and was prepared to go so far as to break off relations with the West temporarily in order to find paths of Russian creative activity 'resting upon the firm principles of philosophy'. 'Russia will find its foundation, its guarantee of autonomy and moral freedom, in philosophy.'"[76]

The study of Vjazemskij by G. Wytrzens formed the subject of a detailed critique by Gleb Struve in *The Russian Review*.[77] As regards content: "The emphasis throughout the book is on Vyazemsky's own literary activity, but the latter is presented against the background of Russian literature of his time and in relation to the evolution of his political opinions from the radicalism of his youth (especially in the 1820's) to the liberal conservatism of his old age." Struve finds special praise for Wytrzens' "painstakingly compiled Bibliography (covering) forty pages and three pages of notes ... a truly priceless tool for any future student of Vyazemsky". However, he does note (understandably enough) one omission: his own father's Introduction and addenda to S. L. Frank's study of Puškin's political thought – which seems to be the critical work on Puškin most suitable for inclusion in the present Bibliography.[78] Special sections of Wytrzens' book are devoted to Vjazemskij's attitude towards Gogol' and towards Belinskij. In view of the almost legendary importance generally attached to Belinskij's letter to Gogol', following publication of the latter's *Selected ... Correspondence with Friends,* it is of interest to be reminded – as Struve reminds us in his review – that Vjazemskij was one of the few people at the time to react favourably to this work of Gogol's.[79] Given this attitude, it is not hard to believe that Belinskij himself should have been, in Struve's words, "one of Vyazemsky's *bêtes noires*".[80]

*c. The Decembrists*

By comparison with the 'Young Men of the Archives', the Decembrist movement has received considerable attention in the literature, especially – though by no means only – from the Soviet side. Once again, there are two valuable Nos. (3 volumes) of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, entitled *Dekabristy literatory,* as well as an edition of "selected socio-political and philosophical works", the first volume of which – dealing with the

Northern Society – was published in 1951, to celebrate the 125th anniversary of the original rising.[81] Among Soviet critical studies, the most valuable are those by M. V. Nečkina, whose *Dviženie dekabristov* ([2], 1955) has been described as "the latest full-scale treatment of the Decembrist movement (completing the author's) earlier studies in the field".[82] Nečkina is also the editor of the Soviet bibliography covering the years 1928–1959, compiled by R. G. Ejmontova. Among Western sources, the most important are the scholarly study by A. G. Mazour (originally published in English in 1937, 2nd ed., 1961) and that by M. Zetlin (*Dekabristy. Sud'ba odnogo pokolenie*), an English version of which – unfortunately containing numerous errors – was published in 1958.[83]

*d. Stankevič and his Circle*

A key figure in this period of Russian intellectual history is that of Stankevič – though less for his own writings (which are few) than for his role, in Utechin's words, "as the inspirer and early guide of a whole galaxy of brilliant men".[84] Stankevič's own writings are in fact so slender that Kropotkin, writing in 1916 (or earlier), roundly declared that Stankevič was one of those men who had "never written anything", but who were mentioned in every course on Russian literature, "... simply for the moral influence they exercised within their circle".[85] While this is an exaggeration (perhaps due to the unavailability of sources at the time Kropotkin was writing), it is a fact that Stankevič wrote very little during his brief lifetime. This being so, his correspondence is, in Zen'kovskij's view, of prime importance. "But even this does not give an adequate idea of the man; one must read widely in the correspondence of Bakunin and Belinskij, and in the various memoirs of the period, to feel Stankevič's full importance and understand his extraordinary influence."[86]

Apart from these sources mentioned by Zen'kovskij, the article by E. J. Brown in *ASEER* [1] deals with the Stankevič circle as a whole. On the Soviet side, there is an exposition of Stankevič's philosophical views by M. M. Grigor'jan [2] in the general work edited by G. S. Vaseckij [2].[87]

## VI. THE WESTERNISERS

*a. Moderate Westernisers*

Mention of Stankevič and his circle brings us to an examination of the 'Westernisers' proper. Before turning to the leading radical thinkers more

or less closely associated with this rather vague connotation, a brief word is necessary concerning those lesser lights referred to in the present Bibliography as Moderate Westernisers (and generally described as 'Liberal' or 'Conservative' in their political views). These are, broadly speaking, the same figures that are to-day considered by Soviet criticism as "representatives of a bourgeois-liberal current of Russian social thought", the 'real *zapadniki*', in marked contradistinction to the more radical ("revolutionary-democratic") Belinskij and Herzen.[88]

The literature is scarce on both sides. On the Soviet side, chief attention seems to have been paid to Granovskij – witness the studies by Asinovskaja and by Kosminskij, and the longish contribution on Granovskij's sociological and philosophical views by M. M. Grigor'jan [3] in Vaseckij [2] (86 pages, as compared with 29 for the similar study of Stankevič). In view of the dearth of primary sources, the Soviet edition of Čičerin's memoirs – though published in 1934 – is included in the present Bibliography.

Western sources include the article by M. Raeff on Katkov, who is described as a "reactionary Liberal". Among the more general works, Utechin [2] contains brief – sometimes very brief – accounts on the political views of most of the figures concerned. Masaryk's account is more in the line of intellectual history, while Zen'kovskij [2] includes a section on the philosophical ideas of Kavelin (whom he classes among the "semi-positivists") and a much longer one on Čičerin.

*b. Belinskij*

When we come to Belinskij, we are at once confronted with a range of Soviet sources that is vast to the point of embarrassment for the bibliographer – and, one might add, of near despair for the student. The reasons for the existence of this enormous literature are twofold: to the general explanation that Belinskij is one of the darlings of Soviet literary critics and historians of Russian thought – in his capacity as "militant atheist", "materialist", and, above all, as the "forerunner of Socialist realism" – comes the particular fact that the year 1948 marked the centenary of his death, and was thus the occasion – especially in the Soviet Union, but also in the West – for the publication of an unusually large number of studies dealing with almost every conceivable aspect of his life, work, and thought.

This centenary literature formed the object of a useful bibliography, compiled and introduced by a brief but illuminating article by Gleb Struve [3E] in *SEER* of May 1949. Struve's conclusion was that, in 1948, "no other single subject called forth so many special articles in the Soviet periodicals" as Belinskij, the centenary of whose death "was regarded as something much more important than the centenary of the bourgeois Revolutions which swept Europe in 1848".[89]

Not for the first time in the history of Russian thought, quantity was not matched by quality.[90] There was little in these articles that was in any way original – "... all follow similar, if not exactly the same lines". At the same time, while they may not teach us much that is new concerning Belinskij, the general trend of these papers, as Struve rightly remarks, "is of considerable symptomatic interest, and the future student of Soviet ideology of 1948 vintage will turn to them with great profit".

Of the marked emphasis laid by Soviet scholars on the later period of Belinskij's activity, Struve admits that, "though this may be *incomplete* Belinsky, it is certainly the *essential* one". Apart from this aspect, Struve discerned two main trends in Soviet criticism of that time – both of which, broadly speaking, would seem to have persisted up to the present day. Firstly, within the national sphere of Russian thought and thinkers, a "persistent effort to disassociate Belinsky from the liberal Westerners", one critic even advancing the view that the very term '*zapadnik*' should no longer be applied to Belinskij, whose attitude towards the West was "more complex and profound".[91] Secondly, derived from this view and closely associated with it, a portrayal of Belinskij which stresses his essential "Russianness", his patriotism. This view in turn has two main aspects. On the one hand, Belinskij is depicted as "an implacable enemy of the 'bourgeois' West"; on the other, his "early debt to Schelling and Hegel is almost completely disregarded"; even when the discussion turns on his materialism and atheism, no opportunity is lost of emphasising the superiority of Belinskij's thought over Feuerbach's.

At the same time, scrupulous care is taken to avoid any possible *rapprochement* of Belinskij's brand of patriotism with that of the Slavophils – as Belinskij himself once did in a memorable outburst against "cosmopolitanism" the year before he died: "Without nationality (*nacional'nost'*), mankind would be a logical abstraction ... On this

point, I am prepared rather to side with the Slavophils than remain on the side of the humanist cosmopolitans."[92]

While it would be asking too much of Soviet scholarship to stress this point,[93] we should at the same time recognise the underlying truth of Belinskij's progressive disillusionment with the West. As P. V. Annenkov, who knew him well, once testified concerning the last year of Belinskij's life: "The more indulgent Belinskij grew towards the Russian world, the more severe and exacting he showed himself towards the world beyond her borders. The same thing happened to him as later happened on more than one occasion to many of our most rabid Westernisers, once they began to travel (*delalis' turistami*): they felt themselves somehow taken in by Europe."[94]

All the main points of Soviet interpretation noted by Struve find their typical (at times even, their extreme) expression in part of Baskakov's paper ([1], 1949) dealing with the collection of articles on Belinskij edited by Z. V. Smirnova [2].[95] A few excerpts will help to illustrate this:

"The foundations of the revolutionary-democratic world-outlook[96] in Russia were laid by V. G. Belinskij. He left his mark in the history of the revolutionary-liberation movement in Russia as an outstanding thinker, immeasurably surpassing the West-European philosophers of the pre-Marxian period."

"He exposed the reactionary character of the idealistic philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, which was directed against revolutionary reforms and which represented an aristocratic reaction against French materialism. Belinskij strove passionately to unmask this idealistic philosophy, which the ideologists of the gentry placed in the service of reactionary forces in Tsarist Russia."

Turning to the article by M. I. Iovčuk [3] which opens the book he is reviewing, Baskakov at once observes a number of "material shortcomings". Firstly, he declares, the opening article in a book of this kind should begin by making clear the class roots of Belinskij's world-outlook, demonstrating in clear and concrete (*sic*) fashion the link between Belinskij's whole activity and the revolutionary-liberation movement. Only on this basis, asserts Baskakov, would it be possible to provide a true picture of Belinskij, on whom he next proceeds to heap a whole catalogue of fulsome (and mostly well-worn) adulatory epithets: "fiery

political fighter, tribune of the people, militant materialist-philosopher and dialectician, original Russian thinker, equal to the tasks of his age, who added the most brilliant pages to the history of pre-Marxian philosophy and social thought".

Again and again, Baskakov returns, with an almost obsessive persistence, to the problem of German idealistic philosophy. He criticises Iovčuk for discerning "only the outward, but not the essential (*principial'noe*) class difference between Belinskij's views and those of the German reactionary-idealists".

Passing to the article by Smirnova [4] dealing with 'The Evolution of Belinskij's views during the 1830's', Baskakov takes her to task for failing to disclose the real content of Belinskij's 'Literary Musings', and for overlooking Belinskij's criticism of "the mystic and irrational character of Schelling's philosophy".[97] Since "Schelling's philosophy of history, in contrast to Belinskij's, was directed to the past . . .", Baskakov draws the conclusion that, "for Schelling, the progress of society and of art was in actual fact retrogression (*regress*)".

In contrast to his detailed and searching criticism of the articles by Iovčuk and by Smirnova (particularly, as noted, with regard to the thorny problem of idealistic philosophy), Baskakov devotes only a brief but positive mention to two articles stressing the materialistic side of Belinskij's thought. In his view, both I. Ščipanov [4] and M. Kammari succeed in giving "a concise but pithy (*soderžatel'nyj*) account of Belinskij's materialism and of his views concerning the role of the popular masses and of the individual in history".

In conclusion – and in this respect Baskakov's article proves a faithful reproduction in miniature of the general trends noted by Struve – we come to the problem of Belinskij and Russia. Having paraphrased (?) Belinskij's views concerning the need for the Russian people to occupy one of the foremost places among the *progressive* peoples of the world, Baskakov cites the famous passage from Belinskij's review of the Moscow University speech of June 10th, 1839: "No, we believe and we know that Russia's vocation lies in an all-round and universal approach (*vsëstoronnost' i universal'nost'*): she must assimilate all the elements of spiritual life, inner life, civic, political, and social life and, having assimilated them, must develop them from within (*iz sebja*) *in her own distinctive fashion.*" In the Russian original, Belinskij here uses the word *samobytno* so dear

to Xomjakov and so closely associated with Slavophil doctrine generally – as Soviet sources also freely admit.[98]

For Baskakov's own attitude towards Slavophils and Westernisers, we have to turn to an earlier part of his article (p. 328), at a point where he is in fact discussing a work on Herzen. In this, he criticises the author[99] for his failure to show that "in sharp opposition to the revolutionary-democratic camp led by Belinskij stood not only the camp of double-dyed reactionary ideology of 'Official Nationality', with which Slavophilism was closely associated (*smykalos'*), but also the Liberal-Westernisers. The author has failed to point out that class demarcation (*razmeževanie*) separated Herzen from the 'Westernisers' also".

In other words, we have here the by now familiar Soviet presentation of the Slavophils, as allegedly standing close to the doctrine of Official Nationality; the Westernisers, as a group of (relatively unimportant) bourgeois-liberal thinkers (Kavelin, Čičerin, Annenkov, Granovskij, etc.); and thirdly – separate from, and largely opposed to, the latter (and, of course, the former), at least from the 'class' aspect – such individual radical ("revolutionary-democratic") thinkers as Herzen and, more particularly, Belinskij.[100]

For to-day's reader, there is nothing particularly unusual or surprising about this presentation as such. What is surprising, however – and of no mean interest to the "history of Soviet history of Russian thought" – is the footnote (2, p. 238) which follows the above excerpt. In this, Baskakov openly admits: "The same error was also committed in my book, *The Sociological Views of V. G. Belinskij,* published in May 1948". Since this 'error' was committed by Baskakov himself such a little while before (his critical article appeared in *VF* 1949, 1), and since the same, or virtually the same, error appeared in at least one other work on Herzen, likewise published in 1948, it would be interesting to know what particular revelation served to convince Baskakov so rapidly and so powerfully of the error of his former view, which was apparently shared by several other Soviet authors. On this point unfortunately, Baskakov remains silent.

Whatever the explanation may be, the general interpretation of Belinskij and his contemporaries reflected in Baskakov's paper – itself broadly typical, as stated, of the 1948 trends noted by Struve – would not seem to have undergone any essential modification from that time to this.

On the other hand, as Struve emphasised at the time he wrote, the general tone of these writings is "in striking contrast with what was emphasised in Belinsky by earlier Russian Radicals and 'Leftists', even though Soviet students of Belinsky make constant references to Lenin and quote profusely from his writings, especially from his polemical articles against the *Vekhi*".[101]

Of Soviet publications concerning Belinskij since 1948, prime importance attaches to the complete edition of his *Works* in 12 volumes [1R], published between 1953 and 1956, described by Hugh McLean as "an elaborate annotated edition".[102] 1955 saw the publication of Belinskij's selected correspondence in 2 volumes [3R].[103] Meanwhile, precious material concerning Belinskij had appeared in Nos. 55, 56, and 57 of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo,* which, as stated, constitutes one of the finest achievements of Soviet scholarship in the field of literature. The three volumes in question appeared in 1948, 1950, and 1951 respectively.

Among critical studies, 1951/52 saw the appearance of a thesis by I. L. Kuznecov on the theme dear to Baskakov: 'the struggle of Belinskij and Herzen against idealism during the 1830's and 1840's.' Of particular interest to the Sovietologist is the work on Belinskij by Ju. G. Oksman, mentioned by Gleb Struve in another of his scholarly articles [2E]. The general interest of this work lies in Oksman's reputation as an outstanding literary critic and historian, trained in the famous Puškin Seminar of S. A. Vengerov; its particular interest lies in the fact that, with the disgrace in 1936 of Lev Kamenev, with whom he had at one time been closely associated at the Puškin House, Oksman himself suddenly disappeared from the scene until "rehabilitated" around 1948. His work on Belinskij – described by Struve as "a monumental chronicle of Belinskij's life and work" over 600 pages long – was his first major work to be published during the post-Stalin era.[104] Of the more important Soviet studies listed in the present Bibliography, the most recent are that bearing the 'standard' title, *The Sociological and Philosophical Views of V. G. Belinskij,* by V. I. Stepanov (1959), and the more general work by M. Ja. Poljakov ([2], 1960), *Vissarion Belinskij. Ličnost' – Idei – Époxa.*

Among Western studies, the two bibliographical articles by Kresky (covering the period 1917–1947) and by Struve (1949) have already

been mentioned. The first major study of Belinskij to appear in English was the work by H. E. Bowman ([2], 1954). As described by Hans Kohn in a brief but interesting review[105], the book only sketches Belinskij's biography in outline, concentrating rather "on a critical analysis of his thought in the various stages of its development". The study, though a competent one, is at a fairly elementary level, containing "many translations of important passages from Belinsky's writings" which "will be of great value ... to the non-specialist reader". Within the confines of this relatively brief review, Kohn devotes considerable space to the basic problem of the proper role of 'art' (in fact meaning, first and foremost, literature) in Belinskij's eyes (in so doing, he does not always make it clear to the reader whether the views expressed are his own or whether they represent a paraphrase of those contained in Bowman's book). "Belinsky was a pioneer in both ways, in the radical criticism of an unacceptable reality and in the insistence that art was a means to an end – the enlightenment of society." Quoting next Venevitinov's view, expressed in 1827 ("Russia has received everything from without ... Our position in the literary world is a completely negative one."), Kohn continues: "Twenty years after Venevitinov's death, ... Belinsky still had a feeling for the spontaneity of true art, but he became the sponsor of *a critical doctrine whereby literature and culture are judged by their service to the real or imagined needs of society.*" (My italics, R.K.) In so doing, he became, in Kohn's view, "the spokesman of a theory of an interrelation between literature and society which was later carried to its logical and absurd conclusion by Pisarev and the Stalinists". Bowman's own views on the problem are summed up in a passage from his book cited towards the end of Kohn's review: "By the very urgency of the public mission which he (Belinskij) assigned to art, he threatened the precarious integrity of the artist. He thereby revealed his growing doubt in the capacity of art to advance the cause of human dignity to which he had so fervently dedicated himself."

Bowman's study – although, as stated, on a fairly elementary level – is of importance if only for the fact that it is still to-day the only major English-language monograph on Belinskij. Comparing this situation with the vast Soviet literature on the subject, we find, as it were, the reverse side of the medal noted earlier with regard to the literature on the Slavophils.[106] On any view of things, this cannot possibly be regarded

as proportional, equitable, or satisfactory. At the same time, the Western literature on Belinskij is not so poor as this bare statement might lead one to expect. Most of the more general studies mentioned early in this study contain fairly extensive chapters or sections on Belinskij. These include the work by Masaryk and – among more recent studies – those by Hare [1], Lampert [1], and, for Belinskij's philosophical ideas, Zen'kovskij [2]. In addition, there is an important recent study in German by B. Schultze [3]. Regarding Belinskij's much-disputed right to a place in the history of philosophical thought, it may be as well to quote a few brief excerpts from Zen'kovskij's evaluation. Taking as his starting-point Čiževskij's view that Belinskij's reputation was wholly 'undeserved'[107], Zen'kovskij continues: "It cannot, of course, be denied that Belinskij was primarily a *writer on social and political themes* even more than a literary critic; but his writings on social and political themes were both grounded in and permeated by philosophic ideas. ... we observe in other thinkers a similar encroachment of 'concrete' life upon 'pure' philosophic interests. ... This 'irregularity' is encountered very frequently among Russian thinkers; only very rarely is a Russian thinker completely free of it. ... I do not wish to offer an apology for philosophic writing on social and political themes; I mean only to emphasise that, in so far as this writing is actually connected with and sustained by philosophic thought, it has a place in a history of philosophy."[108] Although referring here to the specific case of Belinskij, Zen'kovskij's statement is in fact of much wider application, and is of especial relevance to the whole of the present study.

Relevant, too, after such a lengthy examination of Soviet interpretations of Belinskij's thought, and of the numerous "legends" surrounding the ideas of Čaadaev, is the following further passage, which admirably summarises Zen'kovskij's understanding of Belinskij – as far removed, need one add, from Baskakov's as it is possible to imagine:

"If we were to compare Belinskij to one of the Russian thinkers with whom we are already familiar, our first choice would be *Čaadaev* – because of the intensity and passion of their search for total and unconditional truth and justice, 'the one thing that is needful'. In Belinskij, as in Čaadaev, the search for the Kingdom of God and its truth and justice is a central theme. Both of them (and Herzen must be added to their number) were major representatives of Russian 'Westernism' – builders

of culture along the paths laid out by the West. However, all of them were united by a passionate, captious, and severe, but also ardent love of Russia."[109]

As for Belinskij's much-vaunted rationalism, Hare [1] concludes his chapter with the following words: "It may seem odd that such an impassioned rationalist as Belinsky should finally emerge as the first modern Russian to state a firmly reasoned case for the liquidation of all system-building philosophy. But that is the upshot of what he did ... He concluded that scientific thought derives its value as much from setting boundaries to intellectual knowledge as from enlarging its small sphere of certainty. And in so doing, he pointed to the unfettered possibilities of the unknown sphere, where a liberated imagination is entitled to reign supreme. We should be sanguine enough to hope that in the long run, Belinsky's present motivated popularity in the Soviet Union may lead to more appreciation of his far-ranging perspicacity, which the politically-guided approach to him has tended to obscure."[110]

Nothing could illustrate better than these last excerpts the wide gulf which still separates present-day Soviet and Western interpretations of Belinskij's "philosophy" and of his role and importance in the history of Russian thought.[111]

*c. Herzen*

In contrast to the small literary output of so many thinkers who yet have an important place in the history of Russian 19th-century thought (of whom we found Stankevič an extreme example), Alexander Herzen was a prolific writer. The latest and most complete Soviet edition of his *Works* [1R] runs to no less than thirty volumes. This magnificent edition (1954–1963) is beyond doubt among the finest achievements of Soviet scholarship, and it is a matter for wonder that it should not figure in so useful a bibliography as Horecky's [1] *Basic Russian Publications.*[112] There is also a shorter, but still fairly extensive, 9-volume edition of *Works* [2R], compiled by the same editor (V. P. Volgin), published between 1955 and 1958.

Herzen was not only a prolific writer but one gifted with a magnificent style, and his memoirs ([4R] *Byloe i dumy*. In English: 'My Past and Thoughts') – besides providing an invaluable account of the intellectual history of the period – would hold their own in any company for their literary

qualities alone. In Kropotkin's words: "Apart from the historical value of these memoirs, ... they certainly are one of the best pieces of poetical literature in any language. The descriptions of men and events which they contain, beginning with Russia in the forties and ending with the years of exile, reveal at every step an extraordinary philosophical intelligence; ... At the same time these memoirs contain ... fine, poetical scenes from the author's personal life ..."[113] It was of these memoirs that Turgenev once said: "No one has ever written like him; it is written in tears and blood."[114]

The main tenets of Herzen's thought, as it concerns the present study, are well summarised by Utechin: "Although relations between Herzen and the members of the Stankevich circle were very close and cordial, there was a basic difference in orientation. Herzen was far less interested in abstract philosophy than in social and political problems. The execution of the five leading Decembrists in 1826 made a great impression upon the young Herzen, and he swore to dedicate his life to their cause."[115] Though Herzen was not the first Russian political *émigré* (Utechin mentions Prince Kurbskij and N. I. Turgenev, the Decembrist, in this connection), he was none the less "the first to look on emigration as a base from which one could try to influence intellectual and political developments at home, and in this sense he was the father of modern Russian political emigration".[116]

Though, to avoid complications, Herzen is grouped in the present study – as is customary in Western circles – with the so-called Westernisers, such a classification, like all over-simplifications, can be misleading. Despite his early admiration for the West and the fact that he left Russia in disgust in 1847, never again to return, Herzen retained an almost Slavophil faith in the virtues of the Russian peasant and in the possibilities inherent in the *mir*, or peasant commune – which, however, he looked upon as a sort of potentially socialist institution in embryo.[117] These ideas he developed mainly in *From the Other Shore* (1848/9) and *The Russian People and Socialism* (1851), various English editions of which have been published in recent years (*q.v.* Bibliography, *Works* [5E], *infra*). "By thus blending Westernist socialism with the Slavophile admiration for the peasant commune," says Utechin, "Herzen originated the notion of a specifically Russian socialism, a notion that was later picked up by the Populists and became one of the chief planks in their creed.

Herzen's concern for the individual human being tempered his socialism, however, and historians still cannot agree whether to classify him as a socialist or perhaps as a liberal. Like his friend Granovsky, he repudiated the idea that human beings could or should be sacrificed for the sake of an abstract principle, even if it is *salus populi.*"[118]

An essential source for any study of Herzen's socio-political views and activity are the pages of *Kolokol* (in English, *The Bell*), the London newspaper by means of which he realised his great dream of "publishing in Russian outside Russia".[119] *Kolokol* was not only the first Russian *émigré* newspaper; it was also one of the most – some would say *the* most – influential of Russian papers in the whole of the 19th century, being widely distributed inside Russia and being avidly read not only in government circles but even, it is often alleged, by Alexander II himself. With the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and, more particularly, with Herzen's unequivocally pro-Polish stand in 1863, his influence inside Russia rapidly dwindled, and *Kolokol's* star set. A 552-page "systematised inventory" (*rospis'*) of the articles and notes contained in *Kolokol* was published by the Knižnaja Palata in Moscow in 1957 (*q.v.* Bibliography, *infra).*

At once highly cultured, speaking and writing several languages with consummate ease, possessed of a fine literary style, a brilliant thinker and a forceful spokesman of the cause in which he so passionately believed, Herzen is one of the outstanding and most *sympathique* figures of his age. It is no mere chance that he should be more evenly represented in Western and Soviet literature than perhaps any other Russian thinker of the 19th century.

Western sources include a fine study by M. E. Malia[1] (a pupil of the late Prof. M. Karpovich), published by the Harvard University Press in 1961 and reviewed, *inter alia,* by H. Seton-Watson in *SEER* of June 1962. On the subject of Herzen's position *vis-à-vis* Westernisers and Slavophils, the reviewer has a paragraph which is worth citing in full: "The breach between 'westerners' and 'slavophiles' was due above all to the religious issue. On purely political matters they were not so far apart. Herzen in fact was closest to the slavophiles of all the westerners, and was rebuked for his tolerance by Belinsky. But he and Belinsky by the 1840's were agreed on an uncompromising atheism. This led Herzen to break also, though a little less rigidly, with another group of friends, the moderate

westerners, of whom the most prominent was Granovsky. It was Granovsky's refusal to abandon all religion which made Herzen's relations with him intolerable. This new isolation of Herzen, even among the westerners (since Belinsky was in St. Petersburg and Bakunin abroad) made Moscow seem unbearable to Herzen, and largely caused his decision to emigrate. Professor Malia argues ... that Herzen's extremism in Europe, his violent denunciation of the European bourgeoisie, of western liberals and socialists, and even of the whole French nation, were directed against his former friends who had remained in Moscow. He attacked the west not because he had suffered from western injustices but because the west was the ideal of those Russians whom he at once loved and hated most."[120]

Malia has also contributed an important study [2] on Herzen's understanding of the Russian *mir* in the collective work, *Continuity and Change* ..., edited by E. J. Simmons; this volume also contains an interesting chapter by Sir Isaiah Berlin [2], dealing with Herzen's and Bakunin's concept of individual liberty.[121] In an article in *ASEER* of April 1958, F. I. Kaplan [1] contrasts Herzen's brand of 'Westernism' with Russian Fourierism of the 1840's. In 1952, E. H. Carr [1] printed 30 hitherto unpublished letters from Herzen to Georg and Emma Herwegh, together with an introductory article, in Vol. III of *Oxford Slavonic Papers*. Extensive studies on Herzen also appear in the general works by Masaryk, Hare [1], and Lampert [1], while Zen'kovskij [1] devotes a whole chapter to him in his study of *Russian Thinkers and Europe*.

Soviet sources include the general study by Ja. Él'sberg, reviewed by Baskakov [1] in an article already referred to in relation to Belinskij[122]; a third, enlarged edition of Él'sberg's work appeared in 1956. In 1959 came a composite work edited by A. I. Gruzdev *et al.* A considerable number of theses have been devoted to various aspects of Herzen's thought: his "philosophical materialism" is treated by V. P. Volosova (1947) and by P. A. Suslov (1953/54); his sociological and socio-political views by G. V. Terjaev (1947) and by V. G. Safroškin (1948/51) respectively; and his philosophical views by A. A. Ljubimova (Herzen's criticism of German idealism! 1948/51) and by G. P. Donec (1951/52). Herzen's historical views are treated in the study by N. Pirumova (1956).

Herzen is also well represented in the pages of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*. The two double numbers (Nos 39/40 and 41/42) – though published

before 1945 – have been considered essential components of the present Bibliography. Between 1953 and 1958, there followed four further numbers in this series, one (No. 64) dealing with 'Herzen in Collections Abroad' and the other three (Nos 61–63) – much of them correspondence – devoted jointly to Herzen and Ogarëv, to whom we next turn.

*d. Ogarëv*

Though better known as a poet and literary critic, Ogarëv was, in Utechin's view, "the man who gave more thought than anyone else to the practical problems of the revolutionary movement, the problems of organisation, strategy, and tactics".[123] An old friend of Herzen's from the time when he frequented the latter's Moscow circle in the 1830's, he finally joined Herzen in London in 1856, collaborating with him in the launching and editing of *Kolokol,* the first issue of which appeared in July of the following year. The importance of his role, not only in this connection but within the wider framework of Russian revolutionary movements, can be gauged from Utechin's account: "In the years between his emigration and the Polish uprising of 1863, Ogarëv drafted a series of papers on the revolutionary movement which were discussed with Herzen and with emissaries of the St. Petersburg revolutionary circle who, in 1861–62, formed an underground organisation called 'Land and Freedom', along the lines laid down in Ogarëv's drafts. According to Ogarëv, an organisation aiming at a social revolution must be a secret society. He traced the tradition of secret societies from the early Christians ... to the Decembrists. The society must have a self-appointed centre consisting of a few people ... specialists in all the main branches of science and learning ... The centre ... must have its own printed organ, which should be published abroad, out of the reach of the Russian censorship. (It was, in fact, Ogarëv who suggested to Herzen the publication of *The Bell,* and he wrote most of its theoretical articles.)"[124]

Ogarëv has been the subject of considerable Soviet research in recent years.[125] There are two recent Soviet editions of his selected *Works*, each in two volumes. One ([1], 1952–1956) contains his selected socio-political and philosophical writings; the other ([2], 1956) is more literary in nature, and includes his poems, prose, and literary criticism.

Critical studies include a thesis, a book, and an article in *Voprosy filosofii* by M. V. Jakovlev ([1], [2], [3]), and several others by V. A.

Putincev ([2]–[6]). The most recent of these [3], published in 1963, to mark the 150th anniversary of Ogarëv's birth, deals with both his socio-political role and his literary activity. The sections most pertinent to the present study are those on 'Ogarëv and the literary and social struggle of the late '30–'40's' (pp. 32–51); 'Ogarëv's revolutionary activity in emigration. Ogarëv in "*Kolokol*"' (pp. 150–177); and a section on Ogarëv's work as publicist and literary critic (pp. 207–222). The Conclusion ('Problemy izučenija nasledija Ogarëva', pp. 247–257) takes the form of an historical survey of the Russian literature on Ogarëv, including pre-1917 criticism, which is useful in spite of – and illuminating because of – its biased and tendentious character.

## VII. ANARCHISM. MIXAIL BAKUNIN

Bakunin – usually grouped with Belinskij and Herzen as the third great figure in the triad of 'Westernisers' – in fact stands apart in more ways than one. In the first place, whereas Belinskij and Herzen – for all their differences – both remained within the category of what may be termed radical (socialist or liberal) socio-political thought, Bakunin, at an early stage, developed his own creed of out-and-out anarchism. Secondly, his passionate attachment to Russia, and his connections with the revolutionary Panslavist movement, are such that several critics hesitate to call him a 'Westerniser' at all, while Hare even classes him as a Slavophil – albeit of a very different political complexion from those normally covered by the term.[126] To these two differences comes the third one – of considerable relevance to the present study – that Bakunin is virtually ignored by contemporary Soviet criticism. The last important edition of his *Works* (to judge by available reference works) is still the 4-volume one published thirty years ago (1934/35). As for the *FBSP* Index, it contains exactly two references under his name. Of these, only one is to a Russian study – the thesis by A. E. Iban'es on 'The Struggle of Marx and Engels against the Anarchism of Bakunin'. The other refers to the German work by P. Scheibert, *Von Bakunin zu Lenin* . . ., and bears a cross-reference to a review in *Voprosy filosofii* that is anything but complimentary.[127] The inference is plain: Soviet criticism is either not ready, or cannot afford, to 'forgive' Bakunin his consistent record of rivalry to Marx and opposition to Marxism. The following excerpt from the latest (1963) edition

of the *Filosofskij slovar'* effectively sums up the 'official' Soviet point of view: "Bakunin rejected the necessity of preparing for revolution ... He failed to understand the meaning of the scientific theory of society (*sic*), [and] opposed Marxist teaching concerning the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. ... Bakunin's anarchistic theories were criticised by Marx, Engels, and Lenin."[128]

At the same time, the entry recognises the widespread influence of Bakunin's ideas among the revolutionary *narodniki* of the 1870's – which is surely alone sufficient to ensure Bakunin an important place in the history of Russian 19th-century thought. Zen'kovskij, examining Bakunin's significance from the philosophical point of view, has this to say: "His philosophic writing, which is insignificant in extent and is contained chiefly in his letters, is nevertheless of great importance for a correct understanding of philosophic thought in Russia. Stankevič's Hegelianism, which was quite close to the original, was joined peacefully and harmoniously with a basic aesthetic humanism; but Bakunin conceived Hegelianism wholly as a doctrine of *Historical being* and of the dialectic of Absolute Spirit in its historical self-manifestation. This was the point at which Hegelianism exercised its powerful and creative influence, and here Bakunin was a pioneer and a trail-blazer. His own subsequent evolution to a preaching of universal destruction and an ardent defence of anarchism and nihilism based on philosophic materialism is not yet fully understood, but we find in Bakunin and Bakuninism many 'seeds' of what later found such forceful development in the philosophy of Lenin and his followers."[129]

The first large-scale study of Bakunin in English was that by E. H. Carr ([2] 1937). Its continued importance – Shapiro calls it "much the best of the [English] books" and Hare refers to Carr as Bakunin's "only first-class biographer" – is borne out by its current availability.[130] Among studies of particular aspects of Bakunin's thought, the collection of essays by Hepner deals with the Panslav side of the revolutionary movement, while the work edited by G. P. Maximoff deals with Bakunin's political philosophy. Another, more popular, account of Bakunin's doctrine of anarchism is that by the Ukrainian scholar, E. Pyziur. Among articles, that by Sir Isaiah Berlin [2] on Herzen's and Bakunin's ideas on individual liberty has already been referred to.[131] That by Dziewanowski in the *Journal of Central European Affairs* examines Bakunin's (and again

Herzen's) attitude to the Polish rising of 1863. Sections or chapters on Bakunin are also included in the general works by Masaryk, Hare [2], and Lampert [1], while his philosophical views are discussed at some length by Zen'kovskij [2].

## VIII. WORKS DEALING WITH THE INFLUENCE OF WEST-EUROPEAN IDEAS

### *a. German philosophy. Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, etc.*

The second part of this study ends with a brief selection of works dealing with the influence of German and French thought on Russian ideas during the period under review.

From the discussion that has gone before (especially that concerning Belinskij), it will come as no surprise to learn that the FBSP Index contains exactly one reference to Schelling – which is a general paper dealing at the same time with the thought of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel (FBSP 6328: T. I. Ojzerman [2], *q.v.* Bibliography). Fortunately, there exists a useful Western study in German by W. Setschkarew (V. Sečkarëv), published in 1939 but included here as constituting a basic study in the field; also a later one (not specifically related to Russia) by E. Benz [1], published in 1955.

On Hegel, Soviet titles include two by M. I. Iovčuk ([5] and [6]), one by M. A. Dynnik [2], and the thesis by Ja. E. Načkedija, on the theme (mentioned earlier in connection with Baskakov's study) of Hegelianism conceived of as "an aristocratic reaction against the French bourgeois Revolution". Among Western sources, the most important works on Hegel's influence, like Setschkarew's on Schelling, are in German, and date from just before the last war, but again are included here as essential studies. These are Čiževskij's work [2R], *Gegel' v Rossii* (the German version of which [2G] was republished in 1961), and Iakovenko's *Geschichte des Hegelianismus in Rußland,* published in Prague in 1938.

The influence of both Schelling and Hegel on Bakunin and Belinskij during the 1830's and 1840's is treated in Hepner's work on revolutionary Panslavism, already referred to in connection with Bakunin.

Feuerbach's influence is treated from the Soviet point of view in the thesis by I. M. Esin (partly also in that by I. I. Kuzilov) and in articles by V. A. Karpušin, T. I. Ojzerman [1], and (from the historical aspect) by L. R. Xaraxorkin.

*b. French social thought.* (1) *Proudhon, Saint Simon, Fourier.* (2) *The Petraševcy.* (3) *Russia and 1848*

The section of the Bibliography dealing with French influences contains a number of studies dealing with Fourierism in Russia.

That by F. I. Kaplan [1] has already been mentioned in connection with Herzen.[132] The other main Western paper on this theme is the article in *ASEER* of October 1953, in which N. V. Riasanovsky [8] relates Fourierism in Russia to the Petraševcy circle.

On the Soviet side, interest attaches to the article in *Istoričeskie zapiski* by I. I. Zil'berfarb [1], who is also responsible for the Russian translation and commentaries [2] in the Soviet edition of Fourier's selected *Works* in 4 volumes, published between 1951 and 1954.

On the subject of Russia and the 1848 Revolutions, there are two useful Western papers by F. C. Barghoorn [1] and by Sir Isaiah Berlin [3] respectively.*

REFERENCES

53. Cf. *Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (April 1965) 30–50 and 114–128 respectively.
54. Cf. Struve, Gleb [3E], in Bibliography under Belinskij, *infra*; also, more generally, in the present article, pp. 184 ff., *infra.*
55. Lavrin, Janko [4] (see Bibliography Va), pp. 280–281.
56. On this problem, cf. esp. McNally, R. T. [1]: 'Chaadaev's Evaluation of Peter the Great', *ASEER,* March 1964.
57. Lavrin, Janko [4], pp. 283–284. Hare [1] considers that "the pro-Catholic interpretation of Chaadayev has sometimes been wishfully exaggerated" (p. 19). "Roman Catholics ... have slurred over his hostility to unadulterated Christian teaching and his express belief that political Christianity had no longer any part to play in educating society." (p. 12)
58. Symptomatic of the continued interest in this theme is the fact that, as these lines were being written, the R.S.X.D. (Russian Students' Christian Movement) in Paris announced that its annual congress for 1965 would be devoted to the theme of 'Russia and the West'. (Brochure, *S"ezd R.S.X.D. 5-6-7 ijunja 1965 goda,* Paris, 1965.)
59. Lavrin, Janko [4], p. 280.

* This study – with its accompanying Bibliography – was originally intended to appear in two parts. However, the wealth of important material available, even within the limits deliberately imposed from the outset, soon rendered this project out of the question. The third and final part of this study – covering the second half of the 19th century and continuing up to 1917 – is now in preparation and, space permitting, will appear in these pages at a later date.

The present study is being conducted with the aid of a grant from the Swiss National Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research, to whom the author would like to express his grateful appreciation.

60. For a more recent Soviet reference to Čaadaev, cf. the article by V. A. Malinin, 'Naučnaja istorija russkoj filosofii i spekuljacii buržuaznyx filosofov' (in: *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii,* pp. 162–191), to be reviewed in *SST* 5 (1965) No. 4.
61. McNally, Raymond T. [2] (see Bibliography Va), p. 355. The evidence of Čaadaev's association with the Decembrists seems overwhelming. Herzen (*Byloe i dumy,* Ch. XXX) already stated, from a study of Jakuškin's notes, that Čaadaev had been a *member* of the movement. Cf. also, *inter alia,* Utechin [2] p. 75 and *MSE* 10, p. 301. *FS* (p. 489) states that Čaadaev joined the Northern Society as early as 1821, was arrested for complicity on his return to Russia in 1826, was released (only) owing to insufficient evidence, but kept under police surveillance. McNally brings no details in support of his views, yet the onus of proving his case surely rests with him.
62. McNally, Raymond T. [2], pp. 357–358.
63. On the dearth of Soviet literature on the Slavophils, cf. Chapter IVb of this article, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 43 ff.
64. Cf. Malinin, V.A.: 'Naučnaja istorija russkoj filosofii. . .', p. 184, including note 24.
65. Cf. *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 33.
66. On the widespread overlapping of 'concrete' life, in the form of socio-political thought, and philosophical thought proper among Russian thinkers, cf., *inter alia,* the passage from V. V. Zen'kovskij cited in relation to Belinskij, on p. 190, *infra.*
67. Cf. Struve, Gleb. [2E]: 'On Some Malpractices in Soviet Literary Scholarship', *SEEJ* VII (1963) 2, 134–141. Küchelbecker is referred to in Part II, pp. 138–140. Küchelbecker's article, 'Poézija i proza', written in 1835 or 1836, was sent by him to Puškin for publication in *Sovremennik,* but was intercepted by the Third Section. The suppression (in any case rendered pointless by the reproduction alongside the article of a facsimile of the relevant part of the original!) is considered by Struve to be more probably the work of the chief editor of the volume (A. M. Egolin, "a notorious Ždanovite") than that of the commentator of the article, the Soviet critic Vl. Orlov.
68. Lieb, Fritz [2], p. 87.
69. Sakulin, P. N.: *Iz istorii russkogo idealizma. Knjaz' V. Odoevskij. Myslitel'-pisatel'.* M. 1913. (1 vol. in 2 parts)
70. Cf. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [1R], pp. 30–37.
71. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 20. In this connection, cf. Odoevskij's letter to Ševyrëv (1836), following the publication of Čaadaev's first *Lettre philosophique*: "What Čaadaev says concerning Russia, I say of Europe – and *vice versa.*" (Cited in Zen'kovskij [1R], p. 32.)
72. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [1R], p. 30. Odoevskij's philosophical thought is dealt with in some detail in Zen'kovskij's *History of Russian Philosophy* (for details, cf. Bibliography Vb under Odoevskij, *infra.*)
73. Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], pp. 21–22.
74. Cf. Koyré, Alexandre [3]: *La philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIXe siècle.* (In Bibliography VIIIa, *infra.*)
75. Cf. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [2R] I, pp. 142–143; [2E] pp. 132–133.
76. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [2R] I, pp. 143–144; [2E] pp. 133–134.
77. Cf. *The Russian Review* 22 (1963) 3, 325–329.
78. For Puškin's political views, see also his correspondence, e.g. his letter of Oct. 19th, 1836, to Čaadaev, which gives Puškin's reaction to the ideas contained in

Čaadaev's *Lettre philosophique.* (Cf. *A. S. Puškin: Polnoe sobranie sočinenij v desjati tomax,* izd. vtoroe, M., AN SSSR, t. X (1958), str. 596–598 [Letter No. 740].)

79. For a sympathetic defence of Gogol's *Selected... Correspondence with Friends,* cf. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [1R], pp. 54 ff. Also Hare ([1], pp. 60–64), who concludes: "Gogol's crime was not that he had betrayed Russia, but that he had betrayed Belinsky's own ideal version of Gogol..., a permanent social rebel, a consistent satirist and atheist."
80. Cf. *The Russian Review* 22 (1963) 3, 327.
81. Cf. Bibliography, Vc, Decembrists, *Works, infra.*
82. Riasanovsky, N. V., in BRP 363 note.
83. On this point, cf. review by N. V. Riasanovsky in *The Russian Review* 18 (1959) 1, 71–72, and letter from him to the Editor, in *The Russian Review* 18 (1959) 3, 252–253.
84. Utechin, S. V. [2], p. 103.
85. Kropotkin, P.: *Russian Literature: Ideals and Realities.* London, Duckworth & Co. 1916, p. 288.
86. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [2R] I, p. 247; [2E] p. 240. A footnote refers the reader to material on Stankevič in the works by Čiževskij ([2R] and [2G]) and by Setschkareff, on Hegel and on Schelling respectively, q.v., *infra,* Bibliography VIIIa.
87. Cf. Bibliography Vd, Stankevič. Vaseckij [2] is already listed as a general work in Section III, *supra.*
88. On this point, *vide supra,* Chapter IVb of this study, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 45–46. Also in Chapter VIb, on Belinskij, *infra,* pp. 184–185.
89. Struve, Gleb [3E]: 'A Belinsky Centenary Bibliography: An Annotated List of 1948 Publications' (Bibliography, VIb, *infra*), p. 546.
90. Cf. Chapter I of this article, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 32.
91. Cf. Al'tman, I.: 'Patriotizm Belinskogo', cited by Struve [3E], p. 551.
92. Cited in: Zen'kovskij, V. V. [1R], p. 39.
93. On the contrary. Cf. especially the article by Gus, M.: 'Belinskij i Rossija', which "deals mainly with Belinskij's attitude to the Slavophils and the difference between their patriotism and Belinskij's" (Struve [3E], p. 553).
94. Cited in: Zen'kovskij, V. V. [1R], pp. 39–40.
95. Cf. Baskakov, V. G. [1]: 'Knigi po istorii russkoj filosofii', *VF* 1949, 1, 327–338. This article, which is a review of four Soviet books, one each on Belinskij and Herzen and two on Černyševskij, was included in error in Section I of the present Bibliography (Reference Works) instead of Section II (General Works). Cf. Bibliography, p. 250, *infra.* Neither Baskakov's article (which is in any case not confined to Belinskij, and appeared only in 1949) nor the work edited by Smirnova [2] appear in Struve's bibliography, which makes no claim to be complete or exhaustive.
96. In the Russian: *mirovozzrenie.* Despite the widely accepted use of the German word *Weltanschauung* in English philosophical and literary terminology, the present author can see no reason for this when it is a question of rendering the *Russian* word into intelligible English.
97. Contrast the 'Western' account given by Mirsky (*A History of Russian Literature,* 1949, p. 165). Referring to Belinskij's 'Literary Musings', which he regards as "the beginning of Russian intelligentsia journalism", Mirsky continues: "His (Belinskij's) articles were inspired with a youthful irreverence for all that was old and respected in Russian letters, and *an equally youthful enthusiasm for the new*

*ideas of idealism* and for the creative forces of the young generation." (My italics, R.K.)

98. Cf., *inter alia,* Chapter IVb of this article, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 44 (citation from *MSE* concerning Slavophils).
99. The author in question is Él'sberg, Ja.; the book [3]: *A. I. Gercen. Žizn' i tvorčestvo,* 1948 edition. (Cf. Bibliography VIc under Herzen, *infra.*)
100. On current Soviet classification (or better "subdivision") of the so-called Westernisers, cf. Chapter IVb of this article, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 45–46. The Soviet *Filosofskij slovar'* (1963 ed.), in its entry on the *Zapadniki,* lists Herzen and Ogarëv as members of the Moscow circle of Westernisers (*vxodili v kružok...*), but Belinskij as having had (only) "close connections" (*tesnuju svjaz'*) with them. The entry concludes with a surprising reference to Western "falsification", as follows: "Several contemporary falsifiers of the history of Russian social thought (H. Kohn, S. R. Tomkins, A. Schelting, *et al.*) have distorted the substance of the term "*Zapadniki*", using it as a means of deliberately misrepresenting Russian history: to the Westernisers they relate (as continuers of the tradition of Belinskij and Herzen) the *Kadety* and the *Men'ševiki*; the *Bol'ševiki* are declared by them to be the ideological successors of the Slavophils." (*FS,* pp. 152–153.) In so far as the views attributed to these "falsifiers" faithfully reflect their opinions, they are certainly open to attack from Western as well as Soviet critics!
101. Struve, Gleb [3E], p. 547.
102. Cf. BRP 1051 note.
103. As regards Belinskij's correspondence, it is worth recording Zen'kovskij's view ([2E] p. 258; [2R] I, p. 264): "In studying Belinskij one must study his *letters* primarily, for in them he expressed his thoughts and searchings freely."
104. Cf. Struve, Gleb [2E], pp. 136–138. The story of Oksman's "fall and rise" is based largely on the account given by L. L. Domherr (Domger) in: *Sovetskoe akademičeskoe izdanie Puškina,* Research Program on the USSR (East European Fund), New York, 1953.
105. In *The Russian Review* 14 (1955) 2, 160–162.
106. Cf. Chapter IVb of this article, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 44 ff.
107. Zen'kovskij refers to Čiževskij, *Gegel' v Rossii,* p. 113. (For this work, cf. Čiževskij [2R], Section VIIIa of the present Bibliography.)
108. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [2E], pp. 257–258.
109. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [2E], p. 259. The Russian original ([2R] I, p. 266) reads: "... *strastnaja, pridirčivaja, i surevaja, no i gorjačaja ljubov' k Rossii*".
110. Hare, Richard [1], p. 68.
111. At the same time, in view of the recent reference to Čaadaev by V. A. Malinin (*vide supra,* p. 178 and Reference 64), it seems at least conceivable that Soviet critics may reach their own *rapprochement* between Čaadaev and Belinskij – albeit with a very different emphasis from that made by Zen'kovskij!
112. In fact, the Index to BRP contains no entry whatever for Herzen, Bakunin, or Ogarëv!
113. Kropotkin, P.: *Russian Literature* etc. (cf. Ref. 85), pp. 296–297.
114. Cited in: Kropotkin, P., *op. cit.*, p. 297.
115. Utechin, S. V. [2], pp. 116–117.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
117. On Herzen's "crypto-Slavophilism" etc., *vide supra,* Ch. IVb of the present work, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 47.
118. Utechin, S. V. [2], pp. 117–118.

119. "... *pečatat' po-russki vne Rossii*". Cited in Putincev, V. A. [2] (Bibliography VId, *infra*), p. 151.
120. *SEER* 40, 95 (June 1962), 551. (The review of Malia's book covers pp. 550–552.) Herzen's ambivalent attitude towards his 'fellow-' Westernisers was matched by his lifelong personal regard for his Slavophil 'adversaries' (described in his memoirs as "nos amis les ennemis, or better, nos ennemis les amis"). This is well brought out in the following passages which appeared in *Kolokol*, to mark the passing of Xomjakov and of Konstantin Aksakov: "It is painful for those persons who loved them to know that these noble, tireless workers are no longer, that these *opponents*, who were closer to us than many of *ours*, no longer exist. The Kireevskijs, Xomjakov, and Aksakov *accomplished their task*... they... made all serious men think. *With them begins the turning-point of Russian thought*.... Yes, we were their opponents, but very strange opponents: we had *one love*, but *not an identical one*. Both they and we conceived from early years one powerful, unaccountable, physiological feeling, which they took to be a recollection, and we – a prophecy: a feeling of boundless, all-encompassing love for the Russian people, Russian life, the Russian turn of mind. Like Janus, or like a two-headed eagle, we were looking in different directions while *a single heart was beating in us*." (Cited in: Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 89, note 59.) See also Herzen's generous tribute, especially to Ivan Kireevskij, in *Byloe i dumy* (Ch. XXX, *Ne naši*...), where he emphasises that it *was* the "religious wall" (*cerkovnaja stena*) that separated them.
121. Cf. Simmons, Ernest J. (ed.): *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*. On this symposium, *vide supra*, Chapter II of the present work, *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 35; also p. 120 (Bibliography II).
122. *Vide supra*, p. 187, and Reference 99.
123. Utechin, S. V. [2], p. 119.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 119–120.
125. Soviet interest and pride in Ogarëv is not limited to research. As these lines were being written, discussions were apparently under way between the Soviet and British governments for the return of the remains of Ogarëv (who died in Greenwich in 1877) from his grave at Shooter's Hill, London, S.E., to Russia. Cf. the account in *The Times* of May 24th, 1965, quoting an article in *Pravda*. According to this account, the necessary arrangements have already been made in the case of Ogarëv, while the Soviet government also "hopes to secure agreement" from the French government for the transfer of the remains of Herzen, who is buried in Nice. "An architect is preparing a tomb for them in the Lenin Hills overlooking Moscow."
126. Hare, Richard [1], p. 5, where he refers to the fact "that influential Westernisers, like Chaadayev, were politically Conservative, and that *many Slavophils – Bakunin is an extreme example* – were violently radical". (My italics, R.K.) This remark is typical of Hare's frequent confusion of Slavophilism with Panslavism.
127. Cf. FBSP 3765 (2). M. N. Peunova: 'Zlobnye vymysli vmesto nauki', *VF* 1960, 5, 175–178.
128. *Filosofskij slovar'* (M., 1963), p. 40.
129. Zen'kovskij, V. V. [2R], I, pp. 251–252; [2E], p. 245.
130. Shapiro, David: WERH p. 68, B. note; Hare, Richard [2], p. 20. Carr's study is available *inter alia* as No. V–725 of the Vintage Russian Library (*q.v.*, Bibliography VII, *infra*).
131. *Vide supra*, p. 194.
132. *Vide supra*, p. 194.

S. MÜLLER-MARKUS

# SOVIET DISCUSSION ON GENERAL RELATIVITY THEORY

## I. GENERAL SITUATION

One would not have been surprised at all, if the 'trauma' of the philosophers' defeat in the Einstein trial of 1955[1] had led to a stagnation in the discussion of the relativity theory. But on the contrary, it was in 1955 that Fock's basic work was published: 'Theory of Space, Time and Gravitation'.[2] In 1958, A. D. Aleksandrov offered his axiomatics of the relativity theory (abbreviated here as RT). The first Soviet Gravitational Conference was held in Moscow in 1961.[3] The *sbornik* 'Latest Problems of Gravitation'[4] as well as the fundamental work 'Einsteinian Spaces'[5] were published the same year. The Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and Technology of the Academy of Natural Sciences of the USSR published the *sbornik* 'Einstein and the Evolution of Physical-Mathematical Thinking'[6] which is to be considered a counterpart to Schilpp's, *Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist.* In all these works the general relativity theory (GRT) holds the dominant part. Soviet philosopher-scientists, however, are not only interested in the physical-mathematical aspect of this theory, but in the classical philosophical problem of space, time, and matter.

The level of the discussions differs considerably from that of the previous discussion on the special relativity theory (SRT). This is, first of all, due to the participants. The accusers in the Einstein trial (Maksimov, I. V. Kuznecov, Štejnman, Šugajlin, Ovčinnikov) had to cede to brilliant physicists and mathematicians like Fock, Landau, Lifšic, A. D. Aleksandrov and Petrov. Those philosophers, like the scientist-historian B. G. Kuznecov (Institute for the History of Natural Sciences and Technology), A. I. Žukov, Mostepanenko, Sviderskij and Meljuxin, will certainly be careful not to make erroneous statements on physics as the 'only materialistic interpretation'.

On the contrary, we are confronted with a mentality which questions such central theses of Diamat as the infinity of space and time. Naturally,



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 3 (September 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

there are enough orthodox points of view. Thus, in 1954, Uëmov denied the existence of gravitons for ideological reasons, but does not repeat this thesis later. Even the finiteness of space was still being vehemently opposed by I. V. Kuznecov and Korž at the Sixth Cosmogonic Conference in 1957, but, in practice, the physicists pass over to the normal programme, without going into philosophical problems. Discussions on the GRT have in this way become an index of the steadily increasing liberalisation of Soviet scientific philosophy.

There is a further distinction to be made between discussions on the SRT and those on the GRT. In the first case, the whole complex of problems was shaded by references to Lenin's theory of reflection. Maksimov, completely misunderstanding Lenin, gave an interpretation of physical relativity as a philosophical relativism and subjectivism. Kuznecov interpreted Diamat in such a sense that structural causes, like the nature of time and space, are 'forbidden' as a reason for the relativistic effects. The transformation of mass into energy has been condemned, appealing to Lenin's controversy against Ostwald. In all these items Lenin's successors confronted the SRT with a Diamat which they had interpreted in their own way.

However, the classics of Engels and Lenin at least provided certain initiatives. Not so for the GRT: from the classics we learn only that the finiteness of space and time of the world is 'forbidden'. They do not indicate, naturally, the actual foundations of the GRT, *viz.* the unity of metrics and gravitation, the equivalence of acceleration and gravitational effects, nor the general covariance. We have to dig deeper, if we want to comprehend the philosophical problems in this case. Nevertheless, they are no less present: (1) the reality postulate, referring to an objective basis of the gravitation, (2) the primacy of matter, referring to its forms of being space and time in the interpretation of Einstein's field equations, (3) the objectivity of acceleration as compared to a hypothetical equality of the geocentric and heliocentric world-system. And it is out of this depth of the Communist *Weltanschauung* that great scientists like Fock, Aleksandrov and Lifšic, having seriously proven their independence of the ideologists, are fighting to reach a materialistic interpretation of the GRT.

This fight does not exclude the romantic awe that is paid to Einstein and his theory: by general conviction, the GRT is considered one of the

greatest scientific achievements of the genius Albert Einstein, as Ginzburg writes[7], and in nearly the same words, Fock[8] and B. G. Kuznecov.[9]

## II. THE OBJECTIVITY OF GRAVITATION

To the naive mind it may appear that a phenomenon of cosmic dimensions like gravitation, which is always present in our daily life, must be objective. But we have to be cautious not to draw hasty conclusions: the relativity of mass, length and simultaneity shows us that their appropriate definition includes the choice of the frame of reference. A. D. Aleksandrov stresses that this does not diminish the objectivity of the effects, – but are mass, length and simultaneity objective? If 'objective' means 'not being produced by the choice of coordinate systems', then they are not objective. A plane, for instance, is objectively free of curvature. The drawing of curved coordinates does not change its metrics. In any event, we have to distinguish between a mathematical coordinate system, respectively, an $n$-tiple as an ideal object, and a real physical frame-work like our laboratory. Because of the numerical equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass in an isolated physical system, we cannot distinguish whether the falling of a suitcase in a railway carriage is to be explained by a suddenly starting gravitational field or by the train that has retarded its velocity. Einstein developed a theory out of this, whereby a gravitational field can be artificially constructed by the transformation of coordinates.

Exactly formulated: logically, gravitation is equivalent to the deviation of the metric tensor from its Galilean values $g_{\mu\nu}=\delta_{\mu\nu}$. This deviation may be produced by coordinate transformations, e.g.,

$$\begin{aligned} x' &= x\cos\omega t + y\sin\omega t \\ y' &= -x\sin\omega t + y\cos\omega t \\ z' &= z \\ t' &= t \end{aligned}$$

This transformation corresponds to a rotating frame-work. Such an operation results in a 'fictive' gravitational field. It may also be produced by the existence of real masses in a space-time region, the results of which are 'real' gravitational fields. But the description of the effects of both fields – if suitably chosen and restricted to local observations – do not differ at all.

Certainly we cannot conclude from this an *a priori Anschauungsform* 'gravitation' or a corresponding physical theoretical fundamental statement.* On the contrary: the very ability to exchange the expressions 'gravitation' and 'acceleration-field' throws doubt upon an *a priori* interpretation of the problem. Thus, the reproach of 'subjective idealism' cannot be made, as was done by Maksimov upon relativity, nor is it dealing with a relativity as compared to the observation instruments, as in the SRT. The actual problem is: can one think of gravitation as a Newtonian force, or, more generally, as a real factor, e.g. an electric field?

If we accept Einstein's explanation as a $g_{\mu\nu}$-field, then such an interpretation loses its sense, and gravitation is physically no more real than phlogiston. At this point the question splits into different directions. Can gravitation be caused, respectively, annulled by an arbitrary coordinate transformation?** Or is it synonymous to the Riemannian metric of space-time? In this case, the problem is whether or not the physical space-time with a definite Riemannian metric is objective. Naturally, this was not known to Kant, but one has only to replace Newton's space by the Riemann-Einstein space-time to reach the point of departure for a transcendental interpretation of the GRT.

It appears to me that this provides an explanation for the strict refusal of Einstein's principles of the GRT by Fock and a few other philosophers. This is a result of the elementary trend towards objectivism in Soviet thinking. It is significant that criticism on the foundations of the GRT has been continuing since 1952, in complete variance to the discussions on the SRT. In 1952, Kuznecov stated that Einstein had replaced the real gravitational field by an imaginary imitation field (acceleration field), the existence of which is assigned only to the choice of the new point of view.[10] The gravitational fields which are to compensate the acceleration are also to Uëmov purely fictitious. He attacks the view of P. G. Bergmann and Max Born, who consider a gravitational field neither real nor fictitious before having chosen the frame of reference. According to them

* Scholz speaks of *physik-theoretische Hauptsätze*, referring to Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

** Of course, coordinate transformations do not lead to physical effects, but describe those effects that are produced by a rotating physical system like a merry-go-round or a freely falling elevator. The existence of such a system is objective in the sense mentioned above, but not their state of motion which is fully dependent on the choice of a frame of reference.

also, 'true length' in the SRT is an expression without any sense. As Uëmov states, this has its origin only in the equality of observations of the external effects of the real and the fictitious gravitational field. But nothing can be drawn from this equivalence, for various effects may cause the same result. The equivalence of both is strictly local*, for if one wants to 'detransform' the gravitational field in all of space, the space itself would become Euclidean. This, however, is refuted by the very Riemannian character of space.** [11]

Also in 1952, Kursanov, now part of the progressive wing among philosophers, called the geometrizing method of the GRT a mystical, theological speculation, stating that no new physical realities can be constructed at all by free creative works of the mind. The example of Kursanov shows how Soviet philosophy mistrusts the speculative genesis of the mathematical apparatus of the GRT, as well as the introduction of particular structural causes, such as the metric of space-time for the physical effects.

The philosopher Sviderskij (Leningrad) showed a certain progress toward this attitude in 1956, i.e. one year after the acknowledgement of the SRT.[12]

According to this, the GRT maintains the positive character of the SRT *in aufgehobener Form*. It explained the numerical equivalence of inertial and gravitational masses, "abolished the concept of the gravitational force, raised once more the question of the relation of geometry as a mathematical science to the science of metrics in physics, and gave a wider conception of invariant physical laws . . " .[13] The new geometry, however, is based not on a synthesis of measurements with the aid of clocks and rods in various frames of references, but on the natural trajectory of moving particles – an argument which, without any doubt, is directed against positivism.*** On the other hand, according to Sviderskij, there is no reason to extend the equivalence principle to each motion.

* In fact, an artificial gravitational field cannot be produced by an accelerated cosmic rocket. The inertial resistance of the rocket is also increasing together with the acceleration and becomes infinite at $v \to c$.

** The argument does not have any sense because of the explicit locality of the equivalence principle.

*** A free particle in a gravitational field is moving on a geodetic line, in gravitation-free space on a straight line. Inferences about the metric of space may be drawn from the appearance of the geodesy.

Producing or annulling a gravitational field by coordinate transformations can only be applied to an infinitesimal region, and not each gravitational field can be imitated by the state of motion in the frame of reference without a gravitational field.

Still more precise is the criticism of Fock. Without any doubt, his view has to be taken seriously, for he is one of the most famous contemporary physicists, one of Einstein's creative successors.[14] His criticism can be summarized in the following theses:

(1) Einstein's conviction about the finding of a universal principle in a purely speculative manner, as the key to all phenomena in physics, has not proved justified.

(2) Einstein considers the 'acceleration frame of reference' a material system. However, all bodies are deformed while accelerating, according to their elasticity, from which one can conclude that no *general* conception of the accelerated moving laboratory is possible. Thus the concept of the accelerated frame of reference in the GRT can only be used as a mathematical coordinate system.*

(3) Independent of argument (2), the fictitious gravitational field evoked in the accelerated frame of reference cannot be considered true. If one passes over to the boundary conditions, then a fictitious gravitational field can always be separated from a 'true' one which can be seen from the following coordinate transformation:

$$x' = x\cosh\frac{gt}{c} + \frac{c^2}{g}\left(\cosh\frac{gt}{c} - 1\right)$$

$$y' = y, z' - z$$

$$t' = \frac{c}{g}\sinh\frac{gt}{c} + \frac{x}{c}\sinh\frac{gt}{c}$$

If we put this in the Galilean expression for the linear interval $ds^2$

$$ds^2 = c^2\,dt'^2 - (dx'^2 + dy'^2 + dz'^2)$$

we will get

$$ds^2 = \left(c + \frac{gx}{c}\right)^2 dt^2 - (dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2).$$

* In fact, no frame of reference exists which would be able to imitate the gravitation of earth by means of a multitude of accelerated sputniks.

In this case, however, the coefficient of $dt^2$ goes with $x$ against $\infty$ and thus infringes the boundary conditions, it vanishes completely in the plain $x = -c^2/g$. It can be mathematically demonstrated that the real gravitational field can be imitated only in a limited space and only for weak homogeneous fields and slow motions. Fock himself does not use the equivalence principle at all, but only the numerical equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass while deriving the GRT. According to Fock, it is a logical and mathematical error of Einstein to have mixed up local with non-local equivalence. The numerical equivalence, however, is considered universal. If one passes over to the local equivalence, as is done by Einstein, it will lead to losing the generality instead of enlarging the theory.

(4) The general covariance of the equations does not imply any general relativity, for the SRT can already be formulated as generally covariant. Lagrange's equations of the second class are covariant. If a large enough number of auxiliary functions is applied, each equation system can become generally covariant. Relativity is connected with the homogeneity and the isotropy of space-time, i.e. with the physical equivalence of all inertial systems, points and directions in space-time. It is impossible to intensify this homogeneity. On the contrary, in Einstein's theory of gravitation it is limited to the local sphere by introducing Riemann's metric. In this sense the SRT would rather have to be regarded as the general theory, and, inversely, the general as the special. A general relativity, as stated by Einstein, does not exist, and the expression 'general relativity theory' must be rejected.[16]

According to Fock, the true principles of the GRT are (1) space and time, combined to a single four-dimensional manifold with indefinite metric, (2) the influence of physical processes upon metric and, therefore, the unity of metric and gravitation.

Fock explicitly makes a distinction between the relativity theory and its 'Machist' interpretation by Einstein. The basic principles of the theory have nothing to do with the apparent coordination of the sense-data into a logical system. The best way to refute the views of Einstein is to confront them with the simple and clear explanations given in the classics of Marxism.[17] In the second edition of his book mentioned above, Fock significantly admits that his general philosophical view of the theory of space, time and gravitation is based upon the influence of dialectical

materialism, especially on Lenin's *MEK*. Therefore, he also succeeded in disclosing the deficiencies in the views of Einstein.[18]

It is remarkable that Fock's criticism of Einstein is shared by A. D. Aleksandrov without any qualms. It is not surprising that Infeld in Warsaw, as the most prominent collaborator of Einstein, has not accepted this view of Fock; but the physicist M. F. Širokov (MGU), as well as the mathematician Bogorodskij (Kiev), criticize Fock. According to Širokov, Fock does not acknowledge the reality of inertial fields, and the locality of the equivalence does not diminish its fundamental meaning. The laws of conservation of energy and momentum are of the same kind in the gravitational as in the inertial field. Up to a certain point, they cannot be separated from each other. It is true that they differ in their physical nature, but they influence the processes in the same way. A future relativistic theory of elementary particles will have to contain the general covariance.[19]

To Bogorodskij, both fields consist of the same physical nature and differ from each other only by their structures. In Euclidean space we can choose a coordinate system in which the $g_{\mu\nu}$ and its first derivatives, referring to the coordinates, have the same values in all points of a curve both in Riemannian, as well as in Euclidean metric. Thus in Euclidean space-time a frame of reference can be constructed in which the motion of the particle is the same as in an inertial field without gravitation. This is the enlarged form of the equivalence principle. Gravitational fields are therefore divided into inertial fields without gravitation, equivalent to an Euclidean metric (Fock describes them as 'imitated', i.e. those emerging by choosing the coordinates) and into those, which Fock considers as 'true', equivalent to a Riemannian structure. Each limited motion in a gravitational field is equivalent to a particular Euclidean metric, which allows one to unroll the law of motion from a Riemannian space into an Euclidean space. In connection with this the geodesic of the Riemannian space is the straight line of the Euclidean space. The 'imitated' fields of the centrifugal or Coriolis forces are in no case more different in their physical nature from the 'true' gravitational field of the senses, than the electrostatic field of a plain condenser from the spherical field of a charged globe.[20]

Especially significant is the attitude of some philosophers. Here the fronts have changed. While until 1955 the philosophers attacked the SRT

and the physicists, especially Fock himself, defended it, now the front line concerning the GRT does not clearly divide philosophers and physicists in this manner. To G. B. Kuznecov the Riemannian space in a non-local region is also homogeneous, in so far as the world line of a particle which follows only gravitation, as well as that of a particle moving in a straight line, has no particular points. Its motion is not connected with actions, the subject of which would not be demonstrated as the geometrical property of space-time.[21]

For Žukov, in opposition to Fock, the GRT cannot be derived from the equality of inertial and gravitational mass, for otherwise we would only come to kinematics of the gravitation-theory. We must adduce the equivalence principle, that is in fact executed by Fock. He declared it valid for a gravitational field without further digression by setting up generally covariant formulae of the laws of nature. This trick, however, is impossible without using the equivalence principle.[22]

To Mostepanenko the general principle of relativity obviously means a conclusion to be drawn from Diamat: in the postulate of general covariance Einstein was trying to find the material unity of the world by means of the principle of relativity, but with the properties of space. To him 'relativity' is but the physical equality of inertial systems. In fact, not all systems in arbitrary motion are equivalent, but this was never stated by Einstein. His intention was not to find a physical equivalence of frames of reference, but of the laws of nature. Thus, he deepened our conception of the world's unity. From this point of view nature does not know any privileged system.*[23]

## III. SPACE, TIME AND 'MATTER'

The central thesis of Diamat, 'space and time are the forms of existence of matter'[24], does not allow any interpretation of the GRT. In actual fact, it is taken in so wide a sense that official Soviet philosophy easily finds this axiom brilliantly verified in the GRT. Actually, the discussion is taking place against a background of materialistic monism. Can we still speak of a single substance 'matter' – 'matter' now in the sense of a physical being – if the metric of space-time essentially determines the con-

* According to Fok, harmonic coordinates in the GRT are similar to Cartesian coordinates in the SRT (see his discussion with Infeld in *VF*, 1955, 5, 155–157).

duct of matter in the most general laws of nature? Will we thus come to a dualism, i.e. matter and geometrical structure of space-time? Lenin's definition of matter as reality can be opposed to his monism. If, following Diamat, we assign objectivity to space and time, then space-time could perhaps become a second substance beside matter. Einstein's general field theory and the contemporary quantised field theory respectively regard matter as singulars, and as excited states of fields. Thus monism shifts from matter to space. Philosophically interpreted, Samuel Alexander rather than Lenin would have to be considered right. Surprisingly, Soviet philosophers refuse Mach's method of reducing inertia as well as gravitation to the interaction between material bodies.

The GRT gives three fundamental views on this problem: (1) near gravitational masses, the metric of space-time deviates from the Euclidean metric. This deviation is executed *realiter,* as is shown by the deflection of light near the sun and the rotation of the perihelion of Mercury. Its origin is not only in the choice of the frame of reference, for in non-local regions no coordinate transformation causes the curvature to vanish. This corresponds to an axiomatic formulation given by Riemann which only afterwards was physically tested by Einstein. This implies a priority of matter upon space-time. (2) The field equation of Einstein $R_{\mu\nu} - \frac{1}{2}Rg_{\mu\nu} = -KT_{\mu\nu}$ gives the connection between the geometry of space-time and any kind of energy and momentum, including the mass energy $E=mc^2$, with the exclusion, however, of the gravitational energy itself. Formally both sides are completely equal. The right side representing matter can be replaced by an expression from the tensor of curvature. The equations themselves do not exclude the hypothesis 'matter is generated by the curvature of space'. Thus the ontic priority of matter over space and time becomes doubtful. (3) In 1938 Infeld and Hoffmann demonstrated that the laws of motion are immediately concluded from the field-equations.[25] A free mass point obeys a geometrical *Führungsfeld* (Weyl). Whatever philosophical significance is given to view (2), from view (3) it can be concluded that space-time has a priority, as compared to the motion of matter. The metric of space-time, however, (the *Führungsfeld*) is not to be interpreted as a law of nature, it is rather by itself subjected to a law of nature (to Einstein's field-equations). On the other hand, neither is it matter in the sense of something acting energetically, such as bodies, particles and fields of force. The gravitational field is not

a field of force, but a special kind of a field, *viz.* a metrical field, the 'action' of which is not given by a transfer of energy.*

These are problems that concern the very roots of the dogma of the Communist *Weltanschauung*. One has to confess that the discussion is held to the point, apart from certain slips. The level of Reichenbach, Carnap or Whitehead, however, has not been reached thus far.

The main point becomes apparent most clearly in the discussion between Uëmov and Novik in 1954 and 1955.[26] Uëmov criticizes Einstein's conception, in which space as a causal effect of physical phenomena is to be eliminated from the physical *Weltbild* and in which, according to Mach, inertia is caused by the distant mass of the universe.[27] Eddington's postulate, according to which the relation of body and space (localisation) can be replaced by the relation of body and body (distance), is also reactionary for Uëmov, in as much as the localisation cannot be considered a physical fact, because the equivalence of the geocentric and heliocentric systems is inferred from this.

As Uëmov states, the idealistic observation postulate upon which are based these theses has never been consequently realized. Even Newton assumed an influence of space upon physical phenomena in his ice pail experiment. Even Einstein had to give up Mach's principle, after having failed to reduce the inertial effects to the influence of distant masses.**

According to Uëmov, the GRT is in contradiction with the basic statement of Einstein mentioned above, for in this case space gains

* In the equation of motion of a mass point following only the gravitation

$$\frac{d^2x_\mu}{ds^2} + \Gamma_{\alpha\beta}{}^{\mu} \cdot \frac{dx_\alpha}{ds} \cdot \frac{dx_\beta}{ds} = 0$$

the second term does not represent a vector and therefore it is not representing a force.
** In fact, fixed stars do not completely determine the *Führungsfeld,* if three-dimensional space is open. If it is closed, then Mach's conception is indeed applicable, but trivial. One must not say, for instance, that the effects of rotation, like the oblateness of the earth at the poles, can be neutralized, if all other bodies are rotating together with the earth. A rotation of all bodies in common is logically no different from being commonly at rest. In this case, we only have inappropriately chosen the coordinate system, when speaking of a common rotation. Hence, the *Führungsfeld* determines itself as if all bodies were motionless. (See M. v. Laue, *Die Relativitätstheorie,* vierte Auflage, Braunschweig 1956, Bd. II, 6, 7.) If we assume an open space, the concept of entirety, after all, loses its sense. If we assume an island world, we still do not know what lies behind the matter island and we therefore have to introduce boundary conditions, e.g. the pseudo-Euclidean world geometry in the infinity.

metrical properties. Einstein himself admits that the variability of relations between rods and clocks has forever eliminated the notion of a physically empty space and that the state of space is described by the ten functions $g_{\mu\nu}$.[28] For Uëmov, Einstein is contradicting his own initial theses making the attraction of masses a consequence of the curvature of space-time. The reactionary rôle of idealism is apparent here, he says: as a metaphysicist, Newton places space as not being connected with matter. In practice however, he makes space determine the inertia of matter. As a subjective idealist, Einstein abolishes space as causing the phenomena, in practice, however, he makes the properties of space-time cause gravitation. Even more, he also attempts to determine electromagnetic interactions by the properties of space-time and finally, following Mach's economy of thought, he regards space-time as the only reality as compared to the secondary reality of matter which becomes merely a region of especially strong fields.

In this way, Einstein starts with the thesis that the only reality is bodies, i.e. matter, and that space is not able to influence physical phenomena, and he finishes with a thesis which is in full contrast to this one.[29]

In connection with this, Uëmov criticizes Ivanenko's theory of gravitons. In 1916 Einstein discovered that from the field-equations for a weak gravitational field can be derived a wave equation the solution of which corresponds to an electrodynamic equation for a retarded potential. In 1939 Pauli and Fierz[30] discovered that gravitons have the rest mass 0 and the spin 2. According to J. Weber and J. Wheeler, a gravitational wave influences a test particle in a way similar to a plain electromagnetic wave.[31] In 1959, Weber found the procedure for generating and detecting gravitational waves.[32]

In the USSR it is Ivanenko, in particular, who promotes this problem.[33] Uëmov blames Ivanenko for, in opposition to Einstein, consciously taking the idea of space as the only reality. The gravitational field is a form of matter to Ivanenko, for the mutual transformation of various kinds of matter is also possible for ordinary matter and gravitation. A pair of electrons and positrons can emerge out of two gravitons. Such transformations are well in accord with the principles of Diamat and, in Ivanenko's eyes, they give new perspectives for a new physical *Weltbild, viz.* of a general theory of all particles and fields.

This, however, as Uëmov says, is in contradiction to the thesis of space

and time as a form of the existence of matter. Content cannot be transformed into form and *vice versa,* just as life as a form of existence of proteins cannot pass over into proteins. The transformation of space and time into their content and that of the particles of matter into space and time is just as senseless as the transformation of motion into matter and that of matter into motion.[34] The attempt made by Ivanenko to find a fundamental world field, the excited states of which are the particles, means that the forms of existence of matter are not space and time, but that matter is a form of existence of the space-time continuum.[35] If Ivanenko's prophecy comes true, then, according to Uëmov, the gravitational field does not express the properties of space and time. This, however, does not mean that we may doubt *a priori* and for mere philosophical considerations, whether or not a transformation into matter is possible at all.[36] On the other hand, there exist reasons for regarding the very gravitational field as an expression of the properties of space-time: (a) it is invariant*, (b) it is not transforming itself into its content, i.e. into other fields or into matter, (c) it is itself universal as an expression of the properties of the universal forms of the existence of matter and characterizes each material object, (d) the properties of space-time influence the motion of each material object. If it should appear that gravitons are transformed into matter, or that gravitational acceleration depends on the physical properties of a body**, then the gravitational field does not satisfy the conditions mentioned above, and one has to find a new field as an expression of the properties of space-time.[37]

With this, however, Uëmov is manoeuvring Diamat into a critical situation, for its destiny becomes dependent on the discovery of a new kind of particle. Novik, at present working at the Department for Philosophy of Natural Sciences of the IF in Moscow*** heavily attacked Uëmov in 1955. He expresses the new attitude of Soviet philosophy, as compared to Uëmov's dogmatism. Novik does not admit of a general

* This is wrong: locally, any manifold of $g_{\mu\nu}$ may be transformed into the Galilean values $\delta_{\mu\nu}$.

** It follows from the numerical equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass (cf. the experiments of Eötvös) that gravitational acceleration does not depend on the mass of the test particle, but only on the $g_{\mu\nu}$-field.

*** He is engaged in the problems of cybernetics; cf. Novik, V., *Kibernetika, filosofskie i sociologičeskie problemy* (Cybernetics, Philosophical and Sociological Problems), M., 1963.

philosophical principle as being indispensable to the problem of how space influences matter. The relation matter-space-time has nothing to do with that of cause-effect, because matter neither precedes space and time, nor has it caused them. The categories 'cause' and 'effect' cannot at all be applied to the world as a whole, for otherwise we would come to a *causa prima*.[38] The expression 'interaction' refers only to inner-material actions and not to the connection between matter and non-matter. If an inner-material action is assumed, then space-time itself becomes a matter, but it is this very statement that is denied by Uëmov. The assumption of an interaction between matter and non-matter compels us to deny the substantiality of matter. But this is contradictory to the thesis 'that matter is *causa sui* and that therefore nothing can influence matter, for in the universe there is nothing but matter in motion and its phenomena.[39] The relation of form and content cannot be applied to matter as a whole; Diamat uses the expression 'form of existence' as an attribute to substance. The 'ordinary' dialectics of form and content, i.e. the statement of the inverse influence of the form upon the content, is by no means to be transferred to the universe as a whole, but only to certain material things and phenomena. Otherwise, one gets the Aristotelian 'form'. The statement, according to which space-time influences matter like the form influences the content, turns the autonomy of space and time into an *absolutum*.[40] In fact, according to Novik, the curvature of space and time is caused by the gravitational field and, inversely, the latter is caused by gravitating masses. The gravitational field influences the progression of a wave front which leads to a deviation from the Euclidean metric, and this acts back upon the motion of material objects. Thus the changing of the form of existence, called 'motion' influences the form of existence called 'space-time'.

Novik concludes that this demonstrates a unity of the forms of existence 'space-time' and 'motion', which affirms the material unity of the world. From this unity can also be concluded the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass. "The configuration of gravitational masses is the essence behind the phenomenon, i.e. behind the character of the space-time metric. This is the cause which acts upon the character of the metric. Insofar as the existence of a gravitational field causes the non-Euclidicity of space-time, then, together with the decrease of the cause in a great distance of the masses, also vanishes its consequence, i.e. space-

time becomes Euclidean."[41] According to Novik, a unified field theory is well justified as an attempt to find a unified world view. The tendency to reduce the variety of matter to the field is wrong. This would be a metaphysical conception of the unity of the world, a geometrization of the world declaring space-time as a *causa prima* of matter.[42]

It appears to me that in 1954 I. V. Kuznecov formulated the problem perhaps most clearly. He criticizes Fock for having placed the universal properties of space and time above matter and having determined the physical properties of matter by those of space and time. Fok derives the GRT from the propagation of a wave front which is the expression of the properties of space and time as well as the law of inertia. The relation between space and time is, according to Fock, also to be placed above the physical relations of material bodies and those of the interactions.[43] Finally, Fock separates space and time from matter and puts it above matter, transforming space and time into a kind of active principle which implies the characteristics and the motion of matter. Such an interpretation of the form of existence inevitably throws us back to the views of the ancient philosophers stating that in nature there exists an inertial substance and an active 'form' which owes all to this substance, even its motion.[44] Kuznecov reproached A. D. Aleksandrov for the same reason.

Even in Kiev Kuznecov's interpretation was harshly rejected by the participating physicists. Fok and Aleksandrov did not attend. It is significant for the following revolution that it was no other than A. D. Aleksandrov who read the main paper on the relativity theory at the All-Union Conference on Philosophical Problems of Natural Sciences in 1958. He claimed to be fighting on two fronts, against positivism (deriving the theory from the observer), as well as against a vulgar materialism that is unable to comprehend the objectivity of the relative.

Aleksandrov himself entitles his derivation, 'theory of relativity as a theory of structure of absolute space-time'. In the following, we are paraphrasing the author: 'Spacelike' and 'timelike' relations, in reality, do not exist for themselves in a pure form, because the question of space and time loses its sense for an absolutely isolated event. From this it follows that the geometry of space-time is not fixed by itself, but represents the 'space-timelike' structure of the material world. Generally, the form is the structure of the content and, subsequently, space-time is

the form of existence of matter. A rational theory of space-time has therefore to derive the concepts and laws of 'space-timelike' relations from the material relations and laws. Thus the law of the constant velocity of light is the universal form of the connection between things and phenomena, at least for the macroscopic sphere. The light cones of the Minkovskij universe define the relation system (structure) in the manifold of events. The kind of effects, however, is irrelevant, in so far as they are expanding with boundary velocity (velocity of light). The transformations that do not change the structure of the effecting relations are identical to the Lorentz-transformations. For, the demand of invariance, as concerns the transformations, fixes the geometry of space-time; the structure of the relations of action determines the geometry of space-time. The action is the most simple case of the causal relation, and that is why the general 'space-timelike' structure of the world is at the same time the expression of the general causal structure. Abstracting it from its physical content, the relation of action becomes a relation of 'timelike' sequence. Thus, space-time becomes the manifold of all events as seen only from the point of view of its structure, which is determined by the relation system of the precedence or sequence abstracted from all other characteristics. It is four-dimensional and has maximal homogeneity, i.e. the group of its transformations that leaves the relation of sequence unchanged is the maximal one amidst all possible transformations. Philosophically, matter itself determines absolute space-time as its form of existence by its interactions and by the motion of its elements. The general structure of interactions divides absolute space-time into a manifold of relatively simultaneous events and relative spaces and times.

The subsequent discussion has been relatively moderate. Only Sviderskij and Ovčinnikov have made remarks on the actual philosophical problem: Sviderskij, principally, has taken a positive attitude. To him space and time are a general structure, and he cites Aristotle, Leibniz, Diderot and Lobačevskij. He points out that the concept of structure is examined in Leningrad and that it is used for the interpretation of quality, bonds of quality, multiple quality (*mnogokačestvennost'*), etc.[45]

In opposition to Aleksandrov and Sviderskij, Ovčinnikov represents the orthodox attitude, evidently, because he is collaborator of the IF in Moscow. Referring to Aleksandrov, he criticizes his definition of the absolute, regarding it as insufficient. Ovčinnikov said that, on the one

hand, he proceeds from the material relations, which is correct, but, on the other hand, he considers the influence of one event upon the other as abstracted from the temporal precedence. In fact, for Aleksandrov it is not the influence that is absolute but the precedence. This absolute he does not bring into connection with the events, but with space-time, i.e. not with the content, but with the form. To Aleksandrov the structure of space-time is absolute and not the manifold of material relations. From this it follows that Aleksandrov has missed his own aim, and the logic of the deduction remains confused, as it was before. If, according to Ovčinnikov, one proceeds from the absolute properties of space-time, then certain material relations, such as the augmenting mass, become a consequence of these properties. The actual task is to pass from the causal structure over to the space structure. Aleksandrov makes the causal relation identical to the relation of the precedence, without explaining the connection of both of them at all. The concept of the influence, in fact, by no means presupposes that of the precedence. Thus, Aleksandrov's attempt has failed "to go beyond the boundaries of the space-time relations and to explain them by proceeding from the material relations".[46] Ovčinnikov, for his part, suggests deriving the absolute from the invariance in relation to the observation methods, which seems to me nothing else than a return of Mandel'štam's positivism to Soviet philosophy.

## REFERENCES


1. Cf. Müller-Markus, S.: *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie* (Einstein and Soviet Philosophy), Vol. I, Dordrecht, 1960.
2. Fock, V. A.: *Teorija prostranstva, vremeni i tjagotenija* (Theory of Space, Time and Gravitation), first edition in 1955, second edition in 1961; German publication, Berlin, 1960; English publication, London, 1959.
3. Cf. Garbell, M.: *Theses of the First Soviet Gravitational Conference held in Moscow in the Summer of 1961,* Garbell Research Foundation, San Francisco, 1963.
4. Ivanenko, D. (ed.): *Novejšie problemy gravitacii* (Latest Problems of Gravitation). M. 1961.
5. Petrov, A. Z.: *Prostranstva Ejnštejna* (Einsteinian Spaces). M. 1961.
6. *Ejnštejn i razvitie fiziko-matematičeskoj mysli* (Einstein and the Evolution of Physical-Mathematical Thought). M. 1962.
7. Ginzburg, V. L.: *Ejnštejn i sovremennaja fizika* (Einstein and Contemporary Physics). M. 1956. p. 93.
8. Fock, V. A.: *Teorija...*, second edition. M. 1961. p. 52.
9. Kuznecov, B. G.: *Ejnštejn.* M. 1963. pp. 395, 396.
10. Cf. *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoj fiziki* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Physics), M., 1952, p. 61.

11. *Ibid.* p. 314.
12. Cf. Sviderskij, V. I.: *Filosofskoe značenie prostranstvenno-vremennyx predstavlenij v fizike* (Philosophical Significance of Space-Time Notions in Physics), LGU, 1956, and his *Prostranstvo i vremja* (Space and Time), M., 1958.
13. Cf. *Filosofskoe značenie prostranstvenno-vremennyx predstavlenij,* p. 221.
14. In 1939 Fock succeeded in deriving the equations of motion from Einstein's field-equations independent of Einstein, Infeld and Hoffmann (1938). Cf. Fock, V. A.: *Journal of Physics USSR* 1 (1939) 81; Einstein, A., Infeld, L., Hoffmann, B.: *Annals of Mathematics* 39 (1938) 65; Infeld, L.: *Physical Review* 53 (1938) 836; Einstein, A., Infeld, L.: *Annals of Mathematics* 41 (1940) 455.
15. Cf. Fock, V. A.: *Teorija...* second edition, M., 1961.
16. *Ibid.*, especially preface § 45, § 61, § 49, § 93.
17. Cf. Fock, V. A.: 'Sovremennaja teorija prostrantsva i vremeni' (Contemporary Theory of Space and Time), *Priroda* 1953, 12, 13.
18. Fock, V. A.: *Teorija. Ibid.*
19. Cf. Širokov M. F.: *O materialističeskoj suščnosti teorii otnositel'nosti. Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoj fiziki* (On the Materialistic Essence of the Relativity Theory. Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics), M., 1959, p. 324, and 'O roli gravitacii v postroenii elementarnyx častic' (On the Role of Gravitation in the Structure of Elementary Particles), *Vestnik MGU,* 1947, 4, 67.
20. Cf. Bogorodskij, A. F.: *Uravnenija polja Ejnštejna i ix primenenie v astronomii* (The Field-Equations of Einstein and their Application in Astronomy), Kiev, 1962, pp. 25–28.
21. Cf. Kuznecov, B. G.: *Princip otnositel'nosti v antičnoj klassičeskoj i kvantovoj fizike* (The Principle of Relativity in Ancient, Classical and Quantum-Physics), M., 1959, pp. 102–115, and *Besedy o teorii otnositel'nosti* (Talks on Relativity Theory), M., 1960, pp. 24–25.
22. Cf. Žukov, A. I.: *Vvedenie v teoriju otnositel'nosti* (Introduction to Relativity Theory), M., 1961, p. 142.
23. Cf. Mostepanenko, M. V.: *Materialističeskaja suščnost' teorii otnositel'nosti Ejnštejna* (The Materialistic Essence of Einstein's Theory of Relativity), M., 1962, p. 197.
24. *Filosofskij slovar'* (Philosophical Dictionary). Pod red. M. M. Rozentalja i P. F. Judina. M. 1963. p. 80.
25. Cf. *Annals of Mathematics* 39 (1938).
26. Uëmov, A. I.: 'Možet li prostranstvo-vremennyj kontinuum vzaimodejstvovat' s materiej?' (Can the Space-Time Continuum be in Interaction with Matter?). *VF,* 1954, 3, 173. Novik, I. B., 'O sootnošenii prostranstva, vremeni i materii' (On Space, Time and Matter and their Connection with Each Other). *VF,* 1955, 3, 140–147.
27. Cf. Uëmov, A. I.: *VF,* 1954, 3, 173.
28. *Ibid.* p. 176, (following Einstein, A., Infeld, L.: *Die Evolution der Physik* (The Evolution of Physics).
29. *Ibid,* pp. 176–177.
30. *Proceedings of the Royal Society* 173 (1939) 211.
31. *Review of Modern Physics* 29 (1957) 509–515.
32. Cf. Weber, J.: *Gravity Research Price SAS,* Boston, April 1958, April 1959. To see the contemporary state of the problems, cf. Pirani, F. A. E.: 'Gravitational Radiation' in *Gravitation: An Introduction to Current Research,* edited by Louis Witten, New York, London, 1962, pp. 199–226, with a detailed list of literature.

33. Cf. Sokolov, A., Ivanenko, D.: *Kvantovaja teorija polja* (Quantum Field Theory), M., 1952, and *Klassische Feldtheorie* (Classical Field Theory), Berlin, 1953 – Ivanenko, D.: 'Vstupitel'naja stat'ja § 5' in *Novejšie problemy gravitacii* ('Prologue § 5', in 'Latest Problems of Gravitation'), M., 1961.
34. Cf. Uëmov, A. I.: *VF*, 1954, 3, 177.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
38. Cf. Novik, I. B.: *VF* 1955, 3, 141.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 146. Novik calls this *causa prima* a *causa finalis* (!). One should rather speak of a *causa structuralis.*
43. Kuznecov is referring to Fock, V. A.: 'Sovremennaja teorija prostranstva i vremeni' (Contemporary Theory of Space and Time). *Priroda* 1953, 12, 13–26.
44. Cf. also Sviderskij, V. I.: *Prostranstvo i vremja* (Space and Time), p. 96; cf. Leibniz, *Hauptschriften der Philosophie,* Vol. I, p. 126.
45. Cf. *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estestvoznanija* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Natural Science), pp. 410, 411. On the problem of multiple-quality (*mnogokačestvennost'*), cf. Branskij, V. P.: *Filosofskoe značenie problemy nagljadnosti v sovremennoj fizike* (The Philosophical Meaning of the Problem of Visualisability in Modern Physics), L., 1962; review by S. Müller-Markus in *SST* IV (1964) 114.
46. Cf. *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estestvoznanija* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Natural Science), p. 453.

# NOTES AND COMMENTS

## A REJOINDER

There is a pamphlet by P. V. Kopnin and V. F. Perederij: *O čem govorjat filosofy mira.* Zametki učastnikov XIII meždunarodnogo kongressa filosofov v Meksike (What the Philosophers of the World Talk About. Notes of Participants at the 13th International Congress of Philosophers in Mexico, Kiev, 1964, 80 str.). In this popular (and illustrated) report on the Mexico Congress (1963) we find a chapter entitled 'Vetter žaluetsja, Boxenskij bespokoitsja' (Wetter complains, Bocheński worries) (str. 69–72). In describing Professor Bocheński's work in Soviet Philosophy the authors say among other things: The East-European Institute at Fribourg produces "a periodical, in which only such writings are published, as are directed against the Marxist-Leninist teaching. We suggested to Bocheński to reprint in his journal any article from the Soviet philosophical press. But he categorically refused, because his aim is to distort the ideas of Soviet philosophy and not to acquaint the world public with its accomplishments."

This statement is quite a distortion itself and based on misunderstandings: (1) Most of the articles published in *SST* so far have been of a doxographical rather than a critical nature. Without *SST* and the *Sovietica* series many of what Kopnin and Perederij rightly call the accomplishments of Soviet philosophy would not be accessible to large sections of the world public. More than that: a good deal of the critical part of the work has been devoted to demonstrating the existence and the philosophical value of such accomplishments to a sceptical public. (2) If an author distorts the ideas of Soviet philosophy (be it for personal malice, or for the classbound character of his thought, or for any other reason) this charge of distortion must be capable of concrete proof and of detailed refutation. (3) This periodical does not have space enough to reprint translations of articles already published elsewhere. (Therefore it rather reports on them.) But it has never refused and will always welcome original contributions from *any* country, as long as they are of sufficient philosophical interest and scientific standards. (This means among other things, that an effort is made to exclude propaganda of *any* tendency.) A possible subject for a paper by a Soviet author could be, for instance,



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 3 (September 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

to correct any of the very distortions and falsifications as are presented in this periodical according to Kopnin and Perederij.

*W. F. Boeselager*

## CURRENT SOVIET PHILOSOPHY IN ITS OWN MIRROR

N. G. Alekseev and E. G. Judin have given for the first time a self-analysis of Soviet philosophy in *VF* 1964, 12, 'Problems of Dialectical Materialism in the Work of Soviet Philosophers'.[1] It provides in addition a picture of contemporary philosophical life in the USSR. The following are translated excerpts:

*Philosophy in the Praesidium of the Academy of Science (AN)*

In recent years problems of the methodology of science have come to the foreground. The Praesidium of the AN discussed the most important methodological problems of the natural and social sciences[2] at a special session, October 18, 1963. The participants remarked that for the progress of natural science a more intensive elaboration of epistemology, especially in such problems as modelling, principles and essence of the mathematization of knowledge, and principles and methods of systems-research, is needed ... Ambarcumjan and Gluškov have declared that the problem of the existence of extra-terrestrial civilization is a specifically philosophical one. To this problem belong cosmic biology and linguistics.*

Fok has brought the attention of Soviet philosophers to the insufficient elaboration of the most urgent problems in modern physics, especially, for atomic physics, of the connection between physical observation and the methods of observation. The solution of this problem will decisively determine the course of scientific development as well as the evaluation of its results.

The scientific control of the socialistic economic system and the production of economic models has raised some of the most complicated methodological problems. Many difficulties emerging herein can only be overcome, if all philosophers take an active part. But, as Nemčinov has stated, their participation can scarcely be considered sufficient at present.

* In this regard, however, philosophy seems to act as a stimulative fantasy (Müller-Markus).

According to Fedoseev, the distinctive characteristic of modern science consists in the fact that the methodological problems arise on the boundary between various disciplines and philosophy. This expresses the tendency to unify modern science and requires of the philosophers a higher level in the natural sciences and, inversely, of the representatives of natural science in philosophy. As Fedoseev puts it, the following problems stand out: the structure of scientific theories, methods of their construction, the nature of these fundamental concepts, regularity and logic of scientific development, interaction of the methods of various disciplines in modern science.[3]

*Dialectics*

Ukraincev, Koval'čuk and Čertkov[4] are seriously trying to analyse the specificity of the influence of dialectical laws upon the construction of Communist society. It is well known that research on the dialectics of social development is one of the most backward fields in our philosophical science. The unity of dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge is being analysed by Kedrov, Rozental', Kazymžanov, Kopnin, Gabriel'jan, Abdil'din, Bakanidze, Čerkesov, Alekseev and Mal'cev.[5] Kedrov considers dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge as a representation of various aspects of Marxist philosophy. Dialectics is the extensive theory of the laws of evolution, logic represents the application of dialectics to knowledge, and is in this sense a part of dialectics as the theory of evolution. The theory of knowledge is as well part of dialectics, *viz.*, the theory of the relation between thought and being. Kopnin and numerous other Soviet philosophers assume the same attitude. The opposite point of view is expressed most clearly by Il'enko[6], for whom the unity of dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge means their identity. Finally, according to Čerkesov, Alekseev and Mal'cev, the coincidence of dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge can be expressed in the form of concentric circles, the widest of which stands for dialectics, the lesser for epistemology and the smallest for logic.

The connection between dialectical and formal logic is part of one of the most frequently discussed problems. In addition to the books mentioned above, this is expressed in the collected papers 'Dialectics and Logic. Rules of Thinking' and 'Dialectics and Logic. Forms of Thinking'[7], as well as in 'Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Formal Logic'.[8] According to Kedrov, formal logic is a philosophical science and, as an

element, becomes part of dialectical logic. Tavanec and Kopnin, however, consider formal logic not a philosophical but a special science, and they indicate that it is a method of research both for philosophy and special sciences. Alekseev concludes that dialectical logic, as distinct from formal logic, investigates the rules of dialectical thought as a special mode of thought, and that the dialectics of thought is to be distinguished from dialectical thought which can be either spontaneous or conscious.[9] ... One has to confess that the points of view considerably differ from each other and that still more discussions are evidently necessary to find a general point of view.

*Investigation of Categories*

We note with satisfaction that at present literature on the categories has become extensive and varied ... Fedoseev[10] treats the central law of unity as well as that of the conflict of opposites, as do also Čertkov, Batiščev and Elec.[11]

Soviet philosophers, e.g. Uëmov, Rumer and Ryvkin[12], are often involved in analysing relatively little explored categories. They are interested in the epistomological nature of quality[13] ... The problems of dialectics as a system of rules and categories have been exposed in particular by Tugarinov, Rožin, Bibler, Kopnin, Rozental', Alekseev, Mankovskij, and Šeptulin.[14]

*Epistemology*

The tendency to investigate single concrete problems arising in this field is becoming clearer and clearer. First of all, one must mention here the problem of the ideal, as it is expounded by Il'enkov, and in a more detailed manner, by Ponomarev.[15] Since the publication of Spirkin's book 'The Origin of Knowledge'[16], far more attention has been paid to research on the genesis of consciousness and on the descent of categories. To the same sphere also belongs the question of the subject and the object, especially in its epistemological aspects.[17] Despite the differences of opinion, some common principles can be emphasised, i.e. the analysis of the ideal, and of consciousness in its social specificity. (That consciousness cannot be investigated as belonging to the psychological but to the social individual and that it is 'adapted' by it under definite social circumstances.)

The problem of the reflection of the contradictory character of thought in motion has provoked vital discussions to date.[18] Unfortunately, Soviet philosophers and logicians have not yet reached a common view.

*Reflection*

The essence of reflection *(otraženie)* as a general characteristic of matter is demonstrated by Ukraincev, Tjuxtin, Vekker, Medvedev, Iliadi, Novik, Rajkin, Kremjanskij.[19] Ukraincev gives a definition of reflection as the reproduction of the characteristics of one system by the characteristics of another.[20] Tjuxtin is trying to construct an elementary reflectionary cell that is marked by: (1) the existence of two bodies (processes) in interaction, wherein each one acts as a reflected body or as the reflection-carrier; (2) transposition, i.e., the transformation of the structure of the object reflected; (3) the correlation of the structures.[21] Tjuxtin assumes that reflection in anorganic nature exists only as the potential premiss and basis of reflection, but does not exist actually, while, according to Iliadi, Lapšin and Rajkin it is manifest both in organic and anorganic nature.

*Cybernetics*

There has arisen a mountain of problems caused by the philosophical interpretation of cybernetics.[22] Great interest in it was shown at the United Theoretical Conference of the Philosophical Seminars of the Institutes of the AN on Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics, held in the summer of 1962 with the participation of nearly 800 auditors.[23] The definition of the subject of cybernetics still remains unsolved. The definition by Berg, however, of cybernetics as a science of controlling processes in complicated dynamic systems, has been widely acknowledged. Markov defines cybernetics as a general theory of causal nets. According to Ukraincev, information is to be derived from reflection. It is the connection with other systems and with the external world that is realised by a signal. Information and regulation are linked together in pairs.

Therefore, no information is passed on in anorganic nature, except within artificial systems. Žukov[24] has written on this problem. Not so, however, according to Gluškov[25]: to him and Tarasenko information means a general characteristic of matter, and, according to Novik, reflection is connected with well-regulated reflection.[26]

*Models*

At present, a number of works dealing with investigations on modelling have been published, e.g. by Zinov'ev and Rozental', Frolov, Gluškov, Ždanov, Amosov, Novik and Štoff[27], and some others.

All those books deal with (1) the definition and classification of models as special means of knowledge, (2) the application of models in various fields of science, like cybernetics, biology, physics, sociology, economics and linguistics.

*Systems*

A third group of important problems has come up before dialectical materialism in connection with the intensive development that system-research has gone through in recent decades ... These are the focal points in modern biology (theoretical and molecular, ecology, biocenology), physics, geography and criminology.[28]

In recent years the deficiencies in this field have been overcome. Famous books have been written on this by Afanas'ev, Kremjanskij, Sviderskij, Val't, Ovčinnikov, Blauberg, Abramov, Ždanov, Lektorskij, Jugaj.[29] Zinov'ev has analysed the concept of communication, one of the most central in systems-research.[30] Sačkov, Grušin, Mamardašvili, Petrušenko, Mamzin, Proxorenko, and others have written on the problems of the methodology of system-structure research. For three years, a seminar, organized by the Department of the Council for Complex Problems in Cybernetics at the Praesidium of the AN, has been dedicating itself to work on this problem. Most of it has dealt with the systems and structure on an 'objective' level. Without minimising the value of this work it must be said that the most urgent aspects of the problem are the epistemological ones. Recent discussions on such problems as the theory of the major systems which form the basis for economic modelling, have, unfortunately, taken place without the participation of philosophers.

*Semiotics*

The literature published by us during recent years contains numerous works on signs and sign-systems. However, little attention has been given to the epistemological analysis of semiotic problems.

Reznikov, Zinov'ev, Narskij, Revzin, Ščedrovskij and Sadovskij have

written on this problem.[31] Extensive factual material is contained in the volumes 'Structural-Typological Research' (Moscow, 1963), and 'Problems of Structural Linguistics' (Moscow, 1963).[32] Nevertheless, these problems are still ranked only second. Fundamental works in this area do not exist at the moment.

Mitin states that one of the reasons for this backwardness consists in the fact that our philosophers have been repulsed by the one-sided interpretation of Lenin's critique of the theory of hieroglyphs. Lenin's critique means the rejection of any agnostic element. It would be wrong, however, to deny universally the rôle of signs in the process of knowledge. On the contrary, Lenin points out in his *Filosofskie tetradi*[33] the importance of an elaboration of symbolism.[34] There is no doubt today of how urgent the development of philosophical problems in semiotics has become.

*Logic of Science*

In recent years investigations on the logic of science have constantly increased. All-Union-Conferences on the logic of scientific research were held in Tomsk in 1960 and 1963 and in Kiev, 1962.[35] Centres have been established for the logic of science, e.g. the Department for Logic at the Institute for the History of Natural Science and Technology of the AN and at the IF, as well as at the Academy for Pedagogy of the RSFSR. The logic of science has become a rather separate trend. A survey of the first successes in developing the logic of scientific research shows that the field of analysis is extraordinarily important and helpful. Therefore, we can expect new results even in the near future. One of the most urgent tasks is to link research work still more with the needs of the development of science and practice. Asmus[36] has always considered logic as science a logic of scientific research. Mostly, however, logic of research is ascribed to a special field of matter.[37]

In connection with this such problems are also being discussed as forms and methods of abstracting (D. P. Gorskij), formalisation and idealisation (A. L. Subbotin), semantic definition of truth (P. V. Tavanec, A. A. Vetrov), methods of the construction of theories (V. A. Smirnova, A. I. Rakitov, V. S. Vyrev), the use of the means of multivalued and modal logic in the methodology of science (A. A. Zinov'ev), logic of probability (G. I. Ruzavin), analogy (A. I. Uëmov), etc. These investigations have been described in various books.[38]

## REFERENCES


1. 'Problemy dialektičeskogo materializma v rabotax sovetskix filosofov', *VF* 1964, 12.
2. Cf. *Metodologičeskie problemy nauki* (Methodological Problems of Science), M., 1964.
3. *Ibid.* pp. 200.
4. Ukraincev, B. S., Koval'čuk, A. S., Čertkov, V. P.: *Dialektika pererastanija socializma v kommunizm* (The Dialectics of the Growth of Socialism into Communism). M. 1963.
5. Kedrov, M. B.: *Edinstvo dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija* (The Unity of Dialectics, Logic and Theory of Knowledge). M. 1960 – Rozental', M. M.: *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki* (The Principles of Dialectical Logic). M. 1960 – *Lenin i dialektika* (Lenin and Dialectics). M. 1963 – Kasymžanov, A. X.: *Problema sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija* (The Problem of the Coincidence of Dialectics, Logic and Theory of Knowledge). Alma-Ata. 1962 – Kopnin, P. V.: *Dialektika kak logika* (Dialectics as Logic). Kiev. 1961 – Gabriel'jan, G. G.: *Marksistskaja logika kak dialektika i teorija poznanija* (Marxist Logic as Dialectics and the Theory of Knowledge). Erevan. 1963 – Abdil'din, Z., Kasymžanov, A., Naumenko, L., Bakanidze, M.: *Problemy logiki i dialektiki poznanija* (Problems of Logic and of Dialectics of Knowledge). Alma-Ata. 1963 – Čerkesov, V. I.: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija* (Materialistic Dialectics as Logic and the Theory of Knowledge). M. 1962 – Alekseev, M. M.: *Dialektičeskaja logika* (Dialectical Logic). M. 1960 – *Dialektičeskaja logika kak nauka* (Dialectical Logic as Science). M. 1961 – Mal'cev, V. I.: *Očerk po dialektičeskoj logike* (Synopsis of Dialectical Logic). M. 1964.
6. Il'enko, E. V.: *Dialektika abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v 'Kapitale' Marksa* (The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Kapital). M. 1960 – 'Ideal' noe' (The Ideal) in *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija.* Vol. II.
7. *Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija* (Dialectics and Logic. Rules of Thinking), and *Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija* (Dialectics and Logic. Forms of Thinking), both edited by B. M. Kedrov, M. 1962.
8. *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoj formal'noj logiki* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Formal Logic), edited by P. V. Tavanec, M. 1962.
9. Cf. 'Soderžanie i struktura kursa 'Dialektičeskaja logika'' (The Content and Structure of the Course 'Dialectical Logic'), *VF* 1964, 1.
10. Cf. Fedoseev, P. N.: *Kommunizm i filosofija* (Communism and Philosophy), M., 1960.
11. Čertkov, B. B.: *Jadro dialektiki* (The Essential Point of Dialectics). M. 1962. – Batiščev, G. S.: *Protivorečie kak kategorija dialekticeškoj logiki* (The Contradiction as Category of Dialectical Logic). M. 1963 – The *sbornik, O dialektike razvitija sovetskogo socialističeskogo obščestva* (On the Dialectics of the Development of Soviet Socialist Society). M. 1962 and *Dialektika razvitija socialističeskogo obščestva* (The Dialectics of the Development of Socialist Society) edited by M. M. Rozental', M. 1961 – Ukraincev, B. S.: in *Dialektika pererastanija socializma v kommunizm* (The Dialectics of the Growth of Socialism into Communism). Cf. Elec, I.: 'Dialektičeskaja i formal'naja logika ob ob'jektivnyx protivorečijax i kriterii ix različenija' (Dialectics and Formal Logic in Objective and Subjective Contradiction and the Criterion of their Difference), in *Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija* (Dialectics and Logic. Rules of Thinking), M. 1962.

12. Uëmov, A. I.: *Veščі, svojstva i otnošenija* (Things, Qualities, Relations). M. 1963 – Rumer, Ju. B. and Ryvkin, M. S.: *VF* 1964, 7.
13. Cf. *Nekotorye kategorii dialektiki* (Some Categories of Dialectics), ed. M. N. Rutkevič and L. M. Arxangel'skij. M. 1963.
14. V. P. Tugarinov, V. P. Rožin, in *Nekotorye kategorii dialektiki* (Some Categories of Dialectics) published in 1956–1958, ed. by M. N. Rutkevič, and L. M. Arxangel'skij – V. S. Bibler: *O sisteme kategorii dialektičeskoj logiki* (On the System of Categories of Dialectical Logic). Stalinabad. 1948 – Kopnin, V. P.: *Dialektika kak logika* (Dialectics as Logic). Kiev. 1961 – Rozental', M. M.: *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki* (Principles of Dialectical Logic). M. 1960 – *Lenin i dialektika* (Lenin and Dialectics). M. 1963 – Alekseev, M. N.: *Dialektičeskaja logika kak nauka* (Dialectical Logic as a Science). M. 1961 – Mankovskij, L. A.: *Logičeskie kategorii v 'Kapitale' K. Marksa* (Logical Categories in Marx's *Kapital*). M. 1960 – Šeptulin, A. P.: *O vzaimosvjazi kategorij materialističeskoj dialektiki* (On the Mutual Relations of the Categories of Materialistic Dialectics). M. 1960 – Andreev, I. D.: *Dialektičeskij materializm* (Dialectical Materialism). M. 1960 – *O metodax naučnogo poznanija* (On the Methods of Scientific Knowledge). M. 1964 and numerous others.
15. Ponomarev, Ja. A.: 'Problemy ideal'nogo' (The Problem of the Ideal). *VF* 1964, 8.
16. Spirkin, A. G.: *Proisxoždenie soznanija* (The Origin of Consciousness). M. 1960.
17. Lektorskij, V. A.: 'Problema sub"jekta-ob"jekta v teorii poznanija' (The Problem of Subject-Object in the Theory of Knowledge). *VF* 1964, 5.
18. Cf. Janovskaja, S. A. in *Problemy logiki* (Problems of Logic), M., 1963 – Dragun, B. A., Narskij, S. I., Petrov, Ju. A., Zinov'ev, A. A., Vojšvillo, E. K.: *FN* 1964, 1, 2, 3, 4 – Narskij, I. S. in *Formal'naja logika i metodologija nauki* (Formal Logic and the Methodology of Science), M., 1964.
19. Ukraincev, B. S.: 'O vozmožnostjax kibernetiki v svete svojstva otobraženija materii' (On the Possibilities of Cybernetics in the Light of the Reflection of Matter) in *Filosofskie problemy kibernetiki* (Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics). M. 1961 – Tjuxtin, V. S.: *O prirode obraza. Psixičeskoe otraženie v svete idej kibernetiki* (On the Nature of the Image. Psychological Reflection in the Light of the Ideas of Cybernetics). M. 1963. Cf. his articles in *VF* 1962, 5 and 1964, 2 – Vekker, L. M. in *VF* 1963, 2 and 1964, 3. Cf. the books by A. N. Rajkin, N. V. Medvedev, A. N. Iliadi, and V. I. Kremjanskij.
20. Cf. Ukraincev, V. S.: in *VF* 1963, 2.
21. Cf. *VF* 1964, 2, 29–30.
22. Cf. a review of the fundamental philosophical problems of cybernetics in Birjukov, B. V., Spirkin, A. G., 'Filosofskia problemy kibernetiki' (Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics) in *VF* 1964, 9.
23. Cf. A review of the conference reports in *VF* 1962, 11.
24. Žukov, N. I., *Informacija v svete leninskoj teorii otraženija* (Information in the Light of Lenin's Theory of Reflection) in *VF* 1963, 2.
25. Gluškov, V. M.: 'Myšlenie i kibernetika' (Thinking and Cybernetics) *VF* 1963, 1. Cf. Novik, I. V.: 'Negentropija i količestva informacii' (Negentropy and the Quantity of Information) in *VF* 1962, 6, and *Kibernetika. Filosofskie i sociologičeskie problemy* (Cybernetics. Philosophical and Sociological Problems), M., 1963 – Tarasenko, F. P.: 'K opredelenij ponjatija 'informacija' v kibernetike' (On the Definition of the Concept of Information in Cybernetics), *VF* 1963, 4.
26. Cf. *Kibernetika. Filosofskie i sociologičeskie problemy* (Cybernetics. Philosophical and Sociological Problems), p. 60.

27. Zinov'ev, A. A., Revzin, I. I.: 'Logičeskaja model' kak sredstvo naučnogo issledovanija' (The Logical Model as an Instrument of Scientific Research), *VF* 1960, 1 – Frolov, I. T.: 'Gnoseologičeskie problemy modelirovanija biologičeskix sistem' (Epistemological Problems of the Modelling of Biological Systems). *VF* 1961, 2 – Gluškov, B. M.: 'Gnoseologičeskaja priroda informacionnogo modelirovanija' (Epistemological Nature of Information Modelling). *VF* 1963, 10 – Ždanov, Ju. A.: 'Modelirovanie v organičeskoj ximii' (Modelling in Organic Chemistry). *VF* 1963, 6 – Amosov, A. M.: 'Modelirovanie informacii programm v složnyx sistemax' (Modelling of Program-Information in Complicated Systems). *VF* 1963, 12 – Ždanov, G. B.: 'Informacionnye modeli v fizike' (Information Models in Physics). *VF* 1964, 7 – Novik, I. B.: 'Gnoseologičeskaja xarakteristika kibernetičeskix modelej' (Epistemological Characteristics of Cybernetic Models). *VF* 1963, 8 – Štoff, V. A.: *O roli modelej v poznanii* (On the Role of the Models in Knowledge). L. 1963.
28. Cf. Utevskij, B. S., Anučin, V. A.: *VF* 1964, 2.
29. Afanas'ev, V. G.: *Problema celostnosti v filosofii i biologii* (The Problem of Integrity in Philosophy and Biology). M. 1964 – Kremjanskij, V. I.: *VF* 1958, 8 – Sviderskij, V. I.: *O dialektike elementov i struktury* (On the Dialectics of Elements and Structure). M. 1962 – Val't, L. O.: *VF* 1963, 5 – Občinnikov, N. F.: *VF* 1964, 2 – Blanberg, I. V.: *Problema celostnosti organizma* (The problems of Integrity of the Organism). M. 1964 – Abramov, N. T.: *VF* 1962, 2 – Ždanov, Ju. A.: *FN* 1960, 1 – Lektorskij, V. A., Sadovskij, V. N.: *VF* 1960, 8 – Jugaj, G. A., *Problema celostnosti organizma* (The Problem of Integrity of the Organism). M. 1962.
30. Cf. *Issledovanija po logike* (Investigations on Logic), M., 1959.
31. Reznikov, L. O.: *Gnoseologičeskie voprosy semiotiki* (Epistemological Problems of Semiotics). L. 1964 and *VF* 1963, 1 and 1964, 4 – Zinov'ev, A. A. in *Problemy strukturnoj lingvistiki* (Problems of Structural Linguistics). M. 1963 – Narskij, I. S.: *VF* 1963, 6 – Revzin, I. I.: 'Ot strukturnoj lingvistiki k semiotike' (From Structural Linguistics to Semiotics) *VF* 1964, 9 – Ščedrovskij, V. N., Sadovskij, V. N.: 'K xarakteristike osnovnyx napravlenij issledovanija znaka v logike psixologii i jazykoznanii' (On the Characteristic of Basic Directions of Signal Investigations in Logic, Psychology and Linguistics) in *Novye issledovanija v pedagogičeskix naukax* (Latest Investigations in Pedagogical Sciences). 1964, 2.
32. *Strukturno-tipologičeskie issledovanija.* M. 1962 – *Issledovanija po strukturnoj tipologii.* M. 1963 – *Problemy strukturnoj lingvistiki.* M. 1963.
33. Lenin V. I.: *Filosofskie Tetradi.*
34. Cf. *Soč.*, Vol. 38, 9, 107.
35. Cf. review in *VF* 1960, 11; 1962, 10; 1964, 8.
36. Asmus, V. F.: *VF* 1962, 10, 9. 134.
37. Cf. Tavanec, P. V.: 'Logika naučnogo poznanija i sovremennaja formal'naja logika' (Logic of Scientific Knowledge and Contemporary Formal Logic) in *VF* 1964, 3 – Ščedrovskij, G. P.: 'O različie isxodnyx ponjatijax formal'noj i soderžatel'noj logik ' (On the Difference of Original Concepts of Formal and Intensional Logic) in *Problemy metodologii i naučnoj logiki* (Problems of Methodology and Scientific Log c). Tomsk. 1962 – Kopnin, P. V.: 'Logika naučnogo issledovanija i ix osnovnye ponjatija (Logic of Scientific Research and its Basic Concepts). *VF* 1964, 3 – Sadovskij, V. N., 'Problemy metodologii deduktivnyx teorij' (Problems of Methodology of Deductive Theories). *VF* 1963, 3.
38. *Filosofskie problemy sovremennoj formal'noj logiki* (Philosophical Problems of

Contemporary Formal Logic). M. 1962 – *Logičeskie issledovanija* (Investigations on Logic). M. 1959 – *Primenenie logiki v nauke i texnike* (The Application of Logic in Science and Technology). M. 1960 – *Problemy logiki* (Problems of Logic). M. 1963 – *Problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija* (Problems of Logic of Scientific Knowledge), M. 1964 – Zinov'ev, A. A.: *Filosofskie voprosy mnogoznačnoj logiki* (Philosophical Problems of Many-Valued Logic). M. 1960 and *Logika vyskazyvanij i teorija vyvoda* (Logic of Propositions and the Theory of Conclusions). M. 1962 – Gorskij, D. P.: 'Princip parallelizma formy i soderžanija myslenija i ego značenija dlja tradicionnyx logičeskix issledovanij' (The Principle of the Parallelism of Form and Content of Thinking and its Significance for Traditional Logical Investigations). *Doklady APN RSFSR, 1960–1961.*

*S. Müller-Markus, S. Stöcker*

## TWO SOVIET CONFERENCES ON GRAVITATION

The growing interest of Soviet physicists and philosophers is shown by the convocation of an All-Union-Conference on the philosophical problems of Einstein's theory of gravitation and the relativistic cosmology, held in Kiev, May, 1964. The conference was summoned by the Soviet Commission for Gravitation, the Scientific Council for Philosophical Problems of Natural Science of the AN SSSR and by the IF of the Ukrainian AN. 250 physicists and philosophers took part, among them the physicists A. Z. Petrov (Kazan'), D. D. Ivanenko and M. F. Sirokov (Moscow) and the philosophers V. I. Sviderskij and S. T. Meljuxin (Leningrad). It must be considered strange that Fock and A. D. Aleksandrov were missing. The Second Conference on Gravitation took place in Tiflis, April 20–28, 1965. Reports on both conferences will be given separately.

## A PHILOSOPHICAL CONDEMNATION OF LYSENKO

In the first issue of *Novyj Mir* of 1965, Prof. Kedrov condemns Lysenko. According to Kedrov, Lysenko has for the fifteen years since 1948, been driving Soviet biology into a completely wrong direction. A confusion of neo-Lamarckist and anti-evolutional scientific speculations were presented as 'Soviet creative Darwinism'. In reality, Weissmann, Morgan, de Vries and Mende, whom Lysenko accused, have realised really great works in the field of science, based, in point of fact, on materialism. Lysenko made materialism an adjuration to fight against a direction that was unsatisfactory to him. Science, however, cannot be held back by such

adjurations. Kedrov states that Lenin's principle of *partijnost'* is extremely simplified by some 'vulgarisers', who seek only to find the idealism in the new scientific discoveries and to revile them afterwards. Nevertheless, Kedrov admits the existence of a real problem of the connection between classical biology and modern genetics. With the aid of physical-chemical and molecular genetics the mechanism of the evolutionary processes is being penetrated. This new evolutionary biochemistry enables the classical theory of Darwin to be brought closer to contemporary genetics. However, biology is still waiting for a second Niels Bohr, who, as in atomic theory, will interpret the macroscopic nature of life from the knowledge of its sub-cellular and molecular structure and who will in addition permeate genetics with a far-seeing evolutionary thought.

Prof. Dubnin, whose Institute for Genetics was closed in 1948, is now heading the Institute for Radiation-Genetics.

## NEW CENTRES FOR ATHEISM

According to *Pravda,* June 15, 1965, a university was established in the Turkmen SSR for scientific atheism. *Pravda,* June 18, reports that new schools for atheist-agitators have been built in several cities in the middle region of the Urals. The programme will last two years. Courses are mainly for teachers, physicians, engineers and specialists.

## STALIN NEWLY SENTENCED

Four days after Kosygin mentioned Stalin on May 9th, we read in an article by Prof. Fedoseev in the *Izvestija,* May 13; "The ugliest way in which subjectivism expresses itself is the cult of personality. It disregards the objective laws of development and spurns socialist jurisdiction. It abuses power and infringes on socialist democracy." *S.M.M.*

# REVIEW

*The Soviet System in Theory and Practice*, Harry G. Shaffer (ed.). Appleton-Century-Crofts. New York. 1965. 470 pp. $ 4.50.

Mr. Shaffer has produced a book that is rather difficult to review, being close to the limit imaginable both in form and in content. Subtitled 'Selected Western and Soviet Views', it is a *sbornik* divided into eleven chapters, each containing articles or selections by Western Sovietologists and by Soviet sources. In five chapters there are also views by Western Marxists, and in one, by Chinese Communists. The chapters are: 'Communist Ideology and Morality: the Marxist-Leninist Background'; 'Stalin: Great Leader or Cruel Despot?'; 'Soviet Life Today: Some Introductory Observations'; 'Economic Planning in the USSR'; 'Peaceful Coexistence and the Economic Challenge'; 'Living Standards in the USSR'; Education in the USSR'; 'Freedom and Democracy in the USSR'; 'The Position of the Creative Artist in Soviet Society'; 'Soviet Law'; 'Soviet Aid to the Less Developed Countries: Purposes and Accomplishments'. Altogether, there are over 65 articles devoted to these fields.

There is no clear basis of division for the chapter headings, and certain parts (particularly those dealing with Stalin and with the Creative Artist) have been alloted disproportionate amounts of space, while other topics which should have been mentioned are completely omitted (e.g., Diamat, agriculture, religion, the nationalities, the military, and subversion). There is, too, a considerable range in the worth of the contributions. On the whole, those by the Western Sovietologists are quite good, even if frequently elementary. With the exception of Isaac Deutscher's article on the implications of peaceful coexistence, most of the contributions by Western Marxists are poor, and several (notably those by P. M. Sweezy and V. Perlo) are simply twaddle. However, as Professor Oswald Backus observes in the Foreword, "some of the selections were originally prepared for propaganda purposes", and this unfortunately applies also to many of the Soviet selections.

It is a pity that in the section on Ideology no treatment is given to Diamat, although there are two quite good articles, by Prof. R. L. Heilbronner on Marx, and by Prof. Shaffer, on a comparison of Communism and Fascism. Professor Niemeyer's section on Lenin is a collection of excerpts and quotations from his excellent *Facts on Communism*, but comes out somewhat disconnected. The rest of the selections from Western 'Marxists' and Soviets add nothing to these three. Indeed, it is a serious reproach to be made to the editor that frequently he does not seem to have collected the best possible contributions to the various fields. Of course, his task was complicated by the fact that none of the articles were written for the book, but were selected from previous publications, not necessarily corresponding to his chapter headings.

Prof. Shaffer's intention in producing the book, as expressed in the Preface, was to provide students (presumably high-school and college) with a cross-



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 3 (September 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

section of views and interpretations of the Soviet system from a broad spectrum of positions, in order to permit them to analyze, compare and judge for themselves. Although not as comprehensive as might have been hoped for, nor as scientific, it will probably achieve its purpose. Certainly the form of the book, and the principle of it, are excellent. However, the limitations mentioned above, in addition to the absence of any bibliography, subject-index, and with a few exceptions, footnotes or references within the articles themselves, exclude any possibility of the book being used for serious scientific work.

*P. Beemans*

# SOVIET DIALECTICAL LOGIC

This bibliography, like the article on pp. 139–172, can only pretend to offer only a first preliminary survey of Soviet dialectical logic. Its scope is limited in several ways: it includes only publications since 1955; it does not consider the discussion between dialectical and formal logic; it refers, above all, to those works which try to lay the foundations and to give a general elaboration of dialectical logic; treatments of special categories and particular problems of dialectical logic have only been included if they seemed of special importance. For more exhaustive documentation see the bibliography in: T. J. Blakeley, *Soviet Theory of Knowledge*. Dordrecht, 1964, pp. 146 ff.


ABDIL'DIN, Z., KASYMŽANOV, A., NAUMENKO, L., BAKANIDZE, M.: *Problemy logiki i dialektiki poznanija*. Alma-Ata. 1963.

ALEKSEEV, M. N.: *Dialektika form myšlenija*. M. 1959.

ALEKSEEV, M. N.: *Dialektičeskaja logika. Kratkij očerk*. M. 1960.

ALEKSEEV, M. N.: *Dialektičeskaja logika kak nauka*. M. 1961.

ALEKSEEV, M. N.: 'Soderžanie i struktura kursa "Dialektičeskaja logika"'. *VF* 1964, 1, 76–85.

ASMUS, V. F.: 'Nekotorye voprosy dialektiki istoriko-filosofskogo processa i ego poznanija'. *VF* 1961, 4, 111–123.

BIBLER, V. S.: *O sisteme kategorii dialektičeskoj logiki*. Stalinabad. 1958.

ČERKESOV, V. I.: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija*. M. 1962.

*Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija*. Sbornik st. Obšč. red. B. M. Kedrov. M. 1962.

*Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija*. Sbornik st. Obšč. red. B. M. Kedrov. M. 1962.

*Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Istoriko-filosofskie očerki*. Sbornik st. Obšč. red. B. M. Kedrov. M. 1964.

*Dialektika – teorija poznanija. Problemy naučnogo metoda*. Sbornik st. Obšč. red. B. M. Kedrov. M. 1964.

DOLGOV, K. M.: 'Leninskoe ponimanie sootnošenija logiki, dialektiki i teorii poznanija i ego razrabotka'. *VF* 1962, 5, 157–161.

GABRIEL'JAN, G. G.: *Marksistskaja logika kak dialektika i teorija poznanija*. Erevan 1963.

GORTARI, ELI DE: *Vvedenie v dialektičeskuju logiku* (Introduccion a la logica dialektica). M. 1959. Cf. ibid. VOJŠVILLO, E. K.: 'Vstupitel'naja stat'ja', pp. 5–30.

KASYMŽANOV, A. X.: *Problema sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija*. Alma-Ata 1962.

KEDROV, B. M.: 'O dialektiko-logičeskom obobščenii istorii estestvoznanija'. *VF* 1960, 1, 61–74.




*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 3 (September 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

KEDROV, B. M.: 'Opyt metodologičeskogo analiza naučnix otkritii'. *VF* 1960, 5, 63–78.

KEDROV, B. M.: 'Istoričeskoe i logičeskoe v razvitii naučnogo poznanija'. *VF* 1960, 12, 62–73.

KEDROV, B. M.: *Edinstvo dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija.* M. 1963.

KOPNIN, P. V.: 'Dialektika form myšlenija v filosofii Gegelja'. *VF* 1957, 4, 51–62.

KOPNIN, P. V.: 'Marksistskaja filosofija kak metod naučnogo poznanija'. *VF* 1960, 5, 135–144.

KOPNIN, P. V.: *Dialektika kak logika.* Kiev. 1961.

KOPNIN, P. V.: 'Materialističeskaja dialektika – logika razvitija sovremennoj nauki'. *FN* 1963, 4, 66–73.

KRYMSKIJ, S. B.: *Genezis form i zakonov myšlenija.* Kiev. 1962.

MALCEV, V. I.: *O nekotoryx čertax dialektičeskogo logiki.* Uč. zap. filosof. f-ta MGU, Vyp. 190, 1958.

MALCEV, V. I.: *Očerk po dialektičeskoj logike.* M. 1964.

MANEEV, A. K.: *Predmet formal'noj logiki i dialektika.* Minsk. 1964.

NIKITIN, P. I.: 'O dialektike form myšlenija'. *Vestnik MGU* 1960, 6, 59–69.

OJZERMAN, T. I.: 'Dialektičeskij materializm i gegelevskaja koncepcija sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija. In: *VF* 1958, 1, 105–112.

ORUŽEJNIKOVA, S. V.: 'Logičeskaja funkcija kategorij dialektiki'. *FN* 1963, 3, 32–38.

POTKORYTOV, G. A.: 'Sootnošenie istorii i teorii v poznanii'. *VF* 1958 10, 48–55.

POTKORYTOV, G. A.: 'O formax myšlenija v dialektičeskoj logike'. *Vestnik LGU* 1960, 4, 69–77.

*Problemy dialektičeskoj logiki.* Sbornik st. Pod red. V. I. MAL'CEVA. M. 1959.

'Prospekt problemy "Edinstvo materialističeskoj dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija"'. *VF* 1955, 6, 239–244.

RODNYJ, N. I.: 'Sootnošenie istorii i logiki nauki'. *VF* 1965, 3, 37–46.

ROŠKA, G. D.: 'Voprosy dialektičeskoj logiki v filosofii Gegelja'. *VF* 1958, 2, 153–155.

ROZENTAL', M. M.: 'V. I. Lenin o zadačax i principax razrabotki dialektičeskoj logiki'. *VF* 1955, 2, 33–48.

ROZENTAL', M. M.: *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki.* M. 1960.

ROZENTAL', M. M.: *Lenin i dialektika.* M. 1963.

ROZENTAL', M. M.: 'O razrabotki dialektiki kak logiki i teorii poznanija'. *VF* 1964, 10, 15–26.

SAZONOV, Ja. V.: 'O processe dialektičeskogo obobščenija'. *Vestnik MGU* 1960, 1, 67–78.

ŠEPTULIN, A. P.: 'Kategorii dialektiki kak stupeni poznanija'. *VF* 1964, 6, 27–36.

ŠEPTULIN, A. P.: 'Vzaimosvjaz' kategorij dialektiki kak vyvod iz istorii filosofii'. *FN* 1965, 2, 12–21.

ŠINKARUK, V. I.: *Logika, dialektika i teorija poznanija Gegelja* (Problema toždestva logiki, dialektiki i teorii poznanija v filosofii Gegelja). Kiev. 1964.

SITKOVSKIJ, E. P.: 'Lenin o sovpadenii v dialektičeskom materializme dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija'. *VF* 1956, 2, 77–90.
*Voprosy dialektiki i logiki*. Sbornik st. Otv. red. V. P. Rožin. L. 1964.
ŽDANOV, D. A.: 'Problemy genezisa logičeskix form'. *VF* 1963, 10, 163–165.

*Karl G. Ballestrem*

# SELECTED WRITINGS ON NINETEENTH- AND EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY RUSSIAN THOUGHT II

Part I of this Bibliography* contained Sections I–IV, as follows:

I. Reference Works, (Bibliographies, Handbooks, etc.)
II. General Works Covering more or less the Entire Period
III. General Works Dealing with the First Half of the Nineteenth Century
IV. The Slavophils. (a) Western Sources; (b) Soviet Sources

Part II, which appears below, contains the following further Sections:

Additions and Amendments to Sections I–IV.
V. Early Thinkers and Groups. (a) Čaadaev; (b) The 'Lovers of Wisdom' and their Friends; (c) The Decembrists; (d) Stankevič and his Circle.
VI. The Westernisers. (a) Moderate Westernisers; (b) Belinskij; (c) Herzen; (d) Ogarëv
VII. Anarchism and Revolutionary Panslavism. Bakunin
VIII. Works Dealing with the Influence of West-European Ideas. (a) German philosophy. Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, etc.; (b) French social thought: (1) Proudhon, Saint-Simon, Fourier; (2) The Petraševcy; (3) Russia and 1848

Part III of this study – beginning with Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, and Pisarev and continuing up to 1917 – is now in preparation and, space permitting, will be published in these pages at a later date.

## ABBREVIATIONS

This list includes all abbreviations listed for Parts I–IV (cf. *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 114), plus numerous others used here for the first time. Many of the latter are the same as those used in FBSP, *q.v. infra.*

*Note.* After abbreviations of Russian expressions indicating 'edited by', 'introductory article by', 'under the general editorship of', etc., the name(s) of the authors or editors concerned appear in the *Nominative Case.* E.g. vs. D. D. Blagoj (*not* Blagogo); r. I. Ja. Ščipanov (*not* Ščipanova), etc.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ak. | Akademija | *ASJ* | *Anglo-Soviet Journal* (London) |
| AN | Akademija Nauk | BCB | A Belinsky Centenary Bibliography (cf. Struve, Gleb [3E], Section VIb, *infra*) |
| AON | Akademija obščestvennyx nauk pri CK KPSS | *BRP* | *Basic Russian Publications* |
| *ASEER* | *American Slavic and East European Review (Slavic Review)* | | |

* Cf. *Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 1/2 (April 1965) 114–128.

| | |
|---|---|
| č. | čast' (Part) |
| (d) | dissertacija (thesis) |
| Ed. | Editor, Edited by, etc. |
| ed. | edition |
| *FBSP* | *Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy* |
| fil. | filosofii, filosofskij, etc. |
| FLPH | Foreign Languages Publishing House (cf. IIL, *infra*) |
| *FS* | *Filosofskij slovar'* |
| G | gosudarstvennyj, etc. |
| GIXL | Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo xudožestvennoj literatury |
| gl. | glava (Chapter) |
| gl.r. | glavnyj redaktor, etc. |
| IF | Institut filosofii AN SSSR |
| IIL | Izd. inostrannoj literatury (cf. FLPH, *supra*) |
| Inst. | Institut, etc. |
| *IRSH* | *International Review of Social History* (Assen) |
| iz. | izdanie |
| Izb. | Izbrannoe, Izbrannye, etc. |
| Izd. | Izdatel'stvo |
| Izv. | izvestija |
| *JCEA* | *Journal of Central European Affairs* |
| K. | Kiev, Kievskij, etc. |
| kaf. | kafedra |
| komm. | kommentarii |
| kn. | kniga |
| L. | Leningrad, Leningradskij, etc. |
| lit. | literatura, literaturnyj, etc. |
| *Lit. Gaz.* | *Literaturnaja gazeta* |
| Lit. N. | Literaturnoe nasledstvo |
| M. | Moskva, Moskovskij, etc. |
| *MSE* | *Malaja Sovetskaja Enciclopedija* |
| o.r. | obščij redaktor, etc. |
| per. | perevod, perevedënnyj, etc. |
| pol. | polnoe |
| pred. | predislovie |
| prim. | primečanija |
| r. | redaktor, redakcija, etc. |
| R.S.X.D. | Russkoe Studenčeskoe Xristianskoe Dviženie |
| S(S). | Seite(n) [for German titles only] |
| *SEEJ* | *Slavic and East European Journal* (Wisconsin, U.S.A.) |
| *SEER* | *Slavonic and East European Review* (London) |
| sob. | sobranie |
| soč. | sočinenija, sočinenij, etc. |
| Ss. | sbornik statej |
| SSSR | USSR |
| *SST* | *Studies in Soviet Thought* |
| str. | stranica, stranicy [for Russian titles only] |
| t. | tom (Volume) |
| *TLS* | *Times Literary Supplement* |
| TPBI | Trudy Pravoslavnogo Bogoslovskogo Instituta (Paris) |
| U. | Universitet(a) |
| U.P. | University Press |
| *UZ* | *Učënye zapiski* |
| *VF* | *Voprosy filosofii* |
| VKP | Vsesojuznaja Knižnaja Palata |
| VPŠ | Vyssšaja partijnaja škola pri CK KPSS |
| vs. | vstupitel'naja stat'ja |
| Vyp. | Vypusk |
| *WERH* | *A Select Bibliography of Works in English on Russian History 1801–1917* |
| *WLP* | *Russia and the Soviet Union; a Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications* |

## ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS I–IV

*Section Ia (Bibliographies, etc.)*

Delete:

BASKAKOV, V. G.: *Knigi po istorii russkoj filosofii* etc. (This work is inserted as Baskakov, V. G. [1] under Section II, *q.v., infra.*)

*Section Ib (Encyclopaedias, General Reference Aids, etc.)*

Add:

*Filosofskaja enciklopedija.* gl. r. F. V. Konstantinov. tt. I– ... M., G. naučnoe Izd. "Sovetskaja enciklopedija" IF. 1960– ... t. I (A–Didro), 1960, 504 str.; t. II (Diz"junkcija–Komičeskoe), 1962, 575 str.; t. III (Kommunizm–Nauka), 1964, 584 str. [*BRP* 1200]

"A general philosophic reference work, written from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, and containing numerous articles on Russian thinkers and intellectual movements. The major articles include comprehensive bibliographies." (*BRP* 1200 note)

*Section II (General Works covering more or less the Entire Period)*

The following titles should be added to this Section:

*Anthologies.*

*Russian Philosophy; an Historical Anthology.* Edited by James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, with the collaboration of George L. Kline. Chicago, Quadrangle Books. 1965. 3 vols. XX + 434 pp.; XX + 312 pp.; XX + 521 pp. [*WLP* 1622]

"Substantial selections from ... 26 Russian thinkers, ranging from Skovoroda and Radishchev ... to Berdiaev and Losskii ..." (*WLP* 1622 note).

*Slavische Geisteswelt.* Ed. Martin Winkler. Bd. I: Rußland. Darmstadt, Geneva, Holle. 1955. 340 SS. [*WLP* 1385]

"Excellent anthology in German translation of the most important texts relating to the spiritual and intellectual evolution of the Russian people." Pages 1–157 cover the period up to the end of the 18th century. (*WLP* 1385 note)

*Secondary sources*

BASKAKOV, V. G.

[1] 'Knigi po istorii russkoj filosofii'. *VF* 1949, 1, 327–338.

A review of four Soviet books, one each on Belinskij and Herzen and two on Černyševskij. Illuminating from the point of view of Soviet 1948 criticism.

ČIŽEVSKIJ (CHYZHEVS'KYI), Dmitrij

[1G] *Zwischen Ost und West; Russische Geistesgeschichte 18–20 Jahrhundert.* Hamburg, Rowohlt. 1961. [*WLP* 1360; 1566]

The second volume in the author's 2-vol. *Russische Geistesgeschichte*, this

volume covers the 18th to 20th centuries, with special emphasis on the 19th.

*Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax.* r. M. A. Dynnik *et al.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. IF. 1957 – ... t. I, 1957, 718 str.; t. II, 1957, 711 str.; – t. III, 1959, 614 str.; t. IV, 1959, 672 str.; – t. V, 1961, 919 str.

Originally planned in 4 vols. (and so described in earlier volumes) cf. editorial note in Vol. IV, p. 5. Contains numerous sections on Russian philosophical thought, also on German philosophers, from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint. The most important of these are listed separately in the relevant Sections of this Bibliography.

*Iz istorii russkoj filosofii.* Ss. gl.r. I. Ja. Ščipanov.

M., Gospolitizdat (Fil. Fakul'tet MGU). 1952. 766 str.

Includes longish articles on Belinskij, Herzen, Černyševskij, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Plexanov. These are listed separately under the respective thinkers concerned.

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo.* No. 67. *Revoljucionnye demokraty. Novye materialy.* M. AN SSSR. 1959. 800 str.

Contains valuable new material on various Russian 19th-century radical thinkers.

MATHEWSON, R. W., jr.

[1] *The Positive Hero in Russian Literature.* New York, Columbia U.P. 1958. 364 pp. [*WLP* 1429]

"A brilliant analysis of the intellectual and artistic antecedents of 'socialist realism', tracing the demand for 'positive heroes'" from Belinskij onwards. (*WLP* 1429 note)

## V. EARLY THINKERS AND GROUPS

### (a) *Čaadaev*

ČAADAEV, P. Ja. (1794–1856)

*Works*

There is no important post-1945 edition, though a Soviet edition of *Selected Philosophical Works* is apparently in preparation (cf. Malinin, V. A.: 'Naučnaja istorija russkoj filosofii i spekuljacii buržuaznyx filosofov' [cf. Ref. 60 on p. 200, *supra*], p. 184, note 24). Some extracts appear in the anthologies by Kohn and by Žaba (Section II, *supra*). The former includes excerpts from two of the *Lettres philosophiques,* from two letters to A. I. Turgenev, and from the 'Apologia of a Madman', all translated from what is still the standard edition: *Sočinenija i pis'ma,* tt. 1–2, edited by O. M. Geršenzon, M., 1913/14. Cf. also numerous excerpts in the works by C. Quenet and by A. von Schelting (*infra*). "The only complete and accurate series of 'Philosophical Letters' is in the

Manuscript Section of the Institute of Russian Literature in Leningrad, and a Russian translation ... has been available since 1935." (R. T. McNally, *q.v. infra*, [2], p. 352.) Cf. 'Neizdannye "filosofskie pis'ma" P. Ja. Čaadaeva', in: Lit. N., Nos. 22–24, M., 1935.

*Secondary sources*

FALK, H.: *Das Weltbild Peter I. Tschaadajews nach seinen acht 'Philosophischen Briefen'*. Munich, Issar Verlag. 1954. 136 SS. [*FBSP* 2242]
Supports "the basic Gershenzon interpretation" of Čaadaev "as a mystic inclined towards the Roman Church" (McNally [2], p. 354) A Soviet critique is that by P. S. Škurinov ([1] *infra*).

GRIGOR'JAN, M. M.
[1] 'Čaadaev i ego filosofskaja sistema'. In: *Iz istorii filosofii*. Vyp. 2. (M., Izd. VPŠ i AON. 1958. 253 str.) str. 126–182. [*FBSP* 5637(1) and 1741]

HARE, Richard
[1] (Section III, *supra*), pp. 5–24.

KOYRÉ, A. A.
[2] See Section VIIIa, *infra*.

LAVRIN, Janko
[4] 'Chaadayev and the West'. *The Russian Review* 22 (1963) 3, 274–288.

LIEB, Fritz
[1] (Section II, *supra*), pp. 57–63.
Lieb's article was originally published in 1929, soon after the discovery of the missing *Lettres philosophiques* by D. J. Šaxovskoj. See p. 63, note 20 (where wrongly given as Schachowskij).

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, Nos 22–24. M., AN SSSR. 1935.
Contains, *inter alia*, Čaadaev's unpublished *Lettres philosophiques* in Russian translation, with long introductory article by D. Šaxovskoj, *q.v., infra*.

MASARYK, T. G. (Section II, *supra*), Vol. I, pp. 221–236.

MAZOUR, A. G.
[1] 'Pëtr Jakovlevič Čaadaev (1796–1856)'. *Le Monde slave* 11 (1937) 243–266.

MCNALLY, Raymond T.
[1] 'Chaadaev's Evaluation of Peter the Great'. *ASEER* March 1964.
[2] 'The Significance of Chaadayev's *Weltanschauung*'. *The Russian Review* 23 (1964) 4, 352–361.

MOSKOFF, E.: *The Russian Philosopher Chaadayev, His Ideas and His Epoch*. New York. 1937.
"Emphasises the connection between Chaadaev's concept of 'freedom' and that of the Slavophiles." (Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 228)

QUÉNET, Charles
[1] *Tchaadaev et les Lettres philosophiques; contribution à l'étude du mouve-*

*ment des idées en Russie* (Bibliothèque de l'Institut francais de Léningrad, vol. 12). Paris, Institut d'Etudes slaves de l'Université de Paris. 1931. LXIX + 440 pp. [*WLP* 1603]

"A detailed study of Chaadaev's philosophy of history and culture, particularly his view of the relation of Russian to Western European civilisation." (*WLP* 1603 note)

"An important detailed study of Chaadaev ... but the treatment of the Slavophiles is confused and unsatisfactory." (Riasanovsky, N. V. [5], p. 229)

[2] *Tchaadaev et les Lettres philosophiques. Sources et recherches.* Paris. 1931 (as in [1] *supra*).

The bibliography to [1], *supra.*

*Note.* Von Schelting *(Rußland und Europa,* p. 10) refers to: "Charles Quénets 'Lettres philosophiques de Pierre Tchaadaev' (Paris 1937)" *(sic)* – but gives no further details.

SCHEIBERT, Peter [1]. See Section VIIIa, *infra.*

"Thus the Florovsky-Scheibert thesis of Chaadayev as a 'post-Christian ideologue' was added to the growing roster." (McNally [2], p. 355)

SCHELTING, Alexander von. Cf. Section III, *supra.*

This work is mainly concerned with Čaadaev.

SCHULTZE, B. [1]. See Section II, *supra.*

Contains a study of Čaadaev from a Catholic standpoint.

ŠAXOVSKOJ, D.: 'Neizdannye "filosofskie pis'ma" P. Ja. Čaadaeva'. In: *Lit. N.* M. 1935. No. 22–24, pp. 1–78.

ŠKURINOV, P. S.

[1] 'Genrix Fal'k v roli istorika russkoj filosofii.' *VF* 1958, 6, 146–150. [*FBSP* 2134]

Soviet review of the work by Falk, *q.v., supra.*

[2] *Mirovozzrenie P. Ja. Čaadaeva.* M. 1958. [*MSE* 10, 299].

[3] *P. Ja. Čaadaev. Žizn', dejatel'nost', mirovozzrenie.* M., Izd. MGU. 1960. 147 str. [*FBSP* 3990]

"The most recent Soviet evaluation, by the philosopher P. S. Shkurinov, attempted to renovate the Herzen-Plekhanov thesis by characterising Chaadayev as a 'progressive, aristocratic revolutionary'." (McNally [2], p. 354)

ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V. (Section II, *supra)*

[2R] t. I, str. 158–179.

[2E] pp. 148–170.

[3R] 'P. Ja. Čaadaev, kak religioznyj myslitel". *Pravoslavnaja Mysl'* Vyp. 5. Paris, TPBI. 1947.

(b) *The 'Lovers of Wisdom' and their Friends*

KÜCHELBECKER (KJUXEL'BEKER), V. K. (1797–1846)

*Works*

*Izbrannye proizvedenija.* L., Sov. Pis. 1959. 450 str.
*Sobranie sočinenij v 2-x tomax.* r. Ju. Tynjanov. L., Sov. Pis. 1939. [*BRP* 1072. *MSE* 5, 305]

*Secondary sources*

LIEB, Fritz
[2] (Section IV, *supra*), p. 87, incl. note 8.
Lieb considers Küchelbecker as having been at one time "well on the way to becoming the first real Slavophil" ("... auf dem besten Wege, der erste eigentliche Slawophile zu werden") (*loc. cit.*, p. 87).

STRUVE, Gleb
[1R] 'Religioznye motivy v tvorčestve V. Kjuxel'bekera'.
In: *Vestnik R.S.X.D.* No. 29 (July–Aug. 1953), 15–25.
See also Struve, Gleb [2E] under (c) *The Decembrists, infra.*

TYNJANOV, Ju. N.
[1R] 'Kjuxlja'. In: *Izbrannye proizvedenija.* M., Goslitizdat. 1956. 807 pp. A biographical novel (1925) of which Küchelbecker is the hero. Described by Mirsky as "one of the best historical novels in the Russian language" (*A History of Russian Literature*, 1949, p. 106).
[2G] *Wilhelm Küchelbecker. Dichter und Rebell.* Translated from the Russian by M. Einstein. Zurich. 1951.

ODOEVSKIJ, V. F. (1803–1869)

*Works*

*Devjat' povestej.* New York, Izd. im. Čexova. 1954(?). 273 str. Includes 'Sil'fida', 'Salamandra', 'Privedenie', 'Svidetel'', and others.
*Povesti i rasskazy.* r. E. Ju. Xin. M., Goslitizdat. 1959. 494 str. [*BRP* 1078]
*Lit. N.* (No. 22–24, M. 1935) contains, *inter alia*, Odoevskij's Diary for the years 1859–1869.

*Secondary sources*

RIASANOVSKY, N. V. [5] (Section IVa, *supra*), pp. 20–22.
ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V. [1R] (Section II, *supra*), pp. 27–37; [2R] *(ibid)*. t. I, pp. 144–157; [2E] *(ibid.)* pp. 134–148.

PUŠKIN, A. S. (1799–1837)

*Works*

Unlimited number of editions. The most complete (including correspondence, articles, etc.) are:

*Polnoe sobranie sočinenij.* L., Izd. AN SSSR. 1937–1950. tt. 1–16. [*BRP* 1083].
"Large, carefully published variorum edition" (*BRP* 1083 note).

*Polnoe sobranie sočinenij.* iz. vtoroe. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1956–1958.
[*BRP* 1083]
"Small, convenient volumes; minimal annotations." (*BRP* 1083 note)

*Secondary sources*

FRANK, S. L.: *Puškin kak političeskij myslitel'*. Beograd. 1937.
Reprinted in: *Étjudy o Puškine.* Mjunxen (Munich). 1957. str. 28–57.
Originally published as a brochure, the first of a series entitled *Voprosy istorii i kul'tury* edited by P. B. Struve (cf. *Étjudy,* p. 7).

STRUVE, P. B.
[2] Introduction and Addenda to the work by S. L. Frank (1937), *q.v. supra.* (This Introduction does not appear in *Étjudy o Puškine* (1957).)

VENEVITINOV, D. V. (1805–1827).

*Works*

The standard edition is that of 1934, viz.:

*Polnoe sobranie sočinenij,* vs D. D. Blagoj. r. B. V. Smirenskij.
M., Academia. 1934. 533 str. [*BRP* 1095. *MSE* 2, 285].
Zen'kovskij ([2R] only, t. I, str. 143, note 11) refers to this "splendid" ("*prekrasnoe*") edition. It contains the complete poems and letters, with notes and commentary, also a bibliography. (*BRP* 1095 note).

There is also a later, selected, edition: *Izbrannoe.* M. 1956. [*MSE* 2, 285]

*Secondary sources*

KOYRÉ, A. See note under Zen'kovskij, V. V., *infra.*

ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V. (Section II, *supra*)
[2R] t. I, str. 143–144; [2E] pp. 133–134.
A footnote states: "Koyré gives a detailed exposition of Venevitinov's articles (without sufficient analysis, however) in his book *La philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIXe siècle,* pp. 139–145."
(This work is listed in Section VIIIa, *infra.*)

VJAZEMSKIJ, P. A. (1792–1878)

*Works*

There is an edition of *Poems* in the series *Biblioteka poéta (bol'šaja serija):*

*P. A. Vjazemskij: Stixotvorenija.* iz. vtoroe. L., Sov. Pis. 1958. 507 str. The introductory article by L. Ja. Ginzburg (pp. 5–45) contains references to Vjazemskij's socio-political ideas and his relations with the Decembrists.

*Secondary sources*

GINZBURG, L. Ja. *Vide supra,* under *Works.*

WYTRZENS, Gunther: *Pjotr Andreevič Vjazemskij. Studie zur russischen Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.* Vienna, Verlag Notring der wissenschaftlichen Verbände Osterreichs. 1961. 334 SS.
Reviewed at length by Gleb Struve in *The Russian Review* 22 (1963) 3, 325–329. The book deals mainly with Vjazemskij's own literary activity, but this "is presented against the background of Russian literature of his time and in relation to the evolution of his political opinions . . ." Excellent bibliography – "a truly priceless tool for any future student of Vyazemsky".

(c) *The Decembrists*

THE DECEMBRISTS (DEKABRISTY)

*Works*

[1] *Izbrannye social'no-političeskie i filosofskie proizvedenija dekabristov. K 125-letiju vosstanija dekabristov.* V trëx tomax. r. and vs. I. Ja. Ščipanov. (MGU. Kaf. ist. fil.) M., Gospolitizdat. 1951–t.I Severnoe obščestvo. 1951. 732 str. [*FBSP* 1116]

(*FBSP* contains no reference to subsequent volumes.)

[2] *Vosstanie dekabristov. Dokumenty.* t. 7. *"Russkaja Pravda" P. I. Pestelja i sočinenija, ej predšestvujuščie.* M., Gospolitizdat. 1958. 692 str. [*MSE* 7, 83]

[3] *Vosstanie dekabristov. Materialy po istorii.* tt. 1–6, 8–11. M.-L. 1925–1954. [*MSE* 3, 381]

[4] *Dekabristy i ix vremja. Materialy i soobščenija.* r. M. Alekseev and B. Mejlax. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1951. 381 str.

[5] JAKUŠKIN, I. D.: *Zapiski, stat'i, pis'ma dekabrista I. D. Jakuškina.* r. S. Ja. Štrajx. In series 'Lit. pamjatniki'. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1951. 737 str. [*MSE* 3, 381].
PESTEL', P. I.: Cf. [2], *supra,* also t. 4 of [3], *supra.* [*MSE* 7, 83].

[6] RYLEEV, K. F.: *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij.* M.-L. 1934. [*MSE* 8, 96]

See also *Lit. N.* Nos 59 and 60, *infra.*

*Secondary sources*

ADAMS, A. E.: 'The Character of Pestel's Thought'. *ASEER* 12 (Apr. 1953) 153–161. [*WERH* 72]

CEJTLIN, A. G.: *Tvorčestvo Ryleeva.* M. 1955. [*MSE* 8, 96]

DEJNEKO, N. I.: *Voprosy teorii poznanija i logiki v trudax dekabristov.* Kiev, KGU. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 5385]

DRUŽININ, N. M., and SYROEČKOVSKIJ, B. E. (ed): *Očerki iz istorii dviženija dekabristov.* Ss. M., 1954. [*MSE* 3, 381]

EJMONTOVA, R. G. (compiler): *Dviženie dekabristov: ukazatel' literatury, 1928–1959 gg.* r. M. V. Nečkina. M., VKP. 1960. 434 str. [*BRP* 363 note]. For further study by M. V. Nečkina, *vide infra* [2].

FEDOSOV, I. A. [1], [2]. See Section III, *supra,* esp. [1].

GABOV, G. I.

[1] 'Materializm v filosofskix vzgljadax dekabristov'. *VF* 1950, 3, 259–271. [*FBSP* 214]

[2] *Filosofskie i obščestvenno-političeskie vzgljady dekabristov.* IF. 1948–51. (d) [*FBSP* 5538 (2)]

[3] *Obščestvenno-političeskie i filosofskie vzgljady dekabristov. P. Pestel', N. Krjukov, I. Jakuškin, N. Murav'ëv, M. Lunin.* Ak. Artillerijskix Nauk. 1951–52. (d) [*FBSP* 5538 (1)]

[4] *Obščestvenno-političeskie i filosofskie vzgljady dekabristov.* M., Gospolitizdat. 1954. 296 str. [*FBSP* 1090].

HERZEN, A. I.: 'Literatura i obščestvennoe mnenie posle 14 dekabrja 1825 goda'. In: *O razvitii revoljucionnyx idej v Rossii.* M., Goslitizdat. 1958. 158 str. Cf. Herzen (Section VIc, *infra*), *Works* [6R].

LEMBERG, Hans: *Die nationale Gedankenwelt der Dekabristen.* Köln (Cologne) Bohlau Verlag. 1963. 168 SS.

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo.* Nos 59 and 60 contain valuable and interesting materials concerning the literary activities of certain Decembrists, including the poets Ryleev and Küchelbecker *(q.v., supra):* No. 59: *Dekabristy literatory.* č.1. r. A. M. Egolin. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1954. 800 str. incl. 263 ill. No. 60: *Dekabristy literatory.* č.2. r. V. V. Vinogradov. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1956. In 2 books, 672–462 str. Ill.

Concerning No. 59, cf. an interesting article by Gleb Struve ([2] *infra*) in which he reveals the deliberate suppression of a passage in an article by Küchelbecker stressing the Russian people's loyalty to "altar and throne" – a suppression possibly due to the chief editor, Egolin, "a notorious Ždanovite". (Cf. Struve [2], pp. 138–141.)

MAZOUR, A. G.

[2] *The First Russian Revolution, 1825: The Decembrist Movement, Its Origins, Development and Significance.* Second ed., with bibl. supplement. Stanford U.P. 1961. [*WERH* 70]

First published 1937 (Univ. of California Press). A "scholarly exposition" (N.V. Riasanovsky in *The Russian Review* 18 (1959) 1, 72.)

MEREŽKOVSKIJ, D. S.: *Aleksandr I i dekabristy.* New York, Izd. im. Čexova. 416 str.

Analyses Alexander's ambivalent attitude towards the Decembrist leaders.

NEČKINA, M. V.

[2] *Dviženie dekabristov.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1955. tt. 1–2. [*BRP* 363. *MSE* 3, 381]

"The latest full-scale treatment of the Decembrist movement. Completes Nečkina's earlier studies in the field." (*BRP* 363 note) See also Ejmontova, R. G., *supra.*

PIGAREV, K.: *Žizn' Ryleeva.* M. 1947. [*MSE* 8, 96]

RUSIN, V. I.: *Obščestvenno-političeskie i filosofskie vzgljady dekabristov Južnogo obščestva.* M., MGU. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 6556].

SCHWARZ-SOCHOR, J.: 'P. I. Pestel: The Beginnings of Jacobin Thought in Russia'. *IRSH* 3 (1958) 1, 71–96. [*WERH* 73].

STRUVE, Gleb

[2E] 'On Some Malpractices in Soviet Literary Scholarship'. *SEEJ* 7 (1963) No. 2, 134–141.

Part II of this article deals with suppressions of passages and interpretations of thought concerning Küchelbecker, as they appear in *Lit. N.* No. 59, *q.v., supra.*

SYROEČKOVSKIJ, B. E. (ed.) *Vide supra,* under DRUŽININ, N. M.

ŠČIPANOV, I. Ja.

[2] 'Materialističeskaja filosofija v Rossii v pervoj četverti XIX v. Dekabristy-materialisty.' In: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed), *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax.* (M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1957–...), t. I. str. 673–686.

[3] Introductory article to *Works* [1], *supra.*

ZETLIN, Mikhail

[1E] *The Decembrists.* Translated by George Panin. Preface by Michael M. Karpovich. New York, International Universities Press. 1958. 349 pp. [*WERH* 71]

Reviewed, *inter alia,* by N. V. Riasanovsky in *The Russian Review* 18 (1959) 1, 71–72. Many of the errors noted by Riasanovsky occur only in the English version, not in the Russian original (Mixail ZETLIN [1R]: *Dekabristy. Sud'ba odnogo pokolenija*); cf. letter from Riasanovsky to the Editor of *The Russian Review* 18 (1959) 3, 252–253.

(d) *Stankevič and his Circle*

STANKEVIČ, N. V. (1813–1840)

*Works*

None. Some excerpts will be found in the anthology by Žaba, *q.v.*, Section II, *supra.*

*Secondary sources*

BROWN, E. J.

[1] 'The Circle of Stankevich'. *ASEER* 16 (Oct. 1957) 349–368. [*WERH* 897]

GRIGOR'JAN, M. M.

[2] 'Filosofskie vzgljady N. V. Stankeviča.' In: Vaseckij, G. S. [2] (Section III, *supra*), str. 3–32. [*FBSP* 5637 (2), 3870]

KOYRÉ. See Section VIIIa, *infra*. The part dealing with 'Hegel in Russia' includes a discussion of Stankevič's philosophical views. [*WLP* 1567 note].

SCHEIBERT, Peter [1]. See Section VIIIa, *infra*. Includes a study of Stankevič. [*WLP* 1604 note]

VASECKIJ, G. S. *et al.* [1] (Section II, *supra*), str. 390–395. [*MSE* 8, 1072. *FBSP* 902] See also Grigor'jan, M. M. [2], *supra*.

ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V. [2R] (Section II, *supra*), t. I., pp. 247–251; [2E] (*ibid.*) pp. 240–244.

## VI. THE WESTERNISERS

### (a) *Moderate Westernisers*

ANNENKOV, P. V. (1813–1887)
BOTKIN, V. P. (1811–1869)
ČIČERIN, B. N. (1828–1904)
GRANOVSKIJ, T. N. (1813–1855)
KATKOV, M. N. (1818–1887)
KAVELIN, K. D. (1818–1885)
TURGENEV, I. S. (1818–1883)

*Works*

ČIČERIN, B. N.: *Vospominanija Borisa Nikolaeviča Čičerina: zemstvo i Moskovskaja duma*. M., Koop. Izd. Sever. 1934. 371 str. [*WLP* 402]

GRANOVSKIJ, T. N. Some excerpts in Žaba (Section II, *supra*)

TURGENEV, I. S.: *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij i pisem (v 28–i tomax)*. M.-L., Izd. AN SSSR. 1960 – . . . [*WLP* 1093].

"When complete, this will be the best scholarly edition of Turgenev and the first attempt at a complete publication of his letters." (*WLP* 1093 note). *Note:* Vol. 8 of *Sočinenija* and Vol. 8 of *Pis'ma* were published in 1964.

Selected letters will also be found in: *Sobranie sočinenij v 12–i tomax*. M., Goslitizdat. 1953–1958.

See also under *Lit. N.*, *infra* (No. 67, Kavelin-Granovskij correspondence).

*Secondary sources*

ASINOVSKAJA, S. A.: *Iz istorii peredovyx idej v russkoj medievistike. T. N. Granovskij*. r. S. D. Skazkin. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1955. 165 str. [*FBSP* 1008. *MSE* 3, 109]

FISCHER, George

[1] *Russian Liberalism, from Gentry to Intelligentsia*. Cambridge, Harvard U.P. 1958. 240 pp. [*WERH* 120. *WLP* 1586]

Although mainly dealing with a later period, this work includes a study of Čičerin.

GRANDJARD, Henri: *Ivan Tourguénev et les courants politiques et sociaux de son temps*. Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Institut d'Etudes Slaves. 1953. 530 pp.

GRIGOR'JAN, M. M.

[3] 'Filosofskie i sociologičeskie vzgljady T. N. Granovskogo.' In: Vaseckij, G. S. [2] (Section III, *supra*), str. 33–119. [*FBSP* 5637 (3), 3870]

KOSMINSKIJ, E. A.: 'Žizn' i dejatel'nost' T. N. Granovskogo'. In: *VMU No. 4. Serija obščestvennyx nauk*. M. 1957. Vyp. 2. [*MSE* 3, 109]

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo*. No. 67, although devoted primarily to the "Revolutionary Democrats", also includes several valuable letters from Kavelin to Granovskij; No. 67: *Revoljucionnye demokraty. Novye materialy*. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1959. 800 str.

MASARYK, T. G. (Section II, *supra*). Vol. I, Ch. X, Part I (Westernism), pp. 336–349, contains frequent references to Čičerin, Katkov, Kavelin, etc.

RAEFF, M.

[1] 'A Reactionary Liberal: M. N. Katkov'. *The Russian Review* 11 (1952) 3, 157–167. [*WERH* 86]

UTECHIN, S. V. [2] (Section II, *supra*) contains brief accounts on the political and social beliefs of Katkov (pp. 91–94), Granovskij (p. 104), Kavelin (pp. 104–105), and Čičerin (pp. 105–107).

ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V. (Section II, *supra*). On Kavelin ("Semi-Positivism"): [2R], t. I., str. 351–354; [2E], pp. 345–348. On Čičerin [2R], t. II., str. 149–162. [2E], pp. 606–620.

These passages deal primarily with philosophical thought, while those from Utechin (*q.v. supra*) concentrate on socio-political ideas.

(b) *Belinskij*

BELINSKIJ, V. G. (1811–1848)

*Works*

[1R] *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij v 12-x tomax*. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1953–1956. [*BRP* 1051. *MSE* 1, 881. *FBSP* 1018 (3), where given as 18 vols.]

"An elaborate annotated edition ..." (*BRP* 1051 note).

[2R] *Sobranie sočinenij v trëx tomax*. o.r. F. M. Golovenčenko. M., Goslitizdat. 1948. [*FBSP* 1018 (4). BCB II]

[3R] *Izbrannye pis'ma v dvux tomax*. t. 1. 1829–1839. 340 str. t. 2. 1840–1848. 532 str. M., Gospolitizdat. 1955. [*FBSP* 810]

(Reviewed by L. E. Jakobson in *VF* 1956, 6, 197–201. [*FBSP* 282]).

[4R] *Izbrannye filosofskie sočinenij v dvux tomax*. o.r. M. I. Iovčuk, Z. V. Smirnova. M. 1948. [*FBSP* 1018 (1). BCB II]

[4E] *Selected Philosophical Works*. M., FLPH. 1948. LI + 552 str. [*WERH* 890. *WLP* 1479]

Five excerpts from this edition appear in the anthology by Kohn (Section II, *supra*), pp. 119–137.

There is also a second, enlarged edition: 1956, 583 str. This is a translation of *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija*. M., Gospolitizdat. 1941. [*WLP* 1479] "Despite the title, the emphasis is literary, not 'philosophical'." (*WLP* 1479 note).

Other excerpts appear in the following anthology:

[5E] *Belinsky, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov. Selected Criticism.* Edited and with an Introduction by Ralph E. Matlaw. New York, E. P. Dutton. 1962. 226 pp.

See also under: Brodskij [1], *infra*, and *Lit. N.* Nos 55, 56, and 57, *infra*.

*Secondary sources*

ALEKSANDROVA, V.

[1] 'Belinskij i naša sovremennost': K stoletiju so dnja ego smerti.' *Novyj Žurnal* (New York) 19 (1948) 180–190. [BCB IV]

"A general estimate of Belinskij's role in Russian literature and a discussion of present-day Soviet attitude to him." (BCB p. 551).

[2] 'Belinskij i sovetskaja publicistika'. *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (New York) 1948, June 27, p. 8. [BCB IV].

"Belinskij as seen in the Soviet Union to-day, a critical examination of some recent writings." (BCB p. 551).

AL'TMAN, I.: 'Patriotizm Belinskogo'. *Znamja* (M.) 1948, 6, 141–162. [BCB IV]. Belinskij is here portrayed as one of the precursors of Russian social democracy. The author opposes the use of the term *zapadnik* ('Westerniser') as applied to him. (BCB p. 551).

BASKAKOV, V. G.

[2] *Sociologičeskie vzgljady V. G. Belinskogo v period 40–x godov.* IF. 1947. (d) [*FBSP* 5139 (2)].

[3] *Sociologičeskie vozzrenija V. G. Belinskogo.* M. 1948. 156 str. [*FBSP* 1014 (1). BCB III]

[4] *Sociologičeskie vozzrenija klassikov russkoj filosofii XIX veka.* (V. G. Belinskij i N. G. Černyševskij). *V AN SSSR* 1953, 7, 107. [*FBSP* 5139 (1)].

[5] 'Velikij russkij revoljucionnyj demokrat i materialist: K stoletiju so dnja smerti V. G. Belinskogo'. In: *Nauka i žizn'* (M.) 1948, 6, 2–11. [BCB IV].

'Belinskij i sovremennost'.' *Novyj Mir* 1948, 6, 5–13. [BCB IV].
Editorial article for the centenary of Belinskij's death. (BCB p. 552)

*V. G. Belinskij v vospominanijax sovremennikov.* (Serija lit. memuarov).
vs K. I. Tjun'kin. M., Goslitizdat. 1962. 762 str. Ill.
(See also Golovenčenko [2], *infra*.)

*V. G. Belinskij. Éstetika i literaturnaja kritika.* Ss. v dvux tomax.
vs A. Lavreckij. M., Goslitizdat. 1959. t. 1. 703 str. t. 2. 783 str. [*FBSP* 3082].

BOGUCKIJ, I. S.: *Filosofskie vzgljady V. G. Belinskogo.* AON. 1948–51. (d) [*FBSP* 5208].

BOWMAN, Herbert E.

[2] *Vissarion Belinsky, 1811–1848. A Study in the Origins of Social Criticism in Russia.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P. 1954. IX + 220 pp. [*WERH* 888. *WLP* 1479]

The "first major English study" ... "concentrates ... on a critical analysis of (Belinskij's) thought in the various stages of its development" (Review by Hans Kohn in *The Russian Review* 14 (1955) 2, 160–162. – "A useful and judicious, if somewhat pedestrian, survey of Belinskii's intellectual development." (*WLP* 1479 note).

BRODSKIJ, N. L.

[1] *Belinskij i ego korrespondenty.* M. 1948. 314 str. [BCB III]

"Belinskij's selected correspondence, including two newly published letters to K. S. Aksakov and one to M. N. Katkov." (BCB p. 550)

[2] (ed.): *V. G. Belinskij: Sbornik statej i dokumentov k biografii velikogo kritika.* Penza. 1948. 257 str. [BCB III]

[3] (ed.): *Belinskij: istorik i teoretik literatury.* Ss. M. 1949. See also under Zalesskaja and Krendel', *infra.*

CALDER-MARSHALL, A. (ed.): *V. G. Belinsky: 1811–1848.* London, 1948. [BCB III]

"Notes on Belinskij's life extracted from the works of A. Herzen." (BCB p. 550).

CLOUTIER, H. Handley: 'Belinsky – Advocate of Liberty'. *The Russian Review* 8 (1949) 1, 20–33. [*WERH* 900]

DUBOVIKOV, A. N.: 'Belinskij i ego rol' v razvitii natural'noj školy.' *Literatura v škole* 1948, 1, 21–30. [BCB IV]

ÉL'SBERG, Ja. E.

[1] 'Nacional'naja gordost' velikix russkix revoljucionnyx demokratov'. *Literatura v škole* 1948, 4, 9–20. [BCB IV]

[2] 'Russkaja literatura v 40-x godax i problemy razvitija nacional'noj kul'tury'. In: *Istoriko-literaturnyj sbornik.* r. S. Byčkov. M. 1948. pp. 344–383. [BCB IV]

"... devotes considerable space to Belinskij's part in the movement of ideas in the 1840's ... Characteristic of the new anti-Westernist approach to the problem of Russian national culture". (BCB p. 552)

'"The Furious Vissarion": Belinsky and the Example of the West'. In: *TLS* 1948, May 29, pp. 297–298. [BCB IV].

GIFFORD, H.: 'Belinsky – One Aspect'. *SEER* 27 (Dec. 1948), 250–258. [*WERH* 901]

GOLOVENČENKO, F. M.

[1] *V. G. Belinskij: Kritiko-biografičeskij očerk.* M. 1948. 72 str. [BCB III].

[2] (ed.): *Belinskij v vospominanijax sovremennikov.* M. 1948. 480 str. [BCB III]

See also similar title under Belinskij, (M., Goslitizdat. 1962. 762 str.), *supra.*

GUS, M.: 'Belinskij i Rossija'. In: *Teatr* (M.) 1948, 6, 7–14. [BCB IV]

"Deals mainly with Belinskij's attitude to the Slavophils and the difference between their patriotism and Belinskij's." (BCB p. 553)

HARE, Richard [1] (Section III, *supra*), pp. 32–68.

HEPNER, Benoît P. See Section VII (Bakunin), *infra.*

IOVČUK, M. T.

[1] 'V. G. Belinskij – klassik russkoj filosofii'. M., *Izv. AN SSSR,* 1948, 5, 305–321. [BSB IV. *FBSP* 5682 (12)]

"Discusses Belinskij's philosophy on the assumption that, contrary to the traditional 'bourgeois' view, he was an original philosopher." (BCB p. 553)

[2] 'Mirovozzrenie V. G. Belinskogo: K 100-letiju so dnja smerti'. *Bolševik* 1948, 10, 25–41. [BCB IV]

Depicts Belinskij as "a pioneer of revolutionary democracy in Russia, a classic of Russian materialist philosophy, ..." etc. (BCB p. 553)

[3] 'V. G. Belinskij – velikij russkij myslitel'.' In: Smirnova [2], *q.v. infra.*

Reviewed (and strongly criticised) by V. G. Baskakov ([1], pp. 329–330), who describes this article as a reprint of Iovčuk's introductory article to *Izbrannye filosofskie sočinenija* (1948) (cf. *Works* [4R], *supra*).

JAKOVLEV, B.: 'Vopr̈eki istoričeskoj pravde'. *Lit. Gaz.* 1948, Aug. 11, p. 2. [BCB IV].

A Soviet *critique* of various Belinskij-centenary articles. (BCB p. 553).

KAMMARI, M.: 'V. G. Belinskij o roli ličnosti v istorii'. In: Smirnova [2], *q.v. infra.*

KIRPOTIN, V.: 'Vissarion Grigor'evič Belinskij: K stoletiju so dnja smerti. *Oktjabr'* (M.) 1948, 6, 163–183. [BCB IV]

"Connects Belinskij with present-day Socialist Realism." (BCB p. 554)

KRENDEL', R.: 'Vissarion Grigor'evič Belinskij'. *Bibliotekar'* (M.) 1948, 3, 9–16. [BCB IV]

Contains some bibliographical data. (BCB p. 554). (See also Zalesskaja, *infra.*)

KRESKY, Elizabeth: 'Soviet Scholarship on Belinskij'. *ASEER* 7, 3 (Oct. 1948). [BCB IV]

A general examination of Soviet literature on Belinskij during the years 1917–1947. (BCB p. 547, footnote)

KUZNECOV, I. L.: *Bor'ba V. G. Belinskogo i A. I. Gercena protiv idealizma v 30–40-x godax XIX veka.* Voenno-polit. Ak. 1951–52. (d) [*FBSP* 6007]

LAMPERT, E. [1] (Section III, *supra*), pp. 46–107.

LAVRECKIJ, A.

[1] 'Belinskij o buržuaznom Zapade'. *Novyj Mir* 1948, 6, 228–240. [BCB IV]

Depicts Belinskij as utterly opposed to the "bourgeois West" and the threat it implied to Russian culture. (BCB p. 554)

See also: *Belinskij: Éstetika i literaturnaja kritika.*

LEBEDEV-POLJANSKIJ, Pavel I.: *V. G. Belinskij: literaturno-kritičeskaja dejatel'nost'*. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1945. 383 str. [*BRP* 1051].
"A Marxist analysis of Belinskij's aesthetic principles and literary judgments." (*BRP* 1051 note).

'Lenin o nasledii Belinskogo: Kratkij obzor vyskazyvanij'. *Novyj Mir* 1948, 6, 208–227. [BCB IV]
"A short commented anthology of Lenin's pronouncements about Belinskij." (BCB p. 554)

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo*. Nos 55, 56, and 57 (M., AN SSSR 1948, 1950, and 1961 respectively) all contain extensive valuable material on Belinskij.

MACUEV, N.: 'V. G. Belinskij: Bibliografija 1938–1948 gg.' *Sov. Kniga* 1948, 6, 117–121. [BCB I]

MALNICK, B.
[1] 'Belinsky: A Storm Centre of Russian Thought'. *ASJ* 1948, 9, 17–20. [BCB IV]
[2] 'V. G. Belinsky'. *SEER* 27 (May 1949), 363–380. [*WERH* 902]

MASARYK, T. G. (Section II, *supra*), Vol. I, pp. 336–378.

MEZENCEV, P.: *Belinskij. Problemy idejnogo razvitija i tvorčeskogo nasledija*. M., Sov. Pis. 1957. 495 str.

MORDOVČENKO, N.: 'Belinskij – teoretik i organizator realističeskogo napravlenija'. *Znamja* (M.) 1948, 6, 153–161. [BCB IV]

*Nasledie Belinskogo*. Ss. M., Sov. Pis. 1952. 370 str. [*FBSP* 1191]

NEČAEVA, V. S.
[1] *Junost' Belinskogo*. Penza. 1948. 140 str. [BCB III]
"Uses autobiographical material and revises some traditional conceptions." (BCB p. 550)
[2] *V. G. Belinskij. Načalo žiznennogo puti i literaturnoj dejatel'nosti. 1811–1830*. M.-L., Izd. AN SSSR. 1949. [*FBSP* 870]
A second volume appeared in 1954. (Cf. *MSE* 1, 881)

NEČKINA, M.
[3] 'Neistovyj Vissarion i ego époxa'. *Lit. Gaz.* 1948, June 5, p. 2. [BCB IV]
"Belinskij in the general framework of his period." (BCB p. 555)

OKSMAN, Ju. G.: *Letopis' žizni i dejatel'nosti V. G. Belinskogo*. M. 1958.
A "monumental (over 600 pages) chronicle of Belinskij's life and work"; the first major work of Oksman's to be published following his post-Stalin rehabilitation. (Cf. Gleb Struve [2E], *supra*, p. 138.)

POLJAKOV, M. Ja.
[1] *Belinskij v Moskve: 1829–1839*. r. N. L. Brodskij. M. 1948. 314 str. [BCB III]
[2] *Vissarion Belinskij. Ličnost' – Idei – Époxa*. M., Goslitizdat. 1960. 599 str. [*FBSP* 3784]

S. A.: 'Naučnaja sessija k stoletiju so dnja smerti V. G. Belinskogo'. *VF* 1948, 2, 373–375. [*FBSP* 604]

SCHEIBERT, Peter [1] (See Section VIIIa, *infra*). Includes a study of Belinskij.

SCHULTZE, B.

[3] *Wissarion Grigorjewitsch Belinskij, Wegbereiter des revolutionären Atheismus in Rußland.* Munich, A. Pustet. 1958. 219 SS. [*WLP* 1605].

"A study not only of Belinskii's changing attitudes toward traditional religion, but also of his ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of history." (*WLP* 1605 note)

SMIRNOVA, Z. V.

[1] *Mirovozzrenie V. G. Belinskogo.* M. 1948. 32 str. [BCB III]

[2] (ed.): *Velikij russkij myslitel' V. G. Belinskij.* Ss. M. Gospolitizdat. 1948. 203 str.

Reviewed critically at some length by V. G. Baskakov [1], pp. 329–331.

[3] 'Problema realizma v éstetike V. G. Belinskogo'.

[4] 'Razvitie filosofskix vzgljadov V. G. Belinskogo v 30-e gody'.

Both titles [3] and [4] appear in [2] above.

[5] 'V. G. Belinskij'.: In Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.), *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax*, t.II, str. 266–284.

STEPANOV, V. I.: *Filosofskie i sociologičeskie vozzrenija V. G. Belinskogo.* r. M. T. Iovčuk. Minsk, Belorusskij GU. 1959. 400 str. [*FBSP* 3943]

STRUVE, Gleb

[3E] 'A Belinsky Centenary Bibliography: An Annotated List of 1948 Publications'. *SEER* 27 (May 1949), 546–555. [*WERH* 899]

A valuable annotated bibliography of 1948 publications on Belinskij, based mainly on Soviet sources ("all the important Soviet periodicals have been drawn upon") but also on sources in England, France, and the U.S.A. (including Russian *émigré* publications), in so far as these came to the author's notice. The brief introductory article is also useful. This work (abbreviated: BCB) has been freely drawn upon in compiling the present list of works on Belinskij.

ŠČERBINA, V. R.: 'Velikij russkij myslitel' V. G. Belinskij'. *VF* 1948, 2, 171–194. [*FBSP* 688 (1)]

ŠČIPANOV, I. Ja.

[4] 'Materialističeskie vozzrenija V. G. Belinskogo'. In: Smirnova [2], *q.v. supra.*

[5] 'V. G. Belinskij – velikij myslitel' i revoljucionnyj demokrat'. In: Ščipanov, I. Ja. (ed.) *Iz istorii russkoj filosofii* (M., Gospolitizdat. 1952. 766 str.), str. 226–303.

TXORŽEVSKIJ, Ivan: 'Neistovyj Vissarion: K stoletiju so dnja smerti V. G. Belinskogo'. *Russkaja Mysl'* (Paris) 1948, May 28, p. 5. [BCB IV]

A "general estimate of Belinskij" by a well-known Russian *émigré* critic, who is also the author of a 2-vol. history of Russian literature published in Paris. (BCB p. 555).

VASECKIJ, G. S.

[3] *Belinskij – velikij russkij kritik-patriot.* M. 1948. 120 str. [BCB III]

ZALESSKAJA, L. I., and KRENDEL', R. N.: *V. G. Belinskij. K stoletiju so dnja smerti: 'Rekomendatel'nyj ukazatel' literatury.* o.r. N. L. Brodskij. M. 1948. 192 str. [BCB I]

(c) *Herzen*

HERZEN (GERCEN), A. I. (1812–1870)

*Works*

[1R] *Sobranie sočinenij v tridcati tomax.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1954–1963. r. V. P. Volgin *et al.* [*FBSP* 1098 (2), 1687 (1), 3289 (1)–(4), 4276].

By far the most important edition of Herzen to date. Surprisingly, it does not figure in *BRP.*

[2R] *Sočinenija v devjati tomax.* M., Goslitizdat. 1955–1958. r. V. P. Volgin *et al.* [*FBSP* 1098 (3), 1687 (2)]

An abbreviated but still extensive selection by the same editor as the 30-volume edition above.

[3R] *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija.* M., Gospolitizdat. 1946.

*Note: FBSP* 1098 (1) lists a 1948 edition, but no other details.

[3E] *Selected Philosophical Works.* M., FLPH. 1956. [*WERH* 892 note]

[3G] *Ausgewählte philosophische Schriften.* M., Verlag für fremdsprachige Literatur. 1949. Aus dem russischen übersetzt von Alfred Kurella. 652 SS.

A German translation of the Russian 1946 edition ([3R] *supra*).

[4R] *Byloe i dumy.* M., Goslitizdat. 1958. t. 1, č. 1–3, 454 str. t. 2, č. 4–5, str. 707 str. t. 3, č. 6–8, 639 str. [*FBSP* 1687 (3)]

Other editions include: Minsk. 1957. 2 tt.; M. 1962. 2 tt.; M., Goslitizdat. 1963. t. I, 615 str., t. II, 774 str.

[5E] *From the Other Shore: The Russian People and Socialism.* Introduction by Sir Isaiah Berlin. London. 1956. XXXI + 208 pp. Annotated bibl. [*WERH* 892]

No date or publisher given in *WERH.* Utechin ([2], p. 118, footnote) gives: New York, George Braziller, 1960. Transl. M. Budberg.

[6R] *O razvitii revoljucionnyx idej v Rossii.* M., Goslitizdat. 1958. 158 str. [*FBSP* 1687 (4)].

Excerpts from Herzen's writings are contained in the anthologies by Kohn and by Žaba (*q.v.*, Section II, *supra*).

See also under *"Kolokol"* and *Literaturnoe nasledstvo.* (*infra*)

*Secondary sources*

BAZILEVA, Z. P.: *"Kolokol" Gercena (1857–1867).* M. 1949. [*MSE* 2, 1046]

BERLIN, Isaiah

[2] 'Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty'. In: Simmons, E. J. (ed.), *Continuity and Change* . . . (Section II, *supra*), pp. 473–499. [*WERH* 905]

See also Introduction to *Works* [5E], *supra*, and to VENTURI [1E], *infra*.

BRODSKIJ, N. L. (ed.)

[4] *A. I. Gercen v vospominanijax sovremennikov.* M., Goslitizdat. 1956. 446 str.

BUJVAN, M. I.: *A. I. Gercen o nacional'nom voprose.* M., Izd. MGU. 1951–52. (d) [*FBSP* 5252]

CARR, E. H.

[1] 'Some Unpublished Letters of Alexander Herzen'. Also Appendix to same: 'Texts of Thirty Unpublished Letters of Alexander Herzen'. *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 3 (1952) 80–90 and 91–124 respectively. [*WERH* 909]

Commentary and text of 30 letters from Herzen to Georg Herwegh (26) and his wife Emma (3). One (No. 6) is to Natalie Herzen, Georg and Emma Herwegh jointly. The article begins: "Nearly 150 unpublished and virtually unkown letters of Alexander Herzen are in the British Museum and have just been made available to scholars."

ČESNOKOV, D. I.: *Mirovozzrenie Gercena.* M. 1948. [*MSE* 2, 1046]

DERŽAVIN, N. See Section IVb, *supra* (article on Herzen and the Slavophils).

DONEC, G. P.: *Filosofskie vzgljady A. I. Gercena.* K., Izd. KGU. 1951–52. (d) [*FBSP* 5423]

DZIEWANOWSKI, M. K.: 'Herzen, Bakunin, and the Polish Insurrection of 1863'. *JCEA* 8 (Apr. 1948) 58–78. [*WERH* 694]

ÉL'SBERG, Ja.

[3] *A. I. Gercen. Žizn' i tvorčestvo.* izd. tret'e, dopolnennoe. M., Goslitizdat. 1956. 679 str. (Earlier edition: GIXL. 1948. 524 str.) [*FBSP* 1064 (3)]

The 1948 edition is reviewed by V. G. Baskakov ([1], pp. 327–329), who describes it as an "extensive, popular biographical sketch".

GRUZDEV, A. I. *et al.* (ed.): *Tvorčestvo A. I. Gercena.* UZ LG Ped. Inst. t. 196. L., 1959. 480 str. [*FBSP* 4036]

HARE, Richard [1] (Section III, *supra*), pp. 212–273.

IOVČUK, M. T. and ŠČIPANOV, I. Ja.: 'A. I. Gercen – klassik russkoj filosofii XIX veka'. In: Ščipanov, I. Ja. (ed.), *Iz istorii russkoj filosofii,* str. 166–225.

KAPLAN, F. I. [1]. Cf. Section VIIIb, *infra*.

*"Kolokol". Izdanie A. I. Gercena i N. P. Ogarëva. 1857–1867.* Sistematizirovannaja rospis' statej i zametok. M., VKP. 1957. 552 str.

KOYRÉ, A. A. [2] See Section VIIIa, *infra*.

KUZNECOV, I. L. See under BELINSKIJ, Section VIb, *supra*.

LAMPERT, E. [1] (Section III, *supra*), pp. 171–259.

LEVIN, Š. M. [1], [2]. See Section IVb, *supra*. (Two papers on Herzen's relations with the Slavophils.)

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo.* Nos 61–64 concern Herzen, as follows:

No. 61. *Gercen i Ogarëv.* t. 1. r. A. M. Egolin. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1953. 940 str. Ill.

No. 62. *Gercen i Ogarëv.* t. 2. Pis'ma k Gercenu i Ogarëvu. r. V. V. Vinogradov. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1955. 894 str. Ill. [*FBSP* 1099]

No. 63. *Gercen i Ogarëv.* t. 3. Neizvestnye stranicy Gercena. Pis'ma Gercena i Ogarëva. r. V. V. Vinogradov. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1956. 913 str. Ill. [*FBSP* 1099, where wrongly given as part of No. 62]

No. 64. *Gercen v zagraničnyx kollekcijax.* r. V. V. Vinogradov. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1958. 849 str. Ill.

*Note:* There are also important pre-1945 issues devoted to Herzen: Nos. 39/40 and 41/42. (*Gercen,* č. 1 and č. 2 respectively.) M., 1941. [*MSE* 6, 823; 2, 1046]

LJUBIMOVA, A. A.: Kritika A. I. Gercenom nemeckogo idealizma. AON. 1948–51. (d) [FBSP 6061]

MALIA, M. E.

[1] *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P. 1961. XI + 486 pp. Bibl. Index. London, Oxford U.P. [*WERH* 887. *WLP* 634; 1594]

"... a mature work by a true scholar of wide culture, sensitive to literary and philosophical as well as to conventional historical factors"." (The author) ... paints in with great skill the social and intellectual background of both Russia and Western Europe". (Hugh Seton-Watson, in *SEER* 40, 95 (June 1962), pp. 550 ff.)

"Much of the work is devoted to examining the Western European intellectual sources of Herzen's thought ... including the philosophies of Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, and the social theories of Saint-Simon, Proudhon, and George Sand." (*WLP* 634 & 1594 notes)

[2] 'Herzen and the Peasant Commune'. In: Simmons, E. J. (ed.), *Continuity and Change* ... (Section II, *supra*), pp. 197–217. [*WERH* 906]

MASARYK, T. G. (Section II, *supra*), Ch. 12, pp. 384–429.

PIPER, L. See Section IVb, *supra.*

PIRUMOVA, N.: *Istoričeskie vzgljady A. I. Gercena.* M., Gospolitizdat. 1956. 152 str. [*FBSP* 1216]

PUTINCEV, V. A.

[1] *Gercen-pisatel'.* M. 1952. [*MSE* 2, 1046]

SAFROŠKIN, V. G.: *Sociologičeskie vozzrenija A. I. Gercena.* AON. 1948–51. (d) [*FBSP* 6571]

SUSLOV, P. A.: *Filosofskij materializm A. I. Gercena.* M., MGU. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 6761]

ŠČIPANOV, I. Ja.

[6] 'A. I. Gercen.' In: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.), *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax,* t. II, str. 284–302.

See also joint study with IOVČUK, M. T., *supra.*

TERJAEV, G. V.: *Social'no-političeskie vozzrenija Gercena.* AON. 1947. (d) [*FBSP* 6891]

TUČKOVA-OGARËVA, N. A. See under OGARËV, N. P., Section VId, *infra.*

VENTURI, Franco

[1 It] *Il populismo russo.* Turin, Giulio Einaudi. 1952. 2 vols.

[1E] *Roots of Revolution; a History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia.* Introduction by Sir Isaiah Berlin. New York, Knopf. London. 1960. 850 pp. [*WERH* 751. *WLP* 524; 641]

This study, which will later be included in the Section on Populism, contains much information on Herzen and Bakunin. "Lengthy and illuminating introduction". (*WLP* 641 note)

VILENSKAJA, E. S.: 'N. G. Černyševskij i A. I. Gercen o roli narodnyx mass v osvoboditel'noj bor'be'. *VF* 1960, 8, 108–119. [*FBSP* 4108]

VOLOSOVA, V. P.: *Filosofskij materializm Gercena.* AON. 1947. (d)

ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V.

[1R] (Section II, *supra*), Ch. IV, pp. 94–117. [2R] (*ibid.*), t. I, pp. 277–304. [2E] (*ibid.*), pp. 271–298.

*Note:* On many aspects of Herzen's life and thought, see also OGARËV, *infra.* On his attitude towards the Slavophils, see Section IV, *supra.*

(d) *Ogarëv*

OGARËV, N. P. (1813–1877)

*Works*

[1] *Izbrannye social'no-političeskie i filosofskie proizvedenija v dvux tomax.* vs. N. G. Tarakanov. r. M. T. Iovčuk i N. G. Tarakanov. M., Gospolitizdat. IF. t.I, 1952. 863 str. t.II, 1956. 683 str. [*FBSP* 1197]

Reviewed, *inter alia,* by Putincev [4] and by Ščipanov, *q.v., infra.*

[2] *Izbrannye proizvedenija v dvux tomax.* Podgotovka teksta i prim. N. M. Gajdenkov. M., Goslitizdat. 1956. t.1. 'Stixotvorenija'. 491 str. t.2 'Poémy, proza, lit.-kritičeskie stat'i.' 540 str.

See also under *Lit. N., infra.* Also under Herzen, *"Kolokol", supra.*

*Secondary sources*

ČERNJAK, Ja. Z.: 'Fond N. P. Ogarëva'. *"Zapiski Otdela rukopisej"* G. biblioteki SSSR im. V. I. Lenina. M. 1951. Vyp. XII, str. 39–75.

GURŠTEJN, A.: 'Zabytye stranicy Ogarëva'. In: *Izbrannye stat'i A. Gurštejna.* M., 1959. pp. 85–102.

(This article originally appeared in *Literatura i marksizm,* 1930, kn. II.)

HARE, Richard [1] (Section III, *supra*) pp. 29–31.

IOVČUK, M. T.

[4] *Filosofskie i sociologičeskie vzgljady N. P. Ogarëva.* M., Izd. MGU. 1957. 115 str. [*FBSP* 1729 (4)]

JAKOVLEV, M. V.

[1] *Obščestvenno-političeskie i filosofskie vzgljady N. P. Ogarëva.* AON. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 5718 (3)]

[2] *Mirovozzrenie N. P. Ogarëva.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1957. 297 str. [*FBSP* 1746 (2)]

Reviewed by Putincev [5], *infra.*

[3] 'N. P. Ogarëv – revoljucionnyj demokrat i voinstvujuščij materialist.' *VF* 1954, 2, 89–103. [*FBSP* 284]

See also under Putincev [6], *infra.*

KUKEC, G. Ju.: *Mirovozzrenie N. P. Ogarëva.* K., Izd. KGU. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 5964]

LEXNER, E. A.: *Obščestvenno-političeskie i sociologičeskie vzgljady N. P. Ogarëva.* M., Izd. MGU. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 6031]

*Literaturnoe nasledstvo.* Material relating to Ogarëv is contained in all the issues dealing with Herzen, viz. Nos 39–42, and especially Nos 61–63 *(Gercen i Ogarëv),* also No. 64. Cf. under Herzen, Section VIc, *supra.*

PUTINCEV, V. A.

[2] *N. Ogarëv. Kritiko-biografičeskij očerk.* M., Goslitizdat. 1959. 174 str. [*FBSP* 3833]

[3] *N. P. Ogarëv. Žizn' – mirovozzrenie – tvorčestvo.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1963. 260 str.

One of the most recent Soviet studies of Ogarëv, dealing with his socio-political thought as well as with his literary activity. The Conclusion (*Zaključenie.* 'Problemy izučenija nasledija Ogarëva', pp. 247–257) contains a useful survey of the Russian literature, including pre-Revolutionary criticism, albeit from a very biased angle.

[4] 'Opisanija rukopisej A. I. Gercena i N. P. Ogarëva'. In: *Sovetskaja Kniga,* 1952, 8, 114–117.

[5] 'Kniga ob Ogarëve – myslitele i revoljucionere'. *VF* 1958, 7, 124–128. [*FBSP* 2017]

A review of the work by Jakovlev [2], *supra.*

[6] – – – and JAKOVLEV, M. V.: 'Nasledie Ogarëva – myslitelja i publicista'. In: *Vestnik AN SSSR,* 1957, 5, 123–137.

A review of Ogarëv's *Works* [1], *q.v., supra.*

SMIRNOVA, Z. V.

[6] 'Social'no-političeskie i filosofskie vzgljady N. P. Ogarëva'. In: *Vestnik AN SSSR,* 1952, 10, 121 ff. [*FBSP* 6689 (3)]

ŠČIPANOV, I.

[7] 'Obščestvenno-političeskie i filosofskie vozzrenija N. P. Ogarëva'. In: *Bol'ševik* 1952, 12, 66–73. [*FBSP* 6815 (2)]

A review of Ogarëv's *Works* [1], t. I., *q.v. supra.*

TARAKANOV, N. G.

[1] 'N. P. Ogarëv.' In: Dynnik, M. A. *et al.* (ed.) [1], *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax,* t. II, str. 302–310.

TUČKOVA-OGARËVA, N. A.: *Vospominanija.* Serija lit. memuarov. M., Goslitizdat. 1959. 382 str.

Reminiscences of Ogarëv, Herzen, Turgenev, and others.

UTECHIN, S. V. [2] (Section II, *supra*), pp. 119–122.
*Note:* On many aspects of Ogarëv's life and thought, especially after his leaving Russia in 1856, see also HERZEN, Section VIc, *supra.*

### VII. ANARCHISM AND REVOLUTIONARY PANSLAVISM. BAKUNIN

BAKUNIN, M. A. (1814–1876)

*Works*

*Sobranie sočinenij i pisem 1828–1876.* tt. 1–4. M., 1934–35. [*MSE* 1,750]
Excerpts in Žaba (Section II, *supra*).

*Secondary sources*

BERLIN, Isaiah
[2] 'Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty'. See under Herzen (Section VIc, *supra*).

CARR, E. H.
[2] *Michael Bakunin.* London. 1937. X + 501 pp. Bibl. [*WERH* 754] Also available in Vintage Russian Library (V–725), New York, Alfred A. Knopf Inc.
Bakunin's "only first-class biographer, E. H. Carr ..." (Richard Hare [2], p. 20). "... much the best of the books ..." (*WERH,* note on p. 68).

ČIŽEVSKIJ, Dmitrij [1R] and [2G] (Section VIIIa, *infra*) Pt. II, Ch. 3.
"... a long chapter on Bakunin ... based on wide knowledge of the pertinent material". (Zen'kovskij [2E] p. 245, note 1).

DZIEWANOWSKI, M. K.: 'Herzen, Bakunin, and the Polish Insurrection of 1863', See under Herzen (Section VIc, *supra*). [*WERH* 694]

HARE, Richard: 'An Aristocratic Anarchist, Michael Bakunin'. In: [2] *Portraits of Russian Personalities Between Reform and Revolution.* (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford U.P. 1959. XIV + 360 pp). Ch. II. [*WERH* 60]

HEPNER, Benoît P.: *Bakounine et le panslavisme révolutionnaire; cinq essais sur l'histoire des idées en Russie et en Europe.* Paris, M. Rivière. 1950. 319 pp. Bibl. pp. 314–319. [WLP 1589]
Besides "revolutionary Panslavism", deals with the influence of French thought in Russia ca. 1760–1825, and that of Schelling and Hegel on Bakunin and Belinskij during the 1830–40's. (*WLP* 1589 note).

IBAN'ES, A. E.: *Bor'ba K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa protiv anarxizma Bakunina.* K., KGU. 1953–54. (d) [*FBSP* 5669]
(The only Russian work on Bakunin in the whole of *FBSP*!)

KOYRÉ, A. A. [2] See Section VIIIa, *infra.*

LAMPERT, E. [1] (Section III, *supra*), Ch. III, pp. 109–169.

MASARYK, T. G. (Section II, *supra*), Vol. I, Ch. XIII, pp. 430–471.

MAXIMOFF, Gregori P. (ed.): *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism.* Glencoe (Illinois) 1953. 434 pp. Bibl. [*WERH* 758]

PYZIUR, Eugene: *The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin.* Marquette Slavic Studies I. Milwaukee, Marquette U.P. 1955. 158 pp. [*WERH* 759]
SCHEIBERT, Peter [1]. See Section VIIIa, *infra.* [*FBSP* 4241. *WLP* 1604]
VENTURI, Franco [1E] and [1It]. See under Herzen (Section VIc, *supra*).
ZEN'KOVSKIJ, V. V. [2R] (Section II, *supra*), t. 1, str. 251–264. [2E] (*ibid*), pp. 245–257.

## VIII. WORKS DEALING WITH THE INFLUENCE OF WEST-EUROPEAN IDEAS

### (a) *German philosophy. Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, etc.*

ASMUS, V. F. See under OJZERMAN [2], *infra.*
BASKIN, M. P.
[1] 'Nemeckie prosvetiteli. Gerder, Lessing, Šiller, Gëte.' In: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.) [1], *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax,* t. II, str. 5–34.
[2] 'Razloženie gegelevskoj školy.' In: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.) [1], t. II, str. 118–123.
BENZ, Ernst
[1] *Schelling: Werden und Wirken seines Denkens.* Zurich. 1955.
[2] *Franz von Baader und Kotzebue: das Rußlandbild der Restaurationszeit.* Mainz. 1957.
ČIŽEVSKIJ, Dmitrij
[2R] *Gegel' v Rossii.* Paris, Dom Knigi. 1939. 357 str. Bibl. str. 343–355. [*BRP* 1199. WLP 1612 note]
"A thorough study of the influence of Hegelian philosophy on . . . Stankevich, Granovskii, Belinskii, Bakunin, and Chicherin." (*BRP* 1199 note).
[2G] 'Hegel in Rußland'. In: *Hegel bei den Slaven* (Bad Homburg v. d. H., Hermann Gentner Verlag. 1961), pp. 145–396. [*WLP* 1612. *BRP* 1199 note]
An abridged German version of [2R]. Originally published in *Veröffentlichungen der slavistischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft an der deutschen Universität in Prag,* Reihe I, Heft 9. Reichenberg. 1934. (BRP 1199 note) *Note:* [2R] has the fuller text, [2G] has more complete reference notes and bibliography. (Riasanovsky [5], p. 31, note 4.)
[3R] 'Baader i Rossija.' *Novyj Žurnal* (New York) 35 (1953) 301–310.
[4R] 'Šiller v Rossii.' *Novyj Žurnal* (New York) 45 (1956) 109–135.
[5G] *Aus zwei Welten. Beiträge zur Geschichte der slawisch-westlichen literarischen Beziehungen.* The Hague, Mouton and Co. 1956. 352 SS. [*FBSP* 4181]
Contains much material pertinent to history of ideas, the term 'literary' being conceived in its widest (Russian) sense. A Soviet review is that by Solov'ëv, E. Ju., in *VF* 1959, 3, 114–124 (*FBSP* 3927).

DYNNIK, M. A.

[2] 'Filosofija Gegelja i eë mesto v istorii filosofskoj mysli.' In: *Iz istorii filosofii* (M., 1957. 309 str.). [*FBSP* 5439 (3); 1740]

ESIN, I. M.: *Klassiki marksizma-leninizma o materialističeskoj teorii poznanija Fejerbaxa.* VPŠ. 1953/54. (d) [*FBSP* 5475]

FRIDLENDER, G. M.: 'Éstetičeskie i filosofskie vzgljady Šillera'. *VF* 1955, 5, 71–82. [*FBSP* 205 (2)]

GAGOIDZE, V. A.: *Kritika Marksom idealističeskoj dialektiki Gegelja i formirovanie materialističeskogo dialektičeskogo metoda do 1848 goda.* Tbilisi. GU. 1953/54. (d) [*FBSP* 5540]

GRIGOR'JAN, M. M.

[4] 'Materializm Fejerbaxa.' In: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.) [1], *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax,* t.II, str. 123–150.

HEPNER, Benoît P. See Section VII (Bakunin), *supra.* (Deals, *inter alia,* with the influence of Schelling and Hegel on Bakunin and Belinskij during the 1830's and 1840's. Cf. *WLP* 1589 note.)

IAKOVENKO, B.: *Geschichte des Hegelianismus in Rußland.* Prague. 1938. Together with Čiževskij [2R] and [2G], the most important work on Hegelianism in Russia. (Cf. Riasanovsky [5], p. 31, note 4.)

IOVČUK, M. T.

[5] 'Dialektika Gegelja i russkaja filosofija XIX veka'. *VF* 1957, 4, 73–83. [*FBSP* 1729 (2)]

[6] 'Dialektika Gegelja i russkaja domarksistskaja filosofija XIX veka'. In: Vaseckij, G. S. [2] (Section III, *supra*), str. 269–314. [*FBSP* 5682 (7), 3870]

JAKOVENKO, B. See IAKOVENKO.

KARPUŠIN, V. A.: 'O roli L. Fejerbaxa v formirovanii mirovozzrenija Karla Marksa (1842–1843 gg.).' *VF* 1954, 4, 176–181. [*FBSP* 315 (1)]

KLOČKOV, V. M.: 'Sxodstvo i različija v étičeskix vzgljadax L. Fejerbaxa i N. G. Černyševskogo'. *VF* 1957, 6, 47–58. [*FBSP* 1789 (1)]

KOYRÉ, A. A.

[2] *Etudes sur l'histoire de la pensée philosophique en Russie.* Paris, J. Vrin. 1950. 223 pp. [*WLP* 1567]

The article on 'Hegel in Russia' includes a discussion of the philosophical views of Stankevič, Bakunin, and Belinskij. There are also articles on Ivan Kireevskij, Čaadaev, and Herzen. (Cf. *WLP* 1567 note).

[3] *La philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIXe siècle.* (Bibliothèque de l'Institut français de Léningrad, vol. 10) Paris, Honoré Champion. 1929. 212 pp. [*WLP* 1617]

"A meticulous examination of the relationship between German idealist philosophy and Nicholas I's policy of 'official nationalism' ..." (*WLP* 1617 note).

KUZILOV, I. I.: *Otkrytie i obosnovanie K. Marksom materialističeskogo ponimanija istorii i razgrom im social'no-istoričeskix vozzrenij gegel'jancev, Fejerbaxa i Prudona.* M. MGU. 1951/52. (d) [*FBSP* 5990]

MALIA, M. E.

[3] 'Schiller and the Early Russian Left'. In McLean, Hugh *et al.: Russian Thought and Politics* (Section II, *supra*) pp. 169–200. [*WERH* 896; 32]

See also [1], under Herzen (Section VIc, *supra*). (Influence of Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel on Herzen.)

MÜLLER, Ludolf: 'Schellings Einfluß in Rußland. Sergej A. Jurjev und Vladimir S. Solovjev'. In: *Archiv für Philosophie* 3 (1949) 53–81.

NAČKEDIJA, Ja. E.: *Kritika klassikami marksizma-leninizma reakcionnyx sociologičeskix vzgljadov Gegelja kak aristokratičeskoj reakcii na francuzskuju buržuaznuju revoljuciju 1789–1794 gg. i na francuzskij materializm XVIII veka.* AON. 1953/54. (d) [*FBSP* 6239]

OJZERMAN, T. I.

[1] 'Klassičeskaja nemeckaja filosofija. Antropologičeskij materializm L. Fejerbaxa'. In: *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii.* r. M. T. Iovčuk, T. I. Ojzerman, I. Ja. Ščipanov. (M., Socékgiz. 1960. 814 str.), str. 298–318. [*FBSP* 6327 (3), 3482]

[2] (co-author ASMUS, V. F.): 'Klassičeskaja nemeckaja filosofija. Idealističeskie učenija Kanta, Fixte, Šellinga, Gegelja'. In: *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii,* str. 247–297. [*FBSP* 6328, 3482]

(The only reference to Schelling in the Index of *FBSP*!)

[3] Section on Kant, Fichte, and Schelling (gl. I § 2) in: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.) [1], *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax,* t. II, str. 34–73. The following section (gl. I, § 3) deals with Hegel, but its authorship is not specified: *ibid.*, str. 73–115.

PASSAGE, C. E.: 'The Influence of Schiller in Russia, 1800–1840'. *ASEER* 5 (1946) 111–137. [*WERH* 895]

SCHEIBERT, Peter: *Von Bakunin zu Lenin. Geschichte der russischen revolutionären Ideologien, 1840–1895.*

[1] Band 1. *Die Formung des radikalen Denkens in der Auseinandersetzung mit deutschem Idealismus und französischem Bürgertum.* Leyden, E. J. Brill. 1956. 344 SS. [*WLP* 1604. *FBSP* 4241]

The first volume of this study ([1] *supra*) covers the period 1840–1855, and includes studies of Čaadaev, Stankevič, Belinskij, Herzen, Ogarëv, and Bakunin, with emphasis on German (and French) intellectual influences. (Cf. *WLP* 1604 note).

SETSCHKAREFF (SEČKARËV), W.: *Schellings Einfluß in der russischen Literatur der 20er und 30er Jahre des XIX Jahrhunderts.* Berlin. Leipzig. 1939.

"The only monograph on Schelling's influence in Russia." (Riasanovsky [5], p. 230.)

XARAXORKIN, L. R.: 'Iz istorii bor'by samoderžavija i cerkvi protiv rasprostranenija v Rossii ateističeskix i materialističeskix idej L. Fejerbaxa'. *VF* 1958, 9, 88–91. [*FBSP* 1590]

(b) *French Social Thought*

(1) PROUDHON, SAINT SIMON, FOURIER

*Works*

FUR'É, Šarl' (= Charles Fourier): *Izbrannye sočinenija.* Per. s francuzskogo i komm. I. I. Zil'berfarb. vs. V. P. Volgin. tt. 1–4. M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1951–1954. [*MSE* 9, 1193. *FBSP* 1088]

*Secondary Sources*

GRANDJARD, Henri, See Section VIa, *supra.*

IOANNISJAN, A. R.: *Šarl' Fur'é.* M., Izd. AN SSSR. 1958. 152 str. [*FBSP* 4283]

KAPLAN, F. I.

[1] 'Russian Fourierism of the 1840's: A Contrast to Herzen's Westernism'. *ASEER* 17 (Apr. 1958), 161–172. [*WERH* 903]

KUZILOV, I. I. See Section VIIIa, *supra* (re Proudhon).

LABRY, Raoul: *Herzen et Proudhon.* Paris, Honoré Champion. 1928. 250 pp.

MALIA, M. E. [1] See under Herzen (Section VIc, *supra*). (Includes a study of the social theories of Proudhon, Saint-Simon, and George Sand in Herzen's thought.)

RIASANOVSKY, N. V.

[8] 'Fourierism in Russia: An Estimate of the Petrashevtsy'. *ASEER* 12 (Oct. 1953), 289–302. [*WERH* 904]

SCHEIBERT, Peter [1] See Section VIIIa, *supra.* (Deals with French as well as German influences.)

VOLGIN, V. P.: See introductory article to: *Fur'é, Šarl': Izbrannye sočinenija ...* (*supra*).

ZIL'BERFARB, I. I.

[1] 'Idei Fur'é v Rossii v 30–40–x godax XIX veka'. *Istoričeskie zapiski* 27 (1948) 240–265.

[2] Commentary to: *Fur'é, Šarl': Izbrannye sočinenija ...* (*supra*)

(2) THE PETRAŠEVCY

*Works*

*Filosofskie i obščestvenno-političeskie proizvedenija petraševcev.* r. and vs. V. E. Evgrafov. M., Gospolitizdat. AN SSSR. 1953. 824 str. [*FBSP* 1078, where editor wrongly given as Evgarov.]

*Secondary sources*

EVGRAFOV, V. E.

[1] Introductory article to: *Filosofskie ... proizvedenija petraševcev (see Works, supra).*

[2] Section on 'Petraševcy' in: Dynnik, M. A., *et al.* (ed.) [1], *Istorija filosofii v šesti tomax.*, t.II, str. 310–318.

RIASANOVSKY, N. V. [8] See under PROUDHON, etc., *supra*.

(3) RUSSIA AND 1848

*Secondary sources*

BARGHOORN, F. C.

[1] 'Russian Radicals and the West European Revolutions of 1848'. *Review of Politics* 11 (July 1949) 338–354. [*WERH* 761]

BERLIN, Isaiah

[3] 'Russia and 1848'. *SEER* 26 (Apr. 1948) 341–360. [*WERH* 82]

LEXTBLAU, L.: 'Revoljucija 1848 g. i carskaja cenzura'. *Istorik-Marksist* 7 (1940) 3–13.

VENTURI, Franco

[2 It] *Esuli russi in Piemonte dopo il '48*. Turin, Einaudi. 1959. 159 pp. [*WLP* 1577]

An account of the views of Russian *émigrés* such as Herzen, Sazonov, and Engel'son (then living in Nice, Genoa, and Turin) "on the future of Western Europe and of Russia, following the failure of the French Revolution of 1848". (*WLP* 1577 note).

## CHRONOLOGY 1964

Jan. Meeting of the Section of Social Sciences of the Praesidium of the AN on "Elaboration of Methodological Questions in History" (by P. N. Fedoseev and J. P. Francev). With participation of B. M. Kedrov and F. V. Konstantinov of the IF. (*VF* 1964, 5, 138–145) cf. also *Kommunist* 1964, 2, 61–74)

Beginning of the year Scientific meeting in Budapest on contemporary problems of Marxism-Leninism, organized by the Hungarian Ministry for Education and Culture. With participation of one Soviet economist and two philosophers (M. F. Ovsjannikov, A. G. Xarčev). (*FN* 1964, 3, 165–170)
Methodological seminar in Moscow on problems of social sciences, organized by the Chair of Dialectical and Historical Materialism of the humanities faculty of MGU. (*FN* 1964, 3, 162–164)

April First conference in the Institute of Philosophy and Law of Alma-Ata (Kazaxstan), on methodological and logical problems of contemporary natural science. (*VF* 1964, 11, 172)

May First All-Union symposium on philosophical problems of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation and of Relativist Cosmology (organized by the Soviet Commission on Gravitation, the Scientific Council of the AN of the Ukrainian SSR for Philosophical Questions in Natural Science and by the IF of the Ukrainian AN). (*VF* 1965, 2, 148–152)

June Meeting of philosophers and scientists in Obninsk on philosophical problems of natural science. With participation of M. E. Omel'janovskij giving a conference on 'Principles of Dialectical Materialism in Contemporary Physics'. (*VF* 1965, 1, 157–159)

Summer Symposium in Užgorod (Ukrainian SSR) on epistemological problems of change in physics, organized by the

IF of the Ukrainian AN and the Chair of Theoretical Physics and Philosophy of Užgorod University. (*VF* 1964, 12, 148)

Summer — United conference of the methodological seminars in Moscow on problems of interaction of nature and society. (*VF* 1965, 2, 143–148)

24.–28. August — International Aesthetical Congress in Amsterdam (on "Tradition and Innovation in Art"), with participation of 23 Soviet delegates. (*FN* 1965, 1, 140–143; cf. also *VF* 1965, 3, 149–157)

6.–12. Sept. — Fifth International Hegel-Congress in Salzburg on problems of aesthetics. With participation of M. B. Mitin as leader and 14 other Soviet philosophers. (Organized by the International Hegel Society). (*FN* 1965, 1, 143–148)

Nov. — Discussion between the editorial staff of *VF* and the British scientist, Prof. U. Ross Ashby (cybernetist). (*VF* 1965, 1, 154–157).

Dec. — Celebration in honour of the Soviet philosopher, Prof. A. O. Makovel'skij, corresponding member of the AN and member of the AN of Azerbajdžan. (*FN* 1965, 1, 159)

*K. Gerstenmaier*

# CONTENTS


*E. Laszlo* / The Planification of Hungarian Marxism-Leninism 273

*R. T. De George* / Heidegger and the Marxists 289

*R. Thomas* / Bemerkungen zum Materialismusproblem 299

Notes and Comments 311

History of Soviet History of Philosophy – Forces and Relations of Production – Misunderstandings – Blakeleyanism – Translations into Russian – New Lukács Bibliography – New Articles for *VF* – Soviet Study of the Council – Pragmatisierung der Sowjet-ideologie? – *Filosofskij slovar'*

Reviews

Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii (K. G. Ballestrem, R. J. Kemball, P. Beemans) 325

*V. V. Sokolov:* Filosofija Spinozy i sovremennost' (F. Rapp) 333

*E. Laszlo* (Individualism, Collectivism and Political Power (T. J. Blakeley) 336

*A. K. Demidova, V. I. Krasnyx* (Kniga dlja čtenija po marksistskoj filosofii (A. Heidenreich) 338

Biography

Biographical Data on Soviet Philosophers II (P. J. Beemans) 339

Volume V (1965)

Index of Names 349

Index of Subjects 359

Table of Contents 363


*The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editors or members of the institute*


Printed in The Netherlands by D. Reidel, Dordrecht



This content downloaded from 207.162.240.147 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 20:44:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

ERVIN LASZLO

# THE PLANIFICATION OF HUNGARIAN MARXISM-LENINISM

It is generally known that in Communist countries a large part of all theoretical research is planified. The plans themselves are less well known, however. The reasons for this are manifold. First, official plans are neither published, nor communicated on request. Second, local investigators are usually loath to talk about them. (This may be due to a combination of a feeling that central planification in scientific and philosophic research is intrinsically misplaced, and an annoyance at having to work on assigned projects.) Third, when the results are published, no mention is made of the work having been done in fulfilment of a plan.

This writer was fortunate enough to obtain Hungary's official plans of research on Marxism-Leninism while doing field research in that country on philosophy (May/June, 1965).[1] The plans provide an important insight into the inner workings of the ideological-philosophical activity of this Communist country. Their analysis is, therefore, of more than routine interest.

Hungary's present plans of research have been in effect since 1961. They were devised when Kádár initiated his 'New Course', and the outward appearance of 'liberalization' needed to be counterbalanced by an inner 'Marxist ideological offensive'. This offensive, and with it the fulfilment of the plans, is still pursued with the utmost vigor.[2] It is to be fed by the fruits of planified research. The mechanism of the offensive is, roughly, this. Expert and reliable theoreticians at the Party-Academy, the relevant Ministries, the Hungarian Academy of Science and the main Universities devise specific projects concerning the problematic areas of Marxism-Leninism in Hungary. They charge particular institutions with carrying them out. These in turn assign the individual research-projects to their own collaborators, and to those of the other institutions who they esteem are qualified to work on them. The investigators are required to report annually on the work they perform. A 'committee on coordination' convenes once every year (usually at the beginning of the calendar year) to check up on the progress, and allocate new assignments, or to



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

strike or change the former ones. Thus, with minor changes, the plans survive from year to year. (While a new 'five-year period' is starting in Hungary in 1966, the plans of ideological and philosophical research are not expected to undergo to more than the usual minor alterations: numerous projects now operative have deadlines up to 1970.) The results, if and when they are achieved, are disseminated among the relevant strata of the intellectual-technological elite (a stratum of Hungarian society which assumes progressively greater importance for the regime) through publications in the specialized and technical journals, lectures at the relevant institutions of higher learning, and popularizing articles in journals of wide circulation as well as in the newspapers. By this means, the cooperation with the regime of Hungarian intellectuals and technocrats is to be improved, and their faith in Communism fortified.

Hungary's 'national long-range plan of research' (*országos távlati kutatási terv*) includes 73 'Main Tasks' (*főfeladatok*). Of these the following involve Marxism-Leninism:

No. 63. 'Perfecting the Leadership of the People's Economy and Utilizing the Categories of Value';

No. 65. 'Marxist Criticism of the Manifestations of Contemporary Capitalism';

No. 70. 'Research Towards the Marxist Synthesis of Recent Hungarian History';

No. 72. 'Basic Questions of Dialectical Materialism and Logic';

No. 73. 'General Laws (*törvényszerüségek*) of Socialist Society'.

The first and second of these are economic projects assigned, respectively, to the Institute of Economic Science of the Hungarian Academy of Science and to the Karl Marx University of Economics (Budapest). The third is a project for historians for which the Academy's Institute of History is responsible, and the last named is a sociological project assigned to the Academy's new (1963) Institute of Sociology. These are plans for research *applying* the concepts, categories, and principles of Marxism-Leninism. There is one plan, however, which calls for research *on* Marxism-Leninism. This is Main Task No. 72, the project mainly for philosophers. Professor Tibor Elek of the Faculty of Philosophy of Budapest Technical University is charged with its coordination, and the Academy's Institute of Philosophy and the Faculty of Dialectical Materialism and Logic of the Eötvös Lóránd University (Budapest) are the insti-

tutions responsible for assigning the projects. In addition to engaging professional philosophers, these institutions have charged natural and social scientists, even engineers and physicians, with working out the 'philosophical problems' of their respective fields. Main Task No. 72 states a mighty bid for philosophical and ideological competence. It deserves to be stated in detail.

## 'BASIC QUESTIONS OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND LOGIC'

The plan consists of two principal 'tasks', detailed as seven inclusive projects ('theme-complexes'). These are subdivided into 38 individual subjects of research ('themes').

**Task one**

*The present development of dialectical materialism and the sciences*

PROJECT ONE

The categories and laws of dialectical materialism and their meaning for the sciences.

*Subjects*

1. The basic question of social determinism.
2. The category of purpose in Marxist philosophy.
3. The dialectics of quantity and quality.
4. The character of social laws and their purposive use in socialism.
5. (Not approved by the committee.)
6. The law of contradiction with special regard to biology.

PROJECT TWO

The elaboration and concretization of the foundations of the dialectical materialist conception of history on the basis of the development of socialist society.

*Subjects*

7. The dialectics of social being and social consciousness and the experiences of the development of socialist society.

8. The place of institutions in the structure of society.
9. (Terminated in 1963.)
10. The role of the Marxist theory of alienation in the genesis and development of the Marxist conception of history.
11. The mutual relation of economy and politics in the socialist revolution.
12. The specifics of the socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary.
13. The philosophical problems of work.
14. The objective bases of the 'ideological' forms of cognition.

PROJECT THREE

The philosophical problems of the natural sciences.

*Subjects*

15. Basic trends of scientific progress.
16. The material unity of the world, and the natural sciences.
17. Problems of the relation of matter and motion.
18. Philosophical problems of space and time.
19. Pavlov and Freud.
20. Marxism and Darwinism.
21. Critical summing up of the philosophical interpretation of classical quantum physics.

PROJECT FOUR

The technological revolution and dialectical materialism.

*Subjects*

22. The bourgeois and the Marxist interpretation of technological progress.
23. The process whereby science becomes a direct force of production. The technological revolution and the development of cybernetics.

PROJECT FIVE

The Marxist theory of knowledge and the sciences.

*Subjects*

24. The problem of the 'sensory image'.

25. The rational sector of the process of cognition and the critique of its phenomenological interpretation.
26. The methods of cybernetics and their applicability in the various sciences.
27. The purposive application of the method of dialectical materialism in the development of the technological and natural sciences. Applicability of mathematics. Observation, experimentation, measurement.
28. Problems of cognition of space and time.
29. Epistemological significance of the problem of determinism for the development of modern physics.
30. The conformation to law (*törvényszerüség*) of the evolution of scientific cognition.
31. Theoretical and methodological problems of research on [chemical] elements and structures.
32. Some questions of the theory of proof.

**Task two**

*The dialectical-logical study of the problems of logic*

PROJECT SIX

Some important categories of formal and dialectical logic.

*Subjects*

33. The categories of the general, the particular and the singular.
34. The forms of thought and the laws of formal logic.
35. The non-ontological interpretation of the laws of thought and dialectical materialism.

PROJECT SEVEN

The dialectics of concept, judgment, and inference.

*Subjects*

36. (Terminated in 1963.)
37. The dialectical-logical theory of judgment and inference.
38. The dialectical-logical analysis of the theory of judgment of Aristotelian and of modern formal logic.

The plan discloses interesting facts concerning the regime's estimation of the weaknesses of Marxism-Leninism in Hungary. In the light of the plan, Marxism-Leninism needs to be evolved with respect to three main fields, which are evidently felt to challenge its competence. These are (i) the natural sciences with their theoretical and technological entailments, (ii) the 'experience of socialism', i.e. of Communist practices in Hungary, and (iii) technical Western philosophy (including non-dialectical logic). In fact, the plan may be conveniently broken down to the three sections: 'Dialectical Materialism vs. Natural Science'; 'Historical Materialism vs. Social Experience'; and 'Marxist (technical) Philosophy vs. Contemporary Western Thought'. Specifically, the plan requires dialectical materialism to evolve in regard to modern biology (Subjects 6 and 20), theoretical physics (Subjects 17 and 21), psychology (Subject 19), cybernetics (Subject 26), mathematics and technology (Subject 27), chemistry (Subject 31), scientific technology (Subjects 22 and 23) and contemporary philosophy of science (Subjects 15, 16, 18, 28, 29 and 30). Next, we find that the aim to develop historical materialism with respect to current social experience (resolving thereby the hiatus between doctrinaire statements and actual experience) motivates the assignment of all the subjects listed under Project Two, as well as three subjects of Project One (Subjects 1, 2, and 4). They are to treat such delicate problems as that of social determination, the significance of purposive activity, the conscious utilization of 'social laws', the question of the existence and status of alienation under socialism, the 'specifics' of the 'socialist revolution' and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in Hungary, and related questions. Finally, Marxism-Leninism, *qua* philosophy in a technical sense, is to be fortified against Western challenge (or perhaps against internal criticism made possible by the use of non-Marxist concepts and theories) in nine subjects. These include an attempt to define the 'dialectics of quantity and quality' (Subject 3), support Marxist epistemological realism in the face of positivist objections (Subject 24), counter the phenomenological interpretation of mind and cognition (Subject 25), do something about the positivist claim that dialectical materialism is unverified (and unverifiable) (Subject 32), and last, but not least, to defend dialectical logic by criticizing traditional and modern formal logic and defining some of its own (persistently nebulous) categories (Subjects 33 through 38).

## FULFILMENT

Just what have Hungarian theoreticians done so far about living up to these high ambitions?

Plan-fulfilment to date may be looked for in the latest of the annual reports which investigators are required to file with the 'committee on coordination'. These reports refer to work done in 1964, the last completed year of research. Since the reports can contain no more than what the investigators can prove to the committee, claims of preparation can be told from productive work. Whoever has published monographs, studies, or even shorter articles, or else has submitted a dissertation for a degree on the allotted subject, has evidently been busy at his or her task. But the case where the investigator merely reports to have collected or studied materials is not as conclusive: he may have borrowed a library book at the last moment as justification, or may have been conscientiously preparing an important study. Be that as it may, a critical examination of the latest (1964) reports, completed by reference to work published in 1965, presents the following picture.

### *Dialectical materialism vs. natural science*

As suggested above, sixteen of the thirty-eight individual research projects have been devoted to working out the problems modern natural science and its various theoretical implications and technological applications raise for dialectical materialism.

(6) *The law of contradiction with special regard to biology.* Investigator: József Szénasi, lecturer at the Budapest Medical University. He has reported to have collected material. Deadline for the project is 1966.

(15) *Basic trends of scientific progress.* Investigator: Ervin Bóna, collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Science. Bóna has written a study for the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* on 'Forms of Motion and Some Questions of the Classification of the Sciences', and published another article entitled 'New Problems – New Sciences' (*Természettudományi Közlöny*, 1964, 11); with these he is considered to have fulfilled the above project. The original deadline was for 1967.[3]

(16) *The material unity of the world and the natural sciences.* Investigator: József Horváth, lecturer at the Faculty of Dialectical Materialism

of the Eötvös Lórand University, Budapest (ELTE). As early as 1962 Horváth had written 'On the Correct Understanding of the Material Unity of the World' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1962, 1) and has since produced several further articles on the subject. He is presently writing his dissertation on this subject (for the degree of a 'Candidate of Science', awarded by the Hungarian Academy of Science). The time allotted for the project is now up.

(17) *Problems of the relation of matter and movement.* Investigator: Gábor Szabó, of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Party Academy. He has reported to have collected and studied material. Time for the project is up.

(18) *Philosophical problems of space and time.* Investigator: Mrs. István Simonovits, assistant professor (*docens*) at ELTE's Faculty of Dialectical Materialism and Logic. Mrs. Simonovits has reported to have collected and studied material. Time for the project is up.

(19) *Pavlov and Freud.* Investigator: László Farkas of Budapest Medical University. He has reported to have collected and studied material. Deadline is 1966.

(20) *Marxism and Darwinism.* Two investigators have continued their studies on this subject: László Kovács, assistant professor at the Medical University of Debrecen, and Ferenc Pintér, lecturer at the College of Forestry and Timber Industry. Kovács wrote two lengthier studies so far (one on 'Some Philosophical Problems of Biology and Medicine', the other on 'Science and Progress') and has reported to be at work on a book, *Biology and Weltanschauung*. Pintér spent last year attending courses at Lomonosov University (Bulgaria). The allotted time is up.

(21) *Critical summing up of the philosophical interpretation of quantum physics.* Investigator: Antal Müller, collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy. Müller published a paper on the 'Epistemological Questions of Probability and Quantum Mechanics' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1964, 6) and has reported to have finished another on the microphysical role of the effects of measurement.[4] Deadline for the project is 1966.

(22) *The bourgeois and the Marxist interpretation of technological progress.* Two members of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Budapest Technological University were engaged on this project: László Ágoston, assistant professor, and Gojko Petrovic, lecturer. Ágoston has been very productive: he has written on 'Communism or "Unitary Industrial

Society"' in the theoretical journal of the Party, *Társadalmi Szemle* (1964, 5), on 'Technology and Thought Before Marx' (*Almanach*, Christmas edition 1964), and on 'The Scientific Concept of Technology' (*Periodica Polytechnica, Chemisches Ingenieurwesen* 1964, 4). His book, *Modern Technological Progress and Bourgeois Technicism* is now being published. Petrovic has merely done an article on 'Some Manifestations of Technocratic Views in Hungary Prior to 1945' (*Periodica Polytechnica, Special Issue on Philosophy*, 1964). Their deadline is 1967.

(23) *The process whereby science becomes a direct force of production. The technological revolution and the development of cybernetics.* Two investigators were originally charged with working out these projects, Mrs. Béla Ladovéri and László Pásztor, both of the Budapest Technological University. Pásztor has turned out to be 'unsuited to carry out the project' and, since nobody else could be had in his place, the second part of the project, 'the technological revolution and the development of cybernetics' has been dropped. But Mrs. Ladovéri has been busily working at her task. She wrote on 'Some Theoretical-Methodological Questions of the Process Whereby Science Becomes a Direct Force of Production' (*Periodica Polytechnica, Special Issue on Philosophy*, 1964), spoke on this topic on the National Conference of Teachers of Marxism-Leninism, commented on an article on this subject of Otto Pirityi, and went on a three month study trip to East Germany. She is devoting her 'Candidate' dissertation to this problem. Her deadline is 1967.

(26) *The methods of cybernetics and their applicability in the various sciences.* Investigators: Sándor Székely and András Kocsondi, both of the University of Szeged (JATE). Székely is writing his dissertation on the history and development of cybernetics and is going to submit that work as his fulfilment of the project, while Kocsondi reports to have collected materials for a study of cybernetical models and their application in the biological and social sciences. Their deadline is 1968.

(27) *The purposive application of the method of dialectical materialism in the development of the technological and natural sciences. Applicability of mathematics. Observation, experimentation, measurement.* This rather formidable task is undertaken by four members of the Faculty of Philosophy of Budapest Technological University: Tibor Elek, professor, Mrs. Ferenc P. Kovács and István Bodnár, lecturers, and László Lako, assistant. Lako is new to the project, and has not submitted results.

Mrs. Kovács and Bodnár reported to have prepared a comment on the controversy on the Marxist concept of matter.[5] In addition, Mrs. Kovács published an article on this topic in the Bulgarian philosophic journal (*Filosofka Misel*, 1964, 5). Elek presented his finished dissertation (submitted for the highest academic degree in Hungary, that of *Doctor of Science*) as work on the project. It is entitled *The Weltbild of Modern Physics: Comments on Einstein's Autobiography as Scientist.* Elek already has published part of it in the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* (1964, 6) and has written his controversial 'Application of Marxist Philosophy in the Technical University's Pedagogic-Educational and Scientific Work'. The project's deadline is 1967.

(28) *Problems of cognition of space and time.* Also tackled by Elek and Bodnár. Elek submitted his Einstein article, 'Relativitätstheorie und Atheismus' (*Periodica Polytechnica, Elektrotechnik*, 1964, 2), and Bodnár has reported to have spent a month in Leningrad collecting material and gathering information. Time for this project is up, but extension until 1967 has been applied for.

(29) *The epistemological significance of the problem of determinism for the development of modern physics.* Judit Fodor, lecturer at the Budapest Technological University, is doing her post-graduate work on this subject. She has published two articles on Heisenberg's philosophical views (*Periodica Polytechnica, Special Issue on Philosophy*, 1964, resp. *Természettudományi Közlöny*, 1964, 5) and has made a three month study trip to the Universities of Moscow and Leningrad. Her deadline is 1967.

(30) *The conformation to law of the evolution of scientific cognition.* This subject is new to the 1965 plans and consequently no progress-report has been filed yet. The Institute of Philosophy is charged with carrying the project out, already by 1965.

(31) *Theoretical and methodological problems of research on [chemical] elements and structures.* A new subject this year. It is to set forth the work done by Sándor Magyaródi, professor at the Teacher's College at Pécs, on the subject 'The problem of quality and representationality in the development of chemistry'. Magyaródi's project is considered accomplished. The deadline of the new subject is 1970.

*The Historical Materialism vs. current social experience*

Ten subjects come under this heading.

(1) *The basic question of social determinism.* Investigator: Vilmos Sós, collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy. He reports to have finished his dissertation (for the 'Candidate' degree) on 'Determinism and Dialectical Materialism'. It is devoted to the question of social determinism. (When it is officially accepted by the Academy of Science, Sós is expected to be considered as having fulfilled his task.) The deadline is 1967.

(2) *The category of purpose in marxist philosophy.* Investigator: Mrs. Tibor Rózsahegyi, collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy. Mrs. Rózsahegyi finished her dissertation on this subject for the 'Candidate' degree. She published previously, 'The Place and Role of Purpose in the Cognitive Process' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1962, 1), and 'The Purposiveness of Human Activity' (*Ibid.* 1963, 5). While she is considered to have essentially fulfilled her project, the original 1964 deadline has been extended to 1965.

(4) *The character of social laws and their purposive use in socialism.* Investigator: Árpád Volczer, lecturer at ELTE's Faculty of Historical Materialism. He has reported to have studied British work on the statistical and tendential character of social 'laws'. Volczer's deadline is 1968.

(7) *The dialectics of social being and social consciousness and the experiences of the development of socialist society.* Investigators: János Sipos, head of the Section of Historical Materialism at the Institute of Philosophy, and József Erdödi, professor at the Party Academy. Both have been most active. Sipos has written on the relation of being and consciousness in general (published in 1964 in a Czechoslovak as well as in a Greek periodical), and on the problem of social being and social consciousness in particular (*Annales* ELTE, 1964). His important study on the 'Specifics of the People's Democratic Revolution in Hungary' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1964, 1) has started a whole series of discussions. Erdödi has published on 'Science as a Direct Force of Production' (a project officially assigned to Mrs. Ladovéri) and on the concepts of conditions of production and of economy. He is preparing his dissertation on this topic and expects to finish it by 1966. The project's deadline is already up, however.

(8) *The place of institutions in the structure of society.* Investigator:

István Bór, of the Institute of Philosophy. He has reported to have prepared a study on the views of Marx and Engels on 'basis' and 'superstructure', to have collected material for the study of the State as institution, and to be about to write a monograph on bourgeois institution-sociology. His deadline is 1966.

(10) *The role of the Marxist theory of alienation in the genesis and development of the Marxist conception of history.* Investigator: Zoltán Somogyi, of the Institute of Philosophy. He has reported to have collected material and to have prepared a lengthy study on the basis of his previous results. His deadline is 1967.

(11) *The mutual relation of economy and politics in the socialist revolution.* Investigator: Béla Vészi, head of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Party Academy. Vészi is using his research to prepare a dissertation for the *Doctor of Science* degree. Originally expected to finish this work by 1964, he has been granted an extension to 1965.

(12) *The specifics of the socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary.* Two professors of the Party Academy are tackling this project: Sándor Kárpáti and János Somosköi. Kárpáti is writing his dissertation on this subject and has reported to have collected material. Somosköi is doing the same, but has promised to write two studies which, however, have failed to materialize. A one-year extension of the present deadline of 1965 has been applied for.

(13) *The philosophical problems of work.* Investigator: Albert Mihály, post-graduate student at the Karl Marx University of Economics (Budapest). He is preparing for examinations and has reported only to have collected material. His deadline (which he intends to respect) is 1966.

(14) *The objective bases of the 'ideological' forms of cognition.* Investigator: László Mész, assistant professor at the Budapest Medical University. He considers his dissertation 'Class-consciousness and Objectivity' to be relevant to the project. Mész is on sabbatical leave and expects to finish it in time for the 1966 deadline.

*Marxist philosophy vs. contemporary western thought*

The following projects have been designed to fortify Marxist philosophy in its 'struggle' with 'bourgeois' thought.

(3) *The dialectics of quantity and quality.* Investigator: András György

Szabó, head of the Section of Dialectical Materialism at the Institute of Philosophy. Szabó's contribution to the project so far consists of a study for the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy* (1953, 3) entitled 'Property–Quality–Quantity–Essence'. The deadline for his project is 1967.

(24) *The problem of the 'sensory image'.* Investigator: György Márkus, collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy. Márkus is considered to be the most promising critic of neo-positivism in Hungary, noted for his work on Russell and Wittgenstein. He has given a one-year course at ELTE on 'sensory cognition' and his notes have been submitted as the fulfilment of the project. His deadline is 1966.

(25) *The rational sector of the process of cognition and the critique of its phenomenological interpretation.* Investigator: Mihály Vajda, Institute of Philosophy. Vajda is *the* specialist on phenomenology in Hungary, but even he is at an early stage of phenomenological studies. He has to his credit one reply to the present writer's article on phenomenological aesthetics (published in *Valóság*, 1964, 1), entitled 'Intentionality and Reflection' (*Valóság*, 1964, 5). Vajda's deadline is 1966.

(32) *Some questions of the theory of proof.* Investigator: Tamás Földesi, assistant professor at ELTE's Faculty of Dialectical Materialism and Logic. Földesi is writing his doctoral dissertation on Marxist philosophy's theory of proof. He has published part of it as 'Contribution to the Criticism of the Neo-Positivist Theory of Proof' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1964, 4). Time for the project has expired.

(33) *The categories of the general, the particular and the singular.* Investigator: Sándor Szigetvári, lecturer at ELTE's Faculty of Dialectical Materialism and Logic. Szigetvári has worked on one aspect of this project, publishing a study on 'The Process of Cognizing the General' (*Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1964, 3). He has prepared a 'Candidate' dissertation under the title, 'Connections between Inductive and Deductive Inferences on the Plane of Empiricism'. Wisely, no deadline has been fixed for fulfilling all of this nebulous undertaking.

(34) *The forms of thought and the laws of formal logic.* Investigator: Mrs. Katalin G. Havas (an authority on logic in Hungary) assistant professor at ELTE's Faculty of Dialectical Materialism and Logic. She has written a book, *The Law of Identity in Traditional and Modern Formal Logic* (used at present as standard textbook) and is preparing lecture-notes on the further development of traditional forms and laws in modern

formal logic. Her work is expected to fulfil the project in time for its 1965 deadline.

(35) *The non-ontological interpretation of the laws of thought and dialectical materialism.* Investigator: Péter Katona, lecturer at the University of Szeged (JATE). The original title of his subject had been, *The relation of the laws of formal and dialectical logic.* Katona decided, however, to restrict his work in 1965 to the relation of dialectical materialism and the non-ontological interpretation of the laws of logic. (His previous work contained a discussion of the differences between the laws of formal and dialectical logic and a report on the work done on this problem in the USSR and Hungary.) He is writing his 'Candidate' dissertation within the present, restricted formulation of the problem. The officially allotted time is up.

(37) *The dialectical-logical theory of judgment and inference.* Investigator: László Erdei, collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy and coordinator of Project Seven, the main authority on dialectical logic in Hungary. Erdei has concluded his dissertation on this subject for the Academy of Science's Doctor's degree. With that the task is considered to be accomplished. The deadline had been 1964.

(38) *The dialectical-logical analysis of the theory of judgment of Aristotelian and of modern formal logic.* Investigator: Mrs. Anna Madarász, of the Institute of Philosophy. Mrs. Madarász intends to set forth her work in a monograph, two chapters of which are already finished. She expects to meet the deadline: the end of this year.

## OBSERVATIONS

The end-results of the plan cannot be estimated yet. Many of the projects have still several years to go, and even those of which the allotted time has expired are mostly in a semi-finished state. But, after a perusal of the published works and of the summary of the contents of those in preparation, some general observations may be made.

In this writer's estimation, about 24 investigators have now come up with finished works.[6] Of these, approximately 12 have achieved intrinsically interesting and valuable results.[7] The noteworthy feature of the work of these twelve investigators is their willingness to consider facts. While the customary Marxist interpretation is the stated aim (it could

not be otherwise), that which is interpreted is carefully delineated. Criticism is no longer directed at imaginary opponents and theories; the subject of research is thoroughly known. This is clearly evident in the work of each of the twelve investigators, who have treated, respectively: philosophical problems of quantum theory (Müller), the role of technology in socialism (Ágoston), the criticism of relativity and related theories (Elek), philosophical problems of chemistry (Magyaródi), the problem of social determination (Sós), the role of purpose in human affairs (Mrs. Rózsahegyi), the evaluation of the fate of Hungary under Communism (Sipos), problems of epistemological realism (Márkus), verification in Marxist philosophy (Földesi), and made the attempt to define basic concepts of dialectical logic (Erdei), criticize formal logic (Mrs. Havas) and Aristotelian logic (Mrs. Madarász).

It is questionable whether it is the plan, or personal interest and ambition, that has provided the incentive to work on these problems. Knowing some of the investigators personally, this writer leans toward the latter view. But, while the success of 12 out of 38 assignments does not confirm the efficiency of philosophical planification, the plans serve to disclose two important facts concerning the ideological course of Hungary's 'New Course': (1) technical philosophy is included in the regime's current 'ideological offensive'; (2) local investigators are officially invited to do basic research on the truly problematic questions of Marxism-Leninism.

Basic research into problems of Communism is now institutionalized in Hungary. It is difficult to say just where, in years to come, such autonomous work will lead to in a former satellite. It seems certain, however, that it will significantly contribute to ideological diversity in the Communist bloc.

## REFERENCES

1. The author wishes to acknowledge a grant in aid for this purpose by the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia.
2. Cf. for example, 'The Ideological Offensive of Marxism is a Requisite of our Socialist Construction', editorial in the Party's theoretical organ, *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1964,11.
3. Since the 1964 reports have been filed, Bóna published another article on his allotted subject: 'Some Theoretical Questions of the Applied Sciences', in *Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1965, 2.

4. It has been published in the 1965, 4 issue of the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy*.
5. This comment has recently appeared in the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, 1965, 2.
6. These are (in alphabetical order): Ágoston, Bóna, Elek, Erdei, Erdödi, Fodor, Földesi, Havas, Horváth, Katona, Kovács, Ladovéri, Madarász, Magyaródi, Márkus, Mész, Müller, Rózsahegyi, Sipos, Sós, Szabó, Székely, Szigetvári and Vészi. For their respective assignments, cf. 'The Plan', above.
7. Ágoston, Elek, Erdei, Földesi, Havas, Madarász, Magyaródi, Márkus, Müller, Rózsahegyi, Sós and Sipos. Their assignments will be discussed above.

R. T. DE GEORGE

# HEIDEGGER AND THE MARXISTS

## I

French Marxists and existentialists have been engaged in polemical battle since at least 1945. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Camus – all of whom admitted to varying degrees the importance of Marx's contribution to Western thought – were the luminaries on the one side. Lesser lights, such as H. Lefebvre, P. Naville, and R. Garaudy defended 'modern' Marxism, or Marxism-Leninism, as best they could. But they were hopelessly outclassed. When Georg Lukács, the brilliant Marxist from Hungary, joined the fray with his *Existentialisme ou Marxisme*[1], it seemed that a real dialogue might develop. For here was an eminent Marxist philosopher, sympathetic to the early humanistic writings of Marx who also appreciated the positive contributions of the existentialists and the necessity of dealing with the problems they raised. He also brought a new dimension to the debate by turning his attention to Husserl and Heidegger. The latter he criticized both for an unjustifiable use and extension of the phenomenological method[2] and for his passive nihilism, his glorification of the isolated individual and his condemnation of social activity. In passing he remarked that "*Sein und Zeit* is only a polemical writing of imposing dimensions against the Marxist conception of fetishism and the philosophical and social consequences which follow from it".[3] His characterization of existentialism as representing the spiritual and moral chaos of the contemporary intelligentia has become the standard Marxist interpretation of the movement.

The Marxist-existentialist debate continued, developed and changed. Merleau-Ponty and Camus died. Lukacs' efforts in philosophy turned to the study of the young Hegel and to nineteenth century irrationalism. In 1957 Sartre wrote his article 'Marxism and Existentialism' for the Polish journal *Tworczość* and existentialism became something of a rage among young Polish intellectuals. Adam Schaff, the leading Polish Marxist, rose to reply by presenting not only a critique of Sartre but a



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

Marxist answer to the human problems Sartre had raised.[4] Yet Sartre's imposing *Critique de la raison dialectique*[5], the last major contribution to the debate, has almost inexplicably drawn no extended reply from the Marxist-Leninists.

The Soviets, shielded from the realities of the Western world, were long in even noticing existentialism and even longer in joining the fray.[6] Their contribution to the dialogue – if dialogue it be – has been primarily polemical, broadside criticism of the movement as a whole. Yet in more recent years some Soviet philosophers have hesitantly turned their attention to the question of the human person, to an analysis of alienation and to problems of ethics and values – areas on which existentialism focuses much of its interest.[7] Though Soviet studies of existentialism have yet to reach the level of genuine philosophical discussion or refutation, there is also evidence that at least some Soviet philosophers are reading the original existentialist writings, at least for purposes of condemnation. Thus, while D. V. Ermolenko's treatment of existentialism in his *Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii*[8] still relied heavily on such secondary sources as John Wild's *The Challenge of Existentialism*[9] and Marjorie Grene's *Martin Heidegger*[10], later criticisms such as M. Čalin's *Filosofija otčjaniaja i straxa*[11] and P. V. Kopnin's article in *Protiv sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii*[12] cite original sources as well as secondary Western commentaries. In 1963 P. P. Gajdenko's *Ekzistencializm i problema kul'tury*[13] was devoted entirely to a study and criticism of Heidegger, though even a Soviet reviewer complained that the book by no means considered the range of problems central to Heidegger.[14] Gajdenko lists the most important works of Heidegger in his bibliography, but his actual citations are restricted to *Sein und Zeit*, *Holzwege*, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. I. S. Narskij in an article entitled 'The Anti-Communistic Essence of Existentialistic Nihilism' in *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*[15] refers his readers to Gajdenko's analysis of Heidegger's ''fundamental' ontology' and extends his study to Heidegger's concepts of 'nothing' and 'nihilism' as presented in *What is Metaphysics*?[16] and his two volume work *Nietzsche*.[17] The major works of Heidegger have thus been passed in review by Soviet philosophers and presumably they have fulfilled that part of their task of criticizing bourgeois ideologies.

II

Narskij's article is not a contribution to Heidegger scholarship. Yet as typical of Soviet criticism it can serve as a jumping-off point for some general observations.

The article itself is something of a puzzle. It appeared in a slightly different form – a sentence added or dropped here, a paragraph there – in *Filosofskie nauki*, 1964, 3, under the more accurate title of 'Ponjatija 'nigilizma' i 'ničto' v ekzistencializme M. Xajdeggera i antikommunizm' ('The Concepts of 'Nihilism' and 'Nothing' in the Existentialism of M. Heidegger and Anti-Communism'). The article does not fit the rest of the book which deals with Western expositors and critics of Marxism. If existentialism had to be included, an article on Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* would have been more appropriate. That work might be construed to be a falsification of Marxism. Heidegger's *What is Metaphysics?* (in which he never mentions Marxism) and his two volumes on *Nietzsche* (in which Communism and Marxism get only passing mention) can hardly be seriously considered as falsifications of Marxist-Leninist philosophy by even the wildest stretch of the Soviet imagination. So an exposition of Heidegger's nothing and nihilism, by the addition of a few sentences, is changed into an article the title (The Anti-Communistic Essence of Existentialistic Nihilism) of which is patently implausible and which is never borne out by the article's contents. Since the book was published in an edition of only 3500 it was not intended as a propaganda volume and so the inclusion of this particular article is all the more puzzling. For presumably interested philosophers had already read it in *Filosofskie nauki*. It is also interesting to note that several of the footnotes are changed from one version to the next. A reference to Lenin is changed in the book version[18] of the article; but two references to Heidegger are also changed. Heidegger's *Was ist Metaphysik?* is correctly cited as Bonn, 1930 instead of 1929 as in *FN*, and his 'Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität' incorrectly cited as Freiburg, 1933 (where and when it was delivered, not published) is changed to Breslau, 1934 instead of Breslau, 1933, when the work was actually published. Are these latter simply editorial slips of which we should take no notice or are they clues indicating that Soviet critics do not actually go to the primary sources they are criticizing? Though this still remains an open question, Narskij's

article is at least sufficient evidence that the Soviet critics are still reading primarily to refute by polemic.

Heidegger is certainly open to philosophical criticism. He has many insights, has raised important problems, and deserves serious consideration. But that he is often at best unclear and vague, and that his treatment of historical figures such as Nietzsche is challengeable, is a commonplace. I am not, therefore, committing myself to a defense of Heidegger's philosophy against his Soviet critics. Moreover, such a defense in the light of Narskij's article would be a waste of time. For, to Narskij, Heidegger is not a philosopher with whom he argues, but a Western spokesman whose ideology he rejects. Philosophical arguments are therefore here beside the point. He claims, and correctly so, that Heidegger's work emphasizes dread, death, nothing and nihilism. But he ignores the fact that Heidegger's aim is to overcome nihilism, which in his view reached its consummation in Nietzsche. He correctly says that Heidegger feels that Communism is an abortive attempt to overcome nihilism. But he ignores the fact that Heidegger says most other means – science, Christianity, positivism and various contemporary metaphysical systems are also abortive attempts. He claims that the essence of Heidegger's position is essentially anti-Communism. But he ignores the fact that by a similar line of reasoning it is also essentially anti-Christian, anti-positivistic, and so on. He claims (citing his period as rector of Freiburg University) that Heidegger's philosophy supports fascism. But he fails to show how this supposedly pessimistic philosophy supported the future-oriented optimism of fascism, or how the popularity of Heidegger's views can be explained after the defeat of fascism. He ignores the scholarly problems of analysis of the meaning of Heidegger's key terms, and of the continuity or lack of continuity among Heidegger's works. He quotes to caricature and to discredit. And so his approach is negative and in its very negativity he in a sense vindicates Heidegger's passing characterization of Marxism and defeats his own purpose. For it must indeed be difficult for Soviets who learn of Heidegger from Narskij to understand how such a philosophy could possibly be held, how it could possibly be the philosophy representative of the West about which they are learning more and more, and how, if it is representative, there can be so much apparent vigor in such a decadent dying people. (Might they in fact not be paper-tigers after all?).

To expect a careful, *analytic* study of Heidegger from the Soviets would perhaps be to expect too much. But it does not seem too much to ask for a solid *Marxist* critique of Heidegger. And none is yet forthcoming. What is it that I am asking for? Let us take Narskij's thesis that Heidegger's philosophy reflects "the destruction of the social bonds in the foundation of capitalistic reality"[19] and that it is symptomatic of the "spiritual agony of bourgeois individualism".[20] The Marxist, I take it, is not merely giving voice to a tautology when he says that a given philosophy echoes the socio-economic condition of a society. If there is a spiritual crisis in the West which Heidegger's philosophy expresses, I presume that there are other indications of this which can be described and directly linked to Heidegger's thought, as base to superstructure. We are not, therefore, to take Heideggers' thought as the only evidence of the crisis, since we are to explain his thought by a more basic crisis in society. It would be extremely enlightening to see the case argued that there are two or three periods in the development of Heidegger's thought and that these reflect the history of Germany from 1920 to the present. Narskij points to three periods of German contemporary development: (1) the period of the fascist hatred of mankind; (2) the period of devastation and hopelessness in the first years after the failure of Hitler's Germany; and (3) the period of hopeless revanchism.[21] Are the three reflected in Heidegger by different works? Or are all three reflected in all his works? The relation of base and superstructure is extremely complex. But certainly a Marxist critique must make some attempt at showing the relation and not merely rely on the truism that it exists. A genuine Marxist critique must go at least this far. A brilliant one would also account for the fact that there are many critics as well as admirers of Heidegger in the West, and it would account equally well for both the critics and the admirers. Ideally it would further explain in what sense, if any, Heidegger's philosophy is representative of a certain class. It is hardly widely accepted by the masses; the intelligentsia who discuss it – both pro and con – do not form a distinctive class, according to Marxism-Leninism; and to my knowledge most of the Western capitalists, entrepreneurs and industrialists are quite in the dark about what Heidegger is saying. His appeal may well be to the youth. But they, alas, also do not form a class.

It is easy to claim that Heidegger, because he speaks about death, represents the decline of the West. It is more difficult to show it. It is easy

to lump Heidegger and Jaspers together and, ignoring their differences, claim that they both represent the despair of the West, that both played into the hands of the Nazis, and that both oppose the optimistic world-view of Communism.[22] It is much more difficult to defend these claims. It is easy to say that all Western philosophy is basically idealistic, that its diversity and internal controversies represent a divisive, dog-eat-dog, splintered, doomed society. It is much more difficult to show just how this thesis is to be understood and defended. The failure of Marxist criticism of Heidegger, as well as of other Western philosophers, is not necessarily that it has been wrong; but rather that most of it has been shallow, polemical, beside the point, and poor Marxism. Marxist criticism is difficult. Marxist-Leninist criticism has become too easy. It would perhaps be too much to ask that Marxists follow Lenin's advice and criticize not in the manner of Feuerbach but in the manner of Hegel, i.e. not by merely rejecting views but by correcting them "deepening, generalizing, and extending them, showing the *connection* and *transitions* of each and every concept".[23] But this presumably is what Marxist and Marxist-Leninist philosophy should do.

## III

Marxism-Leninism claims to be a world-view. As such it attempts to show not only that other world-views (and the Soviets consider Heidegger to be presenting a world-view) are deficient, unsatisfactory, reactionary or moribund, but also that it itself supplies the most satisfactory and the only true answers to the large problems of human life. Heidegger raises a great number of problems, admittedly more than he satisfactorily answers. Insofar as his problems are unanswerable Marxism-Leninism tends to dismiss them as pseudo-problems. The problem or problems of 'nothing' fall under this class. But insofar as he presents real problems, Marxism-Leninism must supply answers to them and answers which are demonstrably superior to those of other world-views.

According to many Western thinkers, the strength of Heidegger lies in his having raised and brought to the fore questions about the individual person and his uniqueness. He has done this at a time when the individual is being submerged into a leveled mass of humanity as a result of both the uniformity which arises from industrialization and the ever-increasing

organization which modern society demands. He finds man achieves or realizes his uniqueness insofar as he finds himself on the road to his own personal unique death. Thus arise the questions of the meaning of death, the meaning of life, and the possible ways of existing authentically as unique entities instead of as herd-animals. Similarly, as a being in society with others, the status and future of that society with its dangers to the development of the individual also become problems demanding scrutiny and answers. How successful has Marxism-Leninism been in answering these questions and in solving these problems?

Narskij summarily presents what Marxism-Leninism has in the way of an answer. In a critical article it is perhaps not his job to elaborate or defend the solutions. Yet they are at best thin and other Soviet philosophers have admitted that Marxism-Leninism is just beginning to turn its attention to problems of the person.[24]

The Marxist-Leninist position on death is that it is the inevitable and natural end of every human individual and that the only way to wage battle with it is by making life longer, happier, more free of exploitation, suffering and illness, and more full of creative work for the good of society. "No other solution to it is possible. And it is precisely Communism which brings this solution to men."[25] But surely this supposed solution begs the question at issue. Marx was concerned with bettering the lot of the proletariat, an admittedly noble aim. But, to think that suffering or evil will ever be completely eliminated is utopian. Thus the question of what attitude one should take towards his death and the death of his loved ones, toward his and their suffering remains a valid question even under Communism. The question of what one is and what he should do with his life, how he can live it most fully with the unique combination of talents and gifts which are his potentially or actually are questions every developing individual might well ask himself. Platitudes about a future ideal society do not answer these questions for contemporary individuals.

The claim that the mastering of cosmic space[26] or that the building of a future state of Communism makes all present ills worth while, that it gives meaning to individual suffering and death has moreover evidently failed to be convincing or sufficient for the Soviet people. Schaff was acute enough to see that the penchant of young Polish intellectuals for existentialism was an index that Marxism-Leninism did not satisfactorily answer the question of the meaning of life for these students. Existen-

tialism has not had the free circulation in the USSR that it has had in Poland. But the unrest of Soviet youth should serve as a signpost to Soviet philosophers that ideologically (not to mention philosophically) their answers are unsatisfactory. If they would read Heidegger not only to refute him they might at least be enlightened about certain problems which are common to all men as men, not merely to bourgeois men. They could then translate the problems from Heidegger's to their own jargon. To do so, moreover would be in the best tradition of Marxism. Lenin claimed that Marx continued the best of German philosophical thought and he emphasized that Communists should learn wherever possible from the bourgeoisie. Counter to Lenin's injunction, Soviet philosophers seem to have learned little. But then as Engels said of Marx, he was a genius; Soviet philosophers, like Engels, seem to be at best just talented.

Let me mention one final point of the Marxists' blindness with respect to their interpretation of Heidegger. Narskij, for example, sees Heidegger as a prophet of doom, forecasting the downfall of society. But the society which is dying, Narskij says is capitalist society, "and the elimination of capitalistic social relations does not evoke grief in us Marxists".[27] Heidegger's and Jasper's concern about the future of mankind in the face of present day thermonuclear capabilities is dismissed by Narskij as the pessimism of a dying society faced with its replacement by Communism.[28] This may be propaganda. But as an analysis of social reality it is obviously deficient. The Marxian analysis of the demise of capitalistic society is no longer tenable in its original form. Lenin changed it in his analysis of the last or imperialist stage. With the advent of the atomic bomb the Soviet leaders changed it once more. But evidently some of the philosophers have failed to keep up with world realities. The Soviet cry for peaceful coexistence and for peace is based on the realization that in the present situation a world-wide war means not only the end of capitalist society but of socialist society as well, and with it the end of the glorious future of Communism. If Narskij's naive division of the world and the separation of the future of the Western world from the future of the Soviet world is characteristic of Marxist-Leninist thinking, then the concern on the part of all thinking people everywhere for the future of mankind and for its survival should be intensified. For there are not two worlds, but one; not two humanities, but one. Heidegger's approach to the problem of mankind's future may be rejected; but the problem of mankind's future is one

which no portion of the world should consider and decide *in abstracto* and apart from the real possibility of mankind's total self-annihilation.

Heidegger perhaps naively thought that only his philosophy would able to lead to a dialogue between East and West.[29] His reception in the Soviet Union shows that this is hardly likely to be the case. If he is considered by Soviet philosophers as a falsifier of Marxism, how much more rightly can he consider their presentation of his philosophy as a falsification of it. The Marxist-existentialist dialogue which began in France seems to have ended in a one-sided polemic monologue in the pages of Soviet philosophical works, at least with respect to Heidegger. We still await their reply to Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique*. If this too becomes a monologue we can only hope that the real problems of the meaning of life and death which real men face will sooner or later force the Marxist-Leninist philosophers to start dealing with them seriously.

*The University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas*

## REFERENCES

1. Lukács, Georges: *Existentialisme ou marxisme?* (trans. into French by E. Kelemen), Paris, Nagel, 1948; a German version appeared in 1951.
2. See Lukács, Georg: 'Existentialism', in *Philosophy for the Future* (ed. by R. W. Sellars, V. J. McGill, and M. Farber), New York, The Macmillan Co., 1949, pp. 571–590.
3. Lukács, Georges: *Existentialisme ou marxisme?*, 2nd ed., Paris, Nagel, 1961, pp. 118–119.
4. For an English collection of a number of his essays, see Schaff, Adam: *A Philosophy of Man*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1963.
5. Sartre, Jean-Paul: *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Paris, Librairie Gallimard, 1960.
6. One article appeared in *Voprosy filosofii* on Christian existentialism in 1948, another on Sartre in 1949, a third in 1952 on the French Marxism-existentialism controversy and a fourth polemical attack in 1954. It is only towards the end of the 1950's that the Soviet literature on the subject becomes significant.
7. For more details on these developments see my articles 'The Soviet Concept of Man', *SST* IV, 261–276; 'A Bibliography of Soviet Ethics', *SST*, III, 83–103; and 'Value Theory in Soviet Philosophy: A Western Confrontation', *The Proceedings of the XIII International Congress of Philosophy, 1963*, Vol. IV, pp. 133–143.
8. Ermolenko, D. V.: *Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii*. M. 1959.
9. Wild, John: *The Challenge of Existentialism*. Bloomington, Indiana U.P. 1955.
10. Grene, Marjorie: *Martin Heidegger*. London, Bowes & Bowes. 1957.
11. Čalin, M.: *Filosofija otčajanija i straxa*. M. 1962.
12. Kopnin, P. V.: 'O nekotoryx osobennostjax leninskogo metoda kritiki idealističeskix filosofskix koncepcij'. *Protiv sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii*. M. 1963.

R. THOMAS

# BEMERKUNGEN ZUM MATERIALISMUSPROBLEM

Wer die Diskussionen in der Sowjetphilosophie während der letzten Jahre verfolgt hat, wird sich oft die Frage vorgelegt haben, warum dabei das Materialismusproblem nur selten und am Rande erörtert worden ist. Dieser Sachverhalt ist um so erstaunlicher, als auf zahlreichen anderen Gebieten ein lebhafter Meinungsstreit in Gang gekommen ist, der in den Debatten über den dialektischen Widerspruch einen besonders markanten Ausdruck gefunden hat.[1] Die eigentlichen Grundfragen der Ontologie nach dem Inhalt des Begriffs Materialismus und nach einer exakten philosophischen Definition der Materie sind jedoch offen geblieben.

In den folgenden Bemerkungen ist eine doppelte Aufgabe gestellt. Zunächst soll gezeigt werden, daß die Klassiker des Marxismus-Leninismus das Materialismusproblem in ihren Analysen selbst in eine gewisse Aporie geführt haben, die später noch genauer zu kennzeichnen ist. Im Anschluß an diesen Rückblick wird auf einige kritische Neuansätze hingewiesen, die nur auf dem Hintergrund einer Auseinandersetzung mit den Klassikern verständlich sind und so ihr besonderes Gewicht erhalten.

## I. DIE KLASSIKER

Der Begriff Materialismus wird von Marx in Auseinandersetzung und Abgrenzung gegenüber der Philosophie Feuerbachs gewonnen. Materialismus bedeutet für Marx zunächst ein methodisches Postulat der Forschung, das die unbedingte Priorität des Faktischen gegenüber dem erkennenden Subjekt im Erkenntnisprozeß charakterisieren soll. Freilich kann nicht bestritten werden, daß der Materialismusbegriff schon bei Marx ontologische Implikationen besitzt. Materialismus als konstitutives Prinzip einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie bedeutet in dieser Hinsicht die Anerkennung einer grundsätzlichen Einheit von Mensch und Gegenstandswelt, die sich im Prozeß der Arbeit realisiert und unter dem Naturbegriff zusammengefaßt wird. Der die Natur bearbeitende Mensch vollzieht gleichsam einen "Stoffwechsel mit der Natur"[2], ja "der Mensch ist



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

ein Teil der Natur".[3] Es wäre ein Mißverständnis, wollte man aus diesen Bemerkungen ableiten, daß Marx eine qualitative Einförmigkeit der Welt behauptet hätte. Der Mensch selbst ist in gewisser Weise Natur, Sinnlichkeit, aber indem er sich im Arbeitsprozeß als aktives, wirkendes Element betätigt, hebt er sich vom Naturstoff ab und bestätigt sich damit zugleich selbst und seine Naturmacht. "Denken und Sein sind also zwar *unterschieden* aber zugleich in *Einheit* miteinander."[4]

Hat Marx das Seinsproblem lediglich als Problem der Existenz des Menschen in seinem Verhältnis zur Natur gesehen, so weitet sich diese Analyse bei Engels zu einer alle Bereiche des Seienden einbeziehenden ontologischen Theorie. Dabei wählt Engels die folgende These als Ausgangspunkt seiner Betrachtung: "Die große Grundfrage aller, speziell neueren Philosophie ist die nach dem Verhältnis von Denken und Sein."[5] Diese Fragestellung, die auch in der gegenwärtigen sowjetphilosophischen Literatur immer wieder zitiert wird, ist eine fast wörtliche Übernahme der Behauptung Feuerbachs, daß "die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Geistes zur Sinnlichkeit" Hauptproblem der Philosophie sei.[6] Die Beantwortung der Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Denken und Sein hat nach Engels eine Spaltung der Philosophen in zwei Lager bewirkt: "Diejenigen, die die Ursprünglichkeit des Geistes gegenüber der Natur behaupten..... bildeten das Lager des Idealismus. Die anderen, die die Natur als das Ursprüngliche ansahen, gehören zu den verschiedenen Schulen des Materialismus."[7] Danach wird Materialismus durch die ontische Priorität des Materiellen vor allem Geistigen charakterisiert. Die Existenz geistiger Phänomene als Folge materieller Wirkungen wird in diesem Begriff des Materialismus im Gegensatz zum Vulgärmaterialismus, der alle Erscheinungen als rein materiell interpretiert, nicht ausgeschlossen. Da Engels einen ontologischen Dualismus ebenso ablehnt wie die Position des Vulgärmaterialismus, wird Ontologie als Lehre vom Seinscharakter der Seienden überhaupt problematisch. Die Kategorie des Seins, so lehrt er, kann die Dinge eben nur hinsichtlich ihres Seins erfassen und schließt daher die Ermittlung einer gemeinsamen Qualität aller Phänomene aus. Ein deutlich antimetaphysischer Akzent wird gesetzt, wenn Engels das Sein eine "offene Frage" nennt, "von der Grenze an, wo unser Gesichtskreis aufhört". Nur in diesem Zusammenhang wird es möglich, die unmittelbar anschließende These von Engels richtig zu deuten: "Die Einheit der Welt besteht in ihrer Materialität."[8] Nicht alle Phänomene

sind materiell, aber geeint durch ihre Abkunft vom Materiellen und durch ihre Faktizität, die im Erkenntnisprozeß sichtbar wird. Unvermittelt hat sich eine ursprünglich ontologisch gestellte Frage in den Bereich der Erkenntnistheorie verschoben, indem sie in die Nähe eines methodischen Postulats rückt, wie es uns schon bei Marx begegnet ist.

Bleibt also die Grundfrage der Ontologie nach dem Sein des Seienden letzthin offen, so wendet sich Engels – über Marx hinausgehend – einer an naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen orientierten Charakterisierung des Materiebegriffs zu, die zu einer Klärung der ontologischen Problematik nicht wesentlich beiträgt. Zur Materie gehört, als "inhärentes Attribut"[9] die Bewegung, ja, "Bewegung ist die Daseinsweise der Materie. Materie ohne Bewegung ist ebenso undenkbar, wie Bewegung ohne Materie. Die Bewegung ist daher ebenso unerschaffbar und unzerstörbar wie die Materie selbst."[10] Als Voraussetzung alles Seienden ist Materie immer bewegt, "absolute Ruhe, unbedingtes Gleichgewicht gibt es nicht."[11] Die Bewegung kann daher nicht als "bloße Eigenschaft" der Materie gedeutet werden, denn "weder die Bewegung als solche, noch eine ihrer Formen" ist von der Materie abtrennbar.[12] In einem ewigen Kreislauf von Werden und Vergehen entfaltet sich die bewegte Materie bis zur höchsten Entwicklung "organischen Lebens" und "naturbewußter Wesen", und "mit derselben eisernen Notwendigkeit, womit sie auf der Erde ihre höchste Blüte, den denkenden Geist, wieder ausrotten wird", muß sie ihn an anderem Ort und zu anderer Zeit von neuem hervorbringen, um ihren gesetzmäßigen Ablauf zu erfüllen.[13] Haeckel war es als Zufall erschienen, "daß die Materie, das denkende Menschenhirn aus sich hervorbringt", während Engels eine innere Notwendigkeit der Materie behauptet, "zur Entwicklung denkender Wesen fortzuschreiten".[14] Für Engels ist nichts ewig "als die ewig sich verändernde, ewig sich bewegende Materie und die Gesetze, nach denen sie sich bewegt und verändert".[15] Der Versuch einer näheren Bestimmung des Materiebegriffs durch die untrennbare Bindung an Bewegung trägt zu seiner Präzisierung wenig bei, da auch Nichtmaterielles durch Bewegung gekennzeichnet ist. Eine inhaltliche, qualitative Bestimmung des Materiebegriffs lehnt Engels als "eine reine Gedankenschöpfung und Abstraktion" ab. "Wir sehen von den qualitativen Verschiedenheiten der Dinge ab, indem wir sie als körperlich existierende unter den Begriff zusammenfassen".[16] Die Begriffe Materie und Bewegung erhalten ihre Sinngebung

also letztlich nur durch das Vorhandensein bestimmter Merkmale in den Gegenständen "Worte wie Materie und Bewegung sind nichts als *Abkürzungen*, in die wir viele verschiedene sinnlich wahrnehmbare Dinge zusammenfassen nach ihren gemeinsamen Eigenschaften".[17] So wird bei Engels der Versuch einer scharfen Trennung von Geist und Materie durch die Ablehnung eines ontologischen Dualismus einerseits und die Anerkennung einer qualitativen Verschiedenheit von Materie und Bewußtsein andererseits relativiert. "Die widernatürliche Vorstellung von einem Gegensatz zwischen Geist und Materie, Mensch und Natur, Seele und Leib" wird verschwinden, wenn man sich die materielle Einheit von Mensch und Natur vergegenwärtigt.[18]

Um eine Präzisierung dieser im Ergebnis diffus bleibenden Vorstellungen von Engels hat sich Lenin vor allem in seinem 1909 erschienenen Buch *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus* bemüht. Zu einer Zeit, in der die physikalische Forschung das Schlagwort von der "Entmaterialisierung der Materie" formulieren konnte, rückte das Materialismusproblem auf neue Weise in das Zentrum des Interesses und zwang Lenin die Rolle eines Apologeten des Materialismus auf. Berücksichtigt man diesen Sachverhalt, dann wird verständlich, warum die von Lenin versuchten Bestimmungen des Materiebegriffs einer ontologischen Fixierung auswichen und den Hauptakzent auf den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich legten. Die "*Grund*-frage" der Philosophie lautet nun, an Engels anknüpfend und zugleich in Unterscheidung davon, "ob die Dinge, die durch ihre Einwirkung auf die Sinnesorgane die Empfindungen hervorrufen, außerhalb unseres Bewußtseins existieren".[19] Diese Wendung der ontologischen Problematik in eine erkenntnistheoretische Fragestellung war durch Engels bereits vorbereitet, wenn er etwa schreibt: "Allerdings heißt materialistische Naturanschauung weiter nichts als einfache Auffassung der Natur so wie sie sich gibt ohne fremde Zutat".[20] Der Begriff Materialismus wird hier zur Charakterisierung des (erkenntnistheoretischen) Realismus verwendet, der die Existenz von Gegenständen unabhängig von unserem Bewußtsein anerkennt. Auf die begriffliche Unklarheit, die sich aus dieser Vermengung von Ontologie und Erkenntnistheorie ergibt, ist in der westlichen Literatur immer wieder hingewiesen worden.[21] Der Begriff Realismus, der Lenin seinem Inhalt nach durchaus bekannt ist, wird deshalb abgelehnt, weil Lenin fürchtet, daß dieser Terminus eine Verwandschaft zu philosophischen Richtungen andeuten könnte, die sich

in ontologischer Hinsicht vom Materialismus unterscheiden. Auf Dietzgen anspielend, der die "Partei der Mitte" als die "abscheulichste" bezeichnet hat, bemerkt Lenin: "Richtig! Die 'Realisten' u.dgl., darunter auch die 'Positivisten', Machisten usw., das alles ist jämmerlicher Brei, die schmähliche *Partei der Mitte* in der Philosophie, die in jeder einzelnen Frage die materialistische und idealistische Richtung durcheinanderwirft."[22] Ein ontologischer Spiritualismus, der eine idealistische Erkenntnistheorie vertritt, läßt sich in das Grundschema Lenins leicht einordnen, dagegen verwischt eine spiritualistische Ontologie, die realistisch fundiert ist (wie etwa der Thomismus), in unzulässiger Weise die Fronten. Der ontologische und gnoseologische Aspekt des Materialismus sind für Lenin letzthin untrennbar.

In seinen Definitionsversuchen der Begriffe Materialismus und Materie wird daher eine Unterscheidung dieser beiden verschiedenen Hinsichten nicht vorgenommen. Als Prinzip des Realismus (wenn auch nicht eindeutig formuliert), könnte etwa die Feststellung gelten: "Die Notwendigkeit der Natur anerkennen und daraus die Notwendigkeit des Denkens ableiten, ist Materialismus".[23] Andererseits hebt Lenin die ontologische Komponente des Materiebegriffs immer wieder hervor: "Die Materie ist das Primäre. Die Empfindung, der Gedanke, das Bewußtsein, ist das höchste Produkt der in bestimmter Weise organisierten Materie".[24] Wenn Lenin auch ausdrücklich einen Dualismus von Geist und Körper leugnet, so betont er doch, daß der Geist sich qualitativ von der Materie unterscheidet. "Richtig ist, daß sowohl der Gedanke als auch die Materie 'wirklich' sind, d.h. existieren. Den Gedanken als materiell bezeichnen, heißt einen falschen Schritt zur Vermengung von Materialismus und Idealismus tun."[25] Die sich in dieser Formulierung ankündigende ontologische Unterscheidung zwischen Geist und Materie wird von Lenin selbst wieder relativiert, weil für ihn der Geist nur aus der Materie entstanden sein kann. "Freilich ist auch der Gegensatz zwischen Materie und Bewußtsein nur innerhalb sehr beschränkter Grenzen von absoluter Bedeutung: Im gegebenen Falle ausschließlich innerhalb der Grenzen der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundfrage, was als primär und was als sekundär anzuerkennen sei. Außerhalb dieser Grenzen ist die Relativität dieser Entgegensetzung unbestreitbar."[26] Die von Lenin behauptete Relativität des Gegensatzes wirkt sich unmittelbar auf die Definition des Materiebegriffs aus. "Die Materie ist eine philosophische Kategorie zur

Bezeichnung der objektiven Realität, die den Menschen in seinen Empfindungen gegeben ist, die von unseren Empfindungen kopiert, fotografiert, abgebildet wird und unabhängig von ihnen existiert."[27] Zur Bestimmung des Materiebegriffs werden also keine Prädikate wie etwa Ausdehnung, Masse, Energie, herangezogen, sondern lediglich die reale Existenz unabhängig vom Bewußtsein; denn "die einzige 'Eigenschaft' der Materie, an deren Anerkennung der philosophische Materialismus gebunden ist, ist die Eigenschaft, *objektive Realität zu sein*, außerhalb unseres Bewußtseins zu existieren."[28] Die Materiedefinition Lenins ist keine Bestimmung, welche die wirklichen Merkmale und Eigenschaften einer bestimmten Sache aufweist, sondern eine durch Abgrenzung zu einem unterschiedlichen Begriff (dem Bewußtsein) gewonnene Umschreibung. Sie ist damit ohne eigenen Inhalt, naturwissenschaftlicher Kritik mithin weitgehend entzogen. Es wäre freilich falsch, wollte man leugnen, daß auch diese Definition gewisse ontologische Implikationen enthält. So ist in ihr die These enthalten, daß alles, was ist, in den Empfindungen gegeben sein muß. Außerdem wird von Lenin alles Seiende auf die Existenz in Raum und Zeit festgelegt. "'Materialisten', die die wirkliche Welt, die von uns wahrgenommene Materie als *objektive* Realität anerkennen, haben das Recht, daraus zu schließen, daß alle menschlichen Konstruktionen, welchem Zweck sie immer dienen, die über die Grenzen von Raum und Zeit hinausgehen, *unwirklich* sind."[29] In unserem Zusammenhang ist es nur von geringer Bedeutung, daß Lenin neben dem philosophischen Materiebegriff ausdrücklich einen physikalischen Begriff anerkennt, der den jeweiligen Stand der Naturerkenntnis wiedergibt, zumal jede einzelwissenschaftliche Aussage "über die Struktur und die Eigenschaften der Materie .... nur relative, annähernde Geltung" besitzt.[30]

Faßt man diese Aussagen zusammen, dann fällt es schwer, einen einheitlichen Nenner zu finden, bei dem ein sachlicher Gehalt erhalten bleibt. Unbestreitbar ist, daß Lenin die qualitative Verschiedenheit von Materie und Bewußtsein anerkannt hat. Eine genauere Formulierung der Verhältnisbestimmung von Materie und Bewußtsein wird jedoch dadurch erschwert, daß Lenin in der Terminologie uneinheitlich bleibt, das Bewußtsein sowohl als Funktion der Materie wie auch als ihr höchstes Produkt beschreibt. Demnach läßt sich eine genaue ontologische Differenz zwischen Materie und Bewußtsein nicht angeben, wenn Lenin auch

stets die Materie das Primäre nennt und eine Identität von Materie und Bewußtsein ablehnt, indem er ausdrücklich betont, daß die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Sein und Bewußtsein ihren Sinn verliert, sofern man "in den Begriff der Materie auch die Gedanken aufzunehmen" hat.[31] In besonderer Weise wird bei Lenin deutlich, daß die Ineinssetzung von Ontologie und Erkenntnistheorie zu einer Aushöhlung der ontologischen Fragestellung geführt hat, deren letzte Probleme ungelöst bleiben. Dieser Sachverhalt ist deshalb so bedeutsam, weil in der Sowjetphilosophie ein solches Vorgehen lange Zeit geradezu als notwendig apostrophiert wurde, wofür die folgende Bemerkung des bulgarischen Philosophen Todor Pavlov charakteristisch ist: "Die marxistisch-leninistische Ontologie existiert und kann existieren, aber sie wird mit historischer und logischer Notwendigkeit gnoseologisiert, genau so wie die marxistisch-leninistische Gnoseologie mit historischer und logischer Notwendigkeit ontologisiert wird."[32]

## II. REVISION DER KLASSIKER

Angesichts einer so unklaren Ausgangslage wird die Frage bedeutsam, ob die philosophische Diskussion im Sowjetsystem zu einer Präzisierung dieser Auffassungen geführt hat. Zunächst scheint es, als müßte eine negative Antwort gegeben werden. Die "Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie" gehen in ihren Formulierungen zum Materialismusproblem[33] über die Position Lenins nicht hinaus.[34] Sie klammern aber damit eine Reihe kritischer Überlegungen aus, die zuerst in der *Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie* von Autoren aus verschiedenen Ostblockländern seit 1954 publiziert worden sind und vor allem eine exaktere Abgrenzung von Materie und Bewußtsein zum Ziel hatten. Dabei bemühte man sich in erster Linie, den Begriff der Eigenschaft zu präzisieren, den Lenin zur Charakterisierung des Bewußtseins benutzt hatte, als er die Empfindung als eine der Eigenschaften der sich bewegenden Materie beschrieb.[35] Da nun andererseits die qualitative Verschiedenheit des Bewußtseins von der Materie durch die Klassiker anerkannt worden war, schlug der bulgarische Philosoph Polikarov folgende Interpretation vor: "Das Bewußtsein ist nicht materiell im Sinne einer Materieart..., aber es ist materiell im Sinne einer Eigenschaft der Materie."[36] Polikarov demonstrierte an einem Beispiel, daß die Eigenschaft eines Dinges in substantieller Hinsicht von diesem selbst verschieden sein kann: Das bewegte Schattenbild ist selbst

keine Materieart, sondern es steht nur in Abhängigkeit von einem es bewirkenden materiellen Gegenstand.[36a] Eigenschaft bezeichnet in dieser Interpretation also ein Verursachungsverhältnis.

Diese Deutung des Eigenschaftsbegriffs durch Polikarov löst die ontologische Problematik der Leninschen Definition des Bewußtseins jedoch nicht auf. Sie versucht zwar exemplarisch zu verifizieren, daß eine Eigenschaft nicht die gleiche qualitative Beschaffenheit besitzen muß wie die sie bewirkende Substanz. (Die Stichhaltigkeit dieser Beweisführung braucht an dieser Stelle gar nicht näher untersucht zu werden.) Damit ist die Frage der qualitativen Bestimmtheit dieser Eigenschaft aber nicht beantwortet, d.h. die von Lenin gelehrte qualitative Differenz von Materie und Bewußtsein bleibt unerklärt. Wie die Opponenten Polikarovs mit Recht bemerken, gibt es keine qualitätslose Substanz[37], so daß uns lediglich eine philosophisch nicht tragfähige Metapher vorgelegt wird, die sich zwar durch ein originelles Beispiel ausweist, jedoch die Fragestellung selbst eher verdunkelt, weil sie das Substanzproblem stillschweigend eliminiert. Der hier dargestellte Teilausschnitt mag einen symptomatischen Zug der Auseinandersetzungen in der *Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie* repräsentieren: Die Gefahr eines ontologischen Dualismus wird zur Grenze der Diskussion.

Den bedeutsamsten sowjetischen Beitrag zur Interpretation des Materiebegriffs hat wohl Tugarinov geliefert. Er schränkt dessen Anwendungsbereich im Gegensatz zu der oben dargestellten Tendenz ein, indem er die Eigenschaften und Verhältnisse der Dinge herauslöst: "Der Begriff der Materialität bezieht sich in direktem Sinne nur auf die Gegenstände. Der Planet oder der Baum sind ohne Zweifel materiell. Was jedoch die Eigenschaften und Verhältnisse anbelangt, so muß man den Begriff der Materialität auf sie sehr vorsichtig anwenden."[38] Mit dieser Position läßt sich ein ontologischer Materiebegriff erarbeiten, die Konsequenzen müßten jedoch zu einer Revision der Klassiker führen. Wenn man den Begriff der Materialität so problematisch macht, wird die These von Engels aufgehoben, daß die Einheit der Welt in ihrer Materialität besteht. Tugarinov hat den hier skizzierten kritischen Ansatz wohl aus diesen Erwägungen in der Folgezeit nicht fortentwickelt.

Unsere Umschau muß durch die Feststellung ergänzt werden, daß die Diskussionen um das Materialismusproblem einer direkten Analyse der Materiedefinition Lenins als objektive Realität auswichen, weil das Be-

wußtsein von der besonderen Problematik dieser Formulierung zwar vorhanden war, eine Kritik Lenins aber nicht erfolgen durfte. Bisher war von den Aussagen der Klassiker lediglich die dialektische Bewegungsdefinition von Engels als unhaltbar anerkannt worden.[39] Helena Eilstein hat in einem 1955 in *Myśl filozoficzna* erschienen Aufsatz zuerst darauf hingewiesen, daß die Leninsche Materiedefinition überprüft werden müsse. Diese erkenntnistheoretische Bestimmung der Materie sei für die weltanschauliche Auseinandersetzung unzulänglich, da hiermit etwa gegenüber den Thomisten überhaupt kein Abgrenzungsprinzip gegeben sei.[40] Die radikal-kritische Tendenz dieser Aussage ist mit bemerkenswerten Argumenten in einem kurzen Aufsatz "Über die philosophische Bestimmung der Materie" der drei bulgarischen Philosophen Jelev, Djadjev und Uwakow aufgenommen worden, der im vergangenen Jahr in der *Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie* publiziert wurde.[41] Das Redaktionskollegium hatte den provokativen Charakter der Thesen, die von den bulgarischen Philosophen vertreten wurden, dadurch anerkannt, daß es den Aufsatz unter die Rubrik "Korrespondenz" verwies, während im Hauptteil der Zeitschrift ein umfangreicher Artikel von Götz Redlow zu finden war, in dem entschieden gegen die Behauptung polemisiert wurde, die Anerkennung der Leninschen philosophischen Bestimmung der Materie sei Dogmatismus.[42]

Die bulgarischen Autoren beginnen ihre kritische Analyse mit einer zusammenfassenden Übersicht über die Materiediskussion, die in der *Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie* geführt wurde. Als Zentralfrage dieser Auseinandersetzung sehen die Verfasser die Frage an, ob die Bestimmung der Materie als objektive Realität den Tatsachen entspricht. Dabei betonen sie zunächst, daß nicht nur die Materie in ihren Erscheinungsformen objektiv real ist, sondern auch sämtliche ihrer Eigenschaften und Beziehungen, weil diese ebenfalls außerhalb und unabhängig von jedem menschlichen Bewußtsein existieren. In dieser Argumentation wird offenbar die auch von Tugarinow vertretene Auffassung vorausgesetzt, daß die Eigenschaften selbst nicht materiell sind; denn sonst wäre diese Feststellung kein Einwand gegen die Definition der Materie als objektive Realität. Da diese Frage unter den Sowjetphilosophen jedoch umstritten ist, fällt dem folgenden Einwand eine weit stärkere Bedeutung zu. Die Autoren zeigen nämlich, daß nicht nur die Eigenschaften und Beziehungen der Gegenstände, sondern auch das Bewußtsein objektiv real ist. Jedes

fremde Einzelbewußtsein ist im Hinblick auf das eigene Bewußtsein objektive Realität, "weil in bezug auf ein bestimmtes individuelles Bewußtsein nicht nur die Steine, Bäume und Sterne, sondern auch die Gedanken eines anderen individuellen Bewußtseins die Eigenschaft besitzen, objektiv-real zu existieren".[43] Auch wenn man nicht vom eigenen Bewußtsein, sondern von einem kollektiven Gesamtbewußtsein, einem Bewußtsein der ganzen Menschheit ausgeht, ergibt sich das gleiche Ergebnis. Im Hinblick auf dieses Gesamtbewußtsein wäre dann nämlich jedes Einzelbewußtsein objektiv real. Folgt man diesen Überlegungen – und ihre logische Unanfechtbarkeit zwingt dazu – dann ergibt sich nichts weniger, als daß Lenins Materiedefinition unbrauchbar ist, weil sie für Materie und Bewußtsein gleichzeitig gilt.

Ein zweiter kritischer Ansatz orientiert sich an einer kosmologischen Hypothese, die von Polikarov schon 1956 benutzt worden ist.[44] Geht man davon aus, daß auch auf anderen Planeten Bewußtseinsformen existieren, "die Materie bis zur Selbsterkenntnis gelangt ist", dann folgt, daß die Definition: "Materie ist alles, was vor und nach, außerhalb und unabhängig von jedem Bewußtsein existiert, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob es ein menschliches oder außermenschliches kosmisches Bewußtsein ist" ebenfalls unzutreffend ist; "denn im unendlichen Weltall ist das Bewußtsein genau so ewig, wie die Materie selbst, und nur für einen begrenzten Teil kann der Satz gelten, daß die Materie vor und nach dem Bewußtsein existiert".[45] Mit dieser Feststellung von der Ewigkeit des Bewußtseins wird ein ontologischer Dualismus unvermeidlich. Zwar behaupten die Autoren, daß ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis insofern besteht, als es zwar kein Bewußtsein ohne Materie, wohl aber Materie ohne Bewußtsein gibt. Diese Feststellung ist ontologisch aber ohne Bedeutung, weil daraus nicht folgt, daß das Bewußtsein entstanden ist, denn dann wäre es nicht ewig.

Scheuen die Autoren in diesem Punkt noch vor weitgehenden Konsequenzen zurück, so bringen sie um so deutlicher zum Ausdruck, daß die Bestimmung der Materie als objektive Realität zu Widersprüchen führt. Sie stellen Lenin selbst infrage, indem sie eine genaue Analyse seiner Materiedefinition fordern. "Sollte es sich dabei erweisen, daß diese sich mit den Tatsachen nicht vereinbaren läßt, dann ist es ganz im Geiste des Marxismus-Leninismus, wenn sie entsprechend geändert wird." Die Autoren betonen, daß sie eine "dialektische Bestimmung der Materie auf der Grundlage des gnoseologischen Gegensatzes von Materie und Bewußtsein"

für prinzipiell unmöglich halten. Über die Tendenz ihres Anliegens läßt die Schlußbemerkung keinen Zweifel: "Zum Schluß möchten wir noch sagen, daß man mit der Leninschen Bestimmung der Materie als objektive Realität nicht dogmatisch umgehen darf, da sie keine Schulbestimmung ist, die für alle Zeiten Gültigkeit hat. Bestimmungen solcher Art hat Lenin niemals gesucht."[46] Die bemerkenswerte Deutlichkeit, in der hier auf das ungelöste Materialismusproblem verwiesen wird, läßt hoffen, daß sich schon bald eine breite Diskussion entfalten wird, die Philosophie in ihrem eigentlichen, kritisch-analytischen Anliegen zum Vollzug bringt.

## ANMERKUNGEN

1. Vgl. N. Lobkowicz: *Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie.* Dordrecht. 1959.
2. K. Marx: *Werke-Schriften-Briefe.* Herausgegeben von Hans-Joachim Lieber und Peter Furth, Darmstadt. 1960ff. IV. S. 177.
3. A.a.O. I. S. 566.
4. A.a.O. I. S. 598.
5. K. Marx/F. Engels: *Werke.* Herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1957ff. XXI. S. 274.
6. L. Feuerbach: *Sämtliche Werke.* Neu herausgegeben von W. Bolin und F. Jodl. Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt. 1959–60. VIII. S. 152.
7. K. Marx/F. Engels: *Werke.* XXI, S. 275.
8. A.a.O. XX. S. 41.
9. A.a.O. XX. S. 354.
10. A.a.O. XX. S. 54.
11. A.a.O. XX. S. 57.
12. A.a.O. XX. S. 575f.
13. A.a.O. XX. S. 326f.
14. A.a.O. XX. S. 479.
15. A.a.O. XX. S. 327.
16. A.a.O. XX. S. 519.
17. A.a.O. XX. S. 503.
18. A.a.O. XX. S. 453.
19. W. I. Lenin: *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus,* Berlin. 1957. S. 102.
20. K. Marx/F. Engels: *Werke.* XX. S. 469.
21. Siehe etwa J. de Vries: *Die Erkenntnistheorie des dialektischen Materialismus.* München–Salzburg–Köln. 1958. S. 19.
22. W. I. Lenin: A.a.O. S. 331.
23. A.a.O. S. 155.
24. A.a.O. S. 44.
25. A.a.O. S. 234.
26. A.a.O. S. 136.
27. A.a.O. S. 118f.
28. A.a.O. S. 250f. Vgl. auch S. 257: "Der Begriff der Materie drückt nichts anderes aus als die objektive Realität, die uns in der Empfindung gegeben ist."

29. A.a.O. S. 171.
30. A.a.O. S. 251.
31. A.a.O. S. 235.
32. T. Pavlov: *Dialektiko-materialističeskaja filosofija i čestnye nauki.* M. 1957. str. 95.
33. Siehe etwa: *Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie.* Berlin 1959. S. 152ff, S. 162f, S. 171.
34. Hierzu ausführlich: G. A. Wetter: *Sowjetideologie heute 1.* Frankfurt/Main. 1962. S. 28ff, S. 52.
35. W. I. Lenin: a.a.O. S. 36.
36. A. Polikarov: 'Über die Kategorie Materie', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5, 6 (1956) 543.

36a. A.a.O. 545.

37. G. Redlow: 'Lenin über den marxistischen philosophischen Begriff der Materie'. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 2 (1959) 215.
38. V. P. Tugarinov, *Vestnik LGU*, 1956, 17, 76.
39. Vergleiche den Beitrag von A. Kolman in: Lobkowicz, a.a.O. S. 54f.
40. A.a.O. S. 235. Vgl. hierzu auch H. Dahm: 'Rückkehr zum analektischen Sein', in *Ost-Probleme* 27 (1956) 912ff.
41. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5 (1964) 633ff.
42. A.a.O. 582ff.
43. A.a.O. 633.
44. Vgl. Polikarov, a.a.O. 549.
45. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5 (1964) 633.
46. A.a.O. 634f.

# NOTES AND COMMENTS

## HISTORY OF SOVIET HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

While Soviet philosophers have published, for many years, a number of writings on the history of philosophy in foreign countries, the lack of interest – or possibilities – to study their own history was notorious. Recently, however, the situation seems to have changed. There was a paper on historiography of philosophy in the *sbornik, Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov. . .* (reviewed in this issue). Now, B. V. Bogdanov and M. T. Iovčuk are publishing a (far better) study in the *VF* ('K voprosu ob étapax sovetskoj istoriko-filosofskoj nauki', *VF*, 1965, 8, 86–97). Mr. Bogdanov is, according to the same issue of the *VF* (p. 190), a candidate of sciences and senior scientific collaborator of the IF AN, while Professor Iovčuk is a well known Soviet historian of philosophy, one of the leaders in the field in his country.

The paper is concerned with Soviet historiography of philosophy; but, incidentally, supplies also a certain amount of information on the development of Soviet philosophy in general. The avowed aim of the authors is to establish a periodization. They proposed the following: 1. 1917 – middle of the 1930's; 2. Middle of the 1930's – middle of the 1950's; 3. Since the XXth Party Congress.

This corresponds roughly – with some significant differences – the periodization which may be said to be standard in Western scholarship and which runs as follows: 1. 1922–1931: the first period of discussions; 2. 1931–1947: the quiet (dead) period; 3. After 1947: second period of discussions.

Of course, everyone admits that the precise dates indicated here must be interpreted as "nuclei" around which the changes concentrate – but there are important events which happened at those periods, namely the *ukaz* of the CK KP of January 25, 1931 against Deborin, and the beginning of the Moscow Congress on June 20, 1947, with Ždanov speaking on June 24.

The essential differences between both periodizations is that the Soviet study under discussion places the first frontier not in 1931, but vaguely "about the middle of the 1930's", and – this is more important – the second, not in 1947 but in "the middle of the 1950's". While one may ad-

mit that there are reasons for a more flexible limit between the first and second period – in spite of the fact that no Deborinist and no mechanist could publish anything after January 26, 1931 – the second shift must be considered as an error. The *Voprosy Filosofii* were started in 1947, *not* in 1956; much of the work of Professor Iovčuk himself, as well as of several of his colleagues was published before 1956. In general, new life came into Soviet philosophical publications precisely in 1947. This is true about Soviet philosophy in general and also about Soviet historiography of philosophy.

Very little can be said, of course, about the beginnings (1917–1924) and the authors are bound to supply here, as they do, only a few patriotic phrases about the "struggle against" etc... On the other hand much interesting information is given about the period of discussions. The article quotes the following historical books: Deborin, A. M.: *Ljudvig Fejerbax* ... 1923 and *Očerki po istorii materializma XVII i XVIII vv.*, 1929; Českin, A. A.: *Fomas Gobbs*, 1924; Luppol, I. K.: *Deni Didro* (no year indicated); Asmus, V. F.: *Očerki istorii dialektiki v novoj filosofii*, 1929 and *Dialektika Kanta*, 1929 (p. 88); Varjaš, A. N.: *Istorija novoj filosofii*, t. I. č. l. 1926 (p. 89; this is possibly a *sbornik* in which Varjaš wrote only a paper). None of those titles appear in Wetter.

More interesting still is the description of the discussions which took place at the end of this period. The classical distinction of mechanists and Deborinists is of course re-asserted, but the latter are no more called "Mensheviking idealists". As mechanists, the authors name L. I. Aksel'rod-Ortodoks, I. I. Skvorcov-Stepanov, A. I. Varjaš, A. K. Timirjazev, and as followers of Deborin, N. A. Karev, G. K. Bammel', G. S. Tymjanskij.

The value-judgments passed on the mechanists and on Deborin are quite in line with their official condemnation of 1931. We find something new in respect to the celebrated Ždanov speech of 1947. The authors state that some philosophers pretended that the history of pre-Marxian philosophy should not be considered as a part of history of knowledge, philosophy of that time being the ideology of the wealthy (*imuščix*) classes. Ždanov is said to have assumed a similar position. He rejected, it is said, a saying of Černyševskij (quoted by G. F. Aleksandrov) that the writings of the predecessors are the starting point (*isxodnoj točkoj*) of the new systems. Ždanov asserted that this meant the rejection of *partijnost'* – and is rebuked for that (p. 92).

The authors try also to show – with Wetter – that some historiographic work was done in the SU during the period between 1931 and 1947. Then an enumeration of later work is supplied; this part of the paper adds little that is new when compared with the publications in this journal and other works of Western scholarship.

The article is characterized by the fact that not a single Western student of the field is quoted. In one way, this is a pity, for Wetter and Joravsky studied the field intensively years ago, while the *Sovietica* series and the *SST* have published much material. It might be remembered that the first bibliography of Soviet philosophy – consequently also of Soviet historiography of philosophy – was published in the *Sovietica* – and that K. Ballestrem seems to have been the first to attempt a general survey of the latter field in the *SST*. None of these authors is quoted. This is perhaps unfortunate, because it is normal for somebody interested in research to see what others have done in the same line.

On the other hand, it is perhaps better that this be so. For a Soviet historiographer of philosophy seems bound to consider every result of research in this field by somebody who is not a Communist as a falsification. They will even go so far as never to call a criticism of their views, historical or other, "criticism", but always "'criticism'" – in quotation marks. Presumably the Bibliography published in the *Sovietica* would also be a "Bibliography". So if an author does not quote his Western colleagues, he avoids at least the insult and nonsense which he is apparently bound to use when speaking of them.

But quoted or not quoted, Western research in History of Soviet Philosophy in general and History of Soviet Historiography of philosophy in particular, is obviously present in the paper discussed. The fact is that the results are very, very similar. *J. B.*

## FORCES AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

The *FN* 1965, 4 contains a discussion on the meaning of the expression "mode of production" (*sposob proizvodstva*). Up to now this expression has been defined as "forces and relations of productions taken in their unity" (*Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*, 1964, 362) or it was stated that both "taken in their unity constitute (*obrazujut*) the mode of production" (*Političeskaja ékonomija*, 1962, 12 – both statements quoted by Panjušev,

p. 152). This could have been considered as a standard doctrine belonging to the 'dogmatic principles' of Soviet philosophy (it is true that the present writer, while writing a resumé of the *OMF* did not take it over).

But now Mr. I. M. Panjušev, from the philosophical *kafedra* of the N. K. Krupskaja Institute for Education in Moscow attacks the said definitions in a letter (*K voprosu o marksistskom ponimanii sposoba proizvodstva*, pp. 152–158) and says that the mode of production is by no means the above-quoted unity, but rather the economic interrelations between men alone (p. 154). He quotes a number of texts of Marx and Engels in favour of that view. He says – this is nice of him – that the criticized theory was originated by Stalin.

Panjušev is, however, rebuked in the same issue of the *FN* (pp. 158f.) by V. Ž. Kelle, who offers against the new theory systematic considerations instead of texts. The concept of modes of production is necessary he contends. Take, e.g., a slave. As a man he belongs to the *forces* of production; but as a slave, his place is quite clearly in the *relations* of production. In his totality he is best explained as belonging to the slave-owner's *mode* of production.

Both short papers are published as "Letters to the Editors" who, therefore, do not take part in the contest. *J. B.*

## MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Some Soviet philosophers seem to have formed a rather curious idea of the attitude of those non-Communists who are seriously interested in Soviet philosophy. So, recently, writing about the Congress in Mexico City where some contacts were established, one of them says that Professor Wetter *žaluetsja*, while the present author "is afraid". Afraid of what? Of course, of the brilliant development of Soviet philosophy. It is necessary to stress that this is a complete misunderstanding of the attitude assumed by a normal Western student of Soviet philosophy as W. F. Boeselager has pointed out in a note in the previous issue of this journal (*SST* V, No. 3, 223-224). However, the statement contains even more than one misunderstanding.

First of all, I do not think that *any* serious Western student of Soviet philosophy will say its development is brilliant. Far from that, unfortunately. If one compares it with the achievements of Soviet physicists,

biologists, mathematical logicians and others, one is obliged to conclude that Soviet philosophy is a rather underdeveloped science. It is, to put it quite crudely, poor. The present writer believes that it is poor both in comparison to what is being done elsewhere and to what the Soviet philosophers, given their number and capacity, could have done themselves. That is the first point: nobody believes here that Soviet philosophy is already a great and brilliant discipline.

But it is felt to be true that Soviet philosophy, while not having quite overcome its *detskaja bolezn'* (childhood disease) does manifest some progress. The above-mentioned Soviet writers believe that Sovietologist-philosophers have been rather late to discover this, and that they are either worried or even afraid of it. While others have long known that Soviet philosophy is a great, splendid and scientific philosophy (indeed, the only such one in the world) it is only now that those poor Sovietologists are discovering the truth.

This is the second misunderstanding. There are two sorts of people who write about Soviet philosophy in the West. First, there are the friends of Communism, those people who have always asserted that Soviet philosophy is the richest and the most profound. They did so under Stalin, when they were applauding the Tyrant himself and his superficial catechism, and exalting his agitprops. One thing which Soviet philosophers do not seem to realize is that when such people do praise their work, this causes it more detriment than advantage in the opinion of Western philosophers of any importance. For this class of critics have no real importance. That is one sort of writers who try to inform Western philosophers about Soviet philosophy.

The other sort are the Sovietologist-philosophers. They are few and their influence is small. However, the difference between them and the agitprops of the other camp consists in the fact that they do not extol wholesale everything which happens in the Soviet Union, that they try to make a distinction between the valuable and the spurious. That is what gives them at least some chance of winning the opinion of their colleagues.

For it must be stated clearly the great majority of Western philosophers have so far refused to take Soviet philosophy seriously. One can hardly blame them for that: too much nonsense and primitivism has been put in print by men who called themselves Members of Academies and

Professors in the universities of the Soviet Union. It is, however, the present writer's opinion – as well as that of many other Sovietologist-philosophers – that they are objectively wrong in this respect, that the wholesale condemnation of Soviet philosophy is no longer justified. But the public opinion of philosophers is nevertheless such and Sovietologists are engaged in the difficult work of destroying that misunderstanding.

Yet an inverse misunderstanding exists also on this point on the part of Soviet writers. They imagine that the bulk of Western philosophers has a high esteem of them. They are constantly fed with the products of the fellow-travellers and of the Communists in the West, and seem to take them for the representatives of Western thought. They do not realize that if anything can be gained in as far as recognition of the value of recent Soviet work is concerned, this may be done only by scientific research workers, not by propagandists of Communism, whom few philosophers take seriously in the West.

Third – and this is the main point – the small group of Sovietologist-philosophers who try to understand what is going on, and who do not serve any other cause than that of knowledge, is not afraid of or worried by the progress observed. On the contrary. To a historian of philosophy the development of a philosophical school is a phenomenon from which he should, theoretically, be quite detached, i.e., not interested in its progress or decay as such. In actual fact, every historian rejoices when he can state that the phenomenon under observation does progress, that it reaches better and fuller stages. Such is human nature, and people come to sympathize with the object of their study; they would like it to be the best possible. This is perhaps not quite correct – a complete detachment would be better – but so it is in a normal student.

Moreover, a genuine historian of philosophy is always a philosopher himself. He has some systematic problems of his own, difficult problems with which he is grappling, with pain and effort. It is normal, that he looks in history of philosophy – older and contemporary, but above all contemporary – for works in which similar problems are discussed. He hopes to find either help in solving his problems directly – or at least some valuable objections against the views he has assumed. That is why, when a philosophical school improves, when the level of insight into the problems, the level of information and that of rationalization rise in it, such

a man has every reason to be happy. Far from being sorry or afraid, he is pleased.

Finally, there is still something else. Most Western philosophers are rationalists. They believe that the job of the philosopher is to rationalize and that is what they try to do. The commitment to such rationalism is, indeed, the only ideology which a philosopher as such assumes in the West. It is his creed. Now Soviet philosophy, in spite of the verbal declarations of its representatives, was for a long time a very, very irrational trend of thought. It was a sort of 'theology' based on sacred scripts, on the authority of the Central Committees and of local tyrants. It was "quotatology" as Professor Baskin stated in 1947, and little more. *This* caused concern and discomfort to Western philosophers who would have liked the situation to be otherwise – that their Soviet counterparts could be like themselves, i.e., true rationalists.

Now the progress in Soviet philosophy, observed and stated by Western Sovietologists does consist mainly in its progressive rationalization. And, therefore, this progress is to them a fact which they greet with great satisfaction.

One is bound, however, to state that this pleasure is not free from bitterness and concern. There *are* things of which a Western student of Soviet philosophy might be quite rightly afraid. In the West, most Sovietologists who are not philosophers disbelieve completely that Soviet philosophical thought has any relevance at all; it serves, they say, exclusively to justify the power-politics of the respective countries. Most Western philosophers who are not Sovietologists deny any value to Soviet thought for other reasons, as stated. And, of course, professional anti-Communist politicians will do anything in their power to minimize the results obtained by Soviet thinkers.

The small group of men who do read Soviet philosophical writings and are interested in them for their own sake, is not heard when they try to oppose this nearly universal trend in the West. And when they do it, they meet from the side of the Soviet philosophers with complete lack of understanding, expressed in form of base insults.

Well, the spreading of ones views has always been a secondary object of a philosopher's work. What he wants above all is to *know*. And in that effort he can be handicapped, but not stopped by misunderstandings.

*J. B.*

## BLAKELEYANISM

Dr. Blakeley is not exactly a *persona grata* with Soviet philosophers, and this in spite of the considerable services rendered to them by preparing most of the Bibliography of their publications. It is therefore interesting to note that he has found in the Soviet Union at least some followers who wholeheartedly accept one of his theories, Professor L. N. Suvorov, to begin with. Dr. Blakeley was the first among the students of *diahistomat* to state that the 'classical' division into *diamat* and *histomat* is wrong and should be replaced by a division in four parts: on matter, on dialectics, on knowledge, on society. Now here is what we learn from *FN* 1965, 4, 125 about a discussion on the 'Problems of Historical Materialism in the Faculty of Philosophy of the MGU': He (Suvorov) thinks (*ščitaet*) that if dialectical materialism is considered (*rassmatrivat'*) as philosophy of nature and historical materialism as philosophy of society, a philosophy of thought (*myšlenija*) also becomes necessary. But that leads towards a damaging (*narušeniju*) of the unity of Marxist philosophy.

Professor M. N. Alekseev also seems to have advocated a similar view (*ibid.*). But "the attempt to consider historical materialism as *a part of dialectical materialism*" (p. 126, italics mine) did not find much favour with other members of the conference.

So, after all, Blakeleyanism, if present, did not impose itself – which is perhaps a pity from the systematic point of view. *J. B.*

## TRANSLATIONS INTO RUSSIAN

Soviet philosophers are increasingly interested in non- and/or pre-Marxist thought and they are gradually developing a certain taste for factual and competent analysis thereof. At the same time they are learning to read more foreign languages, but good editions of classical texts in Russian translation will certainly always be welcome and useful to them. Recently an important project of such translations has been started under the title of *Filosofskoe Nasledie* (Philosophical Heritage) by the Moscow publishing house "Mysl'". I. Matveeva describes this project in the *Informacija* section of the catalogue *Novye Knigi SSSR*, No. 22, 1965, str. 54–56. During the five years 1964–1968 the following collections are to be published: T. Hobbes: Selected Works, 2 volumes, already published in 1964;

D. Hume: Works, 2 volumes, in 1965; I. Kant: Works, 6 volumes, I–III already published, IV in print, V and VI in 1966; P. Gassendi: Works, 2 volumes, 1965–66; in preparation: Aristotle, Plato, Leibniz, Hegel, Schelling, Feuerbach. Each collection will be accompanied by an introduction, commentaries, indices, bibliography and a portrait of the author. Later, the series is to be continued with translations of American, Asian and 'other' philosophical thought. Of course, there is also a number of Russian pre-revolutionary authors, whose works are to be published as part of this 'Philosophical Heritage', such as P. L. Lavrov, N. V. Šelgunov, N. A. and A. A. Serno-Solov'evič.

Recently, *Novye Knigi SSSR* also announced another interesting translation: P. Teilhard de Chardin (Tejjar de Šarden): *Le phénomène humain* (*Javlenie čeloveka*), izd. "Progress", end of 1965. (R. Garaudy has written the introduction to it.) After mentioning Teilhard's importance as a natural scientist, *Novye Knigi* calls his work 'contradictory' because he was a Catholic theologian at the same time. It remains to be hoped, that Soviet readers will reach a more sophisticated judgement by themselves. (*Novye Knigi*, 1965, 18, 24.)

*W. F. Boeselager*

## NEW LUKÁCS BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Hungarian Academy of Science has compiled a full bibliography of Lukács' works. Part I appeared some months ago, Part II on August 16th. The former includes Lukács' monographs, the latter his shorter studies and articles. All Lukács' publications are said to be included, regardless of the language, place and date of publication.

This sign of renewed interest in the octogenarian Georg Lukács, Hungary's most distinguished philosopher, will no doubt be welcomed not only by specialists, but by all philosophers who appreciate the importance of his thought. *E. L.*

## NEW ARTICLES FOR VF

The editors of *VF* announce the publication of a series of articles for party training and studies, to begin in *VF* 1965, 9. The following is a translation of the outline of the series:

I. *Series of Articles on "Actual Problems of the Construction of Communism"*

1. The present-day scientific-technical revolution and its social consequences.
2. On unity and contradiction in the development of socialist society.
3. Methodological questions on the management of social development.
4. On the ways for the many-sided development and improvement of socialist democracies.
5. The social structure of socialist society.

II. *Series of articles on "Questions of the Theory of Social Development"*

1. The dialectic of objective and subjective in the development of society.
2. The social process.
3. The dialectic of the development of socialist society.
4. The role of science in socialist society.

III. *Series of articles on "Theoretical Questions of Morality and of Moral Development"*

1. Man as the highest value.
2. The collective and the person.
3. The moral value of socialist labour.
4. Communism and Humanism.

IV. *Series of articles on "Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Science"*

1. Philosophical problems of contemporary physics.
2. Methodological problems of biology.
3. The significance of the principle of development for contemporary natural science.
4. Mathematics and natural science.

V. *Series of articles on "Methodological Questions of the Development of Art"*

1. Realism, authentic and imaginary.
2. The problem of artistic form.
3. Art as a form of social consciousness.
4. What is the national character of art.

*P. B.*

## SOVIET STUDY OF THE COUNCIL

L. N. Velikovič, a senior scientific collaborator at the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the AN, has written an article on 'The Dialogue of Catholicism with the World of Today' in *VF* 1965, 8, which is quite refreshing to read. There is little of philosophical interest in it, being a rather straightforward account of the events and concerns of the Catholic Church during the Vatican Council. However, the very fact that it is so straightforward and that Mr. Velikovič has refrained from the usual polemics and abuse against the Church and religion in general is a pleasant change from the customary level of such articles (although it must be mentioned that Mr. Velikovič has already written a similarly non-vituperative article on the second session of the Council in *VF* 1964, 4). He interprets the events from a partisan and sometimes ill-informed basis, and there is an exaggeration of the 'conservative-liberal' differences among the hierarchy, but these are understandable deficiencies, and by no means limited to Soviet writers. Although in neither article is there food provided for the illusions of those who believe in the compatibility of Christianity and Marxist-Leninist ideology – indeed, their fundamental opposition is reaffirmed – interesting allusions are made in several places to the possibility of common action of Catholics and atheists in practical tasks. It will be interesting to see whether future articles on the subject will offer practical suggestions. In any case, the raising of such articles to a polite level is already quite an accomplishment. *P. B.*

## PRAGMATISIERUNG DER SOWJETIDEOLOGIE?

In den vergangenen Jahren hat sich innerhalb der Sowjetideologie eine Entwicklung angekündigt, die als Tendenz der Freisetzung bestimmter Problembereiche aus der Entscheidungskompetenz des Marxismus-Leninismus bezeichnet werden kann. Betrachtet man die markantesten Beispiele – Anerkennung der formalen Logik, der Relativitätstheorie und der Kybernetik – dann wird unmittelbar deutlich, daß die Erfordernisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung diese Entscheidung zwingend herbeigeführt haben. Da solche praktischen Interessen in gleicher Intensität auf dem Gebiet der Gesellschaftswissenschaften nicht bestehen, stießen hier die Bestrebungen um Verselbständigung und Rationalisierung

einzelner Zweige der Forschung auf erheblich größeren Widerstand. Als bestimmender Leitsatz galt die These, daß die Lösungen zu allen Hauptproblemen auf diesem Sektor durch die Klassiker im Prinzip gegeben sind und lediglich eine interpretierende Anwendung auf die Gegenwart vorgenommen werden muß. So erklärt sich auch die kritische Haltung, mit der die Sowjetideologie der Soziologie begegnet ist, obwohl die gestellten Aufgaben (wie etwa quantitative Analysen von Bildungsgrad, sozialer Herkunft usw.) den Aussagebereich des Histomat nicht zu tangieren schienen. Furcht vor zukünftigen Erweiterungen der Fragestellung war jedoch die maßgebende Ursache für eine entschiedene Zurückhaltung der Theoretiker des Marxismus-Leninismus gegenüber solchen Bestrebungen verselbständigter Wissenschaft.

Auf diesem Hintergrund verdient ein am 10. Januar 1965 in der *Pravda* veröffentlichter Artikel von F. Burlackij 'Politik und Wissenschaft' besondere Beachtung. Der Verfasser fordert in seinem Aufsatz – von dem man wohl annehmen darf, daß er von höchster Stelle autorisiert ist –, die Einführung einer politischen Wissenschaft (*političeskaja nauka*) als Voraussetzung für politische Entscheidungen. Er modifiziert damit die bisher verbindliche Auffassung, daß der Marxismus-Leninismus durch die Partei unmittelbar auf die konkreten Situationen des Lebens angewendet werden kann (so etwa *Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus*, Berlin 1960, S. 173), in einem beträchtlichen Maß und deutet auch im Bereich der Gesellschaftswissenschaften die Tendenz zu einer Verstärkung der Sachrationalität an.

Diese Zielsetzung wird aus zahlreichen Formulierungen klar ersichtlich. So wird ausdrücklich betont, daß die "Interpretation bekannter Texte" durch die Sowjetphilosophen ein unzulängliches Verfahren ist. Diese implizite Kritik an der Zitatologie und an den Klassikern selbst wird durch die Forderung ergänzt, es sei notwendig, "eine vernünftige und allseitig abwägende Lösung der Probleme auf der Grundlage einer genauen Kenntnis der Tatsachen, des Studiums gesellschaftlicher Prozesse, der Bewertung verschiedener Gesichtspunkte, alternativer Vorschläge" vorzunehmen. Solche konkreten Antworten auf Fragen, welche das Leben stellt, bleibe die Sowjetwissenschaft bisher schuldig. Im einzelnen bezeichnet der Verfasser als Hauptgegenstand der Forschung für die politische Wissenschaft: das Verhältnis der Klassen in der kapitalistischen und sozialistischen Gesellschaft; die zwischenstaatlichen Beziehun-

gen; Struktur und Tätigkeit von Staat, politischen Parteien, gesellschaftlichen Organisationen, Massenbewegungen; internationale Vereinigungen und Organisationen; Formen und Methoden der Diplomatie; das Studium der öffentlichen Meinung; Methoden der Propaganda. Damit ist eine weitgehende Übereinstimmung mit der Vorstellung von politischer Wissenschaft in den westlichen Ländern gegeben. Gleichzeitig wird ersichtlich, daß zahlreiche Grundbegriffe des historischen Materialismus als Forschungsprobleme der neuen Wissenschaft beansprucht werden.

Für den Philosophen ist es daher im Zusammenhang mit der Frage nach einer möglichen Pragmatisierung der Ideologie von besonderem Interesse, wie der Autor die neue Disziplin in das System der Wissenschaften einordnet. Er beruft sich hierbei bemerkenswerterweise auf eine Analogie zu den Naturwissenschaften. Dort sei in den letzten Jahren viel über die besondere Bedeutung geschrieben worden, welche einer Theorie zukommt, die diese Einzelwissenschaften verbindet. Es wird offensichtlich auf die intensiven Diskussionen angespielt, die um die Einordnung der philosophischen Interpretation naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse in das System der Sowjetideologie von Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftlern geführt worden sind. Kein Geringerer als Suslov hatte einen gewissen Freiheitsraum in diesem Bereich eröffnet, als er 1962 im *Kommunist* (1962, 3, 15) betonte, daß "ernsthafte wissenschaftliche Arbeiten zu den philosophischen Problemen der Naturwissenschaften" fehlen. Nachdem auf diese Weise von offizieller Seite naturphilosophische Forschung freigegeben war, setzte sich bald die Meinung durch, daß die "Dialektik der Natur" (wobei der Terminus nicht einheitlich verwendet wird) ein "relativ selbständiges Gebiet des philosophischen Wissens" ist (so Platonov/Rutkevič in *Voprosy filosofii* 1963, 3, 141). Bedenkt man diese Konsequenzen, dann wird deutlich erkennbar, daß sich wesentliche Möglichkeiten einer Wandlung auch im Bereich der Gesellschaftswissenschaften andeuten, wenn man den Vorschlägen von Burlackij folgt.

Wie groß die Veränderung in der Beurteilung ist, geht auch daraus hervor, daß sich der Verfasser zur Verteidigung seiner Position auf andere sozialistische Staaten beruft, deren Bestrebungen in diesem Bereich bisher strikt abgelehnt wurden. Nun werden diese Versuche als Beweis dafür gewertet, daß man "ohne die Gründung spezieller Institutionen für politische Wissenschaft nur schwer auf wirkliche Wandlungen hoffen kann". Man wird schon jetzt mit Interesse ersten Reaktionen auf diesen Artikel

entgegensehen dürfen, weil sich hier eine weitere Auflösung des klassischen Einteilungsschemas der Sowjetideologie anbahnt.

*R. Thomas*

## FILOSOFSKIJ SLOVAR'

E. M. Kamenka has written an excellent review of the new *Filosofskij slovar'* (pod red. M. M. Rozental' i P. F. Judin, M. 1963) in *Survey*, July 1965, 167–174, entitled 'Philosophy: The New Professionalism'. He situates the significance of this new publication by a well-chosen comparison with the 1951 *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'*, and several judicious comments on the state and direction of Soviet philosophy: "Soviet philosophy is still better at compiling dictionaries than at thinking out philosophical problems and making genuine philosophical contributions. The dictionary under review displays bibliographical competence and reasonable capacity (in the circumstances) for restating someone else's view, rather than insight and critical scholarship. But it also displays a professionalism that is concerned to understand and know, and not merely to parrot dogma."

*P. B.*

*Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leniniskoj filosofii:* Pod red. M. T. Iovčuk, V. A. Malinin, Izd. 'Nauka'. M. 1965. 248 str.

This *sbornik* presents a number of articles criticizing non-Communist Sovietologists and their views on Soviet philosophy. The attitudes expressed are quite characteristic of the approach usually taken in books and articles on this theme, and so it was decided to give them a closer examination than they would normally receive. The following pages contain some reviews of specific articles within the book. R. T. De George has incorporated his comments into an article, 'Heidegger and the Marxists', on pp. 289–298 of this issue.

*The Editors*

E. Ja. Basin: 'Opredelenie ponjatija 'materija' v dialektičeskom materializme i ego buržuaznye 'kritiki''. In *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*, str. 84–100.

After a short introduction about the interest and actuality of the problem (84), the opposing parties are named: F. T. Arxipcev, I. V. Kuznecov, I. S. Narskij etc. on one side, J. M. Bocheński, G. A. Wetter, H. Falk etc. on the other (85).

The author starts by exposing the main Western criticism: the epistemological definition of matter – as given by Lenin and still repeated by today's Diamat – and the theories evolving around it, lead to a confusion between materialism and realism. Consequently, in the treatment of the 'basic question of philosophy' the ontological and the epistemological side are always taken together. As a matter of fact, the ontological and the epistemological positions, materialism and realism, do not necessarily correspond to each other and should be distinguished (85–86).

E. Ja. Basin's answer is: bourgeois philosophers separate ontology and epistemology, because they think of spirit and consciousness as separate and independent modes of existence. This is idealism and theology. In reality, ideal or spiritual being can only be found as consciousness of man, as the knowing activity of a material being which is man. Thus, the ontological question is necessarily related to the epistemological (87–88).

The 'basic question of philosophy' is above all an epistemological question and therefore the definition of matter, in philosophy, is necessarily an epistemological definition (89–90). There is no purely ontological definition of matter. In the history of materialism this has not been known before Holbach. The real understanding of the unity between the epistemological and the ontological was only given – in brilliant fashion – by Lenin (91–93).

What can be said about matter as such comes from the natural sciences. The philosophical definition of matter is the epistemological one (93).

At this point the author goes back to the Western critics and examines their



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

distinction of materialism-spiritualism on the one hand, realism-idealism on the other. He is quick to judge with Lenin that the word 'realism' only serves to hide all kinds of philosophical tendencies, among them all kinds of idealism. He is then happy to announce that the simple criterion of materialism (in its epistemological definition) solves all these problems in a sound and irrefutable way (94–99).

It can be seen at this point that the article of E. Ja. Basin is only of a very limited interest. It is not only inadequate to what Western critics could expect as an answer to their objections, but is also beneath the level of many Soviet publications on the subject. It might be enough to mention that many Soviet philosopers feel that it is not their solution to simply muddle materialism and realism, ontology and epistemology. Most of them actually give an ontological definition of matter (e.g. as *substantia unica*) and feel that the epistemological question can only be explained after a dialectical interpretation of matter and its development.

*K.G.B.*

V. A. Malinin: 'Naučnaja sovremennyx istorija russkoj filosofii i spekuljacii buržuaznyx filosofov'. In: *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii*, str. 162–191.

Malinin is the author of several other papers dealing with Western interpretations of the history of Russian thought, most of them on similar "bourgeois falsifier" lines.[1] The present article is said to be confined to an examination "of the theoretical and methodological problems of the history of Russian philosophy in connection with their interpretation by contemporary bourgeois historians of philosophy", only those works being discussed which have so far received little or no attention in the Soviet literature in the field (p. 164).

The author mentions the existence in the West of numerous "scientific research institutes" and all manner of "centres" devoted to the study of "the Russian question" (the quotation marks are in each case his), and financed in many cases by such "monopolies" as the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford Foundations. Specifically mentioned are the Harvard University Russian Research Centre and that of Columbia University. Such institutes – "the concrete expression of the anti-Communistic attitude of contemporary bourgeois ideology" – also exist in Europe; reference is here made to the *Ost-Europa Institut* in Munich and to the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome – but not to the Fribourg Institute of East-European Studies (p. 165).

Beyond the "common bourgeois basis of ideas", Malinin distinguishes three main categories among Western historians of Russian thought:

(1) Those who practise direct distortion (*prjamaja fal'sifikacija*). This – "the most numerous and most vociferous (*kriklivaja*) group of pseudo-historians," – includes Simmons, Haimson, Scheibert, (Sir Isaiah) Berlin,

Heyer, and others. Their only concern is with the struggle against Communism and Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

(2) Very close to these "professional foes of Communism" is the group of religious historians of Russian philosophy, such as Zen'kovskij, Losskij, Schultze, Ammann, and Munzer. In their writings, these historians also find occasion to pursue their own specifically religious-dogmatic aims (pp. 165–166).

(3) Thirdly comes the fairly numerous group of "liberal bourgeois historians of philosophy", including Koyré, Winkler, Lampert, and Bowman. These writers strive to avoid violent polemical argument with their Soviet counterparts, and to keep things within the limits of academic debate. Indeed, they "even make use of the findings of Soviet scholars in support of their own views" (p. 166).

This latter point seems to occasion the author a mixture of surprise and indignation. Western writers (he declares) cannot plead ignorance of Soviet sources, since "books and many of the articles on the history of Russian pre-Marxist philosophy published in the Soviet Union rapidly become known in the capitalist world". Yet "any such book or article only seems to serve bourgeois researchers as one more corroboration of their pet thesis that the 'reconstruction' of the history of philosophy is possible only from the standpoint of [their] idealistic profundity-of-thought (*glubokomyslija*). The materialistic interpretation of the history of thought is, from their point of view, one-sided, superficial, tendentious, crude, etc." (p. 167). Only among the younger generation does Malinin discern a more "scientific" approach – including an eagerness to spend a probationary period of study in the USSR. Many such students "admit that contact with Soviet scholars influences their approach to an understanding of social thought" (*sic*, p. 168). In this connection, specific mention is also made of "eminent scholars" like Franco Venturi and John Somerville.[2]

Malinin next takes Wetter (and other "opponents of the scientific approach to the history of philosophy") to task for the assertion that Soviet scholars are interested only in the study of materialistic thought and thinkers. This prompts the astounding rejoinder that such writers "either hide or distort (falsify) the fact that the Marxist-Leninist (school of) history of philosophy was the first to interpret scientifically the history of Russian idealism, its social and economic roots, its basic trends, its schools (of thought), and ideas, the views of its individual representatives, and also their concrete-historical, political, and ideological role" (p. 169).

According to Malinin, the fundamental point of departure for Soviet researches of this kind lies precisely in the recognition that the history of philosophy is the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism; "it is not the fault of Soviet historians of philosophy if, in the process, idealism becomes stripped of that inviting appearance which it enjoys in the idealistic school" (p. 170).

The author next turns to the problem of the allegedly distinctive (*samobytnyj*)

or national-specific character (*nacional'noe svoeobrazie*) of philosophy, citing Plexanov in support of the Soviet view that the correct approach to the history of thought in a given country is that which passes from a study of the economic conditions to the "social psychology" of that country, and not *vice versa*. The term "social psychology" has nothing whatever to do with the idealistic concept of a national-specific "spirit" (*dux*), whose existence Plexanov (and Malinin) strenuously denies.

Malinin equally strenuously opposes the "absurd" view that Russian philosophical thought up to the 18th century was exclusively or even mainly religious: "The ideas of Aristotle, Democritus, Epicurus, Plato, and other ancient Greek and Roman philosophers exercised no less influence on Russian philosophical thought than on that of mediaeval Europe" (p. 179). As for the 18th and 19th centuries, whereas Belinskij and Herzen, Černyševskij and Dobroljubov were thinkers of international, as well as national, stature, "the subjective-idealistic, mystic, and irrationalistic ideas of Western European idealists did not find a following" in Russia (p. 182). With regard to Russian idealistic thinkers, neither Kireevskij, nor Čaadaev, nor Solov'ëv, nor Berdjaev produced anything in the way of original thought, merely tying philosophy closer to religion/mysticism and subordinating it to faith. In point of fact (the author argues), Russian idealism was not so much concerned with the synthesis of "Oriental irrationalism" and "Occidental rationalism" (as Western scholars allege) as with taking "a very direct part in the peripetias of socio-political struggle, substantiating and developing the ideology of the ruling classes" – a view to-day admitted even by "bourgeois historians of Russian social thought" such as G. Fischer and T. Bill.[3]

The reasons for the Western obsession with the Slavophils (as representing the first specifically Russian tradition in philosophy), with the "mystic" Solov'ëv and the "irrationalist" Berdjaev, are, in Malinin's view, at once theoretical and political. Far from being ashamed at the pitiful results of the efforts of the Russian idealists in the socio-political sphere, Western advocates of the idealistic school actually claim that the Russian idealists have been proved "right", and in any case maintain that "the socialist revolution (a chance phenomenon!) and the vast transformation of social conditions it brought in its train have in no way affected the eternal and immutable Russian 'soul' (*dux*)." According to them, "Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy takes no account of the specifics of the 'Russian soul', ignores the peculiarities of the Russian turn of mind (*sklada uma*), and so renders illusory all efforts to construct a scientific picture of the evolution of Russian philosophical thought" (p. 186).

In reply, Malinin insists that neither nature nor social history records any such thing as an integral (concept of) "Russian thought" or a "Russian 19th-century ideology". In Russia, as in any other country, "there were materialistic thinkers and idealistic ones – those in favour of social progress and those opposed to it. They studied the 'sense of history', the 'role and destiny of man

in history', in different ways, depending on which trends in social evolution they expressed and which classes' interests they were defending" (p. 187).

The concept of "moral objectives" is likewise a dual one. For one group – the 18th-century Masons, the Slavophils, Berdjaev, Bulgakov, Struve, and others – the "sense of history" meant the conservation of (existing) social conditions. And it is, in Malinin's view, no mere chance that all such social Utopias, from that of Prince Ščerbatov to the "super-reactionary Utopia" of Vl. Solev'ëv, should have proposed a retrospective social ideal. In this connection, Berdjaev, regarded by "bourgeois historians of philosophy" as so great an authority, in fact did no more than brush up Solov'ëv's concept of the "Russian idea" (pp. 189–190). The other group starts with Radiščev, and ends with the revolutionary *narodniki* and Utopian socialists of the 1870's and '80's. Their constant aim was "to unite the sociological conceptions of the history of humanity, of the people's past, with a true conception of its future. Strictly speaking, this was the only current in Russian sociological thought which signified an approach to a scientific understanding of the 'nature of man and his role and destiny in history'." (pp. 188–189).

In conclusion, the author points out that the representatives of so-called religious philosophy include not only Russian Orthodox thinkers but also Catholic and Protestant ones, such as Munzer, Schultze, Wetter, and Kubatka. To him, the most striking thing about their studies on the history of Russian thought is "the stubbornness with which they everywhere seek *and find* 'religious' roots and themes" (p. 190. My italics, R.J.K.) For them, every problem in the history of Russian philosophy is, in the last resort, a religious problem and the fact that Soviet history of philosophy ignores this, for them, decisive aspect constitutes, in their eyes, its mortal sin. In reality, concludes Malinin, "Russian religious philosophy is the philosophical equivalent of contemporary mysticism and ancient neo-Platonic tradition – that mixture of the tenets of Plato, Stoicism, and mediaeval scholasticism" (pp. 191–192).

A few points concerning Malinin's presentation of the well-worn theory of "bourgeois falsification" call for comment. Between the customary statements of a purely doctrinaire materialistic nature, the frequent sarcasms and never-ending quotation marks of a derogatory character, the author does in fact devote considerable space to quotations and perfectly frank and fair paraphrases of various Western expressions of view, and on many occasions one feels that he is sincerely aiming, within the limits of what is possible, at an objective presentation of the problems involved.

A number of factual errors – none of them particularly serious in themselves – yet add up to suggest that his sources of information are far from satisfactory. Thus, Masaryk's *Spirit of Russia* is said to have been translated into English "comparatively recently", whereas in fact the first English edition dates from 1919, and the second (1955, reprinted 1961) does not essentially differ from the first. Similarly, Zen'kovskij's *Istorija russkoj filosofii* was first published in 1948

(t. I) and 1950 (t. II), and not in 1953, as stated on p. 170.[4] Both E. H. Carr and Janko Lavrin (Emeritus Professor at Nottingham University) are classed as "American" (p. 166 and p. 183 respectively). Referring to recent "bourgeois" studies of the Slavophils, Malinin cites Hans Kohn, Simmons, and Wetter, but fails to mention the two fundamental studies by N. V. Riasanovsky (1952) and P. K. Christoff (1961).[5] In general, one is struck by the fact that, although this paper was published in 1965, Malinin cites no Western book, and only one journal (*The Russian Review*, April, 1961), published later than 1960. This suggests that Western sources do not become known in the USSR as rapidly as, by Malinin's own admission, the reverse process takes place.

The above are factual errors or omissions. Expressions of view are obviously harder to tackle. Even so, the presentation of so radical a thinker as Berdjaev as being (with many others) "blinded with hatred for the progressive traditions in Russian democratic and philosophical thought" (p. 185), or as seeing "the sense of history (in) the conservation of (existing) social conditions" (p. 187) is so grotesque a travesty as to amount to a factual error also – and a grave one at that.

Of several dogmatic *obiter dicta*, the classic example appears on page 166. After enumerating his three groups of bourgeois historians of philosophy, Malinin continues: "One of the underlying motives prompting the representatives of the first two groups ... is the attempt to find arguments in the history of philosophy (which can be used) against Marxism-Leninism. Since, in the nature of things (*v prirode*), no such arguments exist, the logical consequence of their efforts lies in the falsification of the history of Russian philosophy." Reduced to its simplest terms, this amounts to saying: "Since we are right and they are wrong, any argument they advance to try and prove us wrong is a lie and a distortion. *Q.E.D.*"

It is not hard to imagine the justifiable outcry from Soviet scholars that would be heard if the same "reasoning" were to be advanced by some Western source in defence of the idealistic school. If Malinin himself really believes in its validity, he might well have spared himself the trouble of writing a 30-page article, for by this simple process all opponents of Marxist-Leninist thought are *a priori* ruled out of court. As long as problems are "solved" on this basis, any attempt at a sincere discussion of legitimate differences of view and approach will perforce remain little more than *un dialogue entre sourds.*

## REFERENCES

1. Cf. *inter alia:* Malinin, V., Tarakanov, N., Ščipanov, I.: 'Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov istorii russkoj filosofii'. In: *Bolševik* 1955, 10, 62. Malinin, V. A.: 'Russkaja filosofija pervoj poloviny XIX veka i eë buržuaznaja interpretacija'. In: *FN* 58, 3, 150–162. Malinin, V. A.: 'Ot psevdofilosofii k naučnomu mirovozzreniju'. In: *VF* 60, 2, 143–147.
2. Malinin here cites Venturi's *Roots of Revolution* (London, 1960; New York, 1961.

Orig. *Il populismo russo*, Turin, 1952). Somerville is the author of *Soviet Philosophy*, has contributed articles to *Voprosy filosofii* (*FBSP* 2094(1) (2)), and has had selected works published in Russian translation in the USSR (*Izbrannoe*, M., IIL. 1960. Cf. *FBSP* 3928).

3. A footnote here mentions G. Fischer's *Russian Liberalism* (Harvard U.P., 1958) and V. T. Bill's *The Forgotten Class* ... (New York, 1959).
4. For Masaryk and Zen'kovskij, cf. the present reviewer's 'Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought...' (*Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965) 33 and 36, and accompanying Bibliography, p. 118 and p. 122.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–43, and Bibliography, pp. 125–126.

*R. J. Kemball*

V. A. Lektorskij: 'Materialističeskaja dialektika i eë buržuaznye "kritiki"'. In: *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii.* str. 47–62.

A rather poorly and, one suspects, very hastily gotten-up article purporting to reply to Western critics of the materialist dialectic. Other works of his have shown that the author is capable of much better thinking, and it is a pity to see him demeaning himself in this fashion. Lektorskij divides the critics into three schools, none of which are clearly defined or restricted, and then seeks to fit into them some of the better known non-Communist writers on the subject. (1) The positivists and pragmatists: F. Frank, K. Popper, and S. Hook, who claim that Diamat is an alogism (its laws are "mystical survivals of pre-scientific ideas unrelated to the methodology of scientific investigation and unable to be formulated in clear, logical terms." – the quotation is from Hook), and that the term 'dialectic' is itself an "ambiguous, useless expression", and "undesirable archaism". (2) The irrationalists: Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and H. Marcuse, who either pretend to defend dialectics by tailoring it to their existentialism, or reproach the Soviets for "logicizing" the dialectical mystique. (3) Those who oppose dialectics to materialism: a trend begun by Bocheński and Wetter. For good measure, T. J. Blakeley receives three pages for the cruelest cut of all: that the Soviet philosophical method is essentially dogmatic and that the classics are matters of faith.

No serious attempt is ever made to reply to any of the critiques of these people, beyond petulant charges that they have not understood Diamat, that they are confusing formal logic with dialectical logic, that they contradict themselves and each other, that they are defending the interests of the exploiting classes, and that in any case, they are wrong. Justification for these replies is sought through several quotes from well-known American philosophers like D. Reap (*Rip*?) and C. Cohen. (Which brings up an interesting point, *en passant*, where do the Soviets dig up these "well-known American philosophers" whom they are perennially quoting in so many of their books?) Blakeley is crushingly rebutted by an answer which boils down to "it's not true, and besides, what is a Thomist doing reproaching us with scholasticism?" Actually, under-

lying Lektorskij's reply to Blakeley, that the Soviets do not refuse to question the classics because of dogmatism but because they are the very bases of their scientific method, can be discerned the real and understandable reason: that their scientific method supplies them with no tools with which they can question the classics.

On the whole, then, the chapter – like the book – is quite disappointing. Until there is some serious attempt to answer the questions posed by non-Communist writers (and posed not maliciously but in an honest desire to understand the Soviet philosophers better), there will be little genuine intellectual exchange no matter how many international congresses are held.

*P. Beemans*

V. V. Sokolov: *Filosofija Spinozy i sovremennost'* (The Philosophy of Spinoza and the Present Day). MGU 1964. 450 str.

Anyone who has had contact with the field of dialectical materialism will surely have been disappointed by the low standard of many books and papers. This is due to the fact that, prior to their investigations, many Soviet writers have been prepared only by reading the classics themselves and the elaborations of their theory in contemporary dialectical materialism. The positive result of this procedure consists in a stimulating freshness of ideas and new approaches and an easy, readable elaboration of evident details. But, on the reverse side, there is a lack of discrimination and no penetration into real philosophical questions. This unsatisfactory standard, so often found, is largely the result of an underestimation of the history of philosophy, generally considered irrelevant to solving philosophical questions since the classics have once and for all pointed to the only competent answers. Therefore Soviet philosophers 'rediscover America' by themselves and follow lines of thought which, together with a detailed elaboration of the possible results, they could have found *mutatis mutandis* in the history of philosophy. (It has to be said that the philosophers of dialectical materialism share this handicap with many contemporary Western thinkers.) Thus, although systematic philosophy can in no case be reduced to the history of philosophy, the latter is a useful and even indispensable means to good performance in the former.

The book under review furnishes an agreeable counter-example to the neglect of history of philosophy. In fact, it is a scholarly investigation of Spinoza's philosophy, and an evaluation of its place in the development of philosophical reasoning from Greek philosophy to the present time. The monograph is based on intense study of Marxist as well as of Western literature concerning Spinoza.

The author begins with a detailed exposition of the sources of Spinoza's thinking. The subsequent analysis and discussion of the Dutch thinker's system occupies about half the book. In a concluding chapter the further development of Spinozism and its role in contemporary thinking are viewed. Throughout the book the author exhibits an embracing and profound knowledge of the complicated cross-references within the history of philosophy. Naturally, the attempt to consider all these connections often leads to very special questions. Thus the danger arises that, in spite of the clear style, the points may not easily be seen among the manifold details. It would have been very useful to have the approximately 1250 notes and the index of names completed by a subject index and a list of the quoted books.

To confront and compare Spinoza's system, with its extremely speculative reasoning, and dialectical materialism would mean making the fund of European philosophical tradition available to contemporary Soviet thought. In fact, from about 1920–1932 there was an intense and stimulating discussion about the relation between dialectical materialism and Spinozism. The prevailing personalities in this discussions were Lunačarskij, Aksel'rod and Deborin (Cf. also



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

G. L. Kline, *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*, London. 1952, p. 14–16). However, as the author of the reviewed book points out (p. 383), Plexanov's formula of the "theological appendage" in Spinozism "literally hypnotized" (*bukval'no zagipnotizirovala*) many Soviet philosophers. Thus, in 1932, Mitin and his followers came to power and the discussion stopped. The book under review is the first one on Spinoza since 1940 and at the same time the first Marxist study which deals with *all* aspects of the system (I. A. Konikov in the review of Sokolov's book in *VF* 1965, 8, 166–169).

What are the main results of Sokolov's monograph? As the author holds the Marxist-Leninist view-point, his book shows in what sense a sufficiently broadened materialism can be found within the history of philosophy and especially within Spinoza. What renders the book so precious is the combination of this view-point with a sober judgement, for his intimate knowledge of the historical connections and his consciousness of the philosophical problems prevent Mr. Sokolov from unbalanced and over-simplified statements. Furthermore, a special merit of the monograph consists in raising the discussion of atheism from popularised agitation to the level of speculative philosophy.

It seems to the reviewer that in dialectical materialism there are two possibilities for a really philosophical treatment of atheism: (1) the humanistic approach of the young Marx regarding the alienation of men and pleading for the reestablishment of his very nature as veiled by religion; (2) the cosmological approach, prevailing in Spinoza. In the latter case, the question is whether the ultimate ground for the existence of the world has to be seen in a transcendent personal being that created the world or in a principle immanent in things themselves, which thus comes out to a pantheistic "deification of matter". Mr. Sokolov calls special attention to Spinoza's rationalism and tries to show that in his philosophy the second view-point was the dominant one. He claims that the theistic traits within the Dutch thinker's system can be explained by caution with respect to the Inquisition and by the lack of other expressions to explain his ideas.

Some short remarks: Mr. Sokolov opposes to Spinoza's teaching of strict determination the dialectical concept of objective chance based on the infinite possibilities always arising in nature. But does such an appeal not equal an escape from a lawful ordered cosmos to the agnostic concept of an indefinite creativity? The attempt to consider the philosophical teachings within the context of the contemporary social conditions offers interesting views but no cogent arguments. The censure that Spinoza's static concept of the world neglects its dynamic and historical character is surely correct. Besides this, it seems to the reviewer, the shortcoming of Spinoza's system consists in the lack of a clear and consistent elaboration of its basic categories and, furthermore, in the rationalistic identification of the logical and the real orders. Thus, in spite of its genial intuitions, this system without serious changes could hardly serve as a completely satisfying philosophical theory. Because of his historical approach Mr. Sokolov has not engaged much in questions of this type.

This stimulating book with its high standard of learning will be of great value

to every scholar interested in Spinoza and his place in the development of philosophical thought. It is not less relevant for studies in dialectical materialism, for it shows how this doctrine could possibly be enriched when making use of the patrimony of the history of philosophy.

*F. Rapp*

Ervin Laszlo: *Individualism, Collectivism, and Political Power. A Relational Analysis of Ideational Conflict.* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 1963. 172 pp.

Strictly speaking, this is not a book about Communism. The author sets out to determine the philosophical bases of political theory. But, since he is dealing with the contemporary political scene, it is inevitable that he devote much of his time to a discussion of the collectivism of our time, i.e. Communism.

The book is divided into two sections: Schematization, where the author outlines the philosophical constructs to be used in the analysis of political reality; and Analyses, where he makes the applications of these constructs to that reality. The first section contains the following chapters: The Epistemological Bases of the Concept of Man; The Conceptual Content of the Idea of Reality; The Structure of Political Theories; The Influence of Theoretical and Institutionalized Principles on Popular Political Thought. In the second part, we find: Communism: The Institutionalized Theory; An Assessment of the Evolution of Popular Political Thought Under Communism; National Revisionism: A Case History; The Dichotomy of Contemporary Political Thinking; The Impact of Soviet Ideological Collectivism; Potentials of Conflict Resolution.

The central thesis of Mr. Laszlo's book is that individualism and collectivism as the basic categories of conflicting political theories are the resultants of divergent modes of epistemological stress. The concrete subject-object relation occurs in space and time and is, therefore, subject to all the real influences of the milieu. This relationship tends to be subject-oriented or object-oriented. In the first case, the subject perceives objects as having "existence" for and in relation to himself: the emphasis is on the relationship to the subject. In the second case, the subject perceives objects as having a certain degree of "being" in and for themselves: the emphasis is more or less evenly placed on subject, object and relation. In the first case we have "collectivism", and in the second "individualism". In other words, although both types of apprehension are present in all subjects, one or the other tends to predominate: as a result, the "existence-oriented" subject will see other individuals in the social group as they relate to himself and will be a "collectivist"; the "being-oriented" subject, on the other hand, will recognize to these other individuals in the social group some degree of "being" analogous to his own and will, consequently, be an "individualist" in social theory.

The ontologically-oriented will want to know: What about being? Mr. Laszlo does not ignore it but he takes the point of view that a man's political theories depend more on *how* he views reality than on the nature of the reality viewed. Which seems reasonable.

Using these notions, the author takes an in-depth look at Communism. Marxism-Leninism was able to implant itself in Russia and take control of the country because the popular attitude had developed a natural penchant for collectivism as the only alternative to Tsarist absolutist individualism (social stratification). The current polycentrism in the Soviet bloc represents a set-



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

back for international collectivism but not for national collectivism. And, the author is optimistic about the future erosion of Communism. He sees signs that the very implementation of Marxism-Leninism itself is engendering attitudes which, in the long run, will sap the very bases of collectivism. The collectivism which originally favored the Communist over-throw of the Tsarist extremes in social stratification is now being eroded by the very stratification which the Communist Party finds necessary for the Communist operation of the country.

Perhaps the most significant portion of Mr. Laszlo's book is the third chapter of the second section, "National Revisionism: A Case History". Here he submits the 1956 freedom-fight in Hungary to a close-knit analysis. After sketching the background to the event, the author closely scrutinizes the demands made by the fighters and their leaders. He comes to the conclusion that none of these demands constitutes a rejection of collectivism or a demand for Western-style democracy. He shows that the tragedy of the situation lay in the fact that this was an anti-Soviet, not an anti-Communist uprising. But, it was termed "counter-revolutionary" and suppressed by the Soviets for whom "anti-Soviet" means "anti-Communist". And, on the other hand, it was left to die in agony by a confused West which seemed incapable of understanding that this people wanted to throw off the Soviet yoke and yet did not want to reject "socialism" or "national-Communism". The lesson was costly for all sides!

Readers of *SST* will also be interested in a comparison which the author makes toward the end of the book. He there shows the similarities and differences between the control which Marxism exerted over the "industrial" proletariat of the nineteenth century and that which Marxism-Leninism is attempting to exert over the "colonial" proletariat of the twentieth century. This thought-provoking comparison provides an interesting point of view from which to view the current Communist wooing of the so-called "third world".

All in all, Mr. Laszlo's treatise is remarkable precisely because it is so thought-provoking. He raises a whole series of interesting questions and suggests exact guide-lines for arriving at a correct understanding and solution of them.

*T. J. Blakeley*

A. K. Demidova, V. I. Krasnyx: *Kniga dlja čtenija po marksistskoj filosofii* (Book for Readings in Marxist Philosophy). Izd. Nauka. M. 1964. 88 str.

This short textbook is presented as an educational aid for the foreign post-graduate (*aspirant*) student wishing to develop a knowledge of basic philosophic vocabulary. It is divided into 20 brief texts, each treating an area of philosophy i.e., "Materialism and Idealism" (3), "Mode of Production, Productive forces, and Relations of Production" (11), "Base and Superstructure" (14), "Marxist Understanding of the Class Struggle" (16), "On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (19). Each text is followed by several exercises for grammar and language proficiency. Finally, there are two supplements (*priloženija*) listing alphabetically 240 word combinations (e.g. *proizvodstvennye otnošenija*) and 800 vocabulary words.

This manual is extremely useful and recommended to the beginner as an introduction to philosophical readings in Russian. However, one must not be discouraged by the content of the texts, which present Soviet doctrine in extremely crude form.

*A. Heidenreich*



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

# BIOGRAPHY

## BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS II

The following is a continuation of the biographical index of Soviet philosophers begun in *SST* III, 3, 220–229. It has been compiled in the same spirit, i.e., to provide those interested in the study of Soviet philosophy with a fuller picture of the backgrounds and specializations of the leading personalities and minds in this field. The information has been drawn primarily from vol. 3 of *Filosofskaja énciklopedija* (M. 1964), covering the letter K–N, and from the personal notes in *Voprosy filosofii* and *Filosofskie nauki.*

The itemization for each entry is as follows: name; date of birth ('new calendar' dates); year of admission to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS); place(s) of study and year(s) of graduation; years of doctorate and professorate; teaching positions and other activities, special awards or other data; area of work, research or specialization in the subject. Following immediately in parentheses are the reference sources. Finally, under '*Works:*' are the sources for his publications; the reference numbers are those of the *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie*, published in five volumes by our Institute. For the sake of reading ease, strict grammatical transliteration from the Russian has not always been followed in all the abbreviations of names of institutes and universities, and most of them have been translated.

In addition to the abbreviations listed on the inside back cover, the following also appear in the text:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | In-t | Institute |
| Corr. | Corresponding | Med. | Medicine, medical |
| Cand. | Candidate | MIFLI | Moskovskij Institut Istorii, |
| Fac. | Faculty | | Filosofii i Literatury |
| *FE* | *Filosofskaja énciklopedija* | Phil. | Philosophy, philosophical |
| G | Gosudarstvennyj | Prof. | Professor, professorate |
| Grad. | Graduated | U | University |
| IKP | Institut Krasnoj | Pg | Pedagogy, pedagogical |
| | Professory | Sc. | Science |

BRAGINEC, Andrej Stepanovič: 13/12/1903–27/4/1963. KPSS 1926. Grad. Xar'kov GU 1934, aspirant Xar'kov GU 1937. Dr. Phil. Director of the Dept. of Philosophy, prof., and pro-rector, L'vov GU. Lenin Order, Order of the Red Star. Was called to L'vov in 1939 to reorganize the univ.; took an active role in the Red Army in World War II. Specialized in history of philosophy and socio-political thought. (*VF* 1963, 6, 180.)
*Works:* 2233, 4287, see also *VF* 1963, 6, 180.

ČUGAEV, Anatolij Jakovlevič: died 6/6/64. KPSS 1944. Grad. Phil Fac. MGU 1938, aspirant MGU 1938–51, cand. phil. sc. MGU 1941. Head of Dept.



*Studies in Soviet Thought* V, 4 (December 1965); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

of Marxism-Leninism, Ašxabad Engineering and Heavy Transport In-t 1941–46; 1946–47 Head of Dept. of Phil. of Central Komsomol School; 1953–55, Head of Dept. of Diahistomat at M Economics In-t; from 1955–64, Head of Dept. of Diahistomat at MGU. Had been editor of *Molodoj Kommunist*, *Komsomolskaja Pravda*, and *Kommunist*; member of secretariat of Ideological Commission of Praesidium of CK KPSS, 1952–53. (*VF* 1964, 7, 184.)

*Works:* 3276, 5368 (1, 2).

FATALIEV, Xalil' Magomedovič: born 1915–23/10/59. KPSS 1942. Grad. Physics Fac. MGU. Dr. Phil. 1949. Was head of Physics Dept. and later Director of the Dagestan Pg In-t; had been deputy to the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR, and deputy to and member of Praesidium of Supreme Soviet of Dagestan ASSR. Afterwards head of Dept. of Diahistomat of the Natural Sciences Fac. of MGU, and senior sc. Collaborator at IF. Awarded Lomonosov Prize of MGU 1959. Editor *Priroda*, *Vestnik MGU*, *FN*, member of academic council of IF, and lecturer for the CK KPSS. (*FN*, 1959, 4, 190–191.)

*Works:* 1071, 1649 (1–3), 3237 (1–3), 3319, 3320, 3969, 5485 (1–12), 6508 (1–15).

IVANOV, Aleksej Ivanovič: 1911–2/7/1964. KPSS 1931. Grad. In-t of Hist. and Phil. 1934, and of M In-t of Oriental Studies 1935. Cand. M. Hist.-Phil. In-t 1942. 1961, Dr. Phil. MGU, thesis on 'Role of World-View of Creative Writing'. Prof. in Phil. Dept. Saratov GU, 1949–56, and Director of Dept., 1956–64. Did diplomatic work in Korea, 1935–40, and was senior instructor in political administration dept. of Red Army during the war. Purged and imprisoned 1945–49, rehabilitated 1954. Worked in the fields of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice, linguistics, aesthetics, atheism, and especially on *partijnost'* in literature and art. (*FN* 1964, 5, 128; *VF* 1964, 11, 184.)

*Works:* 630, 4113, 4162, and editor of more than 50 *sborniki*.

KOČARLI, Firudin Kasum: 24/12/1922. KPSS 1945. Grad. Phil. Fac. Azerbajdžan GU 1950, Head of IF AN Azerbajdžan SSR since 1959, cand. Phil. Sc. 1954. Teaching since 1950. Areas are Histomat and history of Azerbajdžan social and phil. thought. (*FE*, III, 79–80.)

*Works:* 5839; see also *FE*, III, 79–80.

KON, Igor' Semënovič: 21/5/1928. KPSS 1955. Grad. LG Pg In-t 1947, and aspirant there, 1950. Dr. Phil. 1960. Prof. 1963, and teaching since 1956 at Phil. Fac. LGU. Works on history of bourgeois phil. and sociology in 19th and 20th centuries; specializes on history of English socio-political thought since the 17th cent. and on ethics and history of ethics. Worked on *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*. (*FE*, 3, 38.)

*Works:* 346 (1–7), 1800 (1, 2), 3451 (1, 2), 5858 (1–4); see also *FE*, III, 38.

KONSTANTINOV, Fedor Vasil'evič: 21/2/1901. KPSS 1918. Grad. IKP 1932. Dr. Phil. 1953. Prof. 1934, worked in IF 1945–51, rector of AON 1954–55. Editor-in-chief of *VF* 1952–54; director of Agitprop CK KPSS 1955–58; editor-in-chief of *Kommunist* 1955–58, and of *FE*, I–III. Member of AN

1964, and director of IF since 1962. Works in Histomat (problems of development, relations of production, basis and superstructure, role of the individual, the masses and of ideas in history), and in critique of bourgeois sociology. (*FE*, III, 39.)

*Works:* 350 (1–6), 844, 1961, 3249, 3454, 3928, 5758, 5865 (1–9); see also *FE*, III, 39.

KOPNIN, Pavel Vasil'evič: 27/1/1922. KPSS 1943. Grad. Phil. Fac. MGU 1944, aspirant M Pg In-t 1947. Dr. Phil. 1957. Head of Phil. Dept. Tomsk GU 1947–1955; worked in AN 1955–58. Head of Dept. of Diahistomat Kiev GU since 1959, and director of IF AN Ukrainian SSR since 1962. Editor of *VF* since 1963, and of *FE* since 1961. Works on problems of epistemology and dialectical logic, methodology of natural science, and history of logic. (*FE*, III, 62; *FN* 1959, 4, 187.)

*Works:* 351 (1–5), 1142, 1658, 1803 (1–3), 3239, 3457 (1–4), 3458, 5870 (1–7); see also *FE*, III, 62.

KRUŽKOV, Vladimir Semënovič: 16/6/1905. KPSS 1925. Grad. Academy of Communist Education 1931, aspirant 1933. Dr. Phil. 1950. Prof. 1940. Teaching since 1932, director of In-t of Artistic History of the Ministry of Culture 1961. Corr. member AN 1953. State Prize of SSSR 1952. Specializes in history of Russian phil., history of esthetic thought, and problems of the Leninist stage of Marxist phil. (*FE*, III, 103.)

*Works:* 377, 849, 3494, 5948 (1–3), 5949; see also *FE*, III, 103.

KRYVELEV, Iosef Aronovič: 13/9/1906. KPSS 1941. Grad. M Historical-Phil. In-t 1934. Dr. Phil. 1964. Taught in the centre of the League of Militant Godless 1934–36, and at the Anti-Religious Museum 1936–39. Worked at IF 1939–41, and 1947–49. Editor of *VF* 1947–48. Senior sc. collaborator at In-t of Ethnography of AN since 1959, and lecturer at MGU since 1962. His areas are history and theory of atheism, of religion and of culture. (*FE*, III, 104; *VF* 1947, 2–1948, 2; *FN* 1962, 2, 142.)

*Works:* 379 (1–4), 3495 (1–3), 5951 (1–4); see also *FE*, III, 104.

KUBLANOV, Boris Grigorevič: 28/12/1905. KPSS 1932. Grad. Phil. Dept. Xar'kov GU 1936. Dr. Phil. 1960. Head of Phil. Dept. L'vov GU 1963. Works on theory of knowledge, forms of thought, and aesthetics. (*FE*, III, 109.)

*Works:* 4287, 7175; see also *FE*, III, 109.

KUDIN, Vjačeslav Aleksandrovič: 19/2/1925. KPSS 1951. Grad. Literature Fac. Vladivostok Pg In-t 1949, aspirant Kiev GU 1954. Dr. Phil. 1963. Head of Dept. of Ethics, Aesthetics and Logic of Kiev GU since 1960. His fields are socialist realism and the artistic knowledge of reality. (*FE*, III, 110.)

*Works:* 5957; see also *FE*, III, 110.

KURSANOV, Georgij Alekseevič: 10/5/1914. KPSS 1940. Grad. M. In-t pf Transport Engineers 1936, aspirant MIFLI 1938. Dr. Phil. 1951. Prof. 1941, and at VPŠ 1959. He specializes in the theory of knowledge and of logic

(social practice, social knowledge, truth, logical principles of science), philosophical questions of natural science (space and time, relativity, quantum mechanics), and critique of bourgeois philosophy (especially neopositivism, pragmatism, and neothomism). (*FE*, III, 126–127.)
*Works:* 273, 387, (1, 2), 388, 1150, and 1828 (1–3), 2113a, 2185, 3262, 3378, 3504, 3505, 5983 (1–10); see also *FE*, III, 127.

KURYLEV, Anatolij Konstantinovič: 9/2/1909. KPSS 1928. Grad. VPŠ 1950. Dr. Phil. 1963. Director of the In-t for Professional Improvement of Social Science Teachers, at MGU, 1954–61, and since 1963, of the Dept. of Sc. Communism at MGU. Does research on the social-economic questions of urban and rural areas, and on the development of the person in socialist society. (*FE*, III, 129.)
*Works:* 1829, 3506, 3567, 5985 (1–3); see also *FE*, III, 129.

KUUSINEN, Otto Wil'gel'movič: 4/10/1881–17/5/1964. KPSS 1904. Grad. Helsinki U 1900, cand. phil. 1905. Was an early activist in Russian and Finnish social-democratic circles and in the international socialist movement. Was a permanent member of the Comintern, and directed its Ispolkom; for many years was the ideological authority on the CK, and was responsible for the compilation of the *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*. Member of the Presidium 1957, and of the CK KPSS from 1941. Member of the AN 1958. Named Hero of Socialist Labour 1961. (*FE*, III, 127–128.)
*Works:* 3736; see also *FE*, III, 128.

KUZNECOV, Ivan Vasil'evič: 7/9/1911. KPSS 1942. Grad. Physics Fac. MGU 1935. Dr. Phil. 1961. Prof. 1962; has been teaching in theoretical physics and diamat since 1937, and working in the IF. Heads the research section of philosophical questions of natural science of the AN. His fields are, in addition to this, the history of science, Diamat, and certain questions of theoretical physics. (*FE*, III, 111; S. Müller-Markus: *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie I*, p. 58.)
*Works:* 394, 432 (4), 851, 1021 (2), 1096 (1), 1136, 1508, 1660, 1831 (1–3), 2193, 3253, 3509, 3809, 3878 (1), 6008 (1–13), 6095 (5), 6346 (5), 6463; see also *FE*, III, 111.

LADYGINA-KOTS, Nadežda Nikolaevna: 18/5/1889–3/9/1963. Dr. Biological Sc. Grad. Physical Sc. Fac. of M High School for Women 1917. Senior sc. collaborator in the psychology sector of the IF, headed the comparative psychology section of the All-Union Psychological Society, and was the Soviet representative to the animal psychology section of the International Society of Biological Sc. Awarded Order of Lenin. Worked on comparative development of simian and human psychology, and the development of reflective activity in the evolution of living beings. (*FE*, III, 137; *VF* 1963, 10, 183.)
*Works:* 397, 1286; see also *FE*, III, 137.

LEONOV, Mixail Andreevič: march, 1902–4/11/1952. KPSS 1919. Grad. and aspirant Sverdlov GU 1933. Dr. Phil. 1950. Prof. 1939. Director of Diamat

Dept. of IF, 1945–50. Editor *VF* 1947–50. Worked on Diahistomat and history of Marxist philosophy. (*FE*, III, 176; *VF* 1951, 6, 214.)
*Works:* 238, 251, 334, 406 (1–5), 582 (4), 633 (1), 680, 732 (1), 854 (1, 2), 1157 (1–3), 6036 (1–12); see also *FE*, III, 176.

LEONT'EV, Aleksej Nikolaevič: 18/2/1903. KPSS 1948. Grad. MGU 1924. Dr. Pg Sc. 1941. Prof. 1932, since 1941 at MGU, and head of Psychology Dept. of Phil. Fac. MGU since 1945. Member of Academy of Pg Sc., RSFSR 1950. Order of Lenin 1963. Has specialized in the development of psychic activity, and its biological, social and historical influences and processes, on the origins of sense activity, and on the development of the individual brain system. Recently doing investigation in the field of 'engineering psychology'. (*FE*, III, 176.)
*Works:* 1158, 1294, 3538, 3539, 6039 (1–3), 6040; see also *FE*, III, 176–177.

LIFŠIČ, Mixail Aleksandrovič: 23/7/1905. KPSS 1938. Studied at the Higher Artistics-Technical In-t. Senior sc. collaborator at the In-t of History of Art, 1963. Has produced several books on Marxism-Leninism and art, problems of social science, literature and art, and edited collected works in several areas of classic philosophy and aesthetics. (*FE*, III, 195.)
*Works:* 1878; see also *FE*, III, 195.

LOSEV, Aleksej Fedorovič: 22/9/1893. Grad. MGU 1915. Dr. Phil. 1953. Prof. 1923, and during his teaching in the 20's tried to combine Neo-platonism with Hegelian dialectics and Husserlian phenomenology. Later came to Marxism, and since 1944 has been professor of classical philology at the M Pg In-t. Works in the areas of problems of ancient philosophy (especially Aristotle, Plotinus, and Nicholas of Cusa), of categories of dialectics, and critique of bourgeois philosophy. (*FE*, III, 257.)
*Works:* 1857, 4024; see also *FE*, III, 257.

LUPPOL, Ivan Kapitonovič: 1/1/1896–26/5/1943. KPSS 1920. Grad. Law Fac. MGU 1919. Dr. Phil. 1939. Prof. MGU 1925–31, and at IKP 1925–38. Director of In-t of World Literature, 1935–40. Purged under Stalin and rehabilitated posthumously. His fields were the history of philosophy (especially the French Enlightenment) and aesthetics. He edited the first Russian edition of the collected works of Diderot and Lamettrie, and was one of the first to do a philosophical analysis of Lenin. (*FE*, III, 262–263.)
*Works:* 3562, 4268; see also *FE*, III, 263.

LURIJA, Aleksandr Romanovič: 1902. Grad. Kazan' GU, from Social Sc. Fac. 1922, and from M Med. In-t 1937. Dr. Psychology 1937, and Dr. Med. 1943. Prof. of psychology at MGU and active member of the Academy of Psychological Sciences of the RSFSR since 1947. Does research in normal, genetic and pathological psychology. (*FE*, III, 263.)
*Works:* 6076; see also *FE*, III, 263.

LUŠČICKIJ, Ivan Nikolaevič: 20/1/1907. KPSS 1926. Grad. Belorussian GU 1930, aspirant AN Belorussian SSR 1933. Dr. Phil. 1952. Prof. 1953. Director

of Dept. of History of Phil. and Logic, Belorussian GU, since 1953. Specializes in history of philosophy and Histomat. (*FE*, 3, 263.)
*Works:* 1195, 1930, 4217; see also *FE*, III, 263.

MAČKJAVIČJUS, Jonas Antano: 28/2/1922. KPSS 1943. Grad. VPŠ 1949, and AON 1952. Corr. member AN Lithuanian SSR since 1953; 1952–57, headed Phil Dept. of Vilnius Party Academy; since 1957 working in AN Lithuanian SSR. Studies history of philosophy, and sociopolitical thought in Lithuania. (*FE*, III, 373–374.)
*Works:* 6084; see also *FE*, III, 374.

MAKAROV, Aleksej Dmitrievič: 1/2/1903. KPSS 1929. Grad. IKP 1932. Dr. Phil. 1962. Prof. 1938, Head of Dept. of Marxist-Leninist Phil., VPŠ, since 1959. Editor of *FE* since 1959. Works in history of philosophy and Diamat. (*FE*, III, 280.)
*Works:* 1864, 3194; see also *FE*, III, 280.

MAKOVEL'SKIJ, Aleksandr Osipovič: 22/7/1884. Grad. Kazan' U, 1907, prof. Kazan' GU 1918–20, Baku GU 1920–60. 1945–50, Director of IF Azerbajdžan SSR, and senior sc. collaborator at AN Azerbajdžan SSR 1950. Corresponding member AN. His areas are history of ancient philosophy and of Near Eastern philosophy (especially Azerbajdžan), and problems of Diamat, logic and psychology. (*FE*, III, 282.)
*Works:* 421 (1, 2), 1865 (1, 2), 3569, 4281, 5100, 5101, 5722, 6094; see also *FE*, III, 282–283.

MAKSIMOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovič: 16/8/1891. KPSS 1918. Grad. in Physics and Mathematics, Kazan' U, 1916. Dr. Phil. 1934. Prof. 1929, IKP and the Communist Academy, and at Phil. Fac. MGU 1944–49. Editor of *VF* 1949–55, and Corr. member of AN since 1953. His fields of interest are the history of science and philosophical questions of natural science. (*FE*, III, 284.)
*Works:* 134, 432, (1–6), 1170, 6008 (10), 6095 (1–5), 7008 (5); see also *FE*, III, 284.

MAL'CEV, Vasilij Ivanovič: 1/2/1906. KPSS 1930. Grad. Academy of Communist Education 1931, aspirant Phil. Fac. MIFLI 1935, teaching since 1940 at MGU. Dr. Phil. 1955, Prof. 1960. Works on dialectical logic and philosophical questions of biology. (*FE*, III, 287–288).
*Works:* 1804 (2), 1867, 3571 (1, 2), 6098 (1–4); see also *FE*, III, 287–288.

MAMEDOV, Šejdabek Fradžievič: 23/1/1912. KPSS 1939. Grad. MIFLI 1938, aspirant MIFLI 1941. Dr. Phil. 1963. Prof. Phil. Fac. MGU. Editor of *FN*. Specializes in history of philosophy of the peoples of the USSR, especially Transcaucasian and Central Asian. (*FE*, III, 288.)
*Works:* 1658, 1870, 3576 (1–4), 3577, 5722, 6110, 6817; see also *FE*, III, 288.

MAN'KOVSKIJ, Boris Stepanovič: 5/2/1904. KPSS 1932. Dr. Law 1939. Prof. 1938, senior sc. collaborator at IF since 1957. Does research on the problems of the socialist state and law. (*FE*, III, 294.)
*Works:* 437, 3581, 5672; see also *FE*, III, 294.

MAN'KOVSKIJ, Lev Aleksandrovič: 23/5/1900–17/10/1964. KPSS 1919. Grad. Phil. Fac. IKP 1930. Prof. 1933, Rector of Gor'kij GU 1931–38. Dept. of Diahistomat of M Pg In-t. 1956–62. Arrested 1938–46, rehabilitated 1956. Working at IF since 1959. Specializes in dialectical logic. (*FE*, III, 294.)
*Works:* 438, 1873, 5404; see also *FE*, III, 294.

MANSUROV, Nikolaj Sergeevič: 7/5/1921. KPSS 1946. Grad. and aspirant IF 1951. Dr. Phil. 1963. Works on philosophical problems of psychology and associated sciences. (*FE*, III, 293.)
*Works:* 439 (1, 2), 1171, 3582, 3764, 6117 (1–4); see also *FE*, III, 293.

MARKOV, Andrej Andreevič: 22/9/1903. KPSS 1951. Dr. Physics and Mathematics 1935. Prof. LGU 1936, working since 1939 in Mathematical In-t of AN. Since 1959, Director of Dept. of Mathematical Logic of MGU, and corr. member of AN since 1953. Markov works in the following areas: celestial mechanics, theory of dynamic systems, theory of groups, problems of identity and quantity, logic of construction, and constructive mathematical analysis. While investigating problems of quantity, he made important discoveries about algorithms. He formulated the idea of abstraction of identification, and of abstraction of potential practicability. He has had major achievements in algebraic logic and cybernetics. (*FE*, III, 299–300.)
*Works:* 3704, 6123 (1, 2); see also *FE*, III, 299–300.

MARKOV, M. A.: born 1908. Grad. Physics at MGU 1930. Prof. of Physics at In-t of Physics of AN since 1934; corr. member of AN 1953. His self-critique was published in *VF*, 1949, 1, 7. (*Cf.* H. Koch: *Sowjetbuch*, p. 510; *VF* 1949, 1, 7; 1952, 1, 213.)
*Works:* 75 (1), 142, 389, 392 (2), 432 (3), 443, 543, 569, 582 (3, 9, 15), 667 (1), 710, 719 (1), 759, 763, 1173, 3583 (1, 2).

MASLIN, Aleksandr Nikoforovič: 1/10/1906. KPSS 1931. Grad. Socio-Economic Dept. Kazan' Pg In-t 1929, aspirant in phil. MIFLI 1937. Working in IF since 1951, head of sector of development of socialist culture since 1961. Editor of *Propagandist* 1945–46, and of *Partijnaja žizn'* 1946–47, and of *VF* since 1962. Works on history of Russian phil., Histomat, and theories of culture. (*FE*, III, 324.)
*Works:* 447, 875a, 902, 1307, 1881, 1993 (1), 3586 (1, 2), 5874, 6138 (1, 2); see also *FE*, III, 324.

MATVEENKOV, Iov Ivanovič: 18/5/1901. KPSS 1930. Grad. MGU 1927, aspirant IF 1930. Dr. Phil. 1947. Prof. 1958, head of Phil. Dept. of Siberian sector of AN since 1958. Works on laws of social development and construction of Communism. (*FE*, III, 329.)
*Works:* 6142 (1–3); see also *FE*, III, 329.

MELEŠČENKO, Zoja Nikolaevna: 30/5/1893. Grad. St. Petersburg Women's Pg In-t 1913, and Phil. Fac. St. Petersburg U 1914. Dr. Phil. 1962. Since 1944, working in Phil. Fac. LGU. Specializes in history of philosophy (Renaissance, Enlightenment, German classical and contemporary), and in critique of revisionism. (*FE*, III, 380.)

*Works:* 456 (1–3), 1075, 1891 (1, 2), 3002, 3513, 3592, 5096, 6154 (1–4), 6155; see also *FE*, III, 380.

MINASJAN, Artabazd Mixajlovič: born 1913. KPSS 1932. Grad. Baku Agricultural In-t 1936. Dr. Phil. 1963. Prof. 1964, teaching since 1952 in Rostov GU. Specializes in Marxist dialectics, categories of content and form, laws of negation of negation. (*FE*, III, 446.)

*Works:* 6180; see also *FE*, III, 446.

MITIN, Mark Borisovič: 5/7/1901. KPSS 1919. Grad. Phil. Fac. IKP 1929. Director of Academy of Communist Education 1930–39, and of In-t of Marxism-Leninism of CK KPSS 1939–44. Editor-in-chief of *Pod znamenem marksizma* 1930–44, of *Za pročnyj mir, za narodnuju demokratiju* 1950–56, and since 1960, of *VF*. Editor of *Bolševik* 1944–50, and of *Literaturnaja gazeta* 1949–50. Member of the Praesidium of AN, and Dean of Phil. Fac. VPŠ. Secretary of the Dept. of Phil. and Law of AN. Deputy to the Third and Fifth Convocations of the Supreme Soviet. Elected member of CK KPSS at XVIIIth, XIXth, and XXth Party Congresses. Awarded People's Prize of USSR, 1943. Director of All-Union Society for the Diffusion of Political and Scientific Knowledge 1956–60.

Mitin specializes in the following fields: history of world philosophy, especially German classical, the Leninist period in the development of Diahistomat, *Partijnost'*, theory of knowledge (especially on reflection, the ideal and the material, the signal systems and concepts), and is a militant critic of western philosophy. He was, along with P. Judin, instrumental in the 1931 Condemnation of Deborin (cf. J. M. Bocheński: *Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism*, Dordrecht 1963, pp. 34–38). He edited the first edition of *Istorija filosofii* vol. 1–5, and headed the Soviet delegations to the 12th and 13th International Philosophical Congresses. (*FE*, III, 457; H. Koch, *Sowjetbuch*, p. 516.)

*Works:* 473 (1–3), 1508, 1733, 1899, 1912 (1, 2), 2193, 3608 (1–3), 5050 (1), 6191 (1–12); see also *FE*, III, 457.

MOLODCOV, Vasilij Sergeevič: 1/1/1900. KPSS 1919. Grad. Communist In-t for Social Science Teachers 1933. Cand. Phil. Sc. 1949. Prof. 1954; taught phil. at IKP 1935–37, presently head of Dept. of Diamat, Phil. Fac. MGU. Works in Diamat. (*FE*, III, 487).

*Works:* 479 (1–4), 1508, 1916, 2193, 3567, 3616, 3617, 6206 (1–5); see also *FE*, III, 487.

MOMDŽJAN, Xačik Nišanovič: 10/3/1909. KPSS 1944. Grad. Phil. Fac. MIFLI 1934, aspirant MIFLI 1937. Dr. Phil. 1951, Prof. 1956, teaching Phil. Fac. MGU since 1954. Editor of the phil. section of *Kommunist* 1958–62. Works in Histomat, history of philosophy (especially XVIIIth and XIXth cent. French), and Atheism. (*FE*, III, 487.)

*Works:* 105 (4), 233 (5), 480, 866 (1, 2), 1101, 1181 (1–3), 1876, 3516, 5866, 6208 (1, 2); see also *FE*, III, 487.

MORDINOV, Avksentij Egorovič: 23/2/1910. KPSS 1931. Grad. MIFLI 1934.

Dr. Phil. 1954. Prof. 1955, Head of Phil. Dept. of Jakutsk GU 1956. Works on formulation and development of socialist culture. (*FE*, III, 504.)
*Works:* 481 (1, 2), 1918, 3620, 6210 (1, 2); see also *FE*, III, 504.

MOSKALENKO, Fedor Jakovlevič: 20/6/1901. KPSS 1927. Grad. Černigov In-t 1926, aspirant in phil., Academy of Communist Education 1932. Dr. Phil. 1953. Prof. 1953, since 1963, prof. at Kiev GU. Specializes in logic. (*FE*, III, 508.)
*Works:* 1188, 6222 (1–3); see also *FE*, III, 508.

MŠVENIERADZE, Vladimir Vlasovič: 1/3/1926. KPSS 1945. Grad. Phil. Fac. Tbilisi GU 1953, aspirant IF 1957. Dr. Phil. 1953. Senior sc. collaborator IF, 1959. Works in area of history of philosophy and critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and sociology, especially neopositivism and anti-communism. (*FE*, III, 513–514.)
*Works:* 486, 1913, 1935 (1–3), 2241, 6229; see also *FE*, III, 514.

MUMINOV, Ibragim Muminovič: 7/11/1908. KPSS 1940. Grad. Socio-Economic Fac. of Uzbek Pg Academy 1931. Dr. Phil. 1950 (cf. *VF* 1951, 1, 242, 251). Prof. 1950. Vice-president of AN Uzbek SSR 1956, member of CK Uzbek KP 1962. A founder of Samarkand GU 1933, and of IF AN Uzbek SSR 1958. His field is the socio-political thought of Central Asian peoples. (*FE*, III, 510.)
*Works:* 518, 3075, 4255, 6232; see also *FE*, III, 510.

NAAN, Gustav Ioganovič: 17/5/1919. KPSS 1943. Grad. VPŠ 1946, aspirant AON 1949. Vice-president AN Estonian SSR 1951–64, and since 1964, senior sc. collaborator at In-t of Physics and Astronomy of AN Estonian SSR. Works on philosophical questions of natural science (cosmology, theory of relativity). (*FE*, 3, 527.)
*Works:* 490 (1, 2), 6238; see also *FE*, III, 527.

NARSKIJ, Igor' Sergeevič: 18/11/1920. Grad. Phil. Fac. MGU 1948. Dr. Phil. 1961. Prof. 1963, Phil. Fac. MGU. Senior sc. collaborator IF 1951–61; editor of *FN* since 1963. Works in area of theory of knowledge (methodology of science, role of language and symbols in understanding), history of English philosophy (especially logical positivism and linguistic analysis), and of Polish philosophy. (*FE*, III, 551.)
*Works:* 147, 493 (1–6), 494, 495, 645, 1115, 1190, 1226, 1893, 1894, 1929 (1–3), 3557, 3629 (1–7), 3785, 4286, 5684, 6242 (1–11), 6817; see also *FE*, III, 551.

NAZARENKO, Ivan Dmitrievič: 29/8/1908. KPSS 1929. Grad. Xar'kov Electro-Technical In-t 1935, IKP 1934, AON 1948. Dr. Phil. 1962. Director of In-t of Party History for CK Ukrainian KP. Lenin Prize 1964. Works on history of Ukrainian philosophy and classical German philosophy. (*FE*, III, 531.)
*Works:* 6269; see also *FE*, III, 531.

SEREBRJAKOV, Mixail Vasil'evič: born 1879. KPSS 1904. Grad. Law St. Petersburg U 1914. Dr. Hist. Rector of LGU 1917–30; since 1941 has been at various times Dean of the Phil. Fac., Head of the Dept. of History of Phil., and

Director of the In-t of Phil., Economics and Law, at LGU. 1930–48, director of the In-t of History of Art of AN. Worked in fields of phil., political economy, law, history, art and literature. (Cf. H. Koch: *Sowjetbuch*, p. 552.) *Works:* 629, 3322, 4244.

*P. J. Beemans*

# INDEX OF NAMES


Abdil'din, Z. 225, 230, 237
Abramov, L. T. 228, 232
Adams, A. E. 246
Afanas'ev, V. G. 228, 232
Ágoston, L. 280, 287f.
Ahlberg, R. 169
Aksakov, I. S. 44, 46
Aksakov, K. S. 41, 43
Aksel'rod (Ortodoks), L. I. 312, 334
Aleksander, S. 213
Aleksandrov, A. D. 204 ff., 218 ff.
Aleksandrov, G. F. 81, 144 f., 312
Aleksandrov, N. G. 26
Aleksandrova, V. 253
Alekseev, A. V. 106
Alekseev, M. M. 225, 230
Alekseev, M. N. 139, 144, 152 f., 237
Alekseev, N. G. 155, 169, 224
Alekseev, S. S. 26, 28
Aleško, E. N. 106
Almazov, E. 261
Al'tman, I. 253
Al'tman, V. V. 115
Ambarcumjan, V. A. 224
Ammann 327
Amosov, A. M. 228, 232
Anan'ev, V. G. 169
Andreev, G. L. 85, 106, 108
Andreev, I. D. 148, 169
Anisimov, A. F. 106
Annenkov, P. V. 45, 185, 187, 251
Anoxin, P. K. 169
Antonova, L. I. 29
Anučin, V. A. 232
Aquinas, T. 9
Aristotle 6, 54, 63, 70, 102, 219, 319, 328
Arsen'ev, A. S. 106
Arseniev, N. S. 43, 115, 124
Arxipcev, F. T. 325
Ashby, W. R. 262, 270
Asinovskaja, S. A. 183, 251
Asmus, V. F. 229, 232, 264, 312
Ašin, G. 28
Avksent'ev, A. V. 106

Bajer, B. 85
Bakanidze, M. 225, 230, 237
Bakradze, K. S. 142, 144, 150, 298
Bakunin, M. 35, 37, 39, 173, 182, 194, 196 ff., 263
Ballestrem, K. G. 93, 95, 313
Bammel', G. K. 312
Barghoorn, F. C. 35, 199, 268
Baron, P. 50, 124
Bartoševič, E. 106
Basin, E. Ja. 325 f.
Baskakov, V. G. 115, 185 ff., 198, 201, 242, 253
Baskin, M. P. 264
Batalov, E. Ja. 106
Batiščev, G. S. 163, 171 f., 226, 230
Bauer, B. 74, 103
Bazileva, Z. P. 259
Beemans, P. J. 83, 332
Belen'kij, M. S. 106
Belinskij, V. G. 35, 37 ff., 44 ff., 101, 173 f., 181 ff., 193, 196, 198, 260, 328
Bel'jaev, N. A. 28
Belyx, A. K. 27
Benkliev, S. N. 106
Benz, E. 264
Berdjaev, N. 31, 37, 43 f., 48 ff., 116, 125, 328 ff.
Berg, A. I. 227
Bergmann, P. G. 207
Bergson, H. 57 f., 65
Berkeley, G. 6
Berlin, I. 35, 122, 197, 199, 258, 263, 268, 326
Beršeda, R. V. 27
Bespatyx, V. A. 106
Bibler, V. S. 226, 230, 237
Bill, T. 328, 331
Black, M. 51
Blakeley, T. J. 80, 93, 113, 115, 139, 143, 169 f., 310, 323 f., 329
Blanschard, B. 80
Blauberg, I. V. 228, 232
Bocheński, J. M. 1 ff., 73 ff., 103, 115, 139, 168, 223, 317, 323
Bodnár, I. 281 f.
Boeselager, W. F. 84, 100, 224, 303, 306, 311




This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Bogdanov, B. V. 303
Bogomolov, A. S. 55, 64 ff.
Bogorodskij, A. F. 211, 221
Boguckij, I. S. 246
Bolshakoff, S. 125
Bóna, E. 279, 288
Bór, I. 284
Borisoglebskij, E. 106
Born, M. 207
Botkin, V. P. 45, 251
Bowman, H. E. 116, 189, 254, 327
Braginec, A. S. 337
Brisov, E. M. 106
Brodskij, N. C. 254, 259
Brown, E. J. 182, 250
Bubnoff, N. V. 116
Bucharin, N. 97
Budilova, E. A. 107
Bueva, L. P. 155, 170
Buhr, M. 84, 92
Bujran, M. I. 259
Bulgakov 329
Bunge, M. 76
Burlackij, F. 322
Burxard, A. I. 107
Buxalov, Ju. 26
Buxtijarov, A. 28

Calder-Marshall, A. 254
Camerjan, I. P. 107
Camus, A. 281
Carnap, R. 51, 53 f., 56, 214
Carr, E. H. 194, 197, 259, 263, 330
Cejtlin, A. G. 248
Chernov 35
Chmielewski, E. 43, 125
Christoff, P. K. 40, 125, 330
Cloutier, H. 254
Cohen, C. 331
Cohen, M. 56

Čaadaev, P. 33, 38 f., 45, 173 ff., 190, 243, 328
Čalin, M. 290, 297
Čanyšev, A. N. 107
Čašnikov, V. I. 107
Čerkesov, V. I. 144, 149, 152, 162, 170, 225, 230, 237
Černjak, Ja. Z. 261
Černyševskij, N. 37 f., 40, 47 f., 101 f., 173, 310, 328
Čertkov, A. B. 107
Čertkov, B. B. 226, 230
Čertkov, V. P. 225, 230
Českin, A. A. 312
Česnokov, D. I. 259
Čičerin, B. N. 45, 251
Čiževskij, D. 190, 198, 251, 263 f.
Čueva, I. P. 147, 169
Čugaev, A. J. 339

Dahm, H. 94, 139, 168
Danilevsky 35, 39
Davidjuk, G. P. 107
Davletkel'cev, A. 26
Deborin, A. M. 141, 309 f., 334
De George, R. T. 289 ff., 325
Dejneko, N. I. 248
Denin, M. V. 107
Democritus 328
Denisov, A. I. 27, 29
Deržavin, N. 46, 127, 259
Deutscher, I. 235
De Vries, J. 309
D'Holbach, P. 325
Diderot, D. 219
Diekenmann, E. 98
Djad'ev 307
Dmitriev, S. S. 44, 46, 127
Dobroljubov, N. A. 40, 101, 328
Dolgix, F. I. 107
Dolgov, K. M. 237
Dolja, V. E. 107
Donec, G. P. 194, 259
Dostoevskij, F. 33, 35, 37
Dravčenko, V. B. 29
Drijanov, N. M. 107
Druzmin, N. M. 249
Dubovikov, A. N. 254
Dvorcov, A. 85
Dynnik, M. A. 85, 265
Dziewanowski, M. K. 197, 263, 267

Efimov, S. F. 171
Eichhorn, W. 84
Eilstein, H. 307
Einstein, A. 81, 204 ff., 269
Ejmontova, R. G. 182, 249



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Elec, I. 226, 230
Elek, T. 264, 273 f., 279 f.
El'sberg, Ja. 194, 201, 254, 259
Engels, F. 14, 29, 74, 77, 93, 140, 144, 158, 162, 164, 197, 205, 296, 300 f., 306, 309, 314
Epicurus 328
Erdödi, J. 283, 288
Ermakov, I. M. 107
Ermolenko, D. V. 290, 297
Esin, I. M. 198, 265
Evgrafov, V. E. 268
Exin, P. 28
Ezerskij, V. I. 107
Ezrin, G. I. 85

Fadeev, Ju. V. 107
Fadeev, K. 107
Falk, H. 176, 244, 325
Farkas, L. 270
Fataliev, X. M. 340
Fedin, Ju. 108
Fedosov, I. A. 122, 249
Fedoseev, P. N. 225 f., 230, 269, 279
Feuerbach, L. 74, 185, 198, 265, 294, 300, 309, 319
Fichte, J. 198
Fierz, 215
Filatov, A. N. 108
Filimonov, E. G. 108, 111
Filippov, L. A. 116
Fischer, G. 251, 328, 331
Fleischer, H. 11, 143, 145 f.
Florinskij, M. A. 17, 34
Florinsky, M. T. 40, 122
Florovskij, G. 35, 37, 117
Fodor, J. 282, 288
Fogeler, Ja. G. 108
Fok, V. A. 204, 206 f., 209 ff., 218, 220 f., 224
Földesi, T. 285, 287 f.
Fomenko, A. O. 108
Fourier, C. 267
Francev, Ju. P. 269, 279
Frank, F. 331
Frank, S. L. 181, 247
Freymond, J. 105
Fridlender, G. M. 265
Frolov, I. T. 228, 232
Frolov, M. F. 108

Gabinskij, G. A. 108
Gabov, G. I. 249
Gabriel'jan, G. G. 144, 151 f., 225, 230, 237
Gadiev, D. N. 108
Gagarin, A. P. 108
Gagoidze, V. A. 265
Gajdukov, Ju. G. 165, 172
Gajdenko, P. P. 290, 297
Gak, G. M. 11, 149, 155, 170
Galešnik, L. S. 26 ff.
Ganičev, I. 47, 128
Garaudy, R. 289
Garbell, M. 220
Garkavenko, F. 85, 108
Gassendi, P. 319
Gasteyer, C. 29
Gerschenkron, A. 35, 49, 117
Gerstenmaier, K. 270
Geršen'zon, O. M. 176, 178
Gifford, H. 262
Ginzburg, L. Ja. 256
Ginzburg, V. L. 206, 220
Ginzburg, Z. 85
Glezerman, G. E. 11
Gluškov, B. M. 224, 228, 232
Gluškov, V. M. 227, 231
Gogol', N. 181
Golovenčenko, F. M. 254
Gorbačev, N. A. 108
Gornštejn, T. N. 68, 70 ff., 85
Gorodeckij, B. P. 117
Gorskij, D. P. 229, 233
Gortari, Eli de 237
Gračev, G. D. 85
Grandjard H. 252, 267
Granovskij, T. N. 40, 45, 183, 187, 193 f., 251
Gratieux, A. 33, 40, 48, 125
Grene, M. 290, 297
Grigor'ev, G. S. 157, 166, 171 f.
Grigor'jan, M. M. 182, 244, 250, 252, 562
Grjaznov, B. S. 88
Grošev, I. I. 85
Grušin, B. A. 228
Gruzdev, A. I. 194, 259
Gubanov, N. I. 108



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Guizot, F. 30, 48
Gurštejn, A. 261

Haeckel, E. 301
Haimson 326
Halasz, P. 26 ff.
Hammond, T. T. 35
Hampsch, G. 104
Hänggi, J. 87
Hare, R. 38 f., 43, 49 f., 123, 125, 190 f., 194, 196, 198, 202 f., 244, 255, 259, 262 f.
Harper, J. 102
Hartmann, N. 68, 70 ff.,
Havas, K. G. 285, 288
Hecht, D. 117
Hegel, G. 69 ff., 76, 98, 102, 139 ff., 146 f., 151 f., 154, 156 ff., 166, 184 f., 198, 274, 289, 294, 319
Heidegger, M. 7, 289 ff.
Heidenreich, A. 95, 338
Heilbronner, R. L. 235
Heisenberg, W. 282
Hellmann, M. 98
Hepner, B. P. 198, 255, 263, 265
Herzen, A. I. 35, 37 ff., 44 ff., 101, 173 f., 176, 182 f., 190 ff., 249, 258, 328
Heyden, I. G. 84
Heyer 327
Hobbes, T. 318
Hoffmann 213, 221
Hook, S. 331
Horecky, P. L. 32, 115, 191
Horváth, J. 269, 280
Hume, D. 319
Husserl, E. 289

Iakovenko, B. 198, 265
Iban'es, A. E. 196, 263
Il'enkov, E. V. 144, 149, 153, 170 f., 225 f., 230
Iliadi, A. N. 231
Il'ičev, L. F. 85
Il'in, A. Ja. 88 f.
Infeld, L. 211, 213, 221
Ioannisjan, A. R. 277
Iovčuk, M. I. 185, 198, 255, 259, 262, 265, 311 f.
Ivanenko, D. 215, 220, 222

Jadov, V. A. 11
Jakomov, A. T. 108
Jakovlev, B. 255
Jakovlev, E. 108
Jakovlev, M. V. 194, 270
Jakuševskij, I. T. 73
Jakuškin, I. D. 248
Jampol'skaja, C. A. 29
Jampol'skij, K. I. 108
Janovskaja, S. A. 55
Jelev 307
John, W. 307
Joffe, A. F. 26
Joravsky, D. 81, 313
Judin, E. G. 155, 224
Juravskij, S. V. 109

Kádár, J. 273
Kamenka, E. M. 324
Kamenskij, Z. A. 81
Kammari, M. 186, 255
Kant, I. 6, 198, 207, 319
Kaplan, F. I. 199, 259, 268
Karapetjan, A. K. 109
Karapetjan, L. M. 27
Karev, N. A. 312
Karljuk, A. I. 109
Kárpáti, S. 284
Karpovich, M. 34
Karpusin, V. A. 199, 265
Kas'janov, V. M. 109
Kasymžanov, A. X. 155, 170, 225, 230, 237
Katkov, M. N. 259
Katona, P. 286, 288
Kavelin, K. D. 45, 251
Kedrov, B. M. 81, 139, 141, 144, 154, 160 f., 166, 169 ff., 225, 230, 237 f., 261, 269
Kelle, V. Ž. 11, 314
Kemball, R. 30 ff., 128, 173 ff., 268
Kerimov, V. A. 28
Khrushchev, N. 81 f.
Kireevskij, I. V. 39, 41, 44 ff., 126, 328
Kirpotin, V. 255
Kirschenmann, P. 80, 89
Kjuxel'beker, V. K. 179, 254
Klaus, G. 92, 165, 172
Klimovič, L. I. 109
Kline, G. L. 40, 76, 80, 334



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Kločkov, V. M. 275
Klykova, O. M. 86
Kocsondi, A. 281
Kočarli, F. K. 340
Kohn, H. 30, 35, 48, 117, 330
Kokoszyńska, M. 52
Kolbanovskij, V. N. 144, 169
Kol'man, E. 109
Kolonickij, P. F. 109
Komm, A. 109
Kon, I. S. 85, 109, 340
Kondakov, N. I. 142
Konikov, I. A. 334
Konstantinov, F. V. 269, 340
Konstantinov, P. N. 86
Konstantinov, P. V. 269
Kopnin, P. V. 80, 139, 144, 149, 152 f., 157, 161, 166, 170 f., 223 ff., 230, 238, 290, 297, 341
Kornilov, A. 34, 117
Koršunov, A. M. 89
Kosing, A. 84
Kosminskij, E. A. 183, 260
Košelëv, A. I. 44, 180
Kovács, F. P. 281 f.
Koval'čuk, A. S. 225, 230
Kovalev, A. M. 86
Kovalev, S. I. 109
Koval'zon, M. Ja. 11
Kowalski, J. 26
Koyré, A. A. 36, 49, 118, 180, 200, 244, 248, 251, 259, 264 f., 320
Kozlowski, J. 76
Koz'min, B. P. 40, 123
Kožarinova, R. K. 109
Kremjanskij, V. I. 169, 227 f., 231 f.
Krendel', R. N. 255, 258
Kreschnak, H. 166
Kresky, E. 188, 255
Kröber, G. 84
Kropotkin, P. 182, 192, 201 f.
Krut'lo, N. 26
Kružkov, V. S. 341
Krymskij, S. B. 238
Kryvelev, I. A. 109, 341
Kubatka 329
Kublanov, B. G. 341
Kublanov, M. M. 109
Kudin, V. A. 341
Kukec, G. Ju. 262
Kulikov, I. N. 26
Kun, J. C. 104
Küng, G. 51 ff.
Kupcov, V. J. 89
Kursanov, G. A. 208, 341
Kurylev, A. K. 342
Kuusinen, O. W. 342
Kux, E. 104
Kuzilov, I. I. 198, 276
Kuz'min, V. P. 86
Kuznecov, I. L. 188, 204 ff., 212, 218, 220 f., 255, 259, 325, 342

Labry, R. 268
Ladorenko, V. E. 109
Ladovéri, B. 281, 283, 288
Ladygina-Kots, N. N. 342
Lako, L. 281
Lampert, E. 38 f., 49, 101 f., 123, 190, 194, 198, 255, 260, 264, 327
Landau, L. D. 204
Lapšin, O. V. 227
Laszlo, E. 79, 273 ff., 336f.
Lašina, M. V. 109
Lavreckij, A. 263
Lavrentiev, D. F. 86
Lavrin, J. 43, 126, 175, 199, 252, 330
Lavrov, P. L. 319
Lebedev, M. P. 29
Lebedev-Poljanskij, P. I. 256
Lebedinec, G. M. 109
Lefebre, H. 289
Lektorskij, V. A. 153 ff., 166 f., 172, 228, 232, 331 f.
Lemberg, H. 249
Lenin, V. I. 8, 69, 74 f., 91, 93, 98 f., 101 f., 140 f., 146, 151, 154, 156 f., 162, 164, 168, 197, 205, 211 f., 229, 232, 235, 291, 294, 296, 298, 302 ff., 325
Lensu, M. Ja. 109
Leonov, M. A. 342
Leont'ev, A. N. 343
Leont'ev, K. 38
Lerche, W. 166
Levada, Ju. A. 110
Levin, Š. M. 47, 128, 259
Lexner, E. A. 262
Lextblau, L. 268



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Lieb, F. 43, 118, 179, 200, 244, 246
Lifšic, M. A. 204 f., 343
Ljubimova, A. A. 194, 260
Ljubinskaja, L. N. 86
Lobačevskij, N. I. 219
Lobkowicz, N. 145, 169, 309
Losev, A. F. 343
Losskij, N. O. 99, 118, 327
Lukács, G. 289, 297, 319
Lukaševa, E. A. 26
Lunev, G. K. 110
Luščickij, I. N. 343
Luxembourg, R. 97

Mach, E. 9, 213 f.
Macuev, N. 256
Mačjavičjus, J. A. 344
Madarász, A. 286 ff.
Mayaródi, S. 282, 287 f.
Maichel, K. 103
Maizenberg, A. M. 28
Majackij, F. S. 110
Majat, E. V. 110
Makarov, M. 110
Makarov, A. D. 148, 344
Makovel'skij, A. O. 262, 280, 344
Maksimov, A. A. 204 f., 207, 344
Mal'cev, V. I. 144, 225, 238, 344
Malia, M. E. 48 f., 193 f., 260, 266 f.
Malinin, V. A. 40, 123
Malnick, V. A. 40
Mamardašvili, M. K. 228
Mamedov, Š. F. 344
Mandel'stam, L. I. 220
Maneev, A. K. 238
Man'kovskij, B. S. 27, 344
Man'kovskij, L. A. 226, 231, 345
Mansurov, N. S. 345
Mantalov, V. V. 89
Marcuse, H. 331
Marko, K. 96, 103
Markov, A. A. 345
Markov, M. A. 81, 227, 345
Márkus, G. 82, 287 f.
Marx, K. 14, 29, 69, 74 ff., 91, 101 ff., 164, 197, 289, 296, 299 ff., 309, 314
Masaryk, T. G. 33, 43, 118, 126, 190, 194, 198, 244, 252, 256, 260, 264, 331
Maslin, A. N. 345
Mathewson, R. W. 251
Matveenkov, I. I. 345
Matveeva, I. 318
Maximoff, G. P. 264
Mazour, A. G. 178, 182, 244, 249
McLean, H. 34, 118, 188
McMullin, E. 67
McNally, R. T. 176 ff., 199 f.
Medvedev, N. U. 227, 231
Mehring, F. 97
Meleščenko, Z. N. 345
Merežkovskij, D. S. 257
Merleau-Ponty, M. 289, 331
Mész, L. 284, 288
Mezencev, P. 256
Mihály, A. 284
Miliukov, P. 34, 118, 176
Minasjan, A. M. 346
Minkovskij, H. 219
Mitin, M. B. 229, 272, 334, 346
Mitroxin, L. N. 110
Mixaijlova, L. B. 89
Mixnevič, D. E. 110
Molčanov, Ju. B. 110
Molodcov, V. S. 88, 346
Momdžjan, X. N. 110, 346
Mordinov, A. E. 346
Mordovčenko, N. 256
Morozov, K. E. 110
Moskalenko, F. J. 347
Moskoff, E. 244
Mostepanenko, M. V. 204, 212, 221
Motrogilova, N. 110
Mšvenieradze, V. V. 51, 55 f., 80, 347
Müller, A. 280
Müller, R. 266
Müller-Markus, S. 204, 224
Muminov, I. M. 347
Munzer 327, 329

Naan, G. I. 347
Načkedija, Ja. E. 198, 276
Nagel, E. 56
Natorp, P. 10
Narskij, I. S. 51, 152, 228, 232, 290 ff., 295, 298, 325, 347
Naumenko, L. N. 86, 230, 237
Naville P. 289
Nazarenko, I. D. 347



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Nečaeva, V. S. 256
Nečkina, M. V. 38, 119, 182, 249, 256
Nedbajlo, P. E. 27
Niemeyer, G. 235
Nikitin, E. N. 90
Nikitin, P. I. 238
Nikolaev, V. V. 26 ff.
Novik, I. B. 110, 214, 216 ff., 222, 227 f., 231 f.
Novikov, P. S. 54

Odoevskij, V. F. 43, 179 f.
Ogarëv, V. F. 38, 40, 173 f., 179 f., 195 ff., 203, 261
Ogryzko, I. I. 111
Ojzerman, T. I. 149, 170, 198 f., 238, 276
Oksman, Ju. G. 188, 256
Okun, S. B. 40, 123
Omel'janovskij, M. E. 269, 279
Oruženikova, S. V. 238
Osipov, B. S. 113
Ovčinnikov, N. F. 204, 219 f., 228, 232
Ovsjaniko-Kulikovskij, D. N. 33, 119
Ovsjannikov, M. F. 269

Panjušev, I. M. 314
Pantin, I. 111
Partolin, M. N. 26
Passage, C. E. 266
Pásztor, L. 281
Paško, N. A. 111
Patrzalek, A. 28
Pavlov, T. 305, 310
Pečerin, V. S. 38
Pekelis, V. 111
Perederij, V. P. 223 f.
Perlo, V. 235
Perovic, M. 29
Pestel', P. I. 248
Petrenko, R. F. 111
Petrov, A. Z. 204, 220
Petrov, G. I. 27
Petrov, V. S. 27
Petrovic, G. 280
Philipov, A. 139
Piaget, J. 156
Pičeta, V. I. 47, 128
Pigarev, K. 250
Pigolkin, A. S. 27
Pintér, F. 280
Piper, L. 128, 260
Pirityi, O. 281
Pirumova, N. 194, 260
Pisarev, D. I. 35, 101, 189
Pismanik, M. G. 111
Pjaskovskij, B. 111
Plato 10, 60, 319, 328 f.
Plexanov, G. 44, 46, 165, 328, 334
Pogodin, M. P. 35, 126
Pokrovskij, M. N. 46, 119, 128
Pokrovskij, S. A. 38
Polikarov, A. P. 305 f., 308, 310
Poljakov, M. Ja. 188, 256
Poljakova, L. P. 111
Ponomarev, Ja. A. 226, 231
Popov, A. 20
Popper, K. 331
Potkorytov, G. A. 238
Pozner, A. R. 89
Proxorenko 228
Pushkarev, S. G. 119
Pushkin, A. S. 255
Putincev, V. A. 196, 260, 262
Puxlikov, V. K. 111
Pyziur, E. 197, 264

Quenet, C. 178, 245

Radiščev 329
Radkey, O. H. 35
Raeff, M. 183, 252
Rajkin, A. N. 227, 231
Rakitov, A. I. 229
Rapp, F. 68 ff., 335
Razin, V. I. 27
Reap, D. 331
Reavey, G. 120
Redlow, G. 84, 307, 310
Reeve, H. S. 124
Révész, L. 28 ff.
Revzin, I. I. 228, 232
Reznikov, L. O. 228, 232
Riasanovskij, N. V. 34 f., 39 f., 43, 46, 49 f., 120, 124, 126, 180, 199 ff., 246, 268 f., 330
Riemann, B. 207 f., 213
Riklin, A. 104
Rižkij, M. I. 111



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Rjazancev, N. I. 111
Rjazanovskij, V. A. 34, 120
Rogov, I. M. 111
Roška, G. D. 238
Rozental', M. M. 111, 144, 152 f., 157, 169 ff., 225, 228, 230 f., 238
Rozin, V. P. 144, 150, 170 ff., 226, 231
Rožnov, V. E. 111
Rožnova, M. A. 111
Rózsahegyi, T. 283, 287 f.
Rubinštejn, N. 33, 46, 50, 128
Rubinštejn, S. L. 155, 158, 170
Ruffman, K. H. 96
Rumer, Ju. B. 226, 231
Rusin, V. I. 250
Russell, B. 285
Rutkevič, M. N. 147, 149, 164 f., 172, 323
Ruzavin, G. I. 229
Ryleev, K. F. 256
Ryvkin, M. S. 226, 231

Sadovskij, V. N. 228, 232
Safroškin, V. G. 194, 268
Sakulin, P. N. 179 f., 200
Sal'nikov, Ju. F. 111
Samarin, Ju. F. 41, 44, 46, 111
Samoščenko, N. S. 27
Sartre, J.-P. 289 ff., 297, 331
Sazonov, Ju. V. 238
Schaff, A. 54, 76 ff., 86, 289, 295 f.
Scheibert, P. 176, 178, 196, 245, 251, 258, 264, 266 f., 326
Schelling, A. 57, 184 ff., 198, 319
Schelting, A. v. 124, 178, 253
Schiebel, J. 75
Schlick, M. 53
Schultze, B. 50, 120, 127, 245, 258, 327, 329
Schulz, R. 84
Schumann, H. 28
Schwarz, S. M. 35
Schwarz-Sochor, J. 258
Selektor, M. Z. 4
Semenov, V. M. 29
Senin, Ju. 112
Serebrjakov, M. V. 347
Serno-Solov'evič, A. A. 319
Serno-Solov'evič, N. A. 319
Setchkareff, W. 276
Shaffer, H. G. 235
Shapiro, D. 31, 33, 41, 48, 115
Sidorov, D. I. 112
Sidorov, M. M. 90
Simmons, E. J. 34 f., 120, 326, 330
Simonovits, I. 330
Sipos, J. 283, 287 f.
Sitkovskij, E. P. 238
Skvorcov-Stepanov, I. I. 312
Slavina, M. 86
Sluckij, I. I. 28
Smirnov, I. I. 86
Smirnov, N. A. 112
Smirnov, V. A. 46, 152, 229
Smirnova, Z. V. 185 f., 265, 270
Sokolov, A. 222
Sokolov, V. V. 333 ff.
Soloduxin, Ju. N.
Solov'ëv, V. 35, 37, 174, 328 f.
Sommerville, J. 80, 327, 331
Somogyi, Z. 284
Somosköi, J. 284
Sós, V. 283
Spinoza, B. 333 ff.
Spirkin, A. G. 146, 155, 157 f., 169 ff., 226, 231
Stadkevič, N. K. 47 f., 128
Stalin, J. 18, 27, 81, 141, 235, 314 f.
Stankevič, N. V. 40, 173, 180 f., 197, 258
Steenbeck, M. 84
Stegmüller, W. 52
Stepanjanc, M. T. 112
Stepanov, I. M. 29
Stepanov, V. I. 188, 265
Stepanova, A. 112
Stepin, I. 112
Stirner, M. 74
Stoljarov, V. 84, 160, 171
Strumlin, S. G. 112
Struve, G. 173, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187 f., 199 ff., 246, 248, 250, 257, 329
Struve, P. 127
Stupperich, R. 98
Subbotin, A. L. 229
Suslov, P. A. 194, 260, 323
Suvorov, L. N. 318
Suxov, A. D. 112
Sviderskij, V. I. 204, 208, 219, 221 f., 228
Sweezy, P. M. 235



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Syvoečkorskij, B. E. 257 f.
Szabó, G. 280
Szabó, A. G. 284, 288
Székely, S. 281, 288
Szénasi, J. 279
Szigetvári, S. 285, 288

Šapovalov, N. I. 87
Šargorodskij, M. D. 26, 28
Šaxnovič, M. I. 106, 112
Šaxovskoj, D. 245
Ščedrovskij, G. P. 228, 232
Ščerbatov 329
Ščerbina, V. R. 265
Ščipanov, I. Ja. 38, 120, 186, 250, 257, 259 f., 262, 330
Šejnman, M. M. 112
Šelgunov, N. V. 319
Šeptulin, A. P. 160, 171, 231, 238
Šern-Borisova, I. S. 112
Ševyrëv 35, 45
Šilincev, N. 112
Šinkaruk, V. I. 157, 171, 238
Širokov, M. F. 211, 221
Šiškov, V. 112
Škurinov, P. S. 176, 253
Štejn, V. M. 120
Štejnman, Ja. P. 204
Štoff, V. A. 228, 232
Štraks, G. M. 4
Šubina, G. P. 90

Tarakonov, N. G. 271, 330
Tarašenko, F. P. 227, 231
Tarski, A. 51 ff.
Tavanec, P. V. 52 f., 55 f., 153, 226, 229, 232
Terjaev, G. V. 194, 261
Thaden, E. C. 127
Thomas, R. 299, 324
Timirjazev, A. K. 312
Tixomirov, O. K. 155, 170
Tjuxtin, V. S. 146, 169, 227, 231
Tokarev, S. A. 112
Tordai, Z. 82
Trofimov, N. A. 27
Trubnikov, N. N. 172
Tučkova-Ogarëva, N. A. 261, 263
Tugarinov, V. P. 11, 226, 231, 298, 306 f., 310
Tuluzakov, A. A. 112
Turgenev, I. S. 45, 259
Tymanskij, G. S. 312
Tynmanov, Ju. 179, 246
Txorževskij, I. 265

Uëmov, A. I. 205, 208, 214 ff., 221 f., 226, 229, 231
Ugrinovič, D. M. 112
Ukraincev, B. S. 225, 227, 230 f.
Utechin, S. V. 35, 115, 121, 183, 192, 194 f., 201 f., 252, 263
Utevskij, B. S. 232
Uvakov 307
Uzkov, I. N. 110

Vajčuk, V. A. 27
Val't, L. O. 228, 232
Varjaš, A. N. 312
Vaseckij, G. S. 38, 40, 50, 121, 124, 182, 251, 258
Vekker, L. M. 227, 231
Velikovič, L. N. 112 f., 321
Venčkovskij, L. E. 113
Venevitinov, D. V. 45, 179 ff., 189, 247
Venturi, F. 261, 264, 268, 327, 331
Veščikov, A. T. 107
Vészi, B. 284
Vetrov, A. A. 229
Vetrov, V. V. 54 ff.
Vilenskaja, E. S. 269
Vinogradov, V. G. 89
Vjazenskij, P. A. 179 ff., 247
Vojtko, V. I. 113
Volczer, A. 283
Volosova, V. P. 194, 261
Vorob'ev, M. F. 146, 169
Vostokov, B. I. 55
Vygotskij, L. S. 155
Vyrev, V. S. 229
Vyšeslavcev, B. P. 121

Wädekin, K. E. 96
Weber, J. 215, 221
Weidlé, V. V. 34, 121
Wetter, G. A. 139, 147, 168, 223, 312 ff., 325, 329 ff.



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Weyl, H. 213
Wheeler, J. 215
Whitehead, A. N. 58 ff., 102, 214
Wild, J. 290, 297
Wittich, D. 157, 166
Wytrzens, G. 181, 256

Xaraxorkin, L. R. 199, 267
Xar'cev, A. G. 87, 269
Xomjakov, A. S. 35, 37, 39, 41 ff., 124, 126 f., 187

Zajcev, G. N. 113
Zalesskaja, L. I. 258
Zaxarov, F. I. 87
Zenkovsky, V. V. 36, 43, 46, 49, 121, 127, 179 f., 183, 190, 194, 197 f., 200 ff., 245 ff., 251 f., 266, 327, 329, 331
Zernov, N. 43, 127
Zetlin, M. 182, 250
Zil'berfarb, I. I. 268
Zinov'ev, A. A. 153, 228 f., 231 ff.
Zozulja, A. M. 87
Zybovec, V. F. 113

Žaba, S. P. 122, 127
Ždanov, A. A. 4, 81, 311 f.
Ždanov, D. A. 239
Ždanov, G. B. 228, 232
Žukov, A. I. 204, 212
Žukov, N. I. 227, 231



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

# INDEX OF SUBJECTS


Absolute, the 219 f.
abstracting 229
abstraction 54, 70
acceleration 205 f., 209
aesthetics 270
alienation 76 ff., 275, 278, 284, 290, 334
analogy 229
analysis, philosophical 69
anarchism 196 f., 273 f.
anti-Communism 73 f., 291
art 320
atheism 106 ff., 234, 334

Base and superstructure 13, 76
'basic dogma' 1
basic problem 5 ff.
basic question of philosophy 146, 148, 165 f., 300, 325
being 63, 301, 336; social being 275, 283; being and becoming 60 f.
Berlin 92
bibliography 31 ff., 96
biology 57 f., 228, 234, 269, 275, 278, 320
Blakeleyanism 320
bureaucracy 78

Capitalism 76 f.
categories 59, 90, 92, 152, 161, 226, 237
causality 61 f.
cause and effect 217
centralism 16
certainty, sensual 16
chance 72, 89, 334
change, epistemological problems of 279
chemistry 277 f., 282
class 4, 12, 78
classics 299
cognition 276, 278, 282, 284 f.
collective 21
collectivism 336 f.
Communism, construction of 224 f., 320
Communist morality 18
complementarity 89
concept 90, 277
concrete universal 156
consciousness 89 f., 144 ff., 165 f., 226, 305; social consciousness 273, 281, 318; social and individual 154 f., 157 f.
content and form 216 ff.
contradiction 275
correspondence 162 f.
cosmology 233
creativity 62 f.
criticism 287, 291, 313, 315 ff.
critique 73 f.
cybernetics 227, 276 ff., 281, 321

Darwinism 276
death 295 ff.
Deborinists 312
Decembrists 173, 177, 181 ff., 256 ff.
de-Khrushchevization 81 f.
de-Stalinization 81
determination 89, 334; social 278
determinism 71, 277, 282; social 275, 283
development 71; socialist 320
dialectic 18, 59 f., 94, 140 ff., 146, 149 f., 154, 161, 163, 165
dialectics 88, 91, 225 f.
dialectical materialism 68 f., 71 f., 88 ff., 93, 141, 149 f., 275, 278 f., 286, 318, 333 ff.
dialectical monism 166
dictatorship of proletariat 276, 278, 284
dictionary 92
distortion 223
doctrine 1, 3
dogmatism 331 f.
dualism 306

Emotionalism 4
epistemological realism 7 f.
epistemology 139, 145, 149, 166, 224, 226, 325, 336
energy 213
equivalence 210, 212
ethics 290
evolution 57 f., 66, 139
evolutionism 163
existentialism 289 ff.
experience 70; social 167, 278, 283
explanation 90




This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Falsification 73, 223 f., 326, 329 f.
finality 64
flexibility 98 ff.
Führungsfeld 214

General, the 277, 285
genetics 234
Germany, East 84
God 9
gravitation 205 ff., 210, 213, 215, 233; theory 269
gravitational field 207 ff., 215 ff.
gravitons 215

Hieroglyphs 229
historical 159, 167
historical materialism 278, 283, 318
historicism 157
historiography 141; of philosophy 311, 313
history 275; of philosophy 2, 160, 327, 333; Russian 30 ff., 173 ff.
humanism 102
Hungary 82, 273 ff.

Ideal being 68 f., 71
idealism 6, 8 f., 53 f., 69, 82, 326
*Idee* 140, 146 f.
ideology 1, 31, 333
imagination 89
individual 155
individualism 4, 339 f.
inertia, Law of 218
inertial field 211
intuition 58
inference 277, 286
information 89 f., 227
'inner laws' 69 ff.
interaction 217, 219
invariance, the 220

Judgement 277, 286

Knowledge 150, 152, 165; forms of 149; history of 160; process of 154, 157, 161, 165 f.; subject of 154, 156, 164; theory of 93, 140 ff., 148 ff., 154, 157 f., 225, 276

Labour 79, 320
language 51, 53 f., 56, 90, 158
law 12 f., 64; and morality 15 f.
laws, social 275, 283
length 206
*Ljubomudry* 178 ff., 253
localization 214
logic 51, 79, 88, 150 f., 277; dialectical 139 ff., 225 f., 237, 277 f.; formal 51, 141 ff., 151 f., 225 f., 277 f., 284 f., 321; mathematical 51
logical, the 159

Man 294 ff., 320
Manifesto 14
Marxism-Leninism 273 ff., 294 f., 326 f.
mass, 206 220; distant 214
mathematics 278, 281, 320
materialism 6, 8 f., 82, 299 f.,; and idealism 66
matter 62 f., 66, 140, 144 ff., 151, 165 f., 205, 212 f., 215 ff., 302 f., 325; and motion 276, 280
meaning 53
mechanists 312
metaphysics 58 f., 69
methodology 271; of science 88, 93, 224
metric 210
misunderstandings 314 ff.
models 89, 224, 228
monism 213; dialectical 139 f., 140, 145, 147, 149
moral norms 15
motion 217, 301; laws of 213
mysticism 64

Necessity 89 f.
negation of negation 139, 146, 148
norms, social and moral 12 f., 22 f.

Objectification 76
objective 302
objectivism 207
objectivity 206
observation 224
ontology 8, 68, 141, 143, 145, 149, 299, 325

Particles, trajectory of 208
particular 277, 285



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

*partijnost'* 1 ff., 11, 19, 73, 75, 234, 312
Party 20
people 15
periodization 81, 311
person 228
philosopher 1 ff.
philosophy 58 f.
physics 224, 270, 278, 320; quantum 280
planification 273
positivism 52, 55
possibility 70 ff.; and reality 61
potency 146
probability 229
problematicism 3 ff.
problems, philosophical 3 ff.
process 60 f.
progress, scientific 279
production 313 f.
proof 277, 285
properties 306
proposition 53, 56
psychology 93, 155, 278
punishment 21 f.
purpose 275, 283
practice 12, 90 93, 144, 148, 163 ff.
private property 77

Quality 226
quantity and quality 275, 285
quantum theory 89
quotatology 322

Rationalization 317
real being 70 f.
realism 88, 149, 320, 325 f.
reality 70
reflection 89, 93, 146, 159, 162 f., 227; theory 205
regularity 64
relationalism 163
relations 139, 306; of reason 149
relativity 321; theory of 89, 204 ff.
religion 65, 102
research 271
revisionism 76, 337
revolution, socialist 276, 278, 284
Riemannian metric 207, 210 f.
Russia 30 ff., 173 ff.

Science 88; logic of 229; natural 269, 276 f., 279, 320; philosophical problems of 279
semantics 51 f., 54 ff.
semiotics 228 f.
sensation 144
sensory image 276, 285
sentences 62 ff., 56
sign 53
simultaneity 206
singular 277, 285
Slavophils 33, 35, 37, 40 ff., 124 ff., 173, 175
social 167; development 225
social science 269, 321 f.
socialism 76 ff.
society 155, 283; socialist 275 f., 320
sociologism 4
sociology 322
space 214 f., 217; and time 204 f., 207 f., 210 ff., 215 ff., 276, 280, 282
Soviet philosophy 314, 324
Sovietology 73
*sovpadenie* 143 f., 152 f.
Spinozism 333 ff.
state 77 f.; socialist 14
statistical laws 89
structure, concept of 219
substance 145
subjective and objective 99
symbolism 229
syntax 54
systems 228

Technology 278
terminology, philosophical 95
theory 12
thinking 152; forms of 150
thought 285 f.; and being 300; laws of 277; Russian 30 ff., 173 ff.
translations 318
truth 51 ff., 93, 162 ff., 168, 229; absolute 162 f.; criterion of 164; relative 162 f.

Unity, of being and thought 140, 147; of logical and historical 159; of world 212, 217, 276, 279
universality 156



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Vatican Council 321
verification 51 f.

Whole, the 90
work 276, 284
world, the real 68 f.

Westernizers 37, 176, 183 ff., 259 ff.

Ždanov speech 312

XXI Congress 16
XXII Congress 14



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## VOLUME V (1965)

### ARTICLES


BALLESTREM, K. G.: Dialectical Logic 139–172
BOCHEŃSKI, J. M.: On *Partijnost'* in Philosophy 1–11
DE GEORGE, R. T.: Heidegger and the Marxists 289–298
HÖLLING, J.: Die Metaphysik Whiteheads im Urteil der Sowjetphilosophie 57–67
KEMBALL, R. J.: Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought. I 30–50
— : Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Russian Thought. II 173–203
KÜNG, G.: Soviet Philosophy and the Semantic Definition of Truth 51–56
LASZLO, E.: The Planification of Hungarian Marxism-Leninism 273–288
MÜLLER-MARKUS, S.: Soviet Discussion on General Relativity Theory 204–222
RAPP, F.: Dialectical Materialism Versus N. Hartmann's Ontology 68–72
RÉVÉSZ, L.: Recht und Sozialnorm 12–29
THOMAS, R.: Bemerkungen zur Materialismusproblem 299–310


### REVIEWS


BALLESTREM, K. G.: T. J. Blakeley: *Soviet Theory of Knowledge* 93
— : H. Dahm: *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie* 94
— : E. Ja. Basin: 'Opredelenie ponjatija "materija" v dialektičeskom materializme i ego buržuaznye "kritiki"', in *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* 325–326
BEEMANS, P. J.: H. G. Shaffer (ed.): *The Soviet System in Theory and Practice* 235–236




This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

BEEMANS, P. J.: V. A. Lektorskij: 'Materialističeskaja dialektika i eë buržuaznye "kritiki", in *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* 331–332
BLAKELEY, T. J.: E. Laszlo: *Individualism, Collectivism, and Political Power* 336–337
BOCHEŃSKI, J. M.: E. Lampert: *Sons Against Fathers* 101–102
— : K. Marko: *Sowjethistoriker zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft* 103
— : Karl Marx: *A World Without Jews* 103
— : K. Maichel: *Guide to Russian Reference Books. II* 103–104
— : A. Riklin: *Das Berlinproblem* 104
— : G. H. Hampsch: *The Theory of Communism. An Introduction* 104
— : E. Kux, J. C. Kun: *Die Satelliten Pekings* 104–105
— : *Etudes et documents sur la Première Internationale en Suisse* 105
BOESELAGER, W. F.: W. Goerdt: *Die "allseitige universale Wendigkeit" (gibkost') in der Dialektik V. I. Lenins* 98–100
HEIDENREICH, A.: K. G. Ballestrem: *Russian Philosophical Terminology* 95
— : A. K. Demidova, V. I. Krasnyx: *Kniga dlja čtenija po marksistskoj filosofii* 338
KEMBALL, R. J.: V. A. Malinin: 'Naučnaja istorija russkoj filosofii i spekuljacii buržuaznyx filosofov', in *Protiv sovremennyx buržuaznyx fal'sifikatorov marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* 326–331
KIRSCHENMANN, P.: *Philosophisches Wörterbuch* 92
RAPP, F.: *Metodologičeskie problemy sovremennoj nauki* 88–91
— : V. V. Sokolov: *Filosofija Spinozy i sovremennost'* 333–335
THOMAS, R.: *Kommunismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 96

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BALLESTREM, K. G.: Soviet Dialectical Logic 237–239
BLAKELEY, T. J.: Soviet Writings on Atheism and Religion 106–113
KEMBALL, R. J.: Selected Writings on Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth Century Russian Thought. I 114–128
— : Selected Writings on Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth Century Russian Thought. II 240–268



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHY

BEEMANS, P. J.: Biographical Data on Soviet Philosophers. II 339–348

Chronology 1964 277–278



This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Mon, 08 Aug 2016 08:46:15 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms